

Unite or Perish

Africa Fifty Years after the Founding of the OAU

*Edited by Mammo Muchie, Vusi Gumede,
Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju and Hailemichael Teshome Demissie*



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Unite or Perish: Africa Fifty Years after the Founding of the OAU

First published in 2014 by the
Africa Institute of South Africa
Private Bag X41
Pretoria
South Africa, 0001
ISBN: 978-0-7983-0483-2

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Project Manager: Kate Speirs
Copy Editing: Write Skills
Proofreading: Bangula Language Centre CC
Design and Layout: Dudu Coelho
Cover Design: Berekile Pila Projects
Printing: BusinessPrint

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Preface

*Mammo Muchie, Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju
and Hailemichael Teshome Demissie*

This book is the outcome of the third conference in the series of ‘Scramble for Africa’ conferences that was convened to reflect on the unwelcome legacies of the infamous Berlin Conference 125 years ago. Several partners, led by the Africa Institute of South Africa, pooled resources to bring together Africans and friends of Africa from all corners of the globe to deliberate in depth where Africa has been, where it is now and where it is heading. Africa still retains the boundaries drawn up by former colonial powers and the divisions that were inscribed in the geography are scars besmirching the African personality that remains entangled with the coloniality syndrome that is holding Africans back from realizing their potential.

The time has come for Africa to revive the powerful vision articulated by Kwame Nkrumah that ‘Africa Must Unite or Perish’. It is now over 50 years since the Organisation of African Unity was formed and over 10 years since the Africa Union was founded. It is also over 50 years since the untimely departure of Franz Fanon and Patrice Lumumba. The genuine liberation of Africa can be complete only with full independence of the whole of Africa, not with the pretentious independence and fragmented sovereignty of its parts. Unity and the combined independence of all of Africa will make Africa emerge as its own leader, turning Africa into what it should be – a whole greater than the sum of its parts. Only then will Africa be able to stand up to those powers dictating its future. This reality can emerge only when the artificial divisions that others cynically plotted across the breadth and depth of Africa are erased for good and all the current states become provinces of a strong, independent, free and proud Africa.

The main imperative for Africa to emerge as its own leader in this century is for Africans to be totally open and free to ‘unlearning’ division and re-learning unity and to ‘unthinking’ division and re-thinking unity. It is with this purpose that we promote and sustain the debate in this series of conferences. As part of the unlearning process, we have now changed the name of the conference from ‘Scramble for Africa’ into the ‘African Unity for Renaissance’ education conference. We believe that every May, the ‘Unity for Renaissance’ conference will serve as the bell-ringer to stimulate ideas, values and principles of integration, in order to guide us through the trying

times ahead and ensure we come together faster in our pursuit of a fully decolonised and united Africa.

Africa has values that will not only save her, but also the rest of the world. In recent times we have seen in South Africa an extraordinary move by which an African country was turned into a 'rainbow nation', concluding the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle with reconciliation and peace. There is hardly any reason why the South African model cannot be used to solve all the problems in Africa and to put out the conflict flare-ups in Mali, Libya, the Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic and other parts of Africa. At the core of the practical expression of conflict resolution in South Africa are the deep foundational African values of Ubuntu, Ma'at, Ethiopianism philosophy, pan-Africanism and the concept of African Renaissance. Together, these values provide a roadmap for Africans to come together in building a future that will not only liberate Africa, but also provide moral redemption to those who oppressed Africa for far too long and who are bent on re-instating colonial regimes by other means. Africans should resist this with an antidote of re-inheriting the imagination of creating a humane, sharing and caring world, where mutual benefit in place of self-centredness becomes the guiding principle of political, economic, social and cultural life for all in the whole world.

South Africa has yet to use its paradigm of peace and reconciliation to solve the poverty, inequality and the unemployment that is still grinding the country. There remains a real risk of losing this spiritual radiance, power and example that South Africa attained from the peaceful and negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy and from the previous pro-capitalist and pro-western and anti-African foreign policy, to the African Renaissance and Ubuntu Global Diplomacy. South Africa should continue to play its role as the provider of the spiritual radiance and exemplary leadership to solve intricate political problems by extending its role to all problems and difficulties that Africa and the rest of the world are still lumbered with.

South Africa should continue to derive strong inspirational energy from its history of successfully overcoming one of the most difficult conflicts on earth without continuing to use the paradigm of war. The question now is whether it will be able to deploy this energy in the struggle against poverty, inequality and unemployment by creating sustainable well-being for all its citizens. All eyes are on South Africa and on how it fares in using its success to create more successes by eradicating the triple malaise of poverty, inequality and unemployment. Any drawdown from this extraordinary historical achievement will be a huge blow to African pride and self-worth for the rest of Africa and indeed the whole of humanity.

Since the series of conferences started in 2010, each conference concluded with a declaration by the delegates and the proceedings were published

in an edited volume. Thus far, three books, including this book, were produced, as well as three declarations were passed. We have now Tshwane Declaration I, II and III – named after the city that hosted the conference, the City of Tshwane, the successor to Pretoria. The Third Tshwane Declaration is published in this book (see Appendix for the Third Tshwane Declaration). The first book came out with the title *The Africana World: From Fragmentation to Unity and Renaissance* (AISA Publishers, 2011). The Second book is titled *The African Union Ten Years After: Solving African Problems with Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance* – also published by AISA Publishers in 2013. The third conference has produced the present book that is entitled *Unite or Perish: Africa Fifty Years after the OAU*.

We hope to continue producing more books to help spread education to dis-inherit the prevailing colonial imagination and re-inherit a liberated African imagination in the pursuit of creating a steadfast and robust African identity. The need to continue spreading the ‘African Unity for Renaissance’ message cannot be emphasised enough: it needs to be stressed again that ‘efforts to free and unite Africa should integrate the idea of the African with the idea of making the Africa-nation – both with Pan-Africanism and with the African Renaissance. Only then can the problem of comprehensive structural transformation of the continent be seriously undertaken’.¹ There is no alternative but for Africa to unite, become renascent and stand up tall!

It is with this spirit that the very organisation of the series of conferences was based on. The conferences present an instance where Africa’s quest for independence was addressed: the conferences were results of collaboration among 18 different organisations that provided the resources without relying on any donor money to run over four years, including the last conference held in May 2014. This no doubt brings out sharply the commitment and the best thinking from South African institutions to support the best for Africa.

The authors together promote how Africa can end the divide-and-rule legacy of the Berlin Scramble for Africa Conference and the negative consequences of slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism and bring forward the unification of Africa to transform Africa’s economy, society, politics and science and technology by moving along an irreversible trajectory. The contributors deserve appreciation for exploring varied questions and coming up with results which enrich understanding and policy learning.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AACPC	African Committee for Political Co-ordination
AAPRP	All-African People's Revolutionary Party
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and People's Rights
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADF	Alliance of Democratic Forces
ADP	Area Development Programme
AEC	African Economic Community
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFDL	Democratic Alliance for the Liberation of the Congo
AfrCHPR	African Court on Human and People's Rights
AISA	Africa Institute of South Africa
ALD	African Liberation Day
ALSC	African Liberation support committees
AMISOM	Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers to Somalia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AR	African Renaissance
ARDP	Agency for Reconciliation and Development
AU	African Union
AUC	AU Commission
AYC	African Youth Charter
BEAM	Basic Education Assistance Module
BOSS	Bureau for State Security
BOT	Build, Operate and Transfer
CABE	Canadian Alliance of Black Educators
CARICOM	The Caribbean Community
CARIFORUM	Caribbean Forum
CC	Categorical Conversion
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States

COMESA	Common Market for East and Southern Africa
CNDD	National Council for the Defence of Democracy
CNDD-FDD	Forces for the Defence of Democracy – FDD
CPA	Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CPAN	Caribbean Pan-African Network
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EAMA	European Common Market and the Associated African and Malgache Countries
EBA	Everything but arms
ECA	Economic Community for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEA	Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs
EFA	Education For All
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
ESA	Eastern and Southern Africa
ESC	Emancipation Support Committee
F&D	Finance and Development
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FNL	National Forces of Liberation
FTA	free trade agreement
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GER	General Education Requirement
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICGLR	International Conference on Peace, Security and Democracy in the Great Lakes Region
ICT	information and communication technology
IDF	Institutional Development Fund
IECD	Institute for Education and Career Development
IEPA	Interim Economic Partnership Agreement

IFIs	International financial institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KDT	Kuru Development Trust
LDCs	Least developed countries
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LSE	London School of Economics
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the South
MFN	most favoured nation
MIDA	Migration for Development in Africa
MNR	Mozambican National Resistance
MoE	Ministry of Education
MOPPA	Ministry of Presidential and Public Affairs
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MWB	Migration Without Borders
NAMAS	Namibia Association of Norway
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	non-governmental organisations
NIDO	Nigeria in Diaspora Overseas
NMLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
NPCA	NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency
NUR	National University of Rwanda
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PASEN	Pan-African Solidarity Education Network
PATI	Pan-African Technology Institute
PAU	Pan-African University
PIDE	Portuguese security police
PRSPS	Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RTFR	Returning Talent Fund and Resources
S&DT	special and differential treatment
SACU	Southern African Customs Union

SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SAFs	Security Force Auxiliaries
SANNC	South African Native National Congress
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
SMME	Small, Medium and Micro-Enterprise
SRDC	Sixth Region Diaspora Caucus
TDCA	Trade and Development Co-operation Agreement
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TFTA	Tri-partite Free Trade Area
TNI	Trans-National Insurgence
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIA	Universal Negro Improvement Association
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPE	Universal Primary Education
US	United States
WHADN	Western Hemisphere African Diaspora Network
WIR	West India Regiments
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front
WTO	World Trade Organization

Is it Still 'Unite or Perish' Time for Africa?

Mammo Muchie and Vusi Gumede

Hide nothing from the masses of the people. Tell no lies. Expose lies whenever they are told. Mask no difficulties, mistakes, failures. Claim no easy victories.

Amilcar Cabral, 1965¹

Kwame Nkrumah, addressing the sitting that founded the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963, made an important statement:

[Africa] must unite or perish ...The struggle against colonialism does not end with the attainment of national independence ... We are fast learning that political independence is not enough to rid us of the consequences of colonial rule. Without necessarily sacrificing our sovereignties, we can forge a political union based on defence, foreign affairs and diplomacy and a common citizenship, a monetary zone and a central bank. We must unite in order to achieve the full liberation of our continent.²

African unity is not a new challenge. It has, arguably, become more pronounced recently. The fundamental question remains as to why African unity, paramount as the lifeblood for the future of our continent, continues to evade us. 1963 saw the founding of the OAU, bringing together the Casa-blanca, Brazzaville and Monrovia groups. *Unite or perish* was addressed by the formation of the OAU, by achieving the formal end of colonialism.

2002 saw the transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU), aiming to further strengthen African unity and cement the resolution towards realising *African solutions to African problems*.

The Jubilee year of 2013 was declared as the 'Year of pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance' by the AU. Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance remain the guiding principles, paradigms and agendas – as chapters in this volume show – for Africa's renewal and for the further advancement of Africa's development. The declaration of 2013 as the year of pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance could only mean that all efforts should be mobilised, going forward, to open the unprecedented and extraordinary education to remove once and forever the unity and dignity deficit by finding the reliable road-map for a shared value system for all Africans to learn

and prioritise 'African-ness' first before expressing anything else in order to deal with and respond to the many internal and external challenges that continue to undermine the creation of Africa's bright future by implementing pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance.

Agenda 2063 is expected to realise the full unity of Africa. What is very promising is that the unity agenda has not been abandoned. It has been kept alive. But the warning by Nkrumah in 1963, that Africa should unite or perish, is still relevant today. Failure to unite has severe consequences for Africa. How to realise real unity – to be it and do it and not just say it – is critically important.

The recent 8th Pan-African Congress has also tried to contribute to African unity. People of African descent came together in January 2014, congregating in Johannesburg, to tackle issues that affect them and their continent. People came from all parts of the world.³

The African states have been meeting and trying to form substantive unity for over five decades. Those who have not had state power have kept organising the pan-African Congresses since 1900, though not as regularly and as often as needed. It would seem, however, that there is no structure or approach to involve the people systematically to engage Africans the world over to own and guide themselves with pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance. It is in this context that the mobilisation of all Africans is critical for the further renewal of the African continent. The mobilisation that is essential should be pursued, being interlinked, at the very least, to raising the critical consciousness of all Africans, with the aim of ensuring that all Africans support the unity and change that the African continent needs.

There is also the challenge of whether or not to use geography – the continent of Africa – as the place to bring it together. Does the Sahara unite or divide Africa? This issue is on the agenda, as the northern part of Africa has population groups that also live in the Middle East. But there are also people of African descent who live in Europe, Asia and other parts of the world. It can be argued that rather than seeing the unity being designed geographically, an ideal approach could be to focus on uniting values, principles and policies that unify African traditions with modernity, economics with politics, the state with the market, the African histories of glory and suffering that bind all to have similarity by retaining differences and diversity to move Africa together, to come out of donorism to enter into sustainable self-reliance, from resources to knowledge, from fragmentation to integration and from dependence to independence. Africa could explore and revive its rich philosophies to create a strong innovation and development system that could integrate all aspects of economic and social lives.

What is troubling is still the continuing failure in education that puts at the forefront the urgency of why Africans must unite and the ways of

making this unity practical. What is needed is to get the people, the youth and women in particular, the diaspora and all Africans wherever they are, to be involved and to undertake the necessary mobilisation towards making African unity a reality. Unity is to be brought about by the people, and the leaders of Africa have to respond by enhancing and promoting the best possible communication, interaction and networking of people by building trust and awareness across Africa. The AU should be part and parcel of this process of mobilisation, where efforts are made to ensure unity and to ascertain that the states and the peoples of Africa share values and principles, to take responsibility and by encouraging citizens to take direct responsibility in spreading education to raise awareness on pan-African unity for realising the African Renaissance sooner than later. The year 2063 as the deadline for African unity is set too far in the future. Trust between people and governments, between the governed and the governors, should be nurtured. A natural unity of peoples, states and communities is critical to ensure that Africa charts a historical path of complete liberation, well-being and justice for all.

The charter founding the OAU was signed by 32 heads of states and governments on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, with the objective of promoting the unity and solidarity of African states. To its credit, all the OAU's struggles as a pan-African entity have helped to bring to an end formal colonialism and apartheid. The AU was meant to bring about both pan-African unity and the African Renaissance by uniting Africa and democratising its institutions and governance by allowing human rights, the rule of law and accountable and transparent governments to be rooted in African values, norms and institutions. Nowadays, with the situation in Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, Nigeria and other parts of Africa, it would seem that the AU still has to address the problems that the OAU was meant to have solved – essentially, what is needed is African solutions to Africa's problems. African Heads of States have accepted the Constitutive Act that was meant to promote deeper integration and democratisation, human rights, the rule of law and transparent and accountable institutions for better governance. All African governments were to be subjected to independent peer review processes to judge their performance in serving the people, rather than oppressing them – as has been common under many unpredictable dictatorships that promoted corruption, unscrupulous rent-seeking behaviour and violation of the rule of law and human rights.

The AU came into being to complete the deepening African integration and to consolidate liberation from colonialism and apartheid by institutionalising and promoting all-inclusive civic African values, above all divisive linguistic, ethnic, race and other exclusions. There is also a deterrent aspect to the AU's work. Those who commit often embarrassing forced military

and undemocratic takeovers and coups were not to be welcomed to the AU. The principle for democratic African states to intervene in conflict, in order to enhance the overall African security community and public sphere, was fully recognised. State sovereignty was to be no barrier to intervention by the AU if gross human rights violations and non-legitimate military power takeovers took place within states by the forces of member states.

Despite the realisation that Africans must find their own solutions to their problems, two critical challenges continue to make Africa vulnerable and penetrable by external former colonial and neo-imperial forces. The first is the failure to establish credible and predictable institutions that are based on laws, structures, norms and values that sustain human rights, remove violent conflict and strife and deepen democratisation. The second is to remove the unity deficit by making sure that all African states deal with and respond to challenges through Africa's own wisdom, united policy and resources. The richness of Africa's wisdom will not fail Africa in finding ways to unite states, without states feeling they will lose by uniting. Unity can be pursued in such a way that no one loses. And if Africa unites, the forces that have continued to inflict the dignity deficit on Africa's peoples will be restrained.

Africa could re-emerge as an effective leader with confidence in the 21st century by avoiding the imperial arrogance that others use to inflict so much damage and hurt, including the denial of the humanity of Africans. Africans should find ways to return to the glorious past when Africa led effectively in many developmental endeavours and when Africans successfully resisted colonial intrusion. Fifty years after political independence Africa should not be a victim and a mere passive follower of the dictates of others. Africa must not chase former political powers and re-invite them, after having fought them with the resolve never to allow Africa to be colonised again. Political independence must be real. Africa is capable of creating a future that ensures every African's well-being as the true anchor, with values and principles ensuring that no African goes hungry, no one is thirsty and no one begs on the streets. Africa can mobilise its best traditions, values, spirituality and cultures of sharing and caring togetherness in order to build robust development and shape a confident and liberated inclusive future for all Africans, regardless of race, religion, language, gender, region and ethnicity.

The similarities amongst Africans can be celebrated by harnessing diversities and rejecting the Eurocentric anthropological vice, and the unending (to this day) inferiorising preaching of missionaries against native religions and other forms of worship. All these negative forms of interventions ended up exaggerating differences amongst Africans and imposing the imagination of coloniality in order to weaken each one of them by making them

prey to constant divide and rule by former colonial powers and others. The imagination of liberation has yet to prevail. The AU has the responsibility to translate that imagination of freedom, self-worth, pride, confidence, self-reliance and liberation into reality. The mobilisation of Africans to act in unison in dealing with and responding to the challenges and opportunities facing Africa as a whole is overdue.

The chapters in this book originated at the third African Unity Conference held in Tshwane during 19-21 May 2013. The chapters are grouped into a number of pillars: Pan-Africanism and Shared Values; Pan-African Education; Development, Economy and Trade; and Conflict, Peace and Security.

In Part I, Charles Verharen discusses the pan-African origin of humanity, by exploring the roots of ancient ethics. He argues that *humanity* began in Africa some 200 000 years ago. Not so well known is that *philosophy* began in Africa some 5 000 years ago. The author proposes an ethical platform for the AU, grounded in ancient Egyptian and Ethiopian principles of harmony and social justice. Unlike Eurasian models that focus on such virtues as rationality, community bonding, and freedom, Egyptian and Ethiopian philosophies unite humanity with other life forms and the inorganic features of the planet. Because the world faces crises such as global climate change, weapons of mass destruction and the misery of billions in the global south, for humanity to survive, a 'new' philosophy is required. The author recommends that the AU should promote an African model for global development that is grounded in principles of sustainability and social justice to promote universal survival and flourishing.

Mammo Muchie and HaileMichael Teshome Demissie highlight Ethiopianism philosophy, arguing that it provides the origin to pan-Africanism. They argue that Ethiopianism should be revived and should not remain neglected. They argue that even though Ethiopianism has not made it to in-flight leisure magazines, as did the French connection, the Huguenots and other European settlements in South Africa, the history of the Ethiopian connection to the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa is remarkably rich. In the wake of the centenary of the ANC, it is timely to re-visit the Ethiopianism movement that was the ideological front of the struggle against apartheid and colonialism in southern Africa and beyond. Ethiopianism provided the countervailing theology to challenge the theology of racism. The movement was effective in exploiting the deliberate ambiguity of the reference to 'Ethiopia': sometimes in its biblical Greco-Roman usage; sometimes in its modern usage to refer to the Kingdom of Ethiopia; and sometimes in reference to both. The Greco-Roman usage was invoked to capture the universal claim of the movement, while Ethiopia, used in reference to the free Abyssinian kingdom that was successful in fending off continual foreign aggression, was used to provide a concrete and immediate

beacon of freedom for the then liberation movements in Africa and the freedom movements across the globe.

John Trimble introduces the concept of Categorical Conversion (CC), which he deploys as a methodology to examine the process of African Liberation Day (ALD) mobilisation. CC is used at the micro-level to examine the author's participation and subsequent ideological development. CC is applied at the macro level, by examining several ALD efforts in the USA and Africa, in order to study the contending forces over the past 30-plus years. The results of this macro analysis speak to the consciousness and ideological development resulting from the material tensions that make up the ALD organising process. CC is an approach to critical thinking. Conclusions are drawn about how this can assist the institutionalisation of ALD and how CC can be applied. The author promises that, in future research, CC will be applied to other situations, particularly to the processes of activism.

Weston Shilaho discusses why Africa's democratisation processes need strong and independent institutions to curb decision making based on idiosyncrasies, as was the case under single-party dictatorships and military autocracies. Since 1990, when landmark multi-party elections were held in Benin to mark the beginning of Africa's Third Wave of Democracy, the continent has held a series of multi-party elections. Although elections are only a part of democracy, they play a crucial role in setting the democratisation process off on either a sound or shaky trajectory. Thus, Africa's multi-party elections have been a mixed bag. They inspire both hope and cynicism in equal measure, depending on the country in question. Critically, Africa's renewal efforts through the AU and regional bodies are laudable.

Claudius Fergus is among the pioneer advocates for pragmatism pan-Africanism. None fired the imagination of African peoples on both sides of the Atlantic as did the indomitable Marcus Garvey, who skilfully combined pedagogy of race solidarity with practical programmes of development, service and co-operation between Africans in the diaspora and Africans at home. He was branded 'a lunatic' and 'the most dangerous enemy'. The truth, as the author argues, is that Garvey was a man of the future, anticipating the birth of an AU, even as colonialism was tightening its grip on the continent. The chapter takes a critical look at some of the key elements of Garveyism in an attempt to reposition their relevance to the current efforts of the AU's Diaspora Initiative. The chapter puts into historical context the pragmatism that informed the pan-Africanism of Garvey, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Kwame Nkrumah in problematising the Garveyite mantra, 'Africa for Africans at home and abroad', with the challenge of forging a new pan-African identity out of the colonial experience in Africa. The author addresses the problems of identity and considers the significance of steps already taken and how these and other measures might benefit

the Diaspora Initiative, especially in relation to the Caribbean Pan-African Network (CPAN).

Babatunde Fagbayibo argues that Nigeria has contributed immensely to the development of the African continent over the years by making Africa the centrepiece of its foreign policy since the 1960s, especially with its efforts at enhancing the integration process. The stunted development of the continental integration process highlights the need for a renewed and more robust strategic engagement. As a regional hegemon, Nigeria should play a critical role in this regard. This point provides the context within which to recommend policy issues that should shape the way Nigeria not only redefines its role as a regional hegemon, but also makes an effective contribution to the growth of continental integration.

In Part II on Pan-African Education, Morgan Ndlovu discusses the question of knowledge production and development on the continent of Africa today as a controversial one. This is mainly because the colonisation experience of the indigenous communities in Africa did not only take place in the political and economic spheres of people's lives, but it also impacted on other crucial aspects, such as patterns of knowing, imaginations of development, conceptions of truth, representations of own identities and various other subjectivities – all of which complicate the meaning today of both pan-African education and development in Africa in the post-colonial era. The author raises the complexities that underpin the ideas of pan-African education and development in the spatio-temporal construct, dubbed post-colonial Africa today, and questions how the manner in which the concept of pan-African education is discursively projected and implemented affects development in Africa. The author applies the concept of decolonial thought to question both the idea of pan-African education and its relevance to development in Africa by using the case study of university education in Africa to interrogate the appropriateness of the idea of pan-African education and its relevance to the progress of the continent.

Oscar Brathwaite argues that quality education is vital to the development of Africa and the empowerment of Africans worldwide, by suggesting that quality education is the foundation that determines a nation's development. Empirical evidence shows that African youth fall into chronic unemployment and under-employment because they lack the essential education, knowledge and skills to compete in the current job market. The author contends that educational systems globally have failed in different ways to provide African students with a quality education that adequately prepares them for the twenty-first century. One aspect of failure derives from educational systems that still adhere to the Eurocentric paradigm, thus resulting in African students becoming disengaged from learning and having poor achievement outcomes. The author argues that it is crucial that

African scholars and educators shift the educational paradigm on a trajectory that will improve conditions and inspire, empower and enable African students worldwide to succeed at all levels of the educational system.

Amos Otieno Ahenda uses the systems approach to address the dilemma of Africa being the richest continent in natural resources, whilst remaining bedevilled with consistent unrest and rape of its resources, leading to gross under-development. For Africa to change and offer a better livelihood to its citizens, it must re-programme its mental models across the divide to emancipate the populace from its enslaving mindsets, effectively developed and stamped through education systems that continue the perpetuation of the colonial legacy of its past. What Africa needs is not just textbooks and human resources, but an increased ability to generate and utilise its own knowledge in response to its unique challenges. This requires a change in mindset and the embracing of a systems approach that will ultimately make the continent adaptive to the dynamic environment.

Tuntufye Mwamwenda explores university education in Africa since independence, by tracing the contours and the development of higher education over the past 30 years, based on 15 African countries drawn from five geographical regions of Africa, as described by the AU. Before independence, the majority of African countries had no universities of their own, and there were hardly any Africans with a university degree. Following independence, most African countries established one or two universities to cater for their national needs, particularly in terms of manpower. Such universities, staffed by expatriates, remained a monopoly for close to two decades. In the last 30 years, the higher education landscape has gone through total transformation, as more universities have been established, allowing thousands of African students access to higher education. Most of these universities are now staffed by nationals instead of expatriates. This is an achievement and a record that supersedes all other records worldwide in recent human history.

Caroline Marks Madongo investigates participants' attitudes towards indigenous knowledge and development, using an interpretivist paradigm to gain an understanding of how the various topics should be approached and taught in rural settings. Using the example of a village in southern Zimbabwe to reflect and relate the African situation to a wider context, she argues that rural education should not only be limited to basic education, but must reflect critically on macro objectives of knowledge concerning issues such as: urban bias, including Africa's development by Europe; under-development on the continent; and development in terms of moving forward together as African people.

Babatunde Omotosho's paper explores the place of African young women in politics vis-à-vis their male counterparts focusing on political participation. While various explanations and solutions are being sought

regarding the challenges women face within the various spaces that they find themselves in, little has been done to examine the activities of women at the youth stage. Examining their activities in this discourse is crucial, as it throws more light on their plight, with the aim of addressing it. Using existing statistics, Omotosho contends that young women's political participation in Africa is not encouraging. Research has established the general neglect of women globally and in Africa in particular. Extending this frontier through an exploration of the kind of activities young women engage in within the political space is thus critical in this chapter. Omotosho, therefore, seeks to examine what young people do as far as political participation is concerned and what the steps the African Union is taking to address the plight of young women.

Carol William brings out what is often expressed as the cliché, 'education is the key'. This cliché is true, the author argues, especially for the African child wherever he or she resides. But what kind of education is best for this African child? The current education system is failing children in the diaspora, but why is this? Children are not being taught from an Afrocentric point of view. They are in an education system that provides them with little or no information about their identity and gives very little thought to their learning styles and living conditions. For an African child, from conception, education or information must be taught from a holistic perspective with truth, dignity, respect and current living conditions placed at the forefront. The chapter aims to demonstrate that the Afrocentric Montessori methodology can eradicate the education gap by focussing on Montessori methods, such as: utilising the immediate environment as a learning tool; learning sensorially and orally; learning through movement; creating individual tailor-made programmes from an Afrocentric perspective.

In Part III, Solomon Akinboye and Samuel Oloruntoba discuss the transition from the OAU in 1963 to the AU, whose objective remains the promotion of democracy and development. It is paradoxical, the authors argue, that the structures of these organisations have been such that decisions are made essentially by the Heads of States and Governments without adequate, if any input, from citizens. While it may be argued that these Heads of States are representatives of the people and are therefore empowered to make decisions on their behalf, the authors contend that there is a democratic deficit in the AU. The authors contend that before the AU can succeed in fostering socio-economic and political development in Africa, its structures and philosophy must be re-organised to reflect strong democratic credentials, making it an African Union of Peoples. The authors also propose a continent-wide enforcement mechanism, such as an African Court of Justice, to deal with cases of political and economic corruption, which are so pervasive on the continent.

Marumo Nkomo discusses regional integration as being of great importance in the African context. It is seen as a rational response to the difficulties faced by a continent with many small national markets and landlocked countries. As many as 47 nations in sub-Saharan Africa are defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as least developed countries (LDCs), while 12 have a population of less than 2 million. Per capita income levels in the region are among the lowest in the world. It is little wonder then, the author argues, that African governments are pursuing many economic integration initiatives to address these economic challenges – perhaps the broadest and most ambitious being the African Economic Community (AEC). The AU and Abuja Treaty recognise the Southern African Development Community (SADC), along with seven other regional trading blocs, as building blocks to the AEC. SADC, the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) have agreed to form a Tri-partite Free Trade Area (TFTA), which is outside the scope of the Abuja Treaty, but in line with the underlying objectives of that instrument, in particular, strengthening regional economic integration on the continent. Against this backdrop, the European Union (EU) on the one hand and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries on the other, have concluded the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). The CPA mandates the negotiation of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) between ACP countries and the EU. The author highlights the objectives of the Abuja Treaty and analyses whether or not EPA negotiations have to date been supportive of the Treaty's objectives.

Serges Djyouou Kamga also discusses the effects of EPAs on Africa's development by giving an overview of the EPAs. The author examines whether EPAs are the roadmap for the continent's development or another tool for its under-development. The chapter assesses the impact of EPAs on trade, on Africa's partnerships with the West and on African regional integration, which are vital for the continent's development. The author finds that trade, partnerships and African regional integration under EPAs are assembled together to scramble and under-develop the continent.

Vusi Gumede and TK Pooe argue that, within the context of a new or different approach to socio-economic development in Africa, intra-Africa trade and development must be prioritised. In addition, a critical look at Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is necessary in order to ensure that FDI plays a developmental role in Africa. The authors take forward an argument advanced in Gumede (2011 & 2013) that Africa needs a robust socio-economic development model as a foundation for capturing the twenty-second century because the twenty-first century, socio-economically, would most likely be remembered as one that firmly established the ascent of the Asian sub-continent and economies like the People's Republic of China, Republic

of Korea, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and also the subsequent rise of South American and Latin nations. The twenty-first century, as the authors indicate, is about 80 years away. The authors argue for an active role by African governments if the twenty-second century is to be *the* African century. The chapter advances a perspective that privileges the African Renaissance as the *motif force* to anchor Africa's socio-economic development agenda. Fifty years since the founding of the OAU, the authors argue, Africa has not had its own robust socio-economic development approach. It is in this context that intra-Africa trade and development should be prioritised.

Bernard Njoh Niba provides a global overview of the relationship between the AU and the African diaspora, which is an area of great interest for the AU and its citizens outside the continent. The author explores the axis of actions so far embarked upon by the AU, notably in its 2003 resolution relating to diaspora engagement in Africa's development and the World Bank/AU policy formulation programme through the Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant. The chapter traces the evolution of events and the road that lies ahead with regard to diaspora engagement in the development of local government in Africa. It notes that it would be worthwhile to identify several avenues that still exist for active diaspora participation in the development of the African continent. This, the author stresses, could be achieved through a win-win situation agreement brokered by the AU, which has continued to serve as the mother organisation for Africans both locally and in the diaspora. The opportunities and benefits inherent in associating African local government councils or other decentralised bodies with diaspora associations and similar groupings are outlined.

Christal Oghogho Spel discusses the growing public and policy debate on the possible threats of immigration flow to social cohesion within a national context by focusing on the increasing need for political and economic co-operation by states and emphasising the critical relevance of regional integration to global participation. One of the fall-outs of regional co-operation is the free movement of its people across borders. Thus it is not surprising that, as African states purposefully move towards strengthened regional co-operation, there is a growing challenge to issues of cohesion as these relate to integration and co-operation with African immigrants in other African states. The author argues that the efforts at integration must focus on the welfare of African immigrants. The AU could play a more active role in providing social protection for African immigrants in African states.

In Part IV, Manji Augustine Dyal discusses Africa's integrative efforts that are threatened by a myriad of paradoxes. Despite considerable resilience to separation, most African states are today plagued by *separatist* and insurgent movements. African states are preoccupied with the task of quelling internal strife, threats of separation and self-determination among

other disincentives to development and regional integration. The use of sophisticated arms, the author argues, has presented a new problematic for the security, integration and development of Africa. The chapter identifies the interlinked roles of weak political institutions, widespread corruption in government and deprivation and ideology as fertile ground on which separatists and insurgent movements thrive.

Chakwa Joshua explores the growing tendency that developed during liberation wars in Africa for both insurgent and counter-insurgent forces to rely heavily on the use of militias or paramilitary forces, which has continued unabated, despite the attainment of independence. Militias aligned to political parties and even the governments of the day have continued to be employed whenever internal conflict manifests itself, especially during turbulent political times, which include general elections. The chapter establishes the root causes behind the use of militias, the roles they play during armed conflict and what happens to them after civil war has come to an end. It also deals with demobilisation and reintegration processes and how the failure to do this properly generates a cycle of conflict, which the continent continues to experience. Conclusions indicate that despite the centrality of militias to civil wars, they are often abandoned and banished, regardless of their part in the conflict. Programmes designed for war veterans elude them and in no time they are thrown into the dustbins of history. Their neglect is a further source of conflict in the future, as they are prepared at times to align themselves with future potential rebels, who are quick to embrace them.

In the Conclusion, this collection of contributions makes another case for the renaissance of African unity, which is awaiting its realisation, involving all Africans. In the words of Kwame Nkrumah, 'Africa must unite or perish', for the simple reason, as he put it: '... the independence of our separate States is meaningless, unless the whole of Africa becomes free and united'.⁴

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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Ancient African Ethics and the African Union

An African Model for Sustainable Development

Charles Verharen

INTRODUCTION¹

With the passing of Ronald Dworkin, eminent philosopher of law, we are reminded of the need to connect legal theory with ethical or moral considerations.² With the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Organisation of African Unity, we are reminded of the need to connect legal theory with political theory. With the re-colonisation of African states, such as Ethiopia, through Arab and Chinese expropriation of natural resources, we are reminded of the need to connect political theory to practical action. And with the disruption of northern African states through unconstitutional succession, state dissolution in Somalia, interstate conflict in the Sudans, and catastrophic loss of life in the Eastern Congo due to conflict over natural resources, we are reminded of the need for the African Union to address the problems of its member states through urgent solutions that are at once ethical and practical.

The founding documents of both the Organisation of African Unity and the African Union rely in some measure on the United Nations Declaration of Universal Human Rights.³ Such a declaration in turn bases itself on ethical, legal and political theories emerging in large measure from non-African contexts. This chapter aims to stimulate research into ancient African ethical traditions that might serve as legal and political foundations for the African Union's pursuit of solutions to its member states' problems. The logical progression of such a research programme would be to link ancient African ethical principles to models derived from contemporary reflection on such African Bantu principles as *ubuntu* (South Africa, Rwanda, Burundi), *unhu* (Zimbabwe), *botho* (Botswana), *uMunthu* (Malawi), *obuntu* (Uganda) and *utu* (Kenya, Tanzania).⁴

The long-range objective would be to find African ethical models that might be substituted for Eurasian models that have accompanied the

world's march to the threshold of global threats to life that are, for the first time, caused by human action.⁵

The recent meteorite crash in Russia, the asteroid Apophis' (named after an ancient African expression of chaos) projected near miss, and the dinosaurs' extinction through an Apophis-magnitude event, remind us that human life has always been at risk in its millions of years of evolution. However, we now face possible extinction through our own action. It is fitting that we turn away from Europe and Asia to return to our African origins to remind ourselves of the fragile nature of life and our ethical obligations to sustain life for future generations.

The fifty years since the Organisation of African Unity's birth have seen provocative additions to its founding language. Particularly dramatic are the Maputo amendments of 2003 and the Constitutive Act (2000) pertaining to the rights of women and the right of the African Union to interfere in its member states' affairs in extreme cases, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or unconstitutional succession.⁶ This right may foreshadow an African Union that embodies a common currency (the Afro), a military force and an equitable distribution of political and economic power between the African Union, as an integral polity, and its member states.

Intellectual inertia decrees that reflections on the future of the African Union follow models already established in older unions that have demonstrated some success. Examples might be the United States, whose Union endured through the catastrophic Civil War, or newer unions, like the European Union, which currently suffers economic crises that endanger its own common currency.

This chapter advocates resistance to that kind of inertia by calling attention to models indigenous to the global south, rather than the global north. What is missing in both the United Nations Declaration and the African Union's constitutive principles is the recognition that humanity cannot be separated from its environment.⁷ The first indigenous president of a continental American nation, the Bolivian, Evo Morales, spearheads the movement to enjoin the United Nations to enact a declaration on the right of the earth to moral standing. Morales takes the moral foundation for this movement from the ancient South American tradition that the earth, as Pachamama, is the mother of us all.⁸

The origins of this radical political movement in the global south may help allay the fear that ecological philosophy is a Euro-American export, poised above Africa like such predecessors as capitalism and communism, Christianity and Islam, seeking to force her in directions inimical to her own spirit.

However, this chapter will show the seeds of an ecological philosophy in the soil of the earliest African philosophies. Ancient Egyptian philosophy brooks no separation between humans and the earth, and indeed no

separation between the spiritual and the physical. The chapter will also show how an ancient Ethiopian philosophy that unites humanity with the earth may ground contemporary African political practice.⁹

The conclusion will argue for an African philosophical ground for the future of the African Union, springing from ancient African principles. In the words of the organisers of the *50 Years after the Founding of the African Union Conference*, the path to African unity and renaissance must be guided by Africa's 'own wisdom, united policy and resources'.¹⁰ The chapter's most ambitious aim is to encourage research that will link African principles to the global philosophical heritage in search of a sustainable global future grounded in respect for cultural difference and social justice.¹¹

EURASIAN ETHICS VS ANCIENT AFRICAN ETHICS

I begin with a brief summary of Eurasian ethics in order to demonstrate their distance from ancient African ethics. The world's second oldest written ethical system emerges in India some 3 500 years ago.¹² Its foundation must be startling to those accustomed to west Asian and European systems, such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Like those, Hindu ethics take their rise from a belief in god. And like those, the Hindu ontology is monotheistic. However, Hindu philosophy holds that only god exists and that all else that we experience is an illusion called *maya*. While god has many faces, such as Shiva or Vishnu or Kali, they are merely reflections that mirror the one true god, Brahman. The human mission is to realise that our true self, called *At-man*, is identical to god. The term *yoga*, meaning *yoke* or *union*, refers to the spiritual exercises used to awaken the self to its true nature as the godhead. The method is to divert attention away from illusion to focus attention on the self through a process of meditation or mindfulness. Learning to focus the mind on itself takes thousands of lifetimes, made possible through a process of reincarnation.

Hindu ethics are grounded in the tranquillity necessary for the practice of meditation. Since life as we experience it is an illusion, what we do in our lives is but the stuff of dreams. An act of murder is simply a bad dream. The dream's evil nature springs from its consequences. The guilt that may attend the act or the fear of consequences destroys the peace of mind necessary for meditation and prolongs the number of lifetimes required for release from the cycle of life and death. Evil actions have consequences, called *karma*, that make liberation from illusion impossible. That liberation is called *moksha*.

Buddhist ethics arise from a much more practical focus.¹³ While it would be difficult to reach consensus on the Hindu claim that we are ignorant

of our divine nature, it is manifest that life is filled with suffering. The Buddha's very practical promise is to provide a path to eliminate suffering. Suffering, he notes, arises from desire. We desire to seek pleasure, to avoid pain. Desires emerge out of the self, and the Buddha is convinced that the self is an illusion. His rejection of Hinduism stops at this point, since his projected path to realise the non-existence of the self is through the Hindu practice of meditation. While Hinduism and Buddhism have radically different systems of belief about ontology or the study of what exists, they both agree on the importance of meditation to achieve liberation from illusion (*moksha*) or from desire (*nirvana*).

East and west Asian and south-eastern European ethical thinkers focused on community as the ground of ethics. Christ famously announced that universal, unconditional love must be the objective of all ethical conduct. However, around 300 years before Christ, the Chinese philosopher Mo Di (also spelt Mo Ti or Mo-Tzu) proclaimed a doctrine of *chien ai* or universal care.¹⁴ Greek Stoic philosophers and Indian sages like Nagarjuna also emphasised the importance of community bonding.

Socrates, Plato and Aristotle led the parade of European thinkers who claimed that the human capacity for rationality must serve as foundation for all ethical considerations. Plato holds that our mission – to the degree possible – is to remain in school for our entire lives. Our word *school* comes from the Greek word *schole*, meaning leisure. In Plato's school, students learn the art of performing abstractions, generalising from particular cases to reach the perfect forms or ideas that are imperfectly mirrored in the universe's structure.

Aristotle insists that the peak of human happiness is reached in imitating God, whose only function is to think about his thinking. Ancient Greek thinkers privileged reasoning or the process of connecting experiences by means of increasingly abstract concepts. Reason became a primary force in the development of European science and ethics. Kant famously claims that only a good will can be truly good. Such a will must be directed by reason alone, freed from any emotional or self-serving taint. A universal law must direct all ethical reflections. If a course of action is good for one individual, it must be good for all rational agents. The United States philosopher John Rawls achieved fame by using Kant's reliance on reason to articulate a theory of justice as fairness.

A quite different set of early Greek thinkers insisted that pleasure must be the measure of what is truly good. Styled *hedonists* after the Greek word for pleasure, their philosophy resonated in particular with nineteenth century English thinkers like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Their claim is that not only are we motivated to do that which gives us pleasure, but that pleasure is in fact our primary human objective. The utility of an act for

producing pleasure dictates its ethical status. This philosophy came to be called *utilitarianism*. Its foundation is the conviction that all humans have the moral obligation to act for the greatest good for the greatest number. That good is ultimately pleasure.

Perhaps influenced by the power that the privileging of reason had conferred on European peoples – the power to enslave millions of Africans and colonise virtually the whole world – European thinkers like Hegel and Marx imagined that freedom must be the ethical objective of every thinking human being. Reason and freedom go hand in hand. Through its task of linking experiences through abstract patterns or concepts, reason gives us the power to predict and thereby control the future. Power, whether intellectual, political, economic or military, is the ground of freedom. Viewing humanity as the dialectical product of nature, Hegel defined spirit or the expression of freedom as the ‘infinite capacity of nature to change its form’.¹⁵ The measure of our freedom is our capacity to imitate nature by constantly changing her own forms as well as our own.

The global history of ethics is a history of contestation about the nature of life and how it is to be lived. The proponents of the ethical systems we have reviewed imagined that their distinct ethical objectives had to be the only possible final goals for all humans. From our perspective, at the pinnacle of 5 000 years of recorded experience, we can try to amass arguments for the virtues of our own favourites. However, we might have some sense that our favouritism may be the accidental product of our cultural circumstances.

A less ethnocentric approach might examine the emergence of these ethical systems with an eye toward their evolutionary fitness, their capacity to contribute to human flourishing. Under the lens of this kind of examination, each system appears to be indispensable. We are, after all, rational animals who use reason to select appropriate methods to achieve our goals, as Plato and Aristotle insisted. Pleasure and pain are, as Aristotle claimed, the twin rudders of human existence. We seek the one and run from the other. As social animals, we are completely dependent on our communities. Their size, binding principles and the excellence of their members dictate the quality of our lives. Unlike animals, with their powerful jaws and claws, their keen senses and lightning reflexes, we live by our imagination and our power to predict and control the future. In short, we live by our creations. Our creations are the measure of our freedom. And, finally, our success depends on rational, rather than random, control of our attention through acts of introspection or meditation.

Under an even tighter focus of our evolutionary lens, these quite different ethical objectives are indispensable to our survival. They have reflected the lives of billions as the human community has grown from a small handful,

some 200 000 years ago, to over 7 billion strong today. Our bare survival is a function of clean air, adequate temperature control, through clothing and shelter, potable water, nutritious food, basic healthcare and education. However, the best guarantee of survival is our capacity to flourish. And flourishing is best defined through rationality, community bonding, the rational pursuit of pleasure, freedom (measured through creativity), and the rational control of the attention. Rationality is most practically defined as the pursuit of objectives with appropriate means. Our capacity for reason, emotion and (perhaps most importantly) imagination dictate both our objectives and our judgment about the means to reach our objectives.

We cannot claim that our primary ethical objective is survival. And we would be foolish to claim that one of the conditions for flourishing must take precedence over others. Figures we admire most, like Socrates, Christ, Gandhi, King and Biko, have sacrificed their lives for what they take to be higher goals – truth, love or justice. Exaggerated emphasis on one of the conditions for flourishing to the exclusion of others might lead to the self-destruction of humanity. The hypertrophy of rationality in Euro-American cultures has led to the development of weapons of mass destruction that might, in the future, have the capacity to terminate all human life. Technology as the offspring of rationality may produce life-threatening global climate change. The dystrophy of global community bonding has led to the misery of billions in the global south, with Africa being the hardest hit.

What we require is ethics that recognise the co-evolutionary relation of survival and flourishing with a commitment to the principle that our most important ethical objective is to pass life on to our progeny in a condition better than we have received it from our ancestors. Ironically, we may look to the oldest recorded ethical system for “new” ethics to help us carry out our mission.

ANCIENT EGYPTIAN ETHICS

Unlike the global ethical systems reviewed above, ancient Egyptian ethics do not privilege a single ethical good over competitors. Furthermore, Egyptians held that no good is so pure that it does not contain some trace of evil. The converse is true as well. In fact, Egyptians believed that the source of good may in fact be considered the essence of evil. Erik Hornung, one of the most influential contemporary Egyptologists, holds that ancient Egyptian thought must, in many ways, be incomprehensible to us because of our reliance on a two-valued system of logic.¹⁶ Propositions, we think, must be either true or false. And actions must be either good or bad. Hornung insists that our only hope of understanding Egyptian thought is to embrace

the multi-valued logic we now use to understand quantum or sub-atomic phenomena in physics. Actions may be considered to be good or bad, or both good and bad.

Early Egyptologists who read the first deciphered hieroglyphs believed that the texts revealed a mythological naïveté that could not distinguish prior from consequent in causal sequence, or truth from falsity, or good from bad. The ancient Egyptian text, *Book of the Dead* (sometimes called the *Book of Coming Forth by Day*) in some texts (called *spells*), designates *Ra* or the sun as the father of all the gods.¹⁷ In other texts, an anthropomorphic figure, *Osiris*, becomes the father of *Ra*.¹⁸ The perfect figure of evil in Egyptian thought is *Seth*, the brother of *Osiris*, who murders *Osiris* in a pre-meditated frenzy of jealous rage. Yet *Seth* is the perfect figure of good, inasmuch as *Seth* is responsible for the sun being able to complete its circle around the earth. The very essence of evil, the god *Apophis* or *Ouroboros*, attempts to drink up the water surrounding the earth to stop the sun's daily circle of the earth in its heavenly barge. Each night, *Seth* successfully attacks *Apophis* with a spear to prevent him from drinking the celestial water.¹⁹

Apparent confusion in Egyptian texts over causal sequence and the distinction of good from evil might seem to relegate Egyptian thought to a jejune mythological status unworthy of philosophical reflection in pursuit of an ethical platform for the African Union. However, the complete context of Egyptian thought on questions of what exists (ontology) and what is valuable (ethics) must give us pause.

To make a judgment call about the viability of ancient African thought for contemporary African political practice, we must reconsider contemporary definitions of what counts as philosophy.²⁰ Like all other intellectual activities, philosophy is a product of the brain at work. Aldous Huxley famously proclaims that the brain is a reducing valve. One of its primary functions is to divide the immense complexity of experience into separate categories that we designate by means of concepts. By interpreting experience through the lens of concepts or ideas, we are able to anticipate patterns that core through our experience. Our concepts determine what kinds of things we think exist in our experience. Our familiarity with these patterns allows us to predict what will happen in our experience. Our extraordinary capacity for imagination allows us to create new patterns that we may impose on experience in order to control it. Our emotions, tempered by reason or the ability to connect experience by concepts, dictate what kinds of patterns we wish to impose on experience. Our emotions, expressed as desires, decide what kinds of things we want to exist in our experience. Of course these desires may be subjected to reasoned criticism. However, that criticism cannot commence without an initiating desire.

By reason of its function as a reducing valve, the brain strains to gather all the same kinds of experience under a single concept. The term *concept* comes from two Latin words meaning *to grab together*. At the extreme limits of its gathering capacity, the brain attempts to gather all experience under single concepts such as *god* or the *universe*. At the same time, the brain judges the worth or value of all experience under single concepts such as *pleasure* or *happiness*, *love* or *freedom*. In this chapter I define *philosophy* as the brain's operations at the extreme limits of generalisation.

Over time, the brain develops greater and greater capacity for generalisation. The first philosophy, one that still persists in cultures uncontaminated by 'civilisation,' is called *animism*. This philosophy holds that everything that happens in human experience must be caused or controlled by a spirit (from the Latin word *anima*). Just as our 'spirit' or 'mind' or 'thinking' causes our bodily actions, so comparable 'spirits' must drive all possible actions. Because the cause cannot be directly perceived, the essential nature of the spirit must remain undefined. *Spirit* can only be defined through its effects.

The second philosophy is called *polytheism*. The brain's reductive force singles out causal agents for the same kinds of experience or phenomena. A single spirit or god must be responsible for all phenomena of the same kind. One god might control the rain, another the sun, a third fertility, a fourth fate.

The third philosophy is called *henotheism*. Here the brain's natural movement of reduction imagines a single spirit that must exert control over all other spirits. We find examples of henotheism in virtually all the ancient civilisations.

The fourth philosophy is called *monotheism*. Here the brain banishes all gods, except for the single god that must be the source of all that exists (in philosophies that embody creation, such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam) or the source of all that moves (in philosophies such as those of Plato and Aristotle, which do not require creation). However, both types of monotheism insist on a rigid distinction between god and the creation or movement that is god's responsibility.

The fifth philosophy is called *pantheism*. Here the brain collapses the unknown, originating source of creation or movement into that which is created or moved. In Spinoza's famous phrasing, god may be conceived both as nature in the process of creating itself (*natura naturans*) or nature in the process of being created (*natura naturata*).²¹

The sixth philosophy is called *atheism*. Here the physical universe, as comprised of matter and energy, is taken to be its own self-caused cause. The details of this process are of course far from being worked out in the annals of contemporary science, although some consensus still exists on a big bang origin evolving from a chaotic hydrogen cloud.

The seventh philosophy, for lack of a better term, might be called *brainism*. In this contemporary stage of the evolution of thinking, we imagine that the intellectual movement from animism to atheism is a reflection of the brain's reductive function. We now know that our experience of the world as a sea of colour, sound, smell, taste and touch is the result of the brain's production of a *virtual reality* that has evolved over millions of years to promote our survival and flourishing.²² What lies beyond the brain's screen of virtual reality must be the subject of endless speculation. Physicists working in the field of string theory now go so far as to speculate that our experience of reality may be a computer simulation generated by a species far more advanced than ours. Descartes' universal doubt and Hume's scepticism are graphically revived in the film, *The Matrix*.²³

What is important to note in this seven-fold reductive progression is the comfort zone of the brain. In the face of total ignorance, the brain simply cannot accept its ignorance. It must imagine that, through its reductive concepts, it has captured the explanation for what it cannot possibly know with any degree of certainty or even consensus. The reason is not far to seek. A confession of ignorance is at the same time a confession of powerlessness, given that our power as humans is by and large dependent on our knowledge.

Like mythologies and religions, our philosophies are imaginative schemes we invoke in order to mask our ignorance. The difference between the two groups? Mythologies or religions are imagined to be irrevocably 'true'. As such, they stand as final solutions to our most obdurate problems. Philosophies, at their most critical heights, are scaffolds we climb to escape from our ignorance, though we are uncertain of their safety or the directions they force us to take. All three subjects furnish rules or guidelines for the conduct of life.

Only philosophy subjects these guidelines to unrelenting rational criticism. In fact, philosophical criticism historically gives birth to new religions. Two prominent examples are the Buddha's transformation of Hinduism into Buddhism and Martin Luther's reconstitution of Roman Catholicism as Protestantism. The Buddha renounced Hindu metaphysical speculation, but kept Hindu meditation as the proper path to relieve suffering. Luther retained the metaphysical structure of Catholicism's divine trinity, but rejected the Pope and the Church of Rome as the intermediary between man and god.

Philosophies, as the answers to the deepest questions we can ask about our origins and those of the universe of our experience, might seem to be the amusements of mere children or intellectuals who enjoy lives of leisure untrammelled by the struggle for survival or flourishing. We cannot, with any certainty, answer the questions that most disturb us: where do

we come from, why are we here, is there any hope for a life after death? Unfortunately, there is one question that we must answer in the face of total ignorance about the answers to these questions. That question is: How should we live? We have waited for millennia to find out how the universe came into existence. We now have some answers to that question that may achieve consensus. We can wait millennia more to find out if our universe is an island or a continent among a host of other universes. We can wait to find out if intelligent beings like ourselves people the universe we know or other universes we cannot now know.²⁴

What we cannot wait for is consensual answers to the question as to how we should live. Unfortunately, our answers to that question have, historically, depended on our answers to the question about where we come from. Our judgments about how we should live must, in the end, exhibit the same uncertainty as our answers to the question about where we come from.

Philosophy begins with cultures that bring these two questions to self-consciousness. The ancient Egyptians were the first to record their response to these questions in a self-conscious way. Philosophy reaches its contemporary self-conscious pitch by subjecting all possible answers to the two questions to incessant criticism: How can we know that our claims to knowing what exists and what is valuable are unimpeachable? That question has no hope of resolution in the foreseeable future, if the past is a prologue to the future.

Ancient Egyptian philosophy does not separate questions about existence and value. On this count, it follows the rule of reduction strictly. On the other hand, it does not provide explicit reasons as to why its particular reductions are more satisfactory than possible alternatives. While their literary dialogues show a keen awareness of the give and take of explicit argument, ancient Egyptians do not apply this technique to their philosophy as a whole. Self-conscious point-by-point criticism arises much later in the historical record with the extraordinary efflorescence of philosophy in Greece, Hellenised Egypt,²⁵ India and China around 2 500 years ago.²⁶

The Egyptian exercise of the art of reduction assigns the origins of our world to a primordial water-like chaos called *Nun*. While the Egyptians call this principle the father of all gods, it is purely physical. Like the spiritual gods of south and west Asians, *Nun* is self-causing. The ordered universe emerges from this chaos through an evolutionary process called *Khepera* which produces the familiar sun god, *Ra*. Through a metaphorical sexual act, *Ra* creates two physical principles analogous to air and moisture. Through sexual copulation, these principles create two others, analogous to the earth and the sky. Through the same process, the principles create four anthropomorphic gods who are, in turn, responsible for earthly affairs.²⁷

I call this clearly mythological account of the origins of the universe *philosophical* precisely because of its reduction of all existence to a single primordial principle. It expresses a mythological character, because of its use of anthropomorphism: gods create through sexual activity and gods exhibit human traits like love and jealousy, just as we do. However, unlike many of our most ancient origin myths, the Egyptian account does not reduce all of existence to an anthropomorphic figure, but rather to a single physical principle – *Nun*.²⁸ As the account dates back 5 000 years, it is the first origin story that exhibits the trait of *decentering*, or removing itself from a purely human-based explanation of what, to date, cannot possibly be explained.²⁹ Comparable decentering techniques are evident in early Greek thought, with the principles of chaos in Hesiod, and water, fire, atoms and numbers in pre-Socratic philosophers like Thales, Heraclitus, Democritus and Pythagoras. However, these Greek thinkers follow the Egyptians by more than 2 000 years.³⁰

The logical structure of the Egyptian origin account is analogous to our contemporary scientific account. The simplest building block of the universe, the hydrogen atom, exists in a state of chaos. Over time, gravitational attraction assembles these atoms into a singularity, called the *big bang*, through a process of fusing hydrogen into helium. The rise and fall of stars fusing hydrogen into helium produce all the other atomic elements. Gravitational, electromagnetic, nuclear weak and strong forces govern the evolution of these 100-plus elements that finally produce stable, self-reproducing patterns that we call life. The decentering function of the mind eliminates all anthropomorphic principles in this narration, but the theme of movement from chaos to order is retained.

Ancient Egyptian ethics emerge precisely from that movement from chaos to order. In its earliest states, chaos is the appropriate state for the universe. In later stages, order takes the place of chaos. The oppositional movement results in the harmony of the universe. The Egyptian term for that harmony, *Maat*, is variously translated as peace, order, justice or a number of comparable terms.³¹ What counts as harmony varies through different stages of the evolution, both of the universe as a whole and of its constituent elements. In its primordial state, chaos or disorder is the appropriate 'order' for the universe. In its developed state, disorder becomes evil. However, after millions upon millions of years, the universe will revert back to a chaotic state.³² On the micro-level of living forms, harmonious interaction of cells is what is good. However, at some point, those principles of harmony decay and death follows. If organisms have lived out their proper life-span, then the disintegration of harmony at its proper time is not an evil event.

Two points make Egyptian ethics remarkable. First, ethics is embedded in the universe as the structure of the universe. Ethics is not a divine

creation. What is good is the harmony of what exists at its appropriate time. What is evil is the rupture of harmony at an inappropriate time. The organised universe is constantly assaulted by the chaos from which it springs. Chaos can erupt in harmony from time to time. The human mission is to restore harmony where chaos is inappropriate.

Second, ethics is not a human creation. As products of the universe shaped by the harmonious structure of the universe, humans are ethical by nature. Humans who act on behalf of chaos, rather than harmony, are reflections of the primordial chaos that constantly threatens the harmony of the universe. The ancient Egyptians are the first to condemn vengeance as an inappropriate response to humans who commit evil.³³ Justice cannot be a matter of retribution or punishment. Rather, the harmonious community, honouring the principle of *Maat*, has the moral obligation to restore the evil-doer to the community. Where that is impossible, imprisonment, exile or execution may be appropriate, but only as a last resort.

The Egyptian commitment to *Maat* finds its apotheosis in the pharaoh Akhenaten's (~1380-1334 BCE) *Hymns To Aten*.³⁴ He is the first recorded thinker to move past the narrow limits of egocentric and anthropocentric ethics to a vision of ethics embodied in the universe itself. He is also the first recorded thinker to nearly escape the limits of anthropocentrism in a more general sense. Like his predecessors, Akhenaten held that only one physical principle must be the source of all existence. Unlike his predecessors, he claimed that that principle must be light, which he called *Aten*. *Aten* manifests itself to us through the portal of the sun disk. Also unlike his predecessors, he insisted that only one principle, *Aten*, must be responsible for the origin of the universe. Akhenaten did not imagine that human-like gods had any role in the creation process. However, like his predecessors, he believed that the universe emerges from that first principle through a process of emanation or evolution. Through that process, *Aten* becomes the billions and billions of beings that make up the universe: 'You [*Aten*] create millions of forms from yourself alone – cities, towns, and fields, roads and river'.³⁵

While Akhenaten freed himself from the anthropocentrism that makes the first creative principles into human-like figures, he was unable to resist anthropocentrism entirely. As the powerful pharaoh of the two lands of Egypt, Akhenaten claimed that he alone was able to divine the mind of *Aten* for the Egyptian people. While more ancient Egyptians could claim to know right from wrong, through the principles of *Maat* embedded in their very being through the universe, Akhenaten claimed that only he could judge right and wrong through his relationship to *Aten*.³⁶ He imagined himself to be the son of *Aten*, and he imagined that his beloved wife, *Nefertiti*, was *Aten's* daughter.

In spite of this regression to bald anthropocentrism, Akhenaten inaugurates the first revolution in ethics through his claim that the universe is in fact a transformation of the being of *Aten*. *Aten* is responsible not simply for the creation of Egyptians, but of all peoples, regardless of their language or skin colour. Earlier Egyptian ethics moved past anthropocentrism to give moral standing to other life forms and to the natural features of the earth. However, the perilous condition of the early Egyptian empires did not permit granting equal moral stature to non-Egyptians. Early Egyptian texts are filled with references to barbarous sand-dwellers – nomads incapable of building monumental structures for themselves.³⁷

Akhenaten, however, does not privilege the Egyptians over other peoples. *Aten's* creative force is embodied in all peoples and all nations. Unlike others who imagined that their gods privileged them as a 'chosen people', who are morally superior to all other peoples, Akhenaten is the first thinker to move beyond both ethnocentrism and anthropocentrism to recognise that the universe itself and all it contains have moral standing. Judgment of moral worth cannot emanate from the self, the group, or even from humanity as a whole.

Akhenaten reigned for only a few brief years (~1353-1334 BCE). His philosophy was so abhorrent to his contemporaries that they destroyed his images, writings and temples, both in Egypt and Nubia.³⁸ However, his basic understanding of creation is one we tend toward today in our contemporary science, and his stance against ethnocentric and anthropocentric ethics is one we must adopt today in the face of the shrinking and ravaged planet that we now inhabit.

ANCIENT ETHIOPIAN ETHICS

Research into ancient Ethiopian philosophy is problematic for two reasons. First, Ethiopia's north is home to the second culture in Africa which created monuments that have endured through the centuries. The ruins of the Axumite temple in Yeha, near the Eritrean border, date back to 500 CE. The famous stelae in Axum, the largest carved monoliths in the world, date to the early CE centuries. However, funding for archaeological research into Axumite culture, like that into most African cultures outside of Egypt, is quite limited. And warfare between Ethiopia and Eritrea has made thorough research in the border areas impossible. To date, no discovery of Axumite texts has made philosophical speculation possible.³⁹

Second, the absence of ancient texts from more southern Ethiopia means that philosophical speculation in that area must be based on the work of cultural anthropologists. Fortunately, the Oromo group, the largest ethnic

group in Ethiopia, has attracted the attention of missionaries, sociologists and anthropologists over the past several hundred years. Claude Sumner, a long-term philosophy professor at the University of Addis Ababa, began extensive research on Oromo philosophy with the publication of three volumes of original Oromo thought.⁴⁰ Sumner's colleagues at the University have continued his research.⁴¹

The philosophical reflections presented here are based on anthropological studies of Oromo thought by Gemetchu Megerssa, long-term professor of social anthropology at the University.⁴² While he and other colleagues claim that Oromo traditions may extend as far back as 3 000 years, his conclusions are based on anthropological fieldwork, rather than textual analysis.⁴³ Nevertheless, his work provides a foundation for a philosophical analysis of traditional Oromo thought. My hope is that the controversial nature of his claims will inspire further investigation of traditional cultures in Ethiopia.

What is most provocative about Megerssa's research is the comparability of Oromo to ancient Egyptian thought. Scholars who imagine that ancient Egyptian culture spread from Egypt to more southerly Africa will not find the similarities to be remarkable. Ancient Egyptian texts speak of Red Sea navigation from Egypt toward what is now called Eritrea and Ethiopia.⁴⁴ However, no current research methods can be used to argue for cultural diffusion from Egypt to Ethiopia or vice versa. If we are able to secure funding for extensive research into other cultures proximate to the Nile or connected to the Nile through demonstrated trade routes, then we might have grounds for authoritative speculation about cultural diffusion in northern and middle Africa.

Principles of massive reduction characterise Oromo thought, both in the areas of ontology and speculation about what exists and ethics. The origin of all existence is a single principle called *Waaqa*. The term is often translated as *sky god*, but this translation imposes an anthropomorphism on Oromo thought that may not be indigenous. Megerssa suggests that the original principle of creation is a sky god – not in any literal sense, but in the metaphorical sense of a principle that is utterly beyond our comprehension.⁴⁵ His interpretation lends a decided sophistication to Oromo thought. Knowing the limits of physics, particularly in the area of cosmology or the study of the origins and nature of the universe, we can safely say that we have no idea as to how the universe might have arisen. Citing the big bang as its point of origin does nothing to explain the source of the hydrogen atoms that constituted the big bang. Could the Oromo have been so sophisticated as to recognise the fact that they could not begin to explain the origin of the universe?

Megerssa notes that the term *guracha* is often attached to the term for the first principle, *Waaqa*. *Guracha* literally means that which is black

or hidden. The nature of this first principle is left completely unspecified. However, *Waaqa* transforms itself (no gender is specified for the creative principle) through the agency of a watery principle (called *Wallabu*) and formative principles (called *Ayanna*) that are associated with fire.⁴⁶ The analogy with ancient Egyptian creation is striking, particularly in the face of a strong disanalogy. Both cosmologies rely on principles of primitive or chaotic water – *Nun* for the Egyptians and *Wallabu* for the Oromo. Both rely on the principle of the sun or fire – *Ra* for the Egyptians and *Ayanna* for the Oromo. If Megerssa is correct about the antiquity of Oromo thought, both cosmologies anticipate the first principles of fire and water in the pre-Socratic natural philosophies.

The disanalogy between the two cosmologies is that the Oromo push back beyond the first principles of water and fire to a principle that is completely unknown. This reductive move speaks of a high degree of sophistication. Nevertheless, whatever that unknown principle may be, it becomes the universe as we know it through self-transformation, using the agency of *Wallabu* and *Ayanna*. As with the ancient Egyptians, there can be no principle of separation between the first creative principle and the universe as an emanation or evolution from that principle. Such massive reduction of all reality to a single principle is reason enough to call ancient Egyptian and Oromo thought *philosophy*, provided their thought is coupled to a decentering process.

As we saw above, the Egyptians began the arduous trek away from anthropocentrism by claiming that a natural (rather than a super-human) principle had to be the source of the universe. However, they lapsed from their original intention by assigning human traits to the gods that emerged from these natural principles. More than the Egyptians, the Oromo escape the charge of anthropocentrism inasmuch as their first principle does not exhibit human characteristics, such as sexual activity, rage, love or mass slaughter.

Like the ancient Egyptians, the Oromo make no distinction between their reflections on what exists and their ethical principles. Neither commanded by an anthropocentric god, nor decreed by humans, ethics is embedded in the very structure of the universe. The Oromo ethical principle is called *Naaga*, translated as peace, harmony, justice, truth or a number of other terms.⁴⁷ Like ancient Egyptian ethics, *Naaga* is neither ethnocentric nor anthropocentric. The principle of peace dictates that the Oromo live in harmony with other peoples, with other life forms, as well as with the inorganic features of the earth.

The Oromo achieve *Naaga* by following a moral code called *Saffu*. The moral code governs social behaviour, but it emerges from organic biological development, called *finna*. The first stage of that development is called

guddina, which literally means an increase in what is given. Growth in accord with the harmony of nature leads to a state of well-being called *gab-bina*. The term denotes a process of 'growing fat', a desideratum in areas where food production depends upon a fickle climate. Organisms in a state of well-being express their nature through a process of harmonious growth called *ballina*. Where that growth is in harmony with its environment, a state called *badhaadhaa* ensues. *Badhaadha* is a constellation of the earlier stages of *guddina*, *gabbina* and *ballina*.

Organisms in perfect harmony with their environment naturally reproduce themselves through reproductive acts called *hormatta*. These organisms embrace changes appropriate to the environment, while sustaining their identities. The rounds of changes that link identity with difference are called *dagaaga*, after the spiral growth of a ram's horn. Organisms that successfully pass through previous stages have the power to launch themselves into new territories in a process called *daga-horaa*.⁴⁸ Further research is required to determine whether the expansion takes the mode of assimilation or conquest. My research to date indicates that the Oromo believe that their ethical system is so well developed that it deserves exportation beyond Oromia. Texts from the research of Tenna Dewo indicate that *Naaga* (defined as peace) must be a governing principle for all peoples, not simply the Oromo. The Oromo undertake warfare reluctantly. In the words of an Oromo elder, 'We Oromo go fighting only if we do not have any other means to protect our peace. Just as we know how to make peace, fortunately we also know how to do war'.⁴⁹

What deeply separates Oromo from ancient Egyptian ethics is the former's development of a democratic system of government. Egypt was, after all, an empire, and hierarchical structures constitute the essence of empire. The rise and fall of the Egyptian empires and their conquest by the Hyksos, Nubians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks and Romans reflected the evolution of political structures from tribes to city states to nations to empires constantly at war with one another.

The Oromo were primarily a pastoral people, who practised small-scale farming. Their environment and means of production did not permit a big population growth, or a surplus of food or leisure that could enable the development of writing and other large-scale technologies.⁵⁰ While environmental determinists might argue that their political system arose out of their means of production, that is a matter for another chapter.⁵¹

Their democratic political system was grounded in the ethical principle of *Naaga*. Peace or harmony was their primary objective. Disputes were resolved through mediation, where possible, rather than by judgment of right and wrong. The *Jaarssummaa* or council of elders had, as its primary task, the mediation of disputes. The *Gadaa* was an age-graded political

structure that prepared young people to assume the tasks of legislation and executive activities. Asmarom Legesse defines the system as a 'system of generation classes that succeed each other every eight years in assuming political, military, judicial, legislative and ritual responsibilities'.⁵² Every eight years, councils (variously called *Gumii Gaayyoo*, *Mee'Bookku*, *Caffee*) brought together large numbers of communities to deliberate on changes to be made to laws.

The legislative, executive and judicial functions embodied in the Oromo political system are key to democratic government on any scale, including the African movement toward continental union.

The Oromo principles of democracy did not embrace the participation of women. The ancient Egyptians had a better record in this area, as queen Hatshepsut served as pharaoh for many years, although she wore a false beard to emphasise her role as an honorary male in the office of pharaoh.⁵³ Nonetheless, neither the Oromo nor the ancient Egyptians can be faulted for the sexism that is virtually a universal trait of human cultures up to the present moment.

CONCLUSION

What we must not forget in this global survey of ethics is a basic maxim: *To be good is first to be*. We cannot be good unless we first exist. If survival cannot be assured, then it is pointless to pursue questions of ethics. Eurasian ethics have singled out ethical goods that may challenge survival, if they are pursued past the point of moderation. The European hyper-focus on rationality through the pursuit of mathematics and science has yielded extraordinary power. Einstein's $E=mc^2$ is perhaps the single most powerful practical statement ever uttered by a human being, inasmuch as it served as the imaginative key to nuclear weapons. The force of those weapons has helped to stave off global warfare for more than fifty years, although local wars and genocide have multiplied. Nevertheless, the proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to life. While chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction do not yet have the destructive power of nuclear weapons, they may pose an even greater threat to life in the near future. The global north's focus on freedom as a primary ethical goal has led to a globalised economic model that does not address the misery of billions in the global south.

The wisdom of both the ancient Egyptians and Ethiopians is to pursue a comprehensive approach to ethics. While Eurasian ethics tended to single out particular ethical objectives, ancient African ethics sought ways to harmonise sometimes conflicting aims. A hedonist who does not get pleasure

out of seeking to maximise the greatest good for the greatest number will pay scant attention to the ethics of caring or community bonding. A Buddhist dedicating her life to meditation in pursuit of *nirvana* might find little time for the pursuit of rationality in the form of mathematics or science.

Cultures differentiate themselves by reason of their divergent emphases on basic ethical goods. Historical India, like China, might stand apart from European cultures by reason of its emphasis on meditation. However, India found herself to be defenceless when assaulted with the technological tools generated, in part, by the European commitment to rationality. A culture's survival depends on its capacity to harmonise competing ethical goods. Principles of harmonisation must be based on a culture's environmental circumstances, as well as its own idiosyncratic considerations. Cultural difference is key to the survival of the species. Rather than being the spice of life, variety is in fact the very engine of life.

Ancient African ethics stand out by not ranking a single ethical good over all others. The principles of *Maat* and *Naaga* require the harmonisation of all ethical goods. It may appear that African ethics are closest to Aristotle's virtue ethics. Like the Oromo, Aristotle chose a biological model for his ethics. However, Aristotle's principle of *Eudaimonia* does not exhibit the comprehensive quality of *Naaga*. Aristotle's term is poorly translated as *happiness*. The etymology of *happiness* in the sense of luck does not begin to capture Aristotle's idea that the primary human good is virtue or activity in accord with excellence. A better translation might be *flourishing*, if that term is given a biological connotation. The capacity of an organism for flourishing depends on both its nature and its circumstances. Aristotle finds that humans are *rational animals*. What is unique about humans is their capacity for thinking and choosing.

Aristotle's concept of flourishing is inferior to the ancient African concepts of *Maat* and *Naaga* in two respects. First, Aristotle sets up irreducible distinctions among kinds of humans. Only males are capable of both thinking and choosing. Females are certainly capable of thinking, but they do not have the strength of will to carry out their choices. Slaves, whether male or female, are characterised by their incapacity to either think or choose. They must live their lives under the direction of intelligent males.

Second, Aristotle privileges thinking over all other human activities. In doing philosophy, humans imitate God, who causes all motion in the universe by the act of thinking about his thinking.

Aristotle's ethics is not only anthropocentric, but also *androcentric*, privileging males above all other forms of earthly existence. By reason of his higher nature, the thinking man, who has attained wisdom, has the obligation to guide the activities of all others. Women, slaves, animals, the earth itself, all are instruments to carry out the will of the thinking man.

Aristotle's philosophy stands in direct opposition to ancient African ethics that grant moral standing to non-human life forms and the inorganic earth itself.

The ancient Egyptian concept of flourishing does not privilege men over women. And the empire's embrace of slavery did not rest upon a philosophical dehumanisation of the slave. Oromo democracy cannot condone the separation of males into the free and the slave. Nevertheless, the Oromo exclusion of women from democratic processes means that only a combined Egyptian/Oromo ethics can serve as a foundation for contemporary African ethics.

However, this foundation requires a superstructure comprised of research on the full spectrum of African ethics. African philosophers with PhDs from Euro-American institutions, like Kwame Gyekye, Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Appiah and Segun Gbadegesin, have done extensive research on Akan and Yoruba ethical models. Researchers too numerous to mention have published work on other middle and southern African ethical concepts, such as *ubuntu*.⁵⁴ The ancient African emphasis on harmony is compatible with the more recent African emphasis on the networks of mutuality expressed across Bantu ethics. In the best case, research into African ethics will be complemented with that of African scholars, like Frantz Fanon, Aimé Césaire, W.E.B. Du Bois and Alain Locke. Martin Luther King, Jr. presents perhaps the best intimation of what ethics for the African Union's next fifty years should embody: 'All mankind is tied together; all life is interrelated, and we are all caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly'.⁵⁵

Finally, ancient Egyptian and Ethiopian ethics might inspire researchers to examine ethical principles through scientific as well as philosophical lenses.⁵⁶ Both these ancient African philosophies found ethics to be inseparable from the structure of the universe. Contemporary psychologists and biologists imagine that our capacity to be ethical is comparable to our capacity to learn languages and to be rational.⁵⁷ Virtually every human is born with the capacity to learn any of the ~7 000 languages still spoken on the planet. Virtually every human is born with the capacity to be rational. The capacity to exercise ethical, linguistic and rational behaviour is innate, conveyed from our ancestors through our genes. The particular expression of these capacities is a function of the social environment into which we are born. Failure to develop these capacities is not to be explained by 'falls from grace' or 'ill will' or 'evil spirit possession', but rather through variant genetic development or blunt-force head trauma (psychopathy) or self-destructive socialisation (sociopathy).

Humans have been extraordinarily successful in their dramatic rise from a bare handful some 200 000 years ago to over 7 billion strong today. In

The Social Conquest of the Earth, E.O. Wilson attributes our advance in part to an altruism that is essential to our biological nature. Humans are 'eusocial', unlike most other species on the planet.⁵⁸ This term indicates that, in the very best of circumstances, we are capable of sacrificing our own self-interest for the sake of our group. In *The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined*, Stephen Pinker claims that humans have exhibited continual moral progress.⁵⁹ Violence has declined dramatically, he argues, as our definitions of 'our group' have grown to include all humans, not simply those to whom we are most closely connected through genes, language and culture.

Ancient African thinkers speculated that 'doing the right thing' was something that comes naturally to humans. And what comes naturally is in turn a gift of nature. Contemporary research efforts to merge ethics with the sciences of nature may give us an extraordinary impetus to re-examine the experience of our African ancestors in searching for new ways to ensure that we pass the gift of life on to our children's children.

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Re-discovering and Re-vitalising the Neglected Roots of Pan-Africanism

Ethiopianism for African Renaissance and Unity

Mammo Muchie and Hailemichael Demissie

INTRODUCTION

The history of the Ethiopian Connection to the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa is remarkably rich; even though it has not made it to the in-flight leisure magazines, as did the French connection and the Huguenots and other European settlements in South Africa. In the wake of the centenary of the ANC, it is timely to re-visit the Ethiopianism movement, which was the ideological front of the struggle against apartheid and colonialism in Southern Africa and beyond. Ethiopianism provided the countervailing theology to challenge the theology of white racism. The movement was effective in exploiting the deliberate ambiguity of the reference to 'Ethiopia', sometimes in its biblical Graeco-Roman usage, and sometimes in its modern usage, to refer to the Kingdom of Ethiopia and sometimes to both at the same time. The Graeco-Roman usage was invoked to capture the universal claim of the movement, while Ethiopia (as a reference to the free Abyssinian kingdom that was successful in fending off continual foreign aggression) was used to provide a concrete and immediate beacon of freedom for the then liberation movements in Africa and for freedom movements across the globe.

The lightning spread of the liberation theology, which emerged in the form of Ethiopianism, across the black population in South Africa, took the white racist government by surprise. The racists were so deeply threatened by what they called 'the pernicious Ethiopian propaganda' that they legislated to ban what was an otherwise theological church affair. Ethiopianism was the harbinger of the 'church and violence' debate that raged throughout the sixties and seventies. A narrative of the Ethiopianism movement in Southern Africa and its highs and lows in the scholarship on anti-apartheid and anti-colonial struggles is required to mitigate the apparent neglect of the philosophy and its contribution to African liberation, and to recapture the values that were advanced under this ideology. How Ethiopianism is understood and interpreted is of crucial significance to the current discourse

on African renaissance and unity and in standing up to the challenges ahead. As a scholar of Ethiopianism highlighted, 'To rake among the embers of Ethiopianism is to find a few sparks which may throw some light on the obscure roads into the African future ...'¹

'Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance' was the slogan adopted as the theme of the 20th ordinary session of the AU assembly held in Ethiopia in January, 2013. Bringing together the concepts of pan-Africanism and renaissance as the AU's chosen theme was not a thoughtless amalgamation of ideas: rather, it was a recognition of the link between the two ideas and their African roots and authorship. The idea of African Renaissance was aired long before its twenty-first century re-incarnation. It featured in the pan-African ideals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when it was known by various aliases, of which Ethiopianism was among the most prominent. The powerful narratives that were developed around Ethiopianism are of such significance that they continue to inform debates on the current quest for African unity and renaissance. Africa should look back and bring back the ideals and ethos of Ethiopianism to meet the challenges of the unfinished business of African unity and to stand up to the new and emerging challenges that are more subtle and insidious than the challenges that were faced during slavery, colonialism and apartheid. Africa is now in a situation reminiscent of the olden days. It is caught between old and new powers vying for their own spheres of influence in yet another edition of the 'scramble for Africa'. There cannot be a better time than these trying times to bring back the discursive arsenals from the early struggles under the rubric of Ethiopianism.

THE BEGINNINGS OF ETHIOPIANISM

The early flashes of Ethiopianism date back to the sixteenth century when African-American blacks, as slaves in America, found solace in the promise of a homeland in the empire of Ethiopia in the Nile region. The references to Ethiopia in the Bible provided them with an ideology that they could use for spiritual, political and cultural upliftment. The blacks in America, the West Indies and Europe, and in Africa itself, derived enormous inspiration from the Scriptures, in which the word Ethiopia occurs more than 90 times. By far the most widely quoted verse, 'probably the most widely quoted verse in Afro-American religious history', is Psalm 68:31: 'Ethiopia shall stretch her hands unto God'.² The verse was interpreted as pointing to the end of the curse on the black race – an end to the alienation of Africa from God. This was a European belief that was, to some extent, shared by blacks.³ Thus came into being the movement of Ethiopianism as a 'method of winning

Africa for Christ' and as a 'forerunner of the subsequent African philosophies that aimed at black unity to confront White power'.⁴

Some saw the beginning of the fulfilment of this prophetic verse on the political level. After the 1792-1800 successful slave insurrection in Haiti, it was declared: 'Thus doth Ethiopia begin to stretch forth her hand, from the sink of slavery, to freedom and equality'.⁵ The verse gave rise to 'a biblically-rooted pan-African hermeneutic' that later became a widely used source of inspiration and legitimisation of pan-Africanism.⁶ Garvey extensively used the Ethiopian discourse in his speeches and writings that was later known as Garveyism. It was this same verse that was included in speeches that motivated for the establishment of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), the precursor of the African National Congress (ANC).⁷

The main site of the Ethiopianism movement in Africa was southern Africa and some writers even confine it to southern Africa only.⁸ While it was a pan-African movement straddling the continent and the Atlantic, it was certainly more intense in southern Africa. Chronologically, the southern Africa experience was predated by the Ethiopianism movement in the New World, where black clergymen were excluded from full participation in church life. The black clergymen were barred from occupying higher positions in church administration, irrespective of their qualifications or fitness for the relevant office. In 1787, an Ethiopian church, the African Episcopal Methodist Church, was established under the leadership of a freed slave, Bishop Richard Allen, who withdrew from St George's Church in Philadelphia. Followers of this new church, who took part in the American War of Independence, wore a badge displaying the words 'Allen's Ethiopians'. Allen's Ethiopian movement spread, as one author put it, 'like the proverbial mustard seed'.⁹ In both America and southern Africa, the Ethiopianism movement was first a reaction to the discrimination in ecclesiastical administration and the outright marginalisation of black clergymen. Black clergymen underwent demeaning acts of de-selection for ordination and promotion to the clerical echelons. They were denied deserved promotion to the higher ranks of the clergy for no other reason than the colour of their skin. The white mission churches had an unwritten by-law that the ordination of blacks was to be avoided. Even when a black clergyman was ordained, he was stripped of the authority and privilege that he was supposed to have by virtue of his ordination. The fact that this act of discrimination took place in locations as far apart as America and South Africa, over a long period of time, was proof that it was a systemic practice, rather than a symptom of sporadic racism.

The reasons for the discontent of the black clergy that gave rise to the Ethiopianism movement, especially in Africa, range from the personal ambitions of individual black clergymen to doctrinal differences. The following summarises the principal causes of the movement:

... the frustrated desire of many Africans to become church leaders; colour prejudice practised by missionaries and their failure to live by the Christian brotherhood they proclaimed; disputes over church discipline rooted in differing moral standards; the precedent of schism and denominationalism in Western Christianity; personal ambition among Ethiopian founders and their conviction of a divine calling; the denial to black women Christians of adequate means of self-expression in church; and the availability of Scriptures as the basis for a critique of mission Christianity.¹⁰

The black clergy came to realise that the attempt to rectify the wrong-doings of the white clergy within existing church structures would come to no avail. The Reverend Mangena Mokone, founder of the 'Ethiopian Church of South Africa', concluded that 'This separation shows that we cannot be brothers'.¹¹ He further questioned 'If all this is so, where is justice? Where is brotherly love? Where is Christian sympathy?'¹² The option they resorted to was setting up their own independent churches and withdrawing from the white churches.

The first notable withdrawal from the white churches in southern Africa took place when Nehemiah Tile, a minister, who rose to prominence as an accomplished preacher in Thembuland, seceded from the Wesleyan Methodist church in 1884 – a hundred years after the first black church was established by Richard Allen in America. Tile's move was the first salvo heralding a long history of the Ethiopianism movement in Africa. It was such a significant milestone in the history of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa that Nelson Mandela himself paid tribute to the Thembu Church a century later:

... African clergymen sought to free themselves from the fetters of white missionaries by establishing African independent churches. One of the most celebrated breakaways was that of Nehemiah Tile, who founded the Tembu Church in the Transkei in 1884 ... That political movement was to culminate in the formation of the ANC in 1912. It is in this sense that the ANC trace the seeds of the formation of our organisation to the Ethiopian movement of the 1890s.¹³

The next major event in the history of Ethiopianism was the establishment of Reverend Mangena Mokone's church. After resigning from the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Pretoria, he set up his own church and called it the Ethiopian Church of South Africa. Mokone quickly established alliances with the American black churches, which shared a similar history of discrimination and which had passed through a similar route to independence. The number of Ethiopian churches was growing at an alarming rate for

the white authorities. 'Ethiopia' became the label for independent African churches that seceded from white mission churches. As Shepperson recounts, by 1912 in South Africa, the Ethiopianism movement has resulted in 76 independent churches; and three decades later the number has jumped to over 800.¹⁴ With their own specific history and denomination, Ethiopian churches are now believed to number more than 6 000.¹⁵

Ethiopianism was not a phenomenon confined only to the southern African region or the African diaspora in America. It was a movement that was fuelling the anti-colonial struggle in eastern and western Africa too. Jomo Kenyatta, certainly inspired by the movement, is quoted as saying that Ethiopianism was the most popular religious sect.¹⁶ In the then Nyasaland, the 1915 uprising led by John Chilembwe, a Baptist minister, who (like other Ethiopianists) broke away from the Mission Church, espoused Ethiopianism to finally become a national hero of independent Malawi.¹⁷ As late as the dying years of colonialism, Ethiopianism was fully operational, as evidenced by the establishment of the Kenyan Church of Christ in Africa in 1957, which withdrew from the Anglican sect in the same fashion as the rest of the Ethiopian churches.¹⁸

Ethiopianism continued to animate the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle, even in the 1970s and 1980s. The significance of its philosophy continues to inspire historians and scholars to this day. Writing in the 1980s about the revolutionary movements of the 1970s and 1980s, Mutero Chirenje warns against any attempt at pitting the Ethiopianism movement against the African revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s:

... if the activities of the Ethiopian movement and allied organisations ... are viewed in the context of their time, they will be seen to be no less acts of self-determination than are the armed struggles for national liberation now taking place throughout southern Africa.¹⁹

Ethiopianism is not a spent force, as implied by the fact that less and less of it is invoked in the post-colonial and post-apartheid discourse. The essence of Ethiopianism was articulated by one of the founders of the Ethiopian churches as being a movement aimed:

... to plant a self-supporting, self-governing and self-propagating African Church, which would produce a truly African type of Christianity, suited to the genius and needs of the race, and not a black copy of any European Church.²⁰

These ideals in their political dimensions are the ideals Africa has not yet realised and is still struggling to achieve. It is to be reckoned that

Ethiopianism has become even more relevant in the current context of twenty-first century exigencies and Africa's place in the twenty-first century. 'Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance', the theme of the jubilee of the OAU, resonates strongly with the ethos of Ethiopianism. The significance that the movement acquired over the centuries and the multiple meanings that it acquired have enriched the idea and augmented its potency as a source of inspiration for all freedom-seeking people around the globe. The multiplicity of its meaning is such an important feature of the concept of Ethiopianism that it deserves treating it on its own.

BETWEEN THE TWO MEANINGS OF ETHIOPIANISM

The Ethiopia in Ethiopianism is mainly the Ethiopia of the Graeco-Roman and biblical reference. How much overlap there is between the Ethiopia of the Graeco-Roman reference and the Kingdom of Ethiopia is still a matter of debate for historians. The concept of Ethiopianism reflects, to some extent, this debate that vacillates between the biblical Graeco-Roman reference and the Kingdom of Ethiopia. More often than not, the two references reinforce each other, owing to the endurance of the independence of the Kingdom in fending off European colonisation and encroachment, especially with the victory at Adwa and many other events – from the coronation of Ras Tafari as Haileselassie and his deification in Rastafarianism, to the foundation of the OAU in Addis Ababa.

In the latter days of the movement, reference to the Kingdom of Ethiopia, within the context of the movement, was more explicit. The Ethiopian movement acquired more political content as an anti-colonial movement, especially after the battle of Adwa, which bolstered 'the mythic status and redemptive symbolism of Ethiopia in the eyes of Africans at home and abroad'.²¹ For opponents of the movement and for those threatened by its expansion, the ambiguity compounded their anxiety. The convergence of the two senses of Ethiopia created a powerful synergy.

Ethiopianism, which began mainly as a reaction to discontent with church administration, was now becoming increasingly political, buoyed by the beacon of a free African Kingdom that brought a European power to its knees. The movement's identification with the Kingdom of Ethiopia reached new heights with the coronation of Haileselassie and the rise of Rastafarianism. Rastafarianism arose in Jamaica as a sequel to the Ethiopianism that was prevalent before it. With Haileselassie claiming biblical royal pedigree and taking the title of King of Kings, Lord of Lords, and Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, descending from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, the Kingdom of Ethiopia was literally seen in its Biblical

form as the 'black Zion' or the African 'promised land'.²² After the news of the coronation, there was a mobilisation among blacks in the New World for a mass exodus back to Africa.

When Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, Africans on the continent and in the diaspora saw it as an attack on their revered symbol of black history – Ethiopia, which was the 'centre of the African world'.²³ Ruth Iyob quotes Nnamdi Azikwe's homage to Ethiopia as a good example of how Ethiopia, 'the last vestige of black autocracy', was looked on by blacks around the world:

It represents the type of government which the forefathers of Africans established in this continent. [T]hat country will go down as one of the few survivors of the great powers of history ... [T]he continued existence of Ethiopia, after its contemporaries and their descendants had vanished from political history, is, and should be, an object of admiration.²⁴

The admiration was not without its practical implications, as it led to worldwide protest against Italy. The mobilisation against Italian aggression ranged from blacks enlisting in Harlem, New York, to fight for Ethiopia and South African dock workers protesting against the aggression by refusing to handle Italian cargo in Cape Town and Durban.²⁵ After the eviction of Italy from Ethiopia, the restoration of HaileSELLASIE was celebrated as a victory for Africa. Ethiopianism at this historical moment was invariably identified with the Ethiopian kingdom.

Ethiopia's several contributions to the pan-African cause further crystallised the identification of the Ethiopian Kingdom with the movement of Ethiopianism. The concept remains polysemous, especially as to whether the Ethiopia in Ethiopianism is the Kingdom of Ethiopia or the Ethiopia of the ancient Greeks and the Bible. However, since the two senses in which Ethiopia was used were complementary and reinforced each other, no historian agonises over the issue to such an extent as to de-link the two ideas.²⁶ Mandela and Mbeki speak of both Ethiopia and Ethiopianism. The symbolism Ethiopia set for Mandela is on many levels: from the logistics he was provided by the Kingdom (his first passport and military training) to observation at a ceremony where white military advisers bowed to a black monarch (HaileSELLASIE), were all significant moments for Mandela and the anti-apartheid struggle that had its roots in the Ethiopianism movement.²⁷ His impression of Ethiopia was articulated in his autobiography, where he said:

Ethiopia always had a special place in my imagination and the prospect of visiting Ethiopia attracted me more strongly than a trip to France, England

and America combined. I felt I would be visiting my own genesis, unearthing the roots of what made me an African.²⁸

For Thabo Mbeki, the link between Ethiopia and Ethiopianism is organic. He unifies the two ideas while referring to Ethiopia as providing 'the central organising idea for all Africans'. By evoking the battle of Adwa, King Menelik, and the geo-political role of Ethiopia and linking this with Pixley Seme's famous Columbia speech and the activities of Ethiopianists (like the first President of the ANC, John Dube, who was identified by the white authorities as 'a pronounced Ethiopian who ought to be watched'), Mbeki established that one cannot draw a line between Ethiopia as the East African nation and the Ethiopia of Ethiopianism.²⁹

The link between the history of Ethiopianism and the history of the Ethiopian Kingdom is at its strongest in the ideals that the movement was seeking to achieve and the ideal the Kingdom of Ethiopia represented – freedom. The concept has transcended the geographical connotations, developing into an abstract universal philosophy underlying the struggle against discrimination, racism and European white supremacy. It is a concept that appeals to all freedom-seeking people, irrespective of their background – racial, religious or otherwise.

The duality of Ethiopianism playing between the Ethiopia of the Bible and the East African Kingdom was an expression of yet another fundamental duality – the religious and political dimensions of Ethiopianism. The ecclesiastical beginnings of Ethiopianism have not, in any way, limited the concept from taking on purely political and even military and insurgent action as its mode of operation. Right at the start, the very name 'Ethiopia' was deeply political and profoundly subversive, as church historian Adrian Hastings recounts:

'Ethiopian' is an oddly misleading name for what has been characterised as ecclesiastical 'Ethiopianism', because it is not a Protestant name at all, but in itself is already evocative of quite other things. It is both symbolically African (proto-African, pan-African, one might say) and it can actually be found in the Bible. 'Where can you find the name of Dutch Reformed in the Bible?' or 'Methodist'. This is no idle question, but a very serious one. You have given us the Bible, then to the Bible we shall go. The names of Zion and Ethiopia are most undoubtedly there.³⁰

The seditious nature of the movement was well realised by the white regime that identified it as 'its most dangerous opponent'.³¹ Ethiopianism was the harbinger of the latter day 'church and violence' debate of the sixties and seventies, which demonstrated the political involvement of churches in the

starkest of its manifestations.³² The ANC moved to armed struggle while Albert Luthuli, a devout Christian who was opposed to violence, was its president – a paradox that can be explained by the polysemous concept of Ethiopianism.³³

A MOVEMENT AS MUCH POLITICAL AS IT IS ECCLESIASTICAL

During the early flashes of Ethiopianism, it was thought to be non-threatening by the white colonial authorities. Before it came to be labelled as the 'Ethiopian menace', it was thought to be a church affair with no or limited political implications. The clergymen who seceded from white governed churches were modest in their demand for independence. As Mangena Mokone, the founder of the Ethiopian Church of South Africa, put it in his resignation letter, the motive for leaving the church was 'to serve God in his own way'.³⁴ While the true reason behind this was not lost on his superior, to whom the resignation letter was tendered, he too down-played the significance of the resignation. The injustice that Mokone was made to endure and the racial discrimination against black clergymen, in particular the de-selection of black clergymen for higher office, were not mentioned in Mokone's resignation letter, nor in his superior's report to higher church authorities.

Initially, the movement appeared to be a religious movement with no qualms with colonial rule. This was an important tack to get a licence and recognition from the government. '[I]t was as important for the Ethiopians to have a political thrust as it was for them to conceal it'.³⁵ With the passage of time, 'a dialectical relationship between nationalism and Ethiopianism gradually appeared'.³⁶ Ethiopianism fuelled African nationalism, while African nationalism led to the proliferation of the independent churches.

It was, however, clear that the Ethiopianism movement was as much, if not more, political as it was religious. The revolting clergymen were expressing their protest at the discrimination that the church was practising against blacks – discrimination that was the order of the day with white settler rule, but which was evidently against the Christian teaching of justice and Christian brotherhood. The constitution of the Boer Republic of Transvaal stipulated that there was 'no equality in church or state between white and black people'.³⁷ It was, however, a shared position among black nationalists that such racism was not what Christianity taught and that Christianity was against it. The secessionist clergymen were unambiguous in their protest against discrimination, irrespective of the setting where it was taking place – church or government.

While the movement started as a religious movement, it was 'apparent that spiritual matters were not primary issues'.³⁸ Ethiopianism was a direct

anti-racist and anti-colonial movement. Writing about the rise of one of the earliest Ethiopian churches, in 1893 the *Cape Times* lamented in its editorial that 'it would be the height of folly to ignore the [Thembu church] ...'. It characterised the church as 'patriotic', 'political' and 'ecclesiastical'. As historian Mutero Chireje observed, the *Cape Times* was able to foresee the duality of the concept of Ethiopianism – both the religious and political aspects of Ethiopianism – which he thought was not sufficiently stressed in studies of Ethiopianism.³⁹ Recent literature also points out that the view that Ethiopianism was apolitical negatively impacted the research on the Christianity and politics relationship in Africa – a relationship that has yet to be defined to this day.⁴⁰

ETHIOPIANISM TODAY

Ethiopianism today seems to have been relegated to the archives section of the anti-racial, anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle. It was declared 'finished' when the focus was away from pan-African struggles of liberation and towards regional and national liberation struggles. George Shepperson, a scholar of Ethiopianism, thus concluded:

It seems that Ethiopianism is finished as a basis for political action and that it is now no more than a sentimental, nebulous symbol around which the bitter memories of intentions of both races may, on occasion, group themselves.

In its ecclesiastical sense, Ethiopianism has passed its sell-by-date. In the era of talk of the possibility of a black Pope, and with powerful churches led by black pastors, bishops and cardinals, the question of justice and fairness within church governance might have been addressed to a great level of satisfaction as far as debarring black clergymen from the church hierarchy is concerned.

However, churches are not institutions merely preoccupied with their own internal affairs. The social mission that they have assumed harks back to the precepts of the Ethiopianism movement more in the political than in the ecclesiastical sense. In its political sense, Ethiopianism is alive and kicking, with a variegated purpose responsive to the demands of the day. African theology is called upon to confront corrupt leaders, to question the neoliberal ideology wreaking havoc on the African populace, and to be the voice for the voiceless. It is argued that African theology should interrogate concepts such as African Renaissance in light of 'black theology, which takes socio-economic realities seriously'.⁴¹ Ethiopianism has been a prominent facet of black theology, which remains operational despite the push by

mainstream politics to relegate it into irrelevance on the juridical basis of the separation of state and church. Churches are often prodded not to recoil from politics. As a South African clergyman put it: 'If politics is the art of the actual, Christian hope seeks its transformation'.⁴²

The social activism of churches is well documented in its various forms. Among the church movements espousing social activism is the Liberation Theology movement, which had a wide base in South America. This movement advocates active church involvement in the struggle for social justice, radical economic structural change and the rights of the poor. Liberation theology is overtly political and is even said to marry Marxism with Christian theology, with its followers mainly identified as 'the Catholic and Protestant left'.⁴³ The Liberation Theology movement and the Ethiopianist movement share a common purpose, as both movements seek to do 'theology from the perspective of the oppressed'.⁴⁴ In its African and Protestant chapter, the liberation theology movement finds expression in the works of Ghanaian pastor Dr Mensah Otabil. Otabil sought to revive Ethiopianism as a 'Christianised sequel to pan-Africanism' – in effect completing the circle by going back to the beginnings of pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism, as shown in the discussion above, had its origins in the independent black churches that were the seedbed of the pan-African struggle. Ethiopianism was a name given to the pan-African movement until the beginnings of the twentieth century.

Otabil's teaching was openly political, with incisive criticism of African governments, the world economic system, the structural adjustment programme prescribed for Africa, neo-colonialism, the African mentality of 'slavery' and the 'begging attitude'. His book, *Beyond the Rivers of Ethiopia: A Biblical Revelation on God's Purpose for the Black Race*, is thought to have laid the basis for what has been called an 'Evangelical Pentecostal Liberation Theology'.⁴⁵ Otabil's liberation theology is fundamentally political, in the same way as Ethiopianism was. He is quoted as saying that Christians can't say 'let's leave politics to the politicians'. In language that is starkly reminiscent of the Ethiopianism of the nineteenth century, Otabil attacks the twenty-first global economic structure:

The economy is controlled by multi-nationals. We worked for them to create wealth for them to take it out of the country. We were hewers of wood and drawers of water. I prayed to God to prosper, but we have to change economic structures and social structures.⁴⁶

Otabil's work was certainly inspired by Ethiopianism and Pan-Africanism and is testament to the relevance of Ethiopianism to present-day Africa and its quest for a dignified role in the global economic and political sphere.

The relevance of Ethiopianism has been poignantly articulated in Mbeki's appeal to the African intelligentsia:

And thus would our contemporary intelligentsia draw inspiration from the African intellectuals of the 19th century, to give birth to a new Ethiopianism that would enable Africa to claim the 21st century.⁴⁷

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ETHIOPIANISM, AFRICAN RENAISSANCE AND UNITY

The history of Ethiopianism still animates the struggle for pan-Africanism and African Renaissance. It would be an inexcusable omission if the chapter on Ethiopianism is missing in any history book on the anti-colonialism and anti-apartheid struggles and more so if it is over-looked in the search for inspiration and guidance. As we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the OAU, it is imperative that we look back to the early history of pan-Africanism and African Renaissance. The value of Ethiopianism couldn't be any higher than at the jubilee celebration of the pan-African organisation – a time for reflection and action. The pan-African movement, for which Ethiopianism was the moniker until the early years of the twentieth century, is indispensable in informing the trajectories that Pan-Africanism should take. As Shepperson put it, 'To rake among the embers of Ethiopianism is to find a few sparks which may throw some light on the obscure roads into the African future'.⁴⁸ And of late this argument has been updated: 'We cannot understand the history and substance of the pan-African movement without drawing heavily upon sources now classified as Afro-American Studies, on the one hand, and Caribbean Studies, on the other'.⁴⁹ One may then ask if Afro-American and Caribbean Studies can maintain their essence without Ethiopianism.

The ethos of Ethiopianism lives on, despite the liberation of the continent from colonialism and apartheid. The post-colonial condition failed to bring about the liberation that would see Africa stand on its own. In the wake of independence, Africa found itself under the tutelage of former colonial powers who were still dictating Africa's terms of engagement. This state of affairs underwent several christenings, from neo-colonialism to empire, from globalisation to coloniality. The net effect has been that Africa is denied the right to decide for itself, let alone decide for the world. Fifty years on from independence, the quest for genuine liberation stands unanswered. It is back to square one for Africa and by choosing the theme of Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance, the AU is in effect calling for movements like Ethiopianism to be brought back to inform today's efforts at Africa's genuine liberation.

No-one is under any illusion about what independence has brought to Africa. With the newly independent states of Africa came 'slavery by consent', which supplanted 'slavery by coercion' under colonialism. This predicament is now captured by a neologism – coloniality. Ramon Grosfoguel expounds the state of coloniality under which post-independence Africa found itself:

One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonisation of the world. The heterogeneous and multi-global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonisation of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the colonial matrix. With juridical political colonisation we moved from a period of 'global colonialism' to the current period of global coloniality. Although colonial administrations have almost entirely been eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organised into independent states, non-European people are still living under crude European/Euro-American exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchies of European versus non-European remain in place and are entangled with the international division of labour and accumulation of capital at a world scale.⁵⁰

Living under the state of coloniality, as described above, is set to introduce the worst forms of exploitation that humanity has seen in terms of its sophistication, subtlety and brutality. The encounters with the international financial institutions (IFIs), from SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programs) to PRSPs (Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers) have shown that it is the Euro-Americans who call the shots. In cases where countries are formally said to be free not to follow the prescriptions of the IFIs, presenting a semblance of formal political independence, African countries couldn't act otherwise than according to the prescription. The declaration that they are free ignores what Chimni calls 'the factor of structural coercion', whereby the countries are rendered powerless to challenge IFI prescriptions.⁵¹ Compliance with the IFI prescription is achieved 'by the formulation of a compelling and authoritative vision of society, of progress, and of the individual'.⁵² This kind of domination is a new form of colonialism, dubbed 'post-modern colonialism', where 'control of land or political organisation or nation-states is less important than power over consciousness and consumption'.⁵³

Post-modern colonialism or coloniality is what describes the state of African agency today. The evaluation by Chris Lansberg clearly depicts the scene:

At present, African states are not taking ownership of the international and partnership agenda, instead allowing it to drift and hover, thereby playing

into the hands of Western powers that, by nature and tradition, show little interest in African issues, beyond ensuring the continent can yield up its limitless resources. Any concerns Africa itself may have are pushed to the margins, where they will stay unless clearly voiced.⁵⁴

Africa, by choosing its own path of development and by reclaiming its agency, could shun the new modalities of exploitation. The philosophy of Ethiopianism (as reflected in the African Renaissance concept of self-worth, self-reliance and freedom to decide own destiny), offers much needed guidance to navigate the turbulent waters of globalisation. Africa has the power not to be restrained by what some pop-globalisation theorists have called 'the golden straitjacket'.⁵⁵ It has the discursive power and the historical justification to claim the right to re-define globalisation in its own terms.

The African Renaissance discourse leaves much to be desired in terms of clarity and the adequacy of content. One of the reasons for this is the close association of the idea with Thabo Mbeki. Some commentators have even detected it as a danger – and rightly so. As Chris Landsberg observed, there has been a consistent tendency among African leaders to undo ideas and initiatives having to do with their predecessors.⁵⁶ The idea of African Renaissance is no exception, which is evident from President Jacob Zuma's criticism of the African Renaissance idea that his predecessor popularised. Zuma said of the African Renaissance, 'The call for an African Renaissance is threatening to become a fashionable concept, while remaining largely a mystery to the majority of Africans'.⁵⁷

Zuma's criticism of the African Renaissance concept is also shared by scholarly writers, who underscore that the idea remains largely an 'empty vessel' with a high sentiment low substance matrix. Ethiopianism serves to address this problematisation of the African Renaissance concept. The identification of the concept with Thabo Mbeki, while acknowledging the credit that is due to him, has made the concept vulnerable to all sorts of criticisms. Even criticisms of Mbeki's other policies sneak in as criticisms of the African Renaissance by mere association, which turns the debate rather hazy and compounds what Zuma has said of the concept above. Ethiopianism offers the requisite explanation that would put flesh on the bare bones of the African Renaissance concept. What Mbeki has defined as African Renaissance is very much what Ethiopianists were demanding. The essence of Ethiopianism was crisply put by the Zimbabwean historian, Mutero Chirenje, as follows: 'Ethiopianism became a generic term to describe a whole range of the black man's efforts to improve his religious, educational and political status in society'.⁵⁸

Mbeki was indeed drawing heavily on the philosophy of the Ethiopianist movement when he defined African Renaissance in this way:

We have a duty to define ourselves. We speak about the need for African Renaissance, in part, so that we, ourselves and not another, determine who we are, what we stand for, what our vision and hopes are, how we do things, what programmes we adopt to make our lives worth living, who we relate to and how.⁵⁹

It was in strikingly similar terms that Ethiopianism was defined during its early heyday. The Ethiopianist position was summarised by the editor of the *Rand Daily Mail* as follows:

This is our country; these are our farms, and our mines, why are we not working them for ourselves and for our benefit, instead of working for the white people and giving them all the benefit?⁶⁰

Mbeki's use of the term 'African Renaissance' is, at best, open to interpretation and it is no wonder the charges of a 'North-bound gaze' and the pitting of Afrocentric against Eurocentric ideas were levelled against it.⁶¹ While his definition (quoted above) makes it abundantly clear that an Eurocentric agenda in no way corrupts the concept, the very use of the term and the ambiguity that surrounds it has drawn several criticisms. Mbeki's critics have taken issue with the European Renaissance, arguing that the European Renaissance has led to colonialism and slavery, as the inventions and instruments that it produced were deployed to carry out these projects. European Renaissance is therefore considered as 'the negation of [the colonised and enslaved people's] achievement'.⁶² On a different score, if Africa is to emulate the European Renaissance, it is missing the plot, as the European Renaissance has long become passé and Europe has moved on and relished the enlightenment transcending the legacies of the Renaissance.⁶³ Still others pose questions on whether or not Africa has the prerequisites for a European type of renaissance.⁶⁴ On the latter question, it is asked if Africa is investing in the technologies of the century and if it is ready to appropriate these technologies in 'its own way' (to use the refrain from the founder of the Ethiopian church, the Rev. Mangena Mokone).

While modern technologies have been serving as vectors of globalisation and Western dominance, this should not obscure the emancipatory power of technologies. The Internet still remains an instrument of the Western cultural and epistemological hegemony. However, it has enormous power to resist such hegemony and to project African culture and knowledge on the world stage. Africa needs to appropriate the technology in its own terms, just as the Ethiopianists did while appropriating Christianity. Ethiopianism did not reject Christianity in its entirety; and it is certainly short of 'the unapologetic distancing from the Christianity of the white man' expressed

through defection to Islam, for example.⁶⁵ Ethiopianism deployed Christianity's own arsenals to fight the racism of the missionaries and their role as proxies of and promoters of colonial masters. The white mission churches were agents of an earlier phase of globalisation. It was clear that the mission churches had the objective of producing 'Africans who would be serviceable for the project of colonialism'.⁶⁶ The Ethiopianist movement took upon itself the duty to tease out the chaff from the wheat, while embracing the globalisation of that era with a firm assertion that it should be on Africa's terms. The establishment of independent Ethiopian churches across Africa was a counter-homogenising move against European-led globalisation. Ethiopianism teaches that resistance against globalisation and the struggle to preserve African identity, culture and knowledge does not entail a wholesale rejection of what globalisation is all about. This lesson couldn't be more relevant than in the context of the on-going globalisation process. Africa needs to play its part in this process and should avoid being cornered to the ghetto of the 'global village' that technology is instituting. Africa should not be left at the margins of this process, but should be influencing and shaping its future, not only for Africa's benefit, but for the benefit of all humanity. This is exactly what Ethiopianism did by re-inventing Christian theology for the world in a non-racial and truly universal way. The contemporary equivalent of Ethiopianism in the globalisation discourse finds expression in the various proposals to do away with the discontents of globalisation, and the calls for humane globalisation. In view of the handling of the issues of its days by the Ethiopianist movement, present-day anti- or alternative globalisation discourses cannot be taken as the first of their kind.

CONCLUSION

The relevance of Ethiopianism to contemporary socio-political discourse can be questioned on the basis of the aggressive secularism that is backed up by the constitutional order that sanctions the separation of church and state. However, as shown in this contribution, the ideals of Ethiopianism are beyond the ecclesiastical and directly address socio-political issues that could be categorised as purely secular matters. Ethiopianism informs the way Africa should approach globalisation issues, Western technological dominance and dominance in knowledge production as a whole. As Ethiopianism overcame the temptation to totally reject the Christianity of the white man, Africa should also resist the over-zealous aversion towards the globalisation tide or ideas coming from the developed world. In the encounter with Eurocentric ideas, what Africa should do is exactly what the Ethiopianists did: process the new ideas, but 'in its own way'. An African Renaissance

should not necessarily emulate the European Renaissance; but that should not lead to the conclusion that Africa cannot learn from the European Renaissance – not only from its achievements, but also from its failures.

Ethiopianism successfully demonstrated that racial separation was not what Christianity taught. It took secessionist Ethiopian churches to establish this truth for the whole world. The Ethiopian churches excelled in their understanding of the scriptures. The same excellence is what Du Bois was after when he encouraged negro church, negro college, negro public school, negro business and industrial enterprises. It was not the objective of entrenching racial separation that Du Bois was suggesting.⁶⁷ His objective was showing negro efficiency and ingenuity and proving to the world how pointless racial segregation is.

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Applying Categorical Conversion to the Study of the African Liberation Day Process

John Trimble

INTRODUCTION

Nkrumah developed a number of concepts and constructs to assist in activism around African liberation. The African personality, the myth of the Third World, the Three-zone Theory, calls for an all-African army, All-African People's Revolutionary Party, All-African Committee for Political Coordination and categorical conversion (CC), are some of the most important. The following sections provide an introduction to each of these concepts.

AFRICAN PERSONALITY

The African personality is a synthesis of the three African experiences – traditional Africa, Euro-Christian and Islamic influences. The base is the traditional African experience that lasted thousands of years before the other two experiences. They lasted only hundreds of years. Each experience brings its positives and negatives. It is the task of activists to recognise this African identity and deal with the complexities to assert the richness of the African culture. This positive approach will arm African people with the tenacity that is our heritage. It will supply us with the self-confidence that is needed to overcome the oppression of imperialism and neo-colonialism. Some Afro-centric writers assert that Nkrumah's emphasis on African personality replaced Marxist emphasis on the leading role of the worker. 'Nkrumah added socialism to the definition of pan-Africanism. Yet he attributed it not to the inevitable march of the worker. Nkrumah saw the driving force for progress as the Revolutionary African Personality'.¹ Nkrumah, in his autobiography, states:

... the African Personality is merely a term expressing cultural and social bonds which unite Africans and people of African descent. It is a concept of the African nation and is not associated with a particular state, language, religion, political system, or colour of the skin. For those who project it, it

expresses identification not only with Africa's historical past, but with the struggle of the African people in the African Revolution to liberate and unify the continent and to build a just society.²

Nkrumah emphasised the role of the peasant-worker collaboration to achieve a socialist transformation:

Socialism can only be achieved through class struggle ... The African bourgeoisie provides a bridge for continued imperialist and neocolonialist domination and exploitation. The bridge must be destroyed. This can be done by a worker-peasant solidarity organized and directed by a vanguard socialist revolutionary Party.³

Nkrumah continues to emphasise the linkage between socialism and the African personality in one of his final writings. 'A unified and socialist society in which the African Personality will find full expression can and must be constructed'.⁴

MYTH OF THE THIRD WORLD

Nkrumah exposed the notion of the Third World as the confusion that it is. The emphasis on a Third World avoids the intense struggle needed when we confront the reality that there is capitalism and its supporters and those that fight to end capitalism. There is no middle ground, no Third or Fourth World. Under-developed countries will either take the path of revolution and fight for socialist transformation or sink into the sea of pragmatism and opportunism and take the road of neo-colonialism that assists imperialism's effort to maintain capitalism. Nkrumah points out:

... the 'Third World' is neither a practical political concept nor a reality. It is merely a misused expression, which has come to mean everything and nothing. It has been used incorrectly, by both those committed to the revolutionary struggle and by those who are its deadly enemies. The Western press has gladly made use of it to serve its own ends by associating it with racism, and by equating it with concepts such as non-alignment, neutralism and co-existence. It has thus helped to prevent the full weight of the so-called 'Third World' being identified openly and decisively as part of the socialist world.⁵

THREE-ZONE THEORY

The Three-zone Theory postured that under-developed countries existed in three formations: liberated zones, contested zones and enemy-held zones.

It is important to steadfastly support liberated zones. They serve as the example of what we are capable of and also serve as a base of support for the fight that we must take to contested zones and enemy-held zones. How has the end of colonialism affected the potential to apply the Three-zone Theory? Today, we have no liberated zones in Africa. With the end of colonialism and apartheid, are any states in Africa truly enemy held? If not, then all of Africa is in various stages of contested zones. Does this mean there is a need to develop criteria for different stages of contested zones and different degrees of neo-colonialism?

ALL-AFRICAN ORGANISING STRUCTURES

In his *Handbook on Revolutionary Warfare*, Nkrumah called for the building of an all-African army to wage the needed armed struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism. This is an army dedicated to fighting to liberate the whole of Africa. This is an army that does not recognise colonial boundaries and is always at the service of the masses of Africans. There is a need for an all-African political party that practises revolution and holds its objective to be the total liberation and unification of Africa under scientific socialism. From Nkrumah's times until today, we find a plethora of political forces in Africa and the African Diaspora struggling against imperialism and supporting the unification of Africa. Nkrumah recognised that these parties, armies, movements and other formations must be brought together and called for an All-African Committee for Political Coordination.

The formation of a political party linking all liberated territories and struggling parties under a common ideology will smooth the way for eventual continental unity, and will at the same time greatly assist the prosecution of the all-African people's war. To assist the process of its formation, an All-African Committee for Political Co-ordination (AACPC) should be established to act as a liaison between all parties which recognise the urgent necessity of conducting an organised and unified struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism.⁶

This task remains one of Africa's most important challenges.

CATEGORIAL CONVERSION

Categorical Conversion (CC) is perhaps the most complex of his contributions. This theoretical contribution recognises the primacy of matter as the basic category of reality, but affirms the importance of the derivative categories that emerge from qualitative changes in matter and all material

circumstances. CC is a scientific principle that can be demonstrated through physical sciences and social sciences. Its strength is through its application to social circumstances in an effort to gain ideological clarity.

By no means are these all of Nkrumah's practical and theoretical contributions. However, these are sufficient to demonstrate his genius. CC, due to its complexity, is one of the least discussed of President Nkrumah's contributions.

METHODOLOGY

This chapter employs Kwame Nkrumah's concept of CC to particular situations of activism. The author has been involved in African liberation activism over the past 40 years. CC is a concept developed by Kwame Nkrumah in *Consciencism Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization*. Matter is a plenum of forces in tension. This tension is constantly subject to quantitative changes. However, at a critical juncture, the plenum of forces experiences a qualitative change, resulting in a qualitatively different *plenum of forces in tension*, as well as a higher by-product. This by-product is of a different categorial type than the forces in tension that created the by-product. We apply this concept to the class struggle that is inherent in activism. The emergent by-products are political consciousness and ideological development. These by-products are in a different category than activism. Political consciousness and ideological development are real, yet immaterial.

DISCUSSION AND RESULTS

APPLYING CATEGORIAL CONVERSION

In an effort to combat idealism, many activists and theorists over-emphasise materialism. While material realities are primary, they are not the only realities. Consciousness and ideology, as categories emergent from experience, are important in waging revolution. Nkrumah recognised this. 'By categorial conversion, I mean such a thing as the emergence of self-consciousness from that which is not self-conscious; such as the emergence of mind from matter, of quality from quantity'.⁷

Many writers and activists have effectively applied dialectical and historical materialism to analysing social reality.⁸ They are effective tools of analysis. CC expands what dialectical and historical materialism have to offer. Both dialectical and historical materialism deal with the quantitative changes that take place in matter and how a leap or qualitative change

leaves us with a new material reality. However, historical and dialectical materialism do not effectively deal with the by-products of this quantitative change and qualitative transformation – namely consciousness and ideological development. This omission results in limitations on the effectiveness of the use of dialectical and historical materialism by activists.

This effort of applying CC to the struggle to institutionalise African Liberation Day is an effort to demonstrate the significance of CC as a theoretical tool of the African revolution. At the same time, our analysis provides evidence of the importance of the African Liberation Day process in the broader pan-African struggle. We hope to lay the groundwork for furthering the pan-African struggle, by showing how the consciousness and ideological development, which are the emergent properties from the collective work around African Liberation Day, will make the collective movement stronger and more revolutionary.

The roots of African Liberation Day lie with Nkrumah's call for Africa Freedom Day in 1958, soon after the independence of Ghana. This set the groundwork for the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the declaration, in 1963, that 25 May was to be African Liberation Day (ALD). Since then, ALD programmes and celebrations have been organised on every continent.

The focus of our analysis is on ALDs from 1974 to 2012 that the author has participated in. However, this effort addresses other ALDs during this time period and the resultant immaterial developments. The years 1974-75 saw a host of large ALD mobilisations across the African diaspora, as a largely uncoordinated response to heightened consciousness over the liberation struggles in southern Africa. The author draws on his participation in ALDs in: Oakland in 1974, 1975 and 1979; in Washington, DC from 1976 to 2012; in 2008 in Kenya; and 2004 to 2012 in Zimbabwe and Azania/South Africa.

This is not an antidotal analysis, but a conscientious effort to put forward how CC can be applied to better understand – and therefore better implement – its by-products of heightened consciousness and ideological development. This study involves both: a micro-application of CC, looking at the individual's material reality, qualitative leaps and ideological growth; as well as a macro-application of CC. In the macro-case, the forces in tension surrounding the process of ALD are examined, with the intent to determine the quantitative and qualitative developments and the ideological consequences that result from these qualitative developments.

MICRO-ANALYSIS OF ALD PROCESS

In 1973 and 1974, the author was involved in a campaign by employees at HP (then Hewlett Packard) to end the corporation's involvement in South

Africa. At first, HP was receptive to employee involvement and encouraged an investigation. They even allowed employees to meet with HP's South African Director of Operations. When it was clear that the majority of the committee supported disengagement from the apartheid regime, corporate headquarters called for the disbanding of the committee. The liberal white managers on the committee insisted on cooperating with the corporate directive. The author confronted the corporate Director for Equal Employment on how HP could, in clear conscience, remain in South Africa. The Director's response was that if HP did not remain, other computing companies would come and make the profits, and that the only approach to disengagement was a national response. The tension within the committee and between the committee and corporate management resulted in the breakup of the committee. In analysing this situation using CC, the immaterial gain from this experience was a heightened consciousness concerning: 1) the vacillating nature of white liberals in America; 2) how, under capitalism, profits override all concerns about human rights; and 3) how ending apartheid and supporting African liberation required broad support and African leadership.

This heightened consciousness pushed the author to participate in African Liberation Day in Oakland, California, USA in 1974 and to seek out and work with the ALD committee to assist in organising ALD in Oakland in 1975. Africans, born in the USA and living in Oakland and San Francisco, led this effort. There was friction between those who considered themselves Marxists and those considered to be African nationalists. Despite the tension, ALD in Oakland was able to mobilise thousands in support of the African liberation struggle. In this search for a broad-based organisation working for African liberation, the author was introduced to the All-African People's Revolutionary Party (AAPRP) in 1975. The AAPRP called for a global organisation to support African liberation, with the overall objective of a unified socialist Africa. The tension around ALD pitted forces supporting Marxism, African nationalism and pan-Africanism against each other. The author was encouraged to attend ALD in Washington, DC in 1976. This was a massive organising effort, with thousands in attendance. Buses of participants came from Illinois, Ohio and North Carolina, as well as neighbouring states. ALD spanned two days, with a symposium on Friday and a march and rally on Saturday. It was much bigger than the ALDs in Oakland. Representatives from a wide range of liberation movements gave presentations. In this battle of ideas, the author grasped the importance of balancing African identity and allegiance with African unity and scientific socialism. This was an important ideological development that reflects the CC process. Heightened consciousness was the result of activism around ALD. Heightened revolutionary consciousness brings on increased activism.

In 1977, the AAPRP requested organisers to come and assist with ALD mobilisation. They requested that organisers arrive on the first of May. The author drove from California to arrive on 1 May to spend the next three-and-a-half weeks mobilising across Washington DC for ALD. This involved organising all day, seven days a week: leafleting, speaking, pasting up posters and meeting, all to help mobilise for ALD. This intense collective organising was eye opening. It was hard work, but rewarding. The quantitative results were thousands of people mobilised to attend the political education symposium and rally and march to the White House in Washington, DC to call for the end of colonialism and apartheid in Africa. For the author, the qualitative result was heightened consciousness. Understanding ALD as a process, not simply a given day, was an important by-product of this work done during May 1977. The tension of collective work over 16-hour days and confronting strangers (sometime hostile) about the importance of Africa, had its immaterial by-product. CC provided the reality that revolutionary struggle needed to be a full-time effort.

The consciousness gained from ALD organising became a driving force in supporting the institutionalisation of ALD. In 1983, the author supported the AAPRP's call to expand ALD organising from Washington DC to five locations in the USA, as well as London, Canada and the Caribbean. Since then, the author has helped with organising ALD across the USA (in Sacramento, California; Jackson, Mississippi; Atlanta, Georgia) and in Africa (in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe; Nairobi, Kenya; Limpopo, Soweto and Yeoville in Azania/South Africa). Each experience brings a new awareness. This is the process of CC and its impact on the individual.

MACRO-ANALYSIS OF THE ALD PROCESS

Most importantly, ALD was and continues to be a collective process and a collective experience. CC applied to this collective process must highlight the collective ideological developments derived from ALD activism. In the early 1970s, the formation of African Liberation support committees (ALSC) reflected a growing collective consciousness of the need to confront colonisation and apartheid in Africa on a mass level. ALD became the signature activity of ALSC. ALD became the most prominent point of mass contact for the various African liberation movements. A range of organisations and individual activists competed for ideological and leadership space within the ALSCs. The AAPRP decided to break from coalition-based ALD and organise ALD in Washington, DC along clear pan-African ideological lines. This was a purposeful decision, based on the collective ideological development of the AAPRP. Through its earlier participation in ALD, the AAPRP came to recognise that the primacy of Africa and the objective of one unified

socialist Africa must be the focus of the ALD process. The AAPRP ALD, held at Howard University and Malcolm X Park in Washington DC, was the largest and most prominent mobilisation in North America. The theme 'Take ALD back to Africa' sent a clear message of the primacy of Africa to participants, as well as to competing organisations. This heightened the tension among the nationalist, Marxist and pan-African forces organising ALD in the diaspora. This ideological contention was the immaterial by-product, the result of CC and of the massive activism around ALD. In 1977, this led forces opposed to pan-Africanism to plan two additional ALDs to compete with that of the AAPRP. The success of ALD 1976 and associated work that year produced increased numbers of organisers committed to pan-Africanism.

In 1977, three car-loads of organisers left California and two car-loads left Tennessee four weeks before ALD (1977) and joined local organisers from Washington DC and Maryland to conduct a full-time blitz of the DC metropolitan area. These teams worked 12-18 hours a day, handing out hundreds of thousands of leaflets and pasting up thousands of posters across the city. This was only possible because of the collective ideological commitment gained from the previous year's activism. For dozens of these activists, this was the first experience of full-time organising for weeks on end. This collective activism would lead to further development in the ideological sphere. The collective activism not only armed young organisers with material skills they would take back to their respective organising communities, but provided a clearer mindset (the immaterial by-product of CC) that would allow organisers to more effectively wage the battle of ideas.

Each collective organising initiative should be examined employing CC. What are the contending forces during the initiative? How does the initiative result in changes in the tension between these forces? Which forces emerge stronger and which are weakened? What are the immaterial gains of the different contending forces? The ALD process continued to grow through the 1970s and 1980s. As ALD activism mobilised and organised more people, the resulting CC by-product of heightened ideological consciousness had a lasting impact. This global work created a global ideological consciousness opposed to colonialism and apartheid.

The 1990 release of Nelson Mandela and subsequent elections in Azania/South Africa marked the official end of apartheid. The end of formal colonialism and apartheid shifted the forces in tension in Africa and globally around African liberation. The dominant thinking that colonialism had ended and Africans were free to make their own choices was reflected in a reduced participation in ALD globally. Many countries, including South Africa, have renamed ALD Africa Day. In South Africa, government-supported

celebrations are mainly festive and generally do not address the need to defeat neo-colonialism nor the need for a unified socialist Africa. Only a portion of the population that fought to end colonialism and apartheid realised the dangers of neo-colonialism. The end of colonialism and apartheid represented a qualitative and positive material shift in forces contending in Africa. However, electoral concessions gave many the illusion of power. CC unleashed the misconceived notion that Africa was truly liberated and free.

This is the danger in winning concessions and speaks to why it is important, in understanding CC, to consider all immaterial derivatives from material gains. Pan-Africanists, armed with an understanding that only a unified socialist Africa would bring true liberation and true power to Africa, realised that the concessions of political independence, with Africa divided into more than 50 states, did not provide economic independence.

Anticipating the confusion following political independence, accompanied by a deepening of neo-colonialism, pan-African forces intensified their work to institutionalise ALD. The AAPRP is leading efforts to link the various pan-African forces organising ALD.⁹ In 2013, the AAPRP linked together over twenty-five ALD processes across Africa, Europe, the Caribbean and the Americas. Information on most of these can be found on the ALD website.¹⁰

CONCLUSION

Micro-analysis shows the potential to use CC to examine individual ideological development. This approach should be examined in more detail and presented as an approach for an individual to understand how an individual's activism can result in ideological development.

The macro-analysis implementation of CC allows the assessment of movements and broad activist processes with a clearer understanding of the ideological consequences of quantitative and qualitative changes of the forces in tension. This application of CC to the ALD process is a proof of concept. It provides an example that should be extended to other activist processes. It is recommended that a broader set of activists and academics employ this process of CC to: 1) further study the process of ALD; and 2) identify other activist processes that contribute to ideological change.

The pan-African forces will continue to grow numerically and ideologically and work toward the institutionalisation of ALD. This application of CC will contribute directly to the struggle to unify Africa under scientific socialism and, more broadly, contribute to a world free of borders, where people contribute based on their ability and receive based on their needs.

FUTURE WORK

Nkrumah presents CC as an extension of dialectical and historical materialism and a contribution to philosophical materialism. Future work will explore, in depth, the philosophical implications of types of higher order. This research will also take into account other theorists and activists who expanded the initial concepts of dialectical and historical materialism.¹¹ There is space for detailed research on the nature of ideological development that results from activism. While ideological development and political consciousness are clearly of a different type than the material nature of the activism, do these by-products have their sub-types and can they be quantified? These and other related questions will be explored in future investigations.

CC is an effective approach to critical thinking and scientific examination. A considerable amount of research has been done on different approaches to critical thinking and scientific methodologies. Efforts to link and contrast CC to other approaches to critical thinking and scientific methodology will be important.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I must acknowledge the ideological struggle and activist work of the current and former organisers within the AAPRP, who contributed to my ideological development and to the collective consciousness of the pan-African movement. I appreciate the efforts of the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA) in continuing their support for the Scramble for Africa Conference. It plays a key role in institutionalising ALD.

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Institutional and Leadership Rebirth as Prerequisites for Africa's Social, Economic and Political Transformation

Westen Shilaho

INTRODUCTION

The chapter explores the role of visionary leadership and institutions in Africa's quest for democratic consolidation, entrenchment of the rule of law and constitutionalism since the advent of multiparty politics in the early 1990s. It locates the challenge of weak institutions in most African countries to the legacy of colonialism, one party authoritarianism and military dictatorships. The salient point is that some countries stood out in the sense that they established competitive multiparty politics when restriction of the political space by big men was the norm. Some of them, such as Botswana and Mauritius, had progressed in consolidating democracy and ranked high on the continent in human development indices, while others regressed. Hence choices by the first-generation African leaders were either a harbinger of political stability and economic progress or a recipe for divisive and destructive politics and economic turmoil. The chapter shows that, depending on the quality of elections they can either torpedo a democratic process or anchor it. However, the lingering challenge is that, owing to institutions without checks and balances, and personal rule politics,¹ credible and controversy-free elections are rare in Africa.

The chapter further argues that it is incumbent upon African countries to promote regional and continental integration in order to overcome some of the social, economic and political challenges whose origin predate the wave of plural politics. In this regard, the African Union (AU) and its affiliate institutions have the responsibility of spearheading Africa's transformation. Even so, the AU itself needs to overcome challenges that bedevilled its precursor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), such as the organisational deficiencies and the impunity (used throughout this chapter, to mean exemption from punishment or freedom from injurious consequences of an action) that rendered the OAU unable to meet the aspirations of the

African citizenry. Ultimately, Africa needs strong and independent institutions within a milieu of constitutionalism to anchor democracy, provide an ideal environment for economic activity, spur development and secure peace and security.

ONE-PARTY STATE AND WEAK INSTITUTIONS IN AFRICA

The first generation of African leaders, almost without exception, embraced a one-party political system and centralisation of power on grounds that a unitary state would promote a sense of nationhood among citizenry drawn from disparate ethnic groups.² However, the practice of single party politics was not uniform across the board. Aspects, such as the degree of internal party democracy, the ideological basis and the legal status of these single parties, whether *de jure* or *de facto*, differed from country to country.³ Foremost pan-Africanists, such as Kwameh Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, were among the architects and proponents of the one-party state.⁴ Unlike Nkrumah, and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, to name but two, Nyerere did not exploit the monolithic single-party state to institutionalise suppression, corruption and divisive ethnic, religious and regional politics. He was able to counter the 'Berlin Curse' by creating a cohesive nation state out of Tanzania's over one hundred and twenty ethnic groups.⁵ Tanzania stood out in a civil strife-ridden continent owing to Nyerere's conviction of thought. In addition to his contribution to peace and stability across the continent, he devised and implemented *Ujamaa*, an economic model fashioned on African socialism in defiance of foreign templates. *Ujamaa* came unstuck, a fact that Nyerere conceded. Arguably he demonstrated innovation, humility and authenticity, rare leadership qualities in post-colonial Africa.

Tanzania could serve as a model as it shows that foresight and selfless leadership contributes immensely to sustainable political stability. Tanzania has an enviable status, given the preponderance of coups across the continent in the immediate post-independence period and civil strife, following the emergence of the third wave of democracy. However, in the absence of Nyerere, Tanzania experienced political violence in the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar during the 2000 elections, indicating that, unless the post-Nyerere leadership took guidance from his legacy, the uninterrupted national unity since independence in 1962 was not a given. Thanks to political stability and legitimacy back home, Nyerere had the gravitas to play by no means an insignificant role in aiding liberation movements against the last frontier of colonialism in southern Africa and apartheid in South Africa.⁶ He also defied the OAU's indifference to atrocities in member

countries when he deployed troops in Uganda against the dictatorship of Idi Amin Dada that helped in toppling him in 1979. Nyerere's exemplary tenure as Tanzania's president underscored the fact that visionary leadership was a prerequisite to addressing most of the challenges bedevilling Africa. Unfortunately, Africa had not distinguished itself in this regard.

The inability by Africa's civilian governments to deliver on pre-independence aspirations, such as quality education, healthcare and reduction in poverty, partly accounted for military takeovers under the notion that 'military discipline' would enable men in khaki to meet people's needs. Military officers toppled civilian governments for reasons that differed from country to country and included, but were not limited to, ethnicity, regionalism, and runaway corruption within the extant civilian regimes. However, these military officers were more driven by self-interest and predatory inclinations just like the politicians they hounded out of power.⁷ Throughout the 1960s until the late eighties, the continent's citizenry was either under military oligarchies, civilian one-party dictatorships or hybrids of the two.⁸ The populace appeared hapless, given that the geopolitical dictates of the Cold War had no regard for concepts such as the rule of law, democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, 'free and fair' elections and respect for human rights. African strongmen were allied to either the Western or Eastern bloc that gave them free rein to ride roughshod over people and plunder resources. In Uganda, Idi Amin's coup in 1971 against Milton Obote was hailed as a triumph of reform against authoritarianism, given that the Obote administration was implicated in atrocities against Ugandans. Amin was cheerfully received by Ugandans and even abroad. It was only after Amin turned into a bloodthirsty tyrant that words such as 'buffoon', and 'butcher' came to describe him. Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), was propped up and for decades enjoyed the support of the US despite his well known propensity for plunder since he was regarded as a bulwark against Communism in the Central African region.

Before 1989, concepts such as accountability and transparency were not part of the political lexicon in Africa. These terms became buzzwords following the destruction of the Berlin Wall. The plight of the populace in Amin's Uganda, for instance, was accentuated by a lackadaisical OAU whose charter outlawed interference in internal affairs of member states.⁹ Upon the formation of the OAU, the first-order item by African leaders was to affirm the sanctity of colonial boundaries and 'resisted attempts to surrender sovereignty to any supranational authority'.¹⁰ Sovereignty became a fetish to rulers, an albatross down the necks of the populace and a guise for rogue African big men to commit egregious crimes. The most notorious African tyrants were Amin, the Marxist Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, and Hissene Habre of Chad. Rather than restoring the dignity of African

people, 'sovereignty' eroded it even further as arbitrary and draconian laws targeting dissidents were invoked, such as detention without trial.

Tyranny was used to impose upon people the idea of the unitary state. The corollary was that it led to centralisation of power, hence single-party dictatorship. It was for this reason that leadership turnover in most African countries was extremely low since it was impossible to democratically get incumbents out of power through elections.¹¹ These African big men as 'founding fathers' had a patrilineal view of leadership and regarded countries as fiefdoms and people as subjects, hence the absence of accountability. In essence, the unitary state was a camouflage for dictatorial behemoths that clamped down on basic inalienable rights such as freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of conscience, in effect violating human rights and blocking democracy. The rule of law hardly existed in Africa's one-party states as incumbents abused control of the state apparatus to oppress, detain without trial and imprison perceived and real dissidents. Arbitrary amendments on constitutions became normative to emasculate other state institutions and accord the incumbent unfettered powers, and immunity against prosecution. Hence constitutions were not worth the paper on which they were printed. Casual amendments on constitutions took place under what Hyden referred to as the period of opportunism in which, '...constitutions were treated as utilitarian documents that provided a fig leaf of legitimation for illegitimate governments, as symbols of the political authenticity and uniqueness of particular regimes, and – at best – as minimal frameworks of governance.'¹² Cheru cogently observed that there is perhaps no direct link between democracy and a written constitution and so democracy needs core values such as tolerance, trust and honesty that cannot be secured by a constitution.¹³ In fact the challenge against democracy in Africa is that 50 years into independence, African leaders are yet to internalise constitutionalism.

Notions such as 'the president is above the law' and 'life president' emerged during single-party regimes. It was this legacy that hampered the entrenchment of constitutionalism. Pervasive impunity under one-party states survived the system and posed a threat to democracy under multiparty politics. Constitutional, institutional and legal reforms were as good as the rulers entrusted with safeguarding these reforms. In a way, the challenge against democracy on the continent was more attitudinal than statutory. Kenya, an anchor state in the East African sub-region, is illustrative of a dichotomy between norms enshrined in the constitution and practice. Although Kenya enacted a new constitution in 2010, politicians persisted in the old habits of divisive ethnic politics, impunity, mendacity and lawlessness, pervasive under the imperial constitution that vested all the powers in the person of the president. I am aware that there are structural issues, such

as poverty and socioeconomic inequalities, that stifled issue-based politics in Africa, whose deleterious impact I am not minimising. Even then, these issues are part of a vicious cycle in the sense that the role of predatory and tardy leadership in the emergence of these problems cannot be wished away.

The colonial mould of divide and rule continued to impact on post-colonial African politics. Colonialism contributed to a lack of cohesion among African states as borders partly accounted for persistence of loyalty to former colonial masters. Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone divisions hampered pan-Africanism as African leaders often spoke at cross purposes, sometimes in tandem with the dictates of former colonial masters. The colonial legacy of balkanisation lay the foundation of sub-national loyalties due to the absence of social cohesion and national identity. However, this does not mean post-colonial African politics was predetermined. Senegal comparatively made progress in forging some semblance of a nation state out of its religious and ethnic diversity. Leopold Senghor, a Christian, led Senegal since independence in 1960 until he voluntarily stepped down in 1980 in a predominantly Muslim country. This legacy leveraged a bruising political battle in 2012, pitting the incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade, against opposition leader, Mackey Sall. The rivalry was resolved through fiercely contested elections that the latter won. The contest did not turn into sectarian violence as would have been the case in some of the deeply divided African countries.

In Tanzania, politicians from less populous tribes served as presidents since independence in 1962, perhaps indicating the near complete removal of ethnicity as a variable in the country's politics. In contrast, across the border in Kenya, the dominance of the country's political and economic sectors by the populous Kikuyu ethnic group since Kenya's independence in 1963 had contributed to a fragile democracy characterised by reversals. Tanzania's nation-building efforts stood out, not only in the East African sub-region, but also across Africa. Tanzania lacked strong sub-national units as was the case with Baganda in Uganda, Ashanti in Ghana and Barotseland in Zambia. However, some tribes, such as the Kikuyu in Kenya and the Igbo in Nigeria, lacked a centralised authority but exhibited strong ethnic nationalism.¹⁴

It has to be pointed out that civil strife in Africa is not about intolerance against ethnic, regional or religious diversity. The clash is over public goods or the benefits of modernity such as job opportunities, hospitals, educational opportunities, infrastructural facilities, such as paved roads and government contracts.¹⁵ Some politicians cynically mobilise and incite people along ethnic, regional and religious cleavages during elections, in pursuit of and monopolisation power and the attendant privileges. Tanzania and Senegal prove that post-colonial African leaders had agency only in that few acted in the best interest of the citizenry, the posterity and the

continent. The majority opted to engage in self-serving, divisive and short-term politics, hinging on profligacy through pursuit of grandiose projects, primitive accumulation, and accentuation of primordial differences whose destructive effects survived them.

Nowhere was the divisive colonial legacy exploited by the political and military elite for self-serving ends more cataclysmic than in the twin Central African countries of Rwanda and Burundi. The two countries had tortured post-colonial histories defined by pogroms and genocide whose high point was the Rwanda genocide of 1994.¹⁶ Political instability in the two countries was exacerbated by what Mazrui referred to as the 'dual society'¹⁷ status. Contrasting a dual society, such as Belgium and a plural one such as the US, Mazrui observed that whereas a dual society has a single divide that is potentially explosive, a plural society has in-built checks and balances owing to multiple groups that can be categorised ethnically, racially, religiously and culturally, among other forms of identity.¹⁸ A shared identity was no guarantee for social cohesion either. Somali had battled to function as a viable modern nation state since 1991, following the overthrow of Siad Barre's regime, despite its people being of the same culture, language and religion. As vast and diverse a country as the DRC was another troubled African hot spot since the mid-1990s when Mobutu Sese Seko was toppled. These illustrations underscore the fact that political instability affected countries irrespective of size and diversity, further putting credence to visionary leadership, strong institutions, constitutionalism and equitable resource allocation as prerequisites to development and lasting peace and stability in Africa.

In this section, the central question is the importance of leadership in finding solutions to the myriad of challenges facing Africa. Julius Nyerere was arguably the foremost pan-Africanist ever to emerge in Africa. The section does not gloss over the influence of external forces such as the Cold War in Africa's post-colonial crises but does not absolve the first generation of African leaders of blame either. Much as we cannot regard military regimes and single party dictatorships as offshoots of African pathologies, the section argues that Africa lacks a type of leadership to help it overcome these legacies. Africa's cultural diversity would be cause for celebration but instead constitutes a tinderbox because of a type of politics whereby the strong and resourced prey upon the weak and poor.

ELECTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION

It is almost impossible to discuss the challenges facing Africa, especially since the advent of multiparty politics, without focussing on elections.

The state of elections on the continent is nuanced. Some countries such as Senegal, Ghana and South Africa hold incident-free elections devoid of organised violence, but in other countries elections are moments of anxiety and uncertainty. Since the advent of the third wave of democracy in Africa, marked by elections in Benin in 1990, the continent has experimented with multiparty politics for over two decades now.¹⁹ These elections have resulted in a turnover of presidents in some countries. In others, the substance of these elections is dubious owing to unreformed institutions, constitutions without checks and balances and the persistence of big-man politics. It was for these reasons that some incumbents had succeeded in abolishing term limits, parliaments remained weak, and fraudulent elections remained pervasive. Democracy remained fragile because in most African countries institutions were weak, making it difficult to hold credible elections in which there was a possibility of the incumbent being defeated. Hence democratic consolidation was a challenge, even in those countries that seemed to have had a couple of power transfers.

During the period of one-party states, when elections were ritualistic in the sense that ruling parties had no competitors, countries such as Botswana, The Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Tunisia, Egypt and Mauritius had varied forms of multiparty systems long before the end of the Cold War in 1989. Opposition parties had some limited political space to organise and attempt to win power.²⁰ Generally, only Botswana and Mauritius held open and competitive elections, while in the others the incumbent retained the political initiative, reducing the elections to a charade.²¹ Troubled and violence-prone politics in countries such as Zimbabwe, Tunisia, and Egypt were proof that democracy did not get embedded in the body politic. The Gambia is virtually under a grip of a strongman that exposed the shaky base of its democracy.

It is not unheard of for incumbents to lose elections in Africa, even if rare, under multiparty politics. Several factors make it difficult to dislodge Africa's incumbents during elections. On the whole, the three cardinal ones are: weak institutions, political economy and politics based on kinship, and ethnic, regional and religious ties.²² Even with the rise of the election-observation and -monitoring industry, some incumbents are able to manipulate elections through acts that precede the actual voting. Sleight-of-hand tactics such as gerrymandering of constituencies through the delimitation of boundaries, selective issuance of identification cards and registration of voters, creation of administrative districts, eligibility of candidates to stand for office, legal contests in courts, policing, regulation of election campaigns, control of the media and even declaration of the elections date are dependent on executive decisions that give the incumbent the edge and decisively tilt the outcome of the elections in his favour.²³

The insular definition of democracy that tended to equate multiparty politics with the right to form opposition political parties to participate in elections, no matter how flawed, ensured that imperial constitutions devoid of checks and balances remained intact. The institutional infrastructure, including electoral management bodies, the judiciary, legitimate instruments of violence and even the media, tended to be compromised, owing to executive influence. Centralisation of power in effect meant concentrating patronage opportunities in the office of the president for the benefit of the incumbent and a coterie of individuals surrounding him. This cabal operated subterranean like a rhizome and earned the sobriquet the 'kitchen cabinet' in some countries to underscore 'eating' as a colloquial reference to exploitation of the state for enrichment through corruption. The concept of separation of powers integral to the maintenance of the rule of law was non-existent as other arms of the government were beholden to the executive. In such cases, the incumbent contested elections as both participant and arbiter, effectively reducing elections to a charade. Members of the electoral body and judges tasked with arbitrating the anticipated election petitions acted at the behest of the executive. Essentially, the entire state apparatus was biased towards the incumbent as the source of rents and sinecures and thus hostile against any possible change of power. This uneven political playing field made it almost impossible for incumbents to lose elections. In some cases, measures taken to avert humanitarian crises as a result of controversial and shambolic elections fell short of redeeming a democratic crisis. In Kenya and Zimbabwe, disputed elections in 2007 and 2008 respectively resulted in formation of coalition governments. These were stop-gap remedial moves that helped in restoring some semblance of political stability in volatile political situations that could easily have gotten out of hand. But they did not solve the root causes of the conflicts. They were flawed as conflict-resolution mechanisms in the long run. First, they exacerbated divisions arising from supremacy battles related to sharing of executive powers, besides according an opportunity to the incumbent accused of having organised fraudulent elections to have another go at power and consolidate his hold further, making it hard for credible elections to be held subsequently. Second, they were a throw-back to the single party era since they eliminated the opposition in the political equation. This created a stage for grand corruption in the absence of an opposition to hold the government to account.²⁴

In the absence of an even political playing field for credible elections, we had permanent winners and permanent losers. It dawned on African opposition politicians after losing elections repeatedly that without constitutional, institutional and legal reforms, they risked being consigned to opposition benches forever. This was the case mostly in countries that did

not hold national conferences to agree on 'the rules of the game' before holding founding multiparty elections. In Francophone countries such as Benin and Mali these forums preceded multiparty elections and were definitive in incumbents being defeated in elections, as was the case in Benin in 1990.²⁵ In contrast, Kenya was among the countries that did not reform the constitution and institutions before returning to multiparty democracy. After the founding elections in 1992, the country's political battle revolved around the need for comprehensive reform that culminated in the promulgation of a new constitution in 2010. The new charter was realized, following flawed multiparty elections in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007, conducted under a constitution that centralised power and in which incumbency, manipulation of ethnicity, militias and violence were decisive factors. Even the 2013 elections, held after the violently disputed 2007 elections, and the first under the new constitution, did not qualitatively differ from the previous ones since they were marred by perennial allegations of fraud and electoral irregularities. The opposition accused the electoral body of bias towards the winning party.

In most African countries, a change-over from single party rule to multiparty politics did not improve the quality of debate in parliament or enhance national dialogue on pressing issues in the society. Neither did it enhance political tolerance and level the political playing field. Like Kenya, Zimbabwe's quest for reform was equally protracted and costly economically and in terms of human life. In 2013, there was some debate in Zimbabwe concerning how far-reaching reform should be before elections were held the same year. The incumbent and his supporters were keen not to lose the political initiative he had controlled since 1980 and that was why he was opposed to reform, while the lethargic opposition that he stigmatised as lackeys of the so called imperialists agitated for the security sector and media reform, having previously controversially lost elections. Zimbabwe's veteran leader, Robert Mugabe, pulled the rug from under the feet of the opposition, unilaterally declaring the date of elections and thereafter 'won' by a landslide. Like Kenya's elections a couple of months before, Zimbabwe's election results were as controversial and polarising as the preceding ones five years before. Controversial elections in the two countries showed that liberal democracy could not be enhanced in cases where elections were held under an institutional framework susceptible to executive manipulation. Electoral participation before the setting up of structures and institutions to ensure political competition resulted in sham elections.²⁶

Closely linked to institutional weaknesses and how they obstructed the evolution of democracy is the political economy. This refers to 'who gets what when and how', the core question of the discipline of politics. It entails 'issues or patterns of production and distribution in the setting of scarcity',

the core question of the discipline of economics.²⁷ Such issues have to be impartially framed out in the constitution to ensure an equitable share of a country's resources. Mills cited the inability by Africa's constitutions to address issues of resource distribution as the bone of contention in protracted reform processes. Since Africa's political elite exploited access and control of the state for accumulation of capital, losing elections in effect meant losing opportunities for self-aggrandisement for the ruler and allies. Africa's middle class was not large enough to buttress democracy and tended to be bureaucratic, that is, linked to power wielders, since what was ordinarily seen as class interests disguised self-interest and ethno-regional consciousness. Absent diversification of the economy and racketeering through political connections remained the mainstay of politics. The considerable role of the state in economic activity, even after economic liberalisation, offered lucrative opportunities for racketeers. State contracts, bureaucratic appointments, issuance of business permits, control of import and export business taxation and rent seeking ventures that fell under what Bayart referred to as 'politics of the belly'²⁸ heightened competition for political power in a zero-sum political framework.

In Africa, with some extent the exception of South Africa, there was no clear-cut dichotomy between the public and private sectors. It was imagined that privatisation imposed by Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) would reinforce democracy by checking patronage, prevalent because of dominance of the state in economic matters.²⁹ Patronage proved to be hydra-headed because state functionaries were among the largest shareholders in the privatised state entities. What passed for the private sector tended to be no more than 'an elite-linked system of rent seeking'.³⁰ As such, the incentive for the incumbent to engage in electoral fraud or even resort to violence in order to retain power or ensure that his preferred successor prevailed was high since losing elections portended dire economic and political ramifications for him and supporters. The fear of reprisals in case a rival won elections was also real. With the dearth of African economies growing consistently at high rates to dent poverty, unemployment and wide socioeconomic inequalities, and create a private sector relatively independent of the state and economies in which entrepreneurial risk was rewarded, it would be long before the culture of credible elections took hold. At independence, the private sector was virtually absent in African economies. As a consequence the state had to play a larger-than-life role in economic activity – a situation that was blamed for inefficiency, and corruption among state-owned entities, hence the call for privatisation through structural adjustment programmes. Although the situation had improved 50 or so years down the line in a number of countries, the private sector was a fledgling sector since the state still remained influential in

economic activities and most of the private sector was bureaucratic. African leaders, their cronies and bureaucrats owned and had shares in companies that traversed the entire gamut of the economy in some countries. In a case of a conflict of interest, these companies did business with the government. It was this arrangement that led to abuse of state power for illicit acquisitiveness.³¹

The opposition political parties were not any better either. Most of them were simply impatient to assume power and benefit from privileges that came with it; they did not aim to bring about new ideals and ways of conducting politics. A deeply entrenched culture of personal rule, opportunism and abuse of state power for enrichment among politicians on both sides of the political spectrum threatened democracy. Frederick Chiluba of Zambia and Bakili Muluzi of Malawi capitalised on the groundswell of discontent against their predecessors, Kenneth Kaunda and Hastings Kamuzu Banda respectively, to ascend to power in 1991 and 1994 respectively. Kaunda and Banda found themselves under siege due to internal and external factors. A shift in global geopolitics and neoliberal economic policies that precipitated the poverty affecting the populace rendered them unpopular. In the Cold War era, Africa's citizenry suffered under dictatorial regimes through the complicity of the then two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, governance deficits such as corruption and repressive draconian laws made the call for change irresistible.

The quest for change proved illusory. Opposition politicians ascended to power and maintained anti-democratic tendencies just like their predecessors. Chiluba and Muluzi only left office after attempts to hang onto power through unconstitutional third terms were unsuccessful. They hounded the opposition in a manner reminiscent of the autocracy of single-party rule. In Kenya, Mwai Kibaki blocked reform despite rising to power on a reform agenda in 2002. Such previous opposition politicians impeded the reformation of the state, abetted corruption and were intolerant to alternative political views. These political shenanigans could not be curbed unless wide-ranging and substantive reform accompanied multiparty politics. It was ironic that the laws that underpinned single-party rule were the ones that constituted 'the rules of the game' under a multiparty system in many African countries. Although the *de jure* one-party state was no longer in existence, Africa of 1994, the year that the democratic wave climaxed, was on the whole not distinct from Africa a decade earlier.³² There were continuities in terms of state excesses. Despite this, most of the founding multiparty elections in the 1990s were historical, not so much because there was a possibility of the opposition party gaining power, but because the 'actual experience of politics was visible' in the sense that the electorate could vote for opposition parties.³³

Multiparty politics could not thrive in Africa's polities owing to the fusion between the economy and politics. This state of affairs tilted the political playing field in favour of the incumbent because of the advantages of incumbency. Of critical importance was the need to reform constitutions, create independent oversight institutions, diversify the economy, and even the political playing field. By so doing, Africa's political contest would be freed from the clutches of communal ties and thrust into the realm of cross-cutting economic interests and policies.

REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION AND AFRICA'S RENEWAL

The challenges highlighted above could be mitigated through a synergy of efforts at the continental level. In this connection, continental and regional integration efforts taking place on the continent should be embraced and promoted by all Africans. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are the building blocks of the AU. Therefore, the AU can only be as efficient as the sum total of its constituent parts. Initially, colonialists formed large federations which they dismantled before granting independence to separate African countries, some of which were economically and politically unviable as independent entities because of massive underdevelopment, small size and being landlocked.³⁴ In Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, and Cameroon fledgling federal systems were abolished after independence on the grounds that they would promote sub-national sentiment and balkanise the state along linguistic, tribal and regional axes.³⁵ The French set up two large federations in central and west Africa but dismantled them and granted independence to individual countries that have battled ever since in their attempt to become viable modern states. In British West Africa, integration structures inherited from colonialism in terms of regional research and educational institutions, West African Airways and the common currency were abolished at the insistence of Kwameh Nkrumah. The same fate befell East Africa with the collapse of the East African Community (EAC) in 1977.³⁶ The EAC was revived in 2000 and has expanded to include Rwanda and Burundi, in addition to the original members, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Therefore, Africa does not have an encouraging legacy when it comes to cooperation among various countries and regions of the continent.

Against this backdrop, the formation of the AU was aimed at overcoming this history of fragmentation and the lone-ranger approach to challenges affecting Africa. It was inspiring that regional integration efforts had redoubled since the formation of the AU and were likely to result in economic growth and development through increased intra-Africa trade. Africa's statistics in this regard are abysmal. Africa's contribution to world

trade is less than 2 per cent while trade among African countries is the lowest of all the continents, standing at less than 10 per cent. This dismal performance partly stems from the continent's infrastructural challenges, bureaucratic red tape, closed skies, high tariffs, and endemic corruption that conspire to make the cost of doing business in Africa prohibitive. These impediments reduce the AU's ideals to aspiration rather than reality.³⁷ Adedeji argued that neoliberal economic dictum through structural adjustment programmes resulted in economic growth at the expense of holistic human-centred development, which Africa stands in need of if it has to address the pervasive structural underdevelopment and underemployment.³⁸ He points out that economic cooperation has four key functions to serve: it must first be an instrument for national survival and socio-economic transformation, second it has to be a forum for forging common strategies and policies in the food and agriculture sector, and third, in the light of drought and desertification, it has to be a platform for concerted industrialisation strategies and programmes, while fourth, it should be a platform for developing and implementing region-wide systems of transport and communication.³⁹

Economic growth and development engender peace and stability and are integral to democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation in turn hinges on viable and functional economies. Doubt has been expressed as to whether Africa can consolidate democratically in the absence of middle and high national incomes. Low incomes are contributory to challenges that undermine democratisation in Africa.⁴⁰ Africa's middle class is expanding but is not yet at a stage where it can act as a bulwark for democracy. According to Standard Bank research, Africa's middle class is not as large as previously thought. The research conducted in 11 sub-Sahara African countries (Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) shows that there are 15 million middle class households in these countries.⁴¹ This figure is far below the 300 million middle class Africans figure attributed to African Development Banks' 2011 study that defined a middle class person as earning between US\$4 to US\$20 a day.⁴² Structural prerequisites conducive to a stable democracy, such as the private sector, high per capita incomes, and high literacy rates are missing in almost all African countries.⁴³ Ironically the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform prescriptions of the 1980s, which were meant to improve accountability and spur economic growth, affected the consolidation of democracy as these measures caused mass poverty.⁴⁴ The benefits of the current surge in economic growth have to spread beyond a tiny group of elite with political and economic connections and reach the marginalised and poor through development, otherwise Africa's democratisation will perennially be undermined by poverty.

The 2013 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report optimistically entitled 'The Rise of the South' paints a salubrious picture of the global South. It is heartening that Africa is economically growing fast, at a rate only surpassed by Asia. Consequently, investors derive high returns on their investments owing to impressive economic growth in countries such as Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Mozambique, to name but four. This is laudable and is welcome news, bearing in mind that in May 2000 *The Economist* wrote off Africa as a hopeless continent.

However, the celebration ought to be tempered with caution, because in the 2000s there was some economic growth across the continent that led to no transformation at all. This growth was due to high prices of export primary goods, high rates of inflation, and external debt relief that accounted for 'growth without development'.⁴⁵ Furthermore, only 10 African countries, that is Gabon, Egypt, Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, Morocco, Cape Verde, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea and Swaziland, fall under the medium human-development category, while the rest fall under the low human-development category.⁴⁶ The current economic growth has to be sustained for Africa to dent massive unemployment, poverty and inequalities. Moreover, African countries have to diversify their economies and stop relying on export of primary goods, and develop the manufacturing sector. These measures have to be coupled with responsive governments geared towards improving people's living standards through the provision of quality public goods. Failing these requirements, the continent would end up being the only one that experiences economic growth without development. In the words of the Nigerian scholar and long-serving executive secretary of the Addis Ababa-based UN Economic Commission for Africa between 1975 and 1991:

Africa is probably the only continent that has failed to recognise and exploit the nexus between economic growth, on the one hand, and holistic human development, the elimination of large-scale structural unemployment, and the creation of wealth as the only way of eradicating poverty, on the other. In short Africa has not grasped the imperative of socioeconomic and political deconstruction and transformation.⁴⁷

Of concern is that Africa's economic growth is accompanied by widespread socio-economic inequalities, as wealth tends to be concentrated among a tiny fraction of the population, notably those in power and their cronies in the business sector. Africa's middle class is expanding, but so are levels of poverty, and the gap between the rich and the poor is widening. Africa's economic growth is also based on export of primary commodities that are turned into finished products and then sold to Africa at an exorbitant cost.

The absence of the manufacturing sector accounts for the inability by African economies to optimally benefit from its natural resources. Africa is yet to firmly address the lopsided trade imbalance between itself and the developed world that heavily tilts in favour of the latter.

There is a need to tackle obnoxious terms of trade, such as protectionism and subsidies by the developed world to their farmers that make it hard for Africa to compete effectively in international trade. However, African leaders have to get their act together as well. They have to promote intra-Africa trade, strengthen institutions to entrench the rule of law, curb tax evasion and capital flight, in order to maximise economic benefits. Porous legal regimes and plutocracy are challenges that the continent must address. Endemic corruption that borders on kleptomania is pathological enough, but the propensity by some African leaders to stash ill-gotten wealth in offshore accounts exacerbates poverty and inequalities, and stifle democracy, hence imperilling peace and stability.

INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

Economic prosperity is contingent upon sound institutions embedded in the rule of law in order to curb disputes ensuing from disputed elections resulting in wanton property destruction, deaths and balkanised countries, which impact negatively on efforts towards nation building, democracy and economic growth and development. According to the International Criminal Court (ICC), atrocities associated with electoral violence in Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire in 2007 and early 2008 and 2010 respectively, met the Rome Statute threshold definition of crimes against humanity. The ICC intervention in Africa's conflicts was anathematic to the AU in which the notion of 'African solutions to African problems' has increasingly gained currency. In October 2013, the AU heads of state and government held an extraordinary summit in Addis Ababa in which they resolved that African leaders should enjoy immunity against prosecution at the ICC. It was a disturbing resolution and a throwback to the OAU period in which impunity held sway amidst gross human rights violations. Between 15 and 16 May 2014, the AU Ministers of Justice meeting in Addis Ababa recommended that the mandate of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights be expanded to include criminal matters. But there was also a recommendation that a clause cushioning sitting heads of state and government against prosecution be inserted in the extension plan, which showed that the AU was yet to muster the courage to combat impunity. The clause granting sitting heads of state and government and senior government officials immunity was ratified during the

23rd AU Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea on 27 June 2014. It highlights African rulers' aversion to justice for victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The ratification contradicts Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act that condemns and rejects impunity. These were individuals often responsible for the most egregious human-rights violations imaginable and so it made no sense with regard to justice to expand the jurisdiction of the court and accord immunity to African leaders.

In the light of the reluctance within the AU circles to address issues of justice, especially concerning gross human-rights violations, *Pax Africana*, a concept that the renowned Kenyan scholar, Ali Mazrui, coined in reference to 'an African peace established and maintained by Africans themselves'⁴⁸ would remain a pipe dream. The AU did not take seriously its internal governance-audit mechanisms, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), whose recommendations were not binding, so that heads of state or governments of countries that offered themselves for review could ignore them. The APRM report, being critical of some aspects in South Africa's polity, was met with hostility in Pretoria, while another APRM report on Kenya identified ethnicity as a threat to the country's stability. In spite of this, Kenya almost imploded into civil war because of violently disputed elections in 2007, following years of politicised ethnicity. Rwanda was also among the first countries to offer themselves for the peer review process, but Kigali had been adversely mentioned in military incursions in the eastern DRC and was accused of clamping down on opposition voices and civil society, and even extraterritorially hunting down and executing government critics. Despite undergoing the review, political intolerance continued unabated in the country. In this context, the AU and, by extension, some regional economic communities were found wanting as far as early warning systems were concerned. The AU still suffered from the organisational and financial deficiencies that rendered its precursor, the OAU, dysfunctional and moribund. It was indecisive in the conflict in Cote d' Ivoire leading up to and after the disputed elections in 2010, creating room for the French intervention. Moreover, the AU could not resolve the crisis in Libya in 2011, creating room for North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) troops to intervene and topple former Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi. Ironically AU leading members, South Africa and Nigeria, voted for Resolution 1973 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that imposed a no-fly zone, that is, a ban on all flights in the country's airspace, which sounded a death knell on Gaddafi and his authoritarian vice-like grip on Libya. South Africa later protested at having been duped into supporting the resolution.

Africa has country-specific, subregional and continental instruments and institutions whose resolutions and recommendations leaders do not abide by and thus do not implement. The African Commission on Human

and People's Rights (ACHPR) based in Banjul, the Gambia, and the African Court on Human and People's Rights (AfrCHPR) in Arusha, Tanzania depend on the political will of the AU member states to have their decisions implemented.⁴⁹ The required commitment and political will to enforce decisions by these institutions are often absent. It is this cavalier approach to governance and the rule of law that made it possible for the ICC to intervene in situations of heinous human rights violations, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide on the continent. African countries were quick to sign and ratify the Rome Statute without reflection, resulting in the continent producing the largest regional membership to the Assembly of States Parties, the administrative arm of the ICC. Despite this voluntary membership, African leaders, through the AU, changed tune and accused the ICC of selectively targeting Africa, ignoring the fact that almost all Africa's situations before the court were self-referrals. The clash between the ICC and the AU exposed the lack of Africa's commitment to justice and the rule of law, and the lack of adherence to subregional, continental and international instruments and evidence-based policy formulation and implementation.⁵⁰

The AU Constitutive Act abhors an unconstitutional takeover of power through coups and insurrections, egregious human rights abuses, genocide and conflicts that threaten regional stability.⁵¹ But the Act is silent on leaders who retain power through fraudulent elections, one of the immediate triggers of violence and political instability on the continent. The AU and subregional election-observer missions are wont to endorse election results, irrespective of evidence of electoral malpractices. International election-observer missions did not fare any better. They often certified elections as credible, unless they were so flawed that violence on a large scale erupted, as it happened in Kenya in 2007 and Zimbabwe a year later. The election monitoring and observation industry has been operating on the continent since the early 1990s, but their role in deepening democracy is dubious. International election observers endorsed Daniel arap Moi's victories in Kenya in 1992 and 1997 despite evidence of electoral fraud. In some extreme cases, they would even doctor reports to launder irregularity-fraught elections.⁵² The ambiguous wording of some reports by election-observer missions is informed by fear of accentuating polarisation so as to safeguard political stability. But then if the will of the people cannot prevail through credible elections, they are ipso facto disenfranchised and these election-observer missions are complicit.

The transformation of the OAU to the AU in Durban in 2002 was meant to reflect the changed circumstances in the global politics following the end of the Cold War. The OAU relevance lapsed after the end of Africa's decolonisation and of apartheid in South Africa. It was therefore largely effectively a dysfunctional institution viewed outside of the two objectives.

Institutionally, the OAU was inefficient because of a number of shortcomings. First, its charter accorded its executive and administrative arms limited powers that rendered them ineffective.⁵³ Second, the OAU resolutions were not binding on member states that reduced its Assembly to a 'talk shop'. Third, the OAU was militarily 'impotent' and that was the reason it sanctioned the 1975 Cuban intervention in Angola. In 1994 and 1999, the OAU asked the UN to militarily intervene in Rwanda and the DRC respectively because of the persistence of organisational and financial deficiencies. Moreover, the OAU could not stem political instability in Rwanda, Burundi and the Comoros in 1993, having deployed skeletal military missions in these countries.⁵⁴

Some of the OAU's shortcomings were not of its making. It operated at a time when 'democracy' and its derivatives, such as the rule of law, were not in vogue. Competitive elections that most people in Africa used as shorthand for democracy were equally foreign, except in a few countries. The Western and Eastern blocs turned Africa into a theatre for proxy wars as they fought over turfs and allies in an ideological polarity. In a way, this undermined peace on the continent.⁵⁵ In the light of this chequered history, the AU was expected to invigorate governance by correcting the deficiencies of its precursor, especially the notorious clause in the OAU charter of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. This loophole paved the way for brutal dictators such as Idi Amin Dada of Uganda to act with utmost impunity. The 'butcher of Kampala' was even elected chair of the OAU (1975-1976) and served as its spokesman in international forums, despite having murdered an estimated 300 000 Ugandans in a reign of absolute terror.⁵⁶ Devoid of any values and ideals, the OAU could only sink to such pathetic lows. One of the most salient blots on this organisation's legacy was the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, where the OAU was part of the international community that stood by passively as genocidaires planned and executed some of the most horrendous crimes in human history.

The AU does not appear to be substantively better as it is bedevilled by challenges, such as internal institutional incoherence and lack of effectiveness of its various organs.⁵⁷ The lack of moral courage to confront the age-old question of justice vis-a-vis impunity in relation to victims of crimes against humanity still haunted the continental body. The AU's attempt to shield African leaders suspected of masterminding crimes against humanity from prosecution, such as Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya and his deputy, indicted by the ICC for allegedly masterminding the 2007-08 post-election violence in that country, and Omar Al Bashir of Sudan facing a warrant of arrest from The Hague-based court for genocide charges in Darfur, was evidence that the AU encouraged impunity among heads of state and government. It amounts to cynical politics when politicians who are accused

of perpetrating horrendous atrocities against people are expected to guide the process of seeking justice for victims, institutional reconstruction and reconciliation.

The AU architects, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, envisaged a modern organisation sensitive to the changed circumstances whereby emphasis was put on economic growth, security, subregional and continental integration and democracy and good governance. Accordingly, the AU affiliates, such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the pan-African Parliament, and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), were set up to reflect the aspirations for an 'African renaissance'. Within the AU Commission Secretariat, headed by a chairperson, was the Peace and Security Commission modelled on the UN's Security Council. Despite these reform initiatives, some of the structural challenges that rendered the OAU dysfunctional continued to afflict the AU, one of which is the 'democratic deficit' in the sense that there was no involvement of the citizens in decisions made in their name.⁵⁸ After inception, the AU largely thrived on political chemistry among its architects. Arguably Mbeki and Obasanjo were its dynamos. This idiosyncratic base accounts for its internal divisions along regional lines, lackadaisical performance in continental and global affairs and the near moribund state of NEPAD and APRM after they left office. The perennial issue of lack of finance for Africa to implement its programmes plagued the AU. This sticking concern gave donors leverage over AU affairs, including even as sensitive a matter as security.⁵⁹ Lack of total control over its budget and organisational deficiencies accounted for the inability of the AU to promptly intervene in Africa's trouble spots. Other bodies under the AU umbrella, such as the pan-African Parliament, fall within what Adebajo described as Africa's notoriety for 'political alchemy', because such an institution could not be expected to be effective when drawing members from Africa's parliaments that hardly functioned effectively to check dominant executives.⁶⁰ It is imperative that the AU takes on board and implements the findings in the 2007 audit report by the high-level panel led by Adebayo Adedeji, so as to ensure the realization of its objectives.⁶¹

The AU's inability to renew itself and marry rhetoric with decisive action, made sure that coups did not become anachronistic in Africa in the age of democracy, because conditions that precipitated coups prevailed. In the recent past, coups in countries such as Mauritania, Madagascar, Niger, the Central African Republic, Guinea and Mali were illustrative of the destabilising matrix of foreign interests, unreformed states and predatory and profligate African politicians. Hence it was not enough for the AU to condemn these unconstitutional means of taking power without addressing the root causes. Anti-democratic practices, such as rigged elections, human

rights abuses, clampdowns on the media, harassment of civil society and criminalisation of protests within some AU member states, hardly attracted condemnation from the AU, an act of omission that casts aspersions against the commitment of some African leaders to democracy. Thus the AU's preoccupation with punishing coup plotters could be seen as a way of preserving autocratic civilian regimes. Fraudulent elections, dynastic successions, and monopolisation of power along ethno-regional fault lines made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for democratic power transfers to occur. Anti-democratic practices inherent in African polities belied the tendency to attribute Africa's socioeconomic and political problems wholly to the international capitalist system.⁶² In a polity in which freedoms are circumscribed and people have no choice, contestation of power becomes a bare-knuckled messy affair, involving the use of unorthodox means, especially in situations in which the state has no monopoly over violence, is deeply embedded in society and is the only source of wealth.⁶³

Big-man politics, in which power was exercised through a complex web of kinship ties, traditional and religious leaders and even witchcraft,⁶⁴ nurtured poor leadership, hemmed in by ethnicity, regional differences, nepotism, corruption and impunity. There was no accountability in these patron-client systems.⁶⁵ Even under multiparty political systems, most African leaders were hardly held to account, given the centralisation of power and balkanisation of societies. This led to extreme cases where individuals accused of crimes against humanity got elected into power, as happened in Kenya in 2013 when a presidential candidate and his running mate were controversially elected into office despite facing crimes against humanity at the ICC. Lack of accountability on the part of leaders compromised democracy and fostered spoils politics. The corollary was that the competition for capturing the state intensified among fragmented political elites, especially during elections, since it offered benefits, including immunity. Furthermore, weak institutions, rapacious politicians and impunity created weak states that were unable to resist the exploitative mercantilist inclinations of the local political elite, multinational corporations and other external actors. Poverty, economic stagnation, socioeconomic inequalities and violence were some of the outcomes of this retrogressive brand of politics.

CONCLUSION

Political renewal will go a long way to ensuring political stability. This would entail addressing social pathologies, such as endemic corruption that rob the majority of people of a decent livelihood. It would also be important to reorganise the education system on the continent so that it produces

graduates with a sense of self worth and not individuals preoccupied with aping former colonial masters. This would redress the lingering legacy of colonialism that has created what Adedeji described as 'mimic people' due to the loss of a sense of self-esteem and self-confidence.⁶⁶ An educational system resonant with the aspirations of the continent would help to alleviate poverty and unemployment, since it would accord Africans agency as opposed to the colonial educational systems that sought to produce poor imitations of the colonial masters. Thus one of the hindrances to economic growth is the retention of colonial educational systems.

Africa needs to get rid of the bureaucratic red tape that acts against the free flow of people, goods and capital. It is cumbersome for trade to happen among African countries because of trade barriers, such as prohibitively high tariffs. Government officials rationally impede free trade because the ramparts provide opportunities for extraction of rents. Integration means the loss of a certain amount of sovereignty, a fact that some African leaders are resistant to or oblivious of. It is for this reason that African governments ratify continental and international instruments that they are not willing to implement. For Africa to make strides towards economic growth, democratic consolidation and political stability, there must be respect for universal values and norms and zero tolerance for impunity. If Africa's institutions, notably the judicial systems, are not seen to be impartial, there will always be room for meddling by foreigners in Africa's affairs, especially in matters concerning atrocious human-rights violations and security. In all, African countries that have situations at the ICC, that is, Uganda, the DRC, Kenya, Libya, the Republic of Sudan, the Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire and Mali, have common characteristics, which include weak institutions incapable of arbitrating political and legal disputes, institutionalised impunity, endemic corruption, divisive politics, deeply divided societies and a history of violence.

The creation of institutions without the corresponding political will to make them function, did nothing to move Africa from its legacy of authoritarianism, impunity, violence and underdevelopment that were the hallmarks of the one-party and military dictatorships. Insistence by African leaders to run the continent like the worst among the 'Founding Fathers' or 'Fathers of the Nation' who thrived on the big-man mentality and were averse to accountability, put a damper on the 'African renaissance' dream. Africa will only make strides in development once its leaders institutionalise the rule of law, harness its rich human and natural resources for the betterment of the continent and practise rather than simply wax lyrical about democracy. Most of the AU architects have dubious democratic credentials. Latter-day pan-Africanists, Olusegun Obasanjo and Abdoulaye Wade were literally hounded out of office when they tried to unconstitutionally

elongate their stay in power. It cast doubts on their commitment to ideals meant to distinguish the AU from the OAU. Algeria's septuagenarian, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, seems to be firmly in charge. He has been in power since 1999, largely by elbowing out the opposition in a manner reminiscent of the era of 'life presidents'. Thabo Mbeki resigned after recall, months before the end of his second term, over factional politics in his political party. He distinguished himself as a selfless leader unlike most African rulers who would have resisted such a decision precipitating chaos. But the premature termination of Mbeki's tenure of office exposed his lack of grasp of political undercurrents in his party.

Participating in elections of any type, whether primaries by political parties or general elections, without both the opposition and the incumbent being willing to accept the outcome, reduces the electorate to pawns in high stakes and dangerous political games. Concerns about incumbents influencing presidential results in their favour are sometimes legitimate. In other cases the challenge is a 'trust deficit' among political actors, with a microcosmic effect of widespread mistrust in the rest of the society because of divisive ethnic, religious and regional politics. The zero-sum nature of political competition on the continent escalates the costs of not only organising and managing elections, but also of either retaining or losing power. Disputed elections in Kenya in 2007, Cote d' Ivoire in 2010, Zimbabwe in 2008, and the DRC in 2011 jeopardised political stability in these countries. Nigeria's April 2007 elections were highly fraudulent,⁶⁷ in as much as there was no popular uprising in protest against the results. Deadly disputes following contested electoral results were triggered by a lack of political will and malleable institutions that made it hard to organise credible elections, since incumbents were out to win elections at whatever cost.

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Re-visiting Marcus Garvey

Extrapolating Lessons for Twenty-first Century Pan-Africanism
and the AU's 6th Region

Claudius Fergus

INTRODUCTION

'We are Africans not because we are born in Africa, but because Africa is born in us'. This classic Garveyite self-affirmation, which welcomes Internet surfers to 'The Foundation for Democracy in Africa' homepage, is at once sentimental and pragmatic.¹ It appeals to a still powerful constituency of black nationalism that is rooted in historical nostalgia for an estranged motherland, while reconciling with historical *arrivants*' equally legitimate claims to Africa as their natal inheritance. Black nationalism is the edifice of traditional pan-Africanism, which achieved utopian grandeur under Marcus Garvey. Denouncing the 'caste of colour', allegedly perpetrated by W.E.B. Du Bois and associates, Garvey appealed for racial solidarity around one's African ancestry, however removed: 'Remember that Africa is in each and every one of us coloured men ... All of us are Africans ... the only difference is some are Africans at home and some are Africans abroad'.² Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), his Black Star Line, Black Cross Nurses, Ethiopian godhead, *Negro World* and other organs and symbols of African emancipation and empowerment left no doubt about the constituency that he served.

Even during Garvey's time, continental Africans had already begun to see the incompatibility of black nationalism with a post-colonial Africa. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nelson Mandela and Kwame Nkrumah personify critical links in the transformation of Garvey's puritanical black nationalism into the African Union's (AU) heterogeneous pan-Africanism. Although Azikiwe criticised the racial 'hostility' in Garveyism, he endorsed the pedagogy of Africa as the black man's natural homeland. In Azikiwe's concept of the 'new Africa', an African was 'any indigenous black person', but he also recognised all Africans, inclusive of the diaspora, as 'brothers and sisters'. Notably, he also advocated 'co-operation' between natives and settlers,

because 'for harmony [in playing the piano] you must use both the black and the white keys'.³

By the 1940s, the African National Congress (ANC) had come to accept that 'the different races have come to stay'.⁴ Accordingly, its Youth League sanitised its manifesto of the 'ultra revolutionary' Africa-for-the-Africans doctrine and re-branded with a cosmopolitan 'African nationalism' or 'Africanism' doctrine. Mandela had played a key role in drafting the manifesto. Nkrumah completed the revision of Garveyism. In making his case for a new African nationalism, Nkrumah succinctly rejected black nationalism as 'a nebulous movement' inconsistent with post-colonialism: 'To us, Africa with its islands is just one Africa. We reject the idea of any kind of partition. From Tangier or Cairo in the North to Cape Town in the South, from Cape Guardafui in the East to Cape Verde Islands in the West, Africa is one and indivisible'.⁵

This chapter will attempt to address some of the fundamental issues of African diasporan identity and their potential to impact the aims and objectives of the AU's Diaspora Initiative. The chapter will then consider practical measures, initiatives and ongoing developments that foster solidarity, reconciliation and optimism as they relate especially, but not exclusively, to the Caribbean Pan-African Network (CPAN). The author interprets pan-African nationalism in the twenty-first century as a synthesis of 'black nationalism' propagated by Marcus Garvey and 'African nationalism' or continentalism advocated by Nkrumah.

THE SPECTRE OF DIASPORAN POLARISATION

The launch of the Western Hemisphere African Diaspora Network (WHADN) on the heels of the establishment of the AU was certainly welcomed by African-Americans and Afro-West Indians as the long awaited blueprint of Garvey's prophecy of diasporan citizenship in a United States of Africa. Up to mid-2004, WHADN's 'Draft Partnership and Cooperation' protocol assumed no distinction between 'persons of African descent', 'African-Americans' and 'African persons in the diaspora'.⁶ This perception was 'illogical' to African statesmen, who had to contend with 'secondary diasporas' of European, Near Eastern and other Asian origins. Thus, the AU urgently resolved that 'The African Diaspora consists of peoples of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union'.⁷ This liberal definition was expertly framed to appease advocates of black nationalism, while being fluid enough to embrace the cosmopolitanism of post-colonial pan-Africanism. Nonetheless, although overjoyed with the AU's call to partner in building the new Africa, diasporan

mobilisation to participate in the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) continues along lines of black nationalism.⁸

A framework for interrogating the African diaspora depends on the nature of the discourse. For purposes of expediency, Paul T. Zeleza's 'historic diasporas' and 'contemporary diasporas' will be used in this chapter. 'Historic diasporas' resulted mainly from forced migrations before the European 'scramble' for Africa, while 'contemporary diasporas' originated mainly from voluntary migrations that began during the colonial era.⁹ However, academic foibles over identity are more deeply entwined with the distinction of 'African' than with the concept of the diaspora.

The AU's identification with the African diaspora was a timely endorsement of Nkrumahism, but much re-socialisation is still needed to achieve diasporan solidarity within the various networks of the Sixth Region. Adeleke's essays on diasporan identity are brutally frank in treating the bipolarity of historic and contemporary diasporas from the perspective of the latter. The issue has already impacted the time-table for incorporation of the diaspora as voting members of the ECOSOCC and will also impact the nature of diaspora representation. It also impacts the diasporan outreach strategies of member states of the AU. It is therefore critically important to understand the dynamics of diasporan Africanness, in order to formulate strategies to achieve genuine consensus on critical issues and guarantee equity in exchanges between the diasporas and the homeland.

To Tunde Adeleke, 'The depiction of black Americans and Africans as one people united by cultural attributes and historical experience is seriously flawed at the levels of both theory and practice'.¹⁰ The AU's incorporation of the diaspora as an integral entity implicitly rejects Adeleke's assertions. The attempted coalition of civil society organisations across historic and contemporary diasporas throughout the Americas, by 'The Sixth Region Diaspora Caucus' (SRDC), in order to meet the AU's electoral mandate, is a practical demonstration of Garvey's philosophy of power through organisation and the triumph of African unity over ethnic and historic barriers.¹¹ Just as importantly, recent efforts by African scholars to break the silence on internal slavery and slave-trading connected to the Atlantic slave trade demonstrate unequivocally that Africans in the diaspora and Africans at home truly share a common experience in trauma and displacement in the service of western capitalism.¹² It is nonetheless important to explore the implications of Adeleke's claims, since they have the potential to undermine fraternal co-operation between the so-called historic and contemporary diasporas, horizontal interactions within each category, as well as relations between continental Africans and diasporans.

While Adeleke acknowledges that 'Africa has always served black Americans as a basis for articulating identity and inspiration in the struggle for

freedom and survival', he argues that injecting 'mutuality or consensual ethos into the historical relationship of Africans and blacks in diaspora' is a misrepresentation of reality.¹³ Taking African American Douglass Turner Ward as his point of reference, Adeleke contends 'that what shaped the black American identity was slavery, rather than Africa'.¹⁴ Accordingly, he charges Afrocentrists, such as Molefi Asante and Maulana Karenga, with attempting 'to impose a superficial and problematic pan-African identity'.¹⁵ This charge is premised on the assumption that historic diasporas evolved an 'unambiguously Eurocentric' culture that alienates them from their long-lost cousins in the African homeland.¹⁶ Even more disturbing is Adeleke's conviction that this identity-dichotomy still exists and is irreconcilable.

Worse than Eurocentrism is the under-studied psychosis that excites hostility and suspicion between historic and contemporary diasporas and within each category as well. For example, in considering the problem from the 'African' perspective, Bediako Lamoué-Smith believes that African-Americans harbour widespread 'aversion for Africans'.¹⁷ He contends that contemporary diasporans often encounter emotionally disturbed African-Americans who demand to know, 'Why did you sell us into slavery?'.¹⁸ Within Africa, African-Americans and Africans engage in 'mutual prejudices and stereotypes'.¹⁹ On the other hand, Brempong Osei-Tutu admits to occasional 'frictions' between African-American repatriates and Ghanaians, but defends the long-term record of the relationship as being 'cordial'.²⁰

Unless effective strategies, including palliative use of history and greater cultural understanding and interactions, are deployed to heal the psychological wounds inflicted on generations of diasporans by the slave trade and colonial slavery – on both sides of the Atlantic – these questions will continue to haunt the relationship between historic and contemporary diasporas and between the former and the nations that now occupy sites of recruitment and embarkation. Although not addressed by Lamoué-Smith or Osei-Tutu, historic diasporans also direct their anger at their fellow pan-African activists and scholars.

THE HISTORIC DIASPORAN'S RE-INVENTION OF AFRICA

In an address to the Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, Desmond T. Orjiako, spokesperson and Acting Head of Communication and Information of the AU Commission, asserted, 'The making of Africa began with the formation of the OAU and will be realised with the AU'.²¹ In actuality, it was Africans displaced by the Atlantic slave trade who began the seminal construction of pan-Africa with the reconceptualisation of ethnicity as a framework of identity. A long line of intellectuals and activists

contributed to its architecture prior to the OAU blueprint. Knowledge of this history has a role in the prescription for reconciling historic diasporans and African nationals and will be briefly addressed.

To avoid the classical 'social death' of chattel slavery in the New World, the forced migrants of the Middle Passage instinctively sought to re-establish broken bonds. This tragic moment is captured in 'nation songs' of the Caribbean, typical of which is 'Temne Woman', recorded on the island of Carriacou, Grenada, and believed to be of eighteenth-century origin.²² In 'Temne Woman', one hears the lament and loneliness of the exile in an alien environment as the singer searches for a kinswoman as companion or mate: 'Temne woman-o/ Mama-o/ Papa-o/ Me come here/ Me no see Temne-o/ Ai, Temne-o/ Temne woman-o'.²³ These common bonds included the drum, musical rhythms, dance, eschatology and folklore. They formed new associations, sometimes with dominant ethnic and language ties, but over time, became increasingly detribalised. These associations of secret resistance went by names such as 'Regiments' in Trinidad and 'Cabildo' in Cuba.

Although the application of the term Africa to the whole continent and the use of the expression 'African' as a generic referent for captives of the Atlantic slave trade had wide currency among Europeans, eighteenth-century biologists coined new terms, such as *Homo Afer* and *Homo Ethiopicus* to define indigenous Africans. Interestingly, diasporans were also engaged in self re-definition to accord with their exile. The first Africans known to adopt the term 'African' as a common identity were the 'Sons of Africa,' the name of one of the very first pan-African organisations, founded in England in 1786 by native Africans, including Quobna Ottobah Cugoano (Attobah Coguanoo) (a Fante) and Olaudah Equiano (Olu-Uda Ekwunoo) (an Igbo), brought together by struggle against the Atlantic slave trade and the system of slavery that it sustained.²⁴ From that time, race-conscious Africans in the diaspora persistently contested the derogatory classifications and ascriptions of Europeans and proclaimed their collective identity as African or Ethiopian.

The repudiation of tribalism in preference to pan-Africanism was a compelling, emancipatory response to the pervasiveness of white supremacism and its divisive classificatory identities of African-descended peoples. Thus, although Equiano assumed the European appellation, Gustavus Vasa, he proudly appended his signature identity as 'The African'. Similarly, James Beale Horton might not have had the same appeal to pan-Africanists had he completely Romanised his Igbo ethnicity, rather than opt for the hubristic 'Africanus'. Edward Wilmot Blyden's parents were West Indian-born, but at least one grandparent was Igbo; transcending both West Indian and Igbo episteme, Blyden coined the term 'African personality' as a political philosophy of the 'new African'.²⁵ African personality was a fluid concept of

the newly awakened, emancipated and self-confident African. Nkrumah's interpretation of the concept appropriately describes the African personality required to achieve the African nationalism of the twenty-first century: 'a re-awakening consciousness among Africans and people of African descent of the binds which unite us – our historical past, our culture, our common experience and our aspirations'.²⁶

THE CURSE OF 'COLOUR' IN CARIBBEAN DIASPORISATION

After centuries of wrestling against European demonisation of Africa and the idealisation of whiteness, diasporans are still saddled with a multiplicity of identities that is easily exploited by agents of divide-and-dominate. William Wright succinctly, but sarcastically, problematises this identity crisis: 'Are they Africans, Afro-Americans, African-Americans, Blacks, blacks, Black-Americans, or black Americans'?²⁷ Diasporan epistemology of race in the United States (US) differs somewhat from that of the Caribbean. Unlike African-Americans, a person of the same phenotype in the Caribbean may conveniently assert different racial identities at any given time: 'African', 'Black', 'Creole', 'Coloured', 'Mixed', 'West Indian', 'Afro-West Indian', 'West Indian of African-descent' or even 'Negro'. Ironically, no-one was more strident in emphasising the 'Negro' label than Marcus Garvey; yet no one was more strident than he in promoting the Africanness/ Ethiopianess of diasporans prior to the revolutionary 1960s. Indeed, the longer acronym of Garvey's main organ was UNIA-ACL, the latter standing for 'African Communities League'. The 'Negro' in the twenty-first century Caribbean must, therefore, be re-socialised with the African personality or be omitted from the AU's 'Diaspora Initiative'. As Frantz Fanon contends, 'That there is an African people, that there is a West Indian people, this I do believe. But when someone talks to me about 'Negro people', I try to understand what is meant'.²⁸

CARIBBEAN DIASPORISATION AND THE RISE OF MODERN PAN-AFRICANISM

Did colonial slavery displace Africa in shaping the identity of today's descendants of historic diasporans, as Adeleke contends? Even if this assertion were partly true for the US, it was not equally so for the Caribbean. The distinctions validate the AU's delineation of the Caribbean as an autonomous Regional Network of the Sixth Region. One explanation for the distinction is in the demographic make-up of the colonial populations

and the continuing importations of substantial numbers of native Africans into the Caribbean space well into the nineteenth century. Successive generations of Africans maintained their African spirituality, folklore, proverbs and cultural practices, and successfully reconfigured their identity within a pan-African framework long before the term pan-African was coined.

The Caribbean is a unique sociological laboratory in which to examine the different historical dynamics of diasporan identity. All colonies harboured Maroons, some with centuries of independence prior to general emancipation. The descendants of the most notable groups showcase strong African survivals. Just as significant, colonies ended slavery with varying percentages of their black populations being African born, with over 50 per cent in Haiti and highs of over 30 per cent in Trinidad and British Guiana.

Native Africans fell into two categories in the Anglophone Caribbean. The first comprised conscripts in the British West India Regiments (WIR). Of the 77 000 Africans recruited between 1794 and 1802, over 13 000 were taken directly from the decks of slave ships arriving in Caribbean ports.²⁹ In 1807, the 10 000 African soldiers in the WIR were emancipated by a special Act of Parliament.³⁰ Of this number, a few hundreds were granted arable lands in northern Trinidad. The new arrivals complemented other free African communities on the island, including emancipated ex-soldiers who had served in the Anglo-American War of 1812-1814, free independent Muslim settlers, and a high percentage of Maroons (forest-based as well as urban).³¹

The second category of native Africans comprised those liberated by British squadrons as well as semi-voluntary indentured labourers. Although all British West Indian colonies had a shared experience in post-slavery colonialism, not all were cut off from continuing immigration from Africa. Between 1834 and 1867 some 40 000 native Africans arrived as free people. Most were 'liberated' Africans previously re-settled in Sierra Leone; others were recruited as indentured labourers from the Kru coast of modern-day Liberia. Altogether, some 9 000 disembarked in Trinidad and about 14 000 in British Guiana.³² This period of semi-voluntary migration coincided with ongoing slave imports, mainly into Cuba. Studies by linguist, Maureen Warner-Lewis, and anthropologists such as Melville Herskovits and J.D. Elder, validate strong ethnic African identities in Trinidad, maintained through personal names, songs, proverbs and religious beliefs, well into the twentieth century.³³ Interestingly, British Guiana did not have a similar experience of African retentions, despite parallel migration patterns.³⁴ It is no wonder that Trinidad was host to the largest number of UNIA branches outside the US and Cuba.

African diasporans in Trinidad retained their Yoruba Ifa/Orisha religion and created a distinctive Africanised Christianity in the Shouter Baptist/

Spiritual Baptist faith, much like the Aladura of Nigeria, Santería/Lukumi of Cuba, and Candomblé of Brazil. The lingua franca of the Africanised Trinidadian masses, an Africanised French or patois dialect (now called Kreyol in some islands), was also different from the language of colonisation for most of the nineteenth century and facilitated cultural resistance and African retentions in the island. In the process of diasporisation, their creole language was critical to the retention of African cuisine, music and dance genres, folktales, proverbs, ethics, herbal science and esoteric beliefs and practices.

The proliferation of Maroon settlements, revolutionary emancipation and continued African immigration might account for the prevalence of militant pan-Africanists in Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana. These include Toussaint L'Ouverture, Benito Sylvain, Jean Price Mars, Marcus Garvey, Amy Jacques Garvey, Amy Ashwood Garvey, Alma LaBadie, Bob Marley, George Padmore, C.L.R. James, Stokeley Carmichael (Kwame Toure), Ras T. Makonnen, Walter Rodney and Ivan van Sertima.

THE SIXTH REGION IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION

Garvey's perspective on the realignment of world power in the aftermath of the First World War, remains relevant to the current phase of globalisation: 'There is no doubt about it that we are living in an age of world re-organisation out of which will come a set programme for the organised races of mankind that will admit of no sympathy in human affairs, in that we are planning for the great gigantic struggle of the survival of the fittest'.³⁵ The reorganisation of imperialism in the aftermath of the Cold War was, indeed, the catalyst that transformed the OAU into the AU.³⁶

Contrary to Adeleke's Europeanisation indictment against nineteenth-century diasporan repatriates, their sincere objective was to create a new Africa that would make the best use of its natural and human resources, including her diaspora. This objective had not changed with Garvey's more direct approach to economic empowerment. As he explained, when accused of wanting to flood Africa with diasporans:

The doctrines of going 'Back to Africa' must be clearly understood. We are not preaching the doctrines to ask all the Negroes in Harlem and of the United States to pack up their trunks and to leave for Africa. We are not so crazy ... The majority of us must remain here, but we must send our scientists, our mechanics and our artisans and let them build railroads, let them build the great educational and other institutions necessary and when they are constructed the time will come for the command to be given, 'come home'... Not until then.³⁷

Nkrumah echoed the same sentiments when diasporan expectations of return heightened with Ghana's achievement of independence.³⁸

This prioritising of human-capital transfers from Africans in the diaspora to the continent is now the core element of the AU's Diaspora Initiative. As articulated by Ortiajo, 'The Africa Union plans to assemble and utilize a data bank of human resources available in the diaspora to turn Africa's brain drain into brain gain. Those qualified will then be invited to take up jobs in their professional capacity or in areas of proficiency'.³⁹ Many diasporan civil society organisations (CSOs) stand committed to repatriation, but their priorities, like those of the UNIA, are different: national unity, strong democratic institutions and political transparency. Homeland states must therefore transform the political culture to facilitate this historically unique socio-economic revolution. The rapid progression from July 1999 – when the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU decided to convene an Extraordinary Session to expedite the socio-economic and political integration on the Continent – to 2006 – when the AU amended the Constitutive Act by making diasporans voting members of the Union through ECOSOCC – demonstrates how far-reaching results can be achieved with decisive political will.

ORGANISATION AS POWER: THE CHALLENGE OF MOBILISATION AND PARTICIPATION IN ECOSOCC

Garvey never tired of emphasising the primacy of effective organisation. It is important to note that the Sixth Region covers a geographic area many times larger than the African continent. Garvey knew that it is 'a hard and difficult task' to organise the diaspora 'for the common good'. Nevertheless, with control of only 20 of the 150 seats on ECOSOCC, the Regional Networks comprising the Sixth Region will be much more effective when they seek consensus on common issues, because they 'have a common cause'.⁴⁰ Indeed, against tremendous odds, the convening of 'Town Hall' meetings in North America, the Caribbean and Europe since 2005 have demonstrated a sincere desire by convenors to pull out all the stops in the search for consensus. Already achieved is a formula for 'operational unity without uniformity', by which each CSO in the Western Hemisphere will maintain its own sovereignty with 'one equal vote' on an international Diaspora Council.⁴¹

There are many sceptics who would readily dismiss the work in progress toward continental union, the empowerment of civil society and the AU's Diaspora Initiative, in much the same way that contemporaries dismissed Garvey's vision of diasporan citizenship in a United States of Africa as 'pitiable rubbish'.⁴² After all, never before in the history of humankind had a

project of such magnitude been attempted without 'force of arms'.⁴³ One of the greatest lessons bequeathed by Garvey and his wife, Amy Jacques, was confidence in Africa's future sovereignty at a time when the continent was under the tightest grip of the colonial powers. They also invested the same level of confidence in a united continental government, although the continent was almost fully partitioned for maximum, colonial exploitation. Amy Jacques anticipated that the compilation and publication of her husband's thoughts and speeches would become a manifesto to liberation fighters and an inspiration to leaders of 'the glorious future of national independence in a free and redeemed Africa, achieved through organised purpose and organised action'.⁴⁴

The adoption of cosmopolitanism as the framework of the AU has not consigned Garveyism to obsolescence or irrelevance. As indicated earlier, Garvey understood the challenges of plural identities among people of African descent. Thus, he warned, 'The evil of internal division is wrecking our existence as a people, and if we do not seriously and quickly move in the direction of a readjustment it simply means that our doom becomes imminently conclusive'.⁴⁵ The challenge of unity among peoples of African descent becomes even more compelling if the Regional Networks of the Sixth Region are to elect competent representatives to ECOSOCC.

As stated at the Paris Conference of September 2007, 'The success of the African diaspora largely depends on their organisational development, their coordination and their level of awareness'.⁴⁶ Garvey left an enviable record and model of civil society organisation in his UNIA, the first trans-oceanic, trans-national, grassroots network of African peoples prior to ECOSOCC. UNIA achieved success through networks linking the metropolis of Harlem with most of the US, several countries in Latin America and most of the Caribbean islands. Its communication outreach, through the *Negro World*, like Anansi's web, reached into distant parts of the African continent. From its metropolis in Addis Ababa, ECOSOCC is similarly structured to impact its global diaspora through the five Regional Networks that comprise the Sixth Region. Organisationally, the task of ECOSOCC is vastly more complex than that undertaken by UNIA. Unlike UNIA, ECOSOCC must harmonise all legitimate CSOs in the diaspora, but lessons might still be learnt from the achievements of the former.

Perhaps Garvey's most valuable lesson was the power of communication and political education. Article 2 of the Statutes of ECOSOCC outlines the objectives of the Council, amongst which are to: (1) 'Promote continuous dialogue between all segments of the African people on issues concerning Africa and its future'; and (2) 'Forge strong partnerships between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, the youth, children, diaspora, organised labour, the private sector and professional

groups'.⁴⁷ Nowhere in the statutes is it stated how the education necessary to promote an awareness of these ideals is to be achieved. While print media still retains relevance and impact, today's *Negro World* must be driven by twenty-first-century information technology.

Information is power, but only to those who control it. Current images of Africa in trans-national mass-media networks have fossilised around negative phenomena, including: natural disasters, such as famine and floods; man-made disasters, such as refugees and war; poverty, violence and HIV/AIDS. This stereotypical branding of the continent breeds despair among diasporans already conditioned to anticipate such pessimism. Whatever might have been Gaddafi's personal agenda, there are valuable ideological lessons in his 'Voice of Africa' radio, launched as he positioned himself as Nkrumah's successor to the project of political union of the continent. The AU needs to prod the African private sector and member states to go beyond Gaddafi's personal agenda. There is a crying need for an All-Africa global telecommunications network with an emphasis on news, debate and commentary on current affairs. At present, the content of African cable networks with international transmission is almost exclusively cultural.

The challenge of controlling and managing mass communication is an equally daunting one in the Sixth Region. If elected representatives are to be truly representative of the respective constituencies, the political education of the respective CSOs in each Regional Network must be prioritised. The US has an old tradition in diasporan ownership of electronic media; the Caribbean record is disheartening. However, the Caribbean Pan-African Network (CPAN) seems to point in the right direction. CPAN is divided primarily by the sea, language and political cultures. It is a daunting space, where pan-Africanists must also be successful pan-Caribbeanists.

The Emancipation Support Committee (ESC), a by-product of the 'Black Power' movement of the early 1970s, serves as the Secretariat of CPAN. Following the Town Hall method, the ESC has convened plenary meetings in Trinidad and Tobago of CSOs comprising the entire pan-African spectrum. In 2012 it sent delegates to engage with CSOs and governments in several independent territories in CPAN as well as Mexico and Venezuela on plans for the commemoration of the UN 'International Year for the People of African Descent'. The ESC has also launched a two-hour weekly talk-show-radio programme called *Indaba* ('Where Knowledge Grows') as a medium of communication and dialogue on African history and heritage in the Caribbean and the promotion of business entrepreneurship, among other facets of empowerment. The potential of the programme to engage other CSOs (in CPAN and beyond) in live debate via telephone hook-up was successfully put to the test. This author is a member of the programme planning committee of *Indaba*. The radio programme also benefits from live streaming on

Facebook. If Indaba-type programmes are replicated throughout CPAN, this Network can contribute significantly to horizontal dialogue across CSOs, which is absolutely necessary for the effective functioning of ECOSOCC.

'BACK TO AFRICA': REPATRIATION, REPARATION, RECONCILIATION

In recent times many positive developments in Africa have become blueprints for deepening relations between Africans in the diaspora and Africans at home. Although Garvey did not invent the expression 'Africa for the Africans', he nevertheless appropriated it as the first principle of his philosophy, as inscribed in the title to the work, *The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey or Africa for the Africans*. 'Africa for the Africans' was the ideological mantra of the 'Back to Africa' movement, one of the pillars of African nationalism and pan-Africanism.⁴⁸ To first-generation transatlantic diasporans, repatriation as transmigration was an act of personal redemption. Garvey perceived repatriation as a crusade to liberate Africa from colonialism while presenting Africa with the opportunity for national redemption. Today, repatriation is a major element of Africa's vision of development. To the diaspora, repatriation is also intimately connected to the reparation and reconciliation necessary to heal the psychological wounds of separation that created the historic diasporas of the Americas.

Ghana and Ethiopia provide early models of post-colonial sites of return to the historic diaspora; Garveyism influenced both. In the Caribbean, the two most persistent and influential advocates of repatriation have been Rastafarians and calypsonians. Rastafarians acknowledge: Garvey as a founding-prophet of the movement; Emperor Haile Selassie I as Jah, the Son of God; and Ethiopia as the spiritual homeland. During the 1930s, Ethiopia became the focal object of reinforcement to the Back to Africa movement.

In response to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, calypsonians – predominantly Trinidadians – called the diaspora to arms in defence of Africa's sacred land.⁴⁹ (Shortly after the Second World War, calypsonian 'Lord Kitchener' became a crusader for pan-Africanism after his encounters with continental Africans in London. He celebrated this conversion with the first post-World War Two 'Back to Africa' calypso: 'I want to come back home, Africa/ Girl, I tired roam'. Ray Funk described Kitchener's 'Back to Africa' as the most popular calypso of that time, with its highest sales coming from West Africa.⁵⁰ Kitchener's style of speaking directly to Mother Africa and appealing for her compassion, as a prodigal-son, was adopted by successive calypsonians. Ghana's independence also inspired many Back to Africa calypsos and carnival bands with Back to Africa creations, both of which peaked during the Black Power movement.

When Nkrumah combined Ghana's famous gold with green, red and a black star for his country's national flag and launched his Black Star Shipping Company, he was actually signalling to the pan-African movement that Ghana had assumed the flagship of Garvey's vision of African unity and commitment to economic independence. Nkrumah was the first post-colonial leader to apply the principles of Garvey's repatriation framework, welcoming any pan-Africanists with 'special skills' to assist in the development of Ghana. However, while assuring other diasporans that Ghana had adequate room to welcome them back home, he thought that such migration 'could only be planned and carried out within the context of a unified continent'.⁵¹

Recent support by African rulers for repatriation ties in with renewed calls for reparation. Between 1984 and 1994 three events awakened new interest in the history of the European Atlantic slave trade and colonial slavery, namely: the 50th anniversary of the publication of Eric Williams' *Capitalism and Slavery*; the 150th anniversary of African emancipation in the British Empire; and the launch of UNESCO's Slave Route project in Benin. The natural outcome was a concerted call on the colonial powers for recognition of the slave trade and slavery as crimes against humanity and acknowledgement of the validity of reparations.

Since 1990 many African statesmen have added their voices in support of the diaspora. Not surprisingly, imperialist scholars have stepped up a counter-discourse that resonates with a muted call for reparation from Africa itself.⁵² Although former President Obasanjo has validated Africa's indebtedness, many diasporans consider it reprehensible to make such a call on the motherland. The most recent African scholarship has been shifting the paradigm more toward shared responsibility and reconciliation, with the latter being framed as the redemption necessary for the re-absorption of Africans in the diaspora.

History demands that Nigeria plays a seminal role in supporting such a policy. The ports of Nigeria accounted for the vast majority of embarkations of captive-ancestors in the Anglophone Caribbean.⁵³ Rising to the challenge, Nigeria hosted two historic reparation conferences between 1990 and 1993. At the first meeting, President Ibrahim Babangida ensured that Western powers heard the call.⁵⁴ In an address to an emancipation forum in Trinidad and Tobago in 2005, Obasanjo affirmed that if African states should move toward reparations, Nigeria (under his watch) would willingly support it.

Under President Jerry Rawlings, Ghana's interest in diaspora relations was rekindled after his participation in Trinidad and Tobago's emancipation celebrations in 1997. The commitment to reconciliation with the diaspora has been demonstrated in several ways, including: the annual commemoration of emancipation at Cape Coast; the renaming of Elmina's and Cape

Coast Castle's infamous 'Doors of No Return' with the symbolic caption, 'Door of Return'. To underscore this change in policy, the Ghana legislature passed the Immigration Act 2000 (No. 573) that accords 'a right to abode' to 'a person of African descent ... capable of making a substantial contribution to the development of Ghana'.⁵⁵

President Obasanjo, premier invitee to the 2005 emancipation celebrations in Trinidad, promised to initiate an emancipation commemoration in Nigeria. Ugandan President Yoweri Museweri made a similar commitment while in Trinidad for the 2008 emancipation commemoration. In 2011, the heads of the Nigerian and South African diplomatic missions in Trinidad and Tobago committed their respective governments to fully financing the country's emancipation celebrations from the following year.⁵⁶

In the making of the historic diasporas, Benin-Togo is to the French Antilles what Nigeria and Ghana are to the Anglophone Caribbean. Accordingly, Benin has focused on the Francophone Caribbean to pursue its reconciliation policy. In 1997 the Government of Benin facilitated the repatriation of Rastafarians from Guadeloupe, which ranked second to Haiti in the wars against slavery in the late eighteenth century. Two years later President Mathieu Kérékou established the Agency for Reconciliation and Development (ARDP) and appointed an Ambassador for the pan-African diaspora and the Rastafarians. In 2003 the Government followed this up with the establishment of a 'Grassroots-Garden of Brotherhood School and Children's Centre'.⁵⁷ Like Ghana, Benin has also begun to host annual commemorations of emancipation.⁵⁸

Nigeria has also set new standards in repatriation. In a 2006 television interview, Obasanjo announced his government's commitment to reserve 10 per cent of each district of Abuja for the resettlement of 'Africans in diaspora, who want to have a place to call their own in the continent of Africa'. Obasanjo also facilitated the founding of the global 'Nigeria in Diaspora Overseas' (NIDO) in 2000, to give Nigerians in the diaspora a greater voice in Nigeria's and Africa's affairs.⁵⁹ In June 2007 NIDO confirmed the distribution of 300 'certificates of occupancy' for the construction of housing units on 65 hectares of land in the Pyakasa suburb of Abuja. The Diaspora Village was envisaged as being self-contained, with churches, mosques, schools, a health facility, hotels and shopping malls.⁶⁰ Unfortunately, the project has become mired in a web of political and legal entanglements.⁶¹

It should be noted that while Obasanjo's public avowal implicitly included the historic diasporans, the recipients of certificates were all contemporary Nigerian diasporans, mostly resident in Canada.⁶² The Abuja Diaspora project underscores the issue of identity and belonging addressed at the beginning of this chapter. Admittedly, family ties and other social networks in the homeland create natural advantages for contemporary

diasporans. Nevertheless, historic justice and the principle of reconciliation require that similar concessions be extended equitably to all Africans in the diaspora.

Although Ethiopia lay beyond the labour-catchment area of the Atlantic system, she has pioneered the repatriation of Rastafarians since the 1960s. In 2005, Ralph Gonzalves, Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, visited Ethiopia and signed a bilateral visa-waiver agreement; both countries also signed a treaty for the reservation of a parcel of land for members of the Nyahbinghi order of Rastafarians.⁶³ Although of distinctive Portuguese extraction, Gonzalves publicly describes himself as a black man. He has strongly supported the current AU's Sixth Region policy as well as the reparations movement. In endorsing the visa waiver agreement, Dr Desta Meghoo-Preddie, former Director of the Bob Marley Foundation, declared, 'This was an opportunity that could not be missed and needed to be placed in the broader context of African diasporan relations ... We are working for the day when all Africans at home and abroad can travel freely within and to Africa. The bilateral visa agreement is the first step for CARICOM (The Caribbean Community) and African nations towards that goal'.⁶⁴ In 2009 the government of Ghana signed a similar visa-waiver agreement to facilitate Trinidad and Tobago nationals.

Repatriation and other intercourse between Africans in the diaspora and continental Africans will remain under-achievements unless governments are committed to eliminating the huge obstacles to free movement, especially from the Caribbean, to anywhere on the African continent. These obstacles are not insurmountable. At the lowest level, and the most easily resolved, is the problem of visas. Cost is only one of the many issues, but it will be singled out here because of the author's personal experience. A single-entry 'emergency visa' to Ghana costs USD\$150 – a punitive fee that is out of sync with the stated repatriation/reconciliation policy and which is exacerbated by irritating bureaucratic formalities.

Only a few African countries have diplomatic missions in the region. In order to resolve this shortcoming in the short term, African embassies and consulates could facilitate the processing of visas for states without diplomatic missions. At a more sophisticated level, one embassy could issue a visa that facilitates travel within an entire sub-region of the continent, and ultimately, throughout the AU, as is the case with the SCHENGEN visa system. However, even with visas, travel remains a major challenge. In 2007, in response to proposals emanating from the African Union-African Diaspora conference in Barbados, host-nation South Africa expressed interest in an air bridge with South Africa as the hub.

A trans-Atlantic air bridge linking CARICOM and Africa would revolutionise travel, cultural exchange and business. Renewed overtures were

made by South Africa in 2009; these were re-affirmed in 2011, heightened by expectation of firm action during the 2012 AU-CARICOM summit in South Africa.⁶⁵ The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago did not attend the summit, but two months later, she announced that an air-services agreement had been reached with Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, chief guest at Trinidad and Tobago's 2012 emancipation celebrations.⁶⁶ The current status of these commitments is unknown.

CONCLUSION

The success of the AU's Diaspora Initiative will depend on the quality of organisation within the global diaspora and ECOSOC. The convocation of Town Hall symposia in the Americas and Europe has demonstrated emphatically the capacity of Africans in diaspora to transcend all manner of differences, albeit along traditional lines of black nationalism. The emerging African narrative of introspection within academia in breaking the silence on the Atlantic slave trade augurs well for healing the wounded psyche of 'Africans at home and abroad' and in promoting true pan-African unity. Limited to the concerns raised in this chapter, the following measurable objectives could expedite the transformation of the 'universal confraternity' birthed by the UNIA into the 'New Africa' as conceived by Azikiwe, and 'the African personality' as conceived by Nkrumah, and now inscribed constitutively into the African Union: the strengthening of diaspora advocacy for greater recognition of Africa in the curricula of their respective educational authorities; constructive support of African governments for educators in the diaspora to facilitate the teaching of African languages; provision of financial and institutional support for a systematic expansion of intra-Africa and Africa-Diaspora student/faculty exchanges; aggressive marketing of global Africa's common cultural heritage, especially music, dance and spirituality; a greater commitment to forging bilateral and multilateral agreements toward the resolution of travel impediments between continental Africa and its global diaspora; expanding the current outreach by African states in projects of reconciliation between homelands and diasporas; and by changing the negative images of Africa through greater African ownership of globally transmitted information.

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Re-thinking Nigeria's Foreign Policy Approach to Continental Integration

Policy Perspectives

Babatunde Fagbayibo

INTRODUCTION

An inherent feature of the praxis of international relations is the existence of pivotal states or regional hegemons. These states possess the capacity to set the tone and/or shape strong bilateral and/or multilateral arrangements. Emboldened by factors such as a huge population, a strong army and a big economy, they have the geo-strategic advantage to determine, for good or bad, the direction of events and actions. In the multilateral context, regional hegemons have played important roles in the creation of global and regional organisations. The United Nations (UN), Bretton Woods institutions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU) are some of the organisations that owe their existence to powerful countries.

The centrality of regional hegemons to the success, or lack thereof, of regional integration initiatives forms the general framework of discourse of this article. In this context, the chapter examines Nigeria's contribution to continental integration efforts thus far, and how this can be enhanced. Having made Africa the focal point of its foreign policy since the 1960s, Nigeria has, over the years, contributed immensely to the development of the African continent. As a regional hegemon, successive Nigerian governments have consistently championed efforts aimed at enhancing the integration and connectedness, at both sub-regional and continental levels, of African countries. The creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the AU, the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the contribution to peace-keeping and peace-making efforts across the continent, and considerable financial commitment to regional integration efforts, can be listed as some of Nigeria's achievements.

Questions can then be asked as to why these contributions have not made a significant impact on the attainment of the desired continental

integration. While the inability to achieve qualitative continental integration cannot, and should not, be blamed solely on Nigeria, its position as a regional hegemon puts it at the locus of finding constructive means of addressing these problems. The underlying principle here is that Nigeria should engage in a re-think of its approach to the continental integration process. This will require a strategic, nuanced approach that takes into account the realities of a changing Africa.

NIGERIA'S AFRICA, AFRICA'S NIGERIA

So far I have concentrated on the problems of Africa. Please do not think we are not interested in the problems of the rest of the world; we are intensely interested in them and hope to be allowed to assist in finding solutions to them through this organisation, but being human we are naturally concerned first with what affects our immediate neighbours.¹

It is a trite view in international relations that a country's foreign policy is generally determined by its national interest. Mainly derived from a complex interplay of domestic and external factors, such national interest provides the parameters for designing and implementing foreign policy initiatives. The domestic context is usually the starting point, as it informs the nature and texture of the foreign policy. As Kissinger asserted, '[T]he domestic structure is taken as given; foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends'.² The domestic structure or context is largely defined by a number of political and economic factors, such as the administrative/political system, ethno-politics, population size and natural resources. These factors play an extensive role in the formulation of the Nigerian foreign policy, especially as it relates to Africa.³

Since independence in 1960, each successive administration in Nigeria, as well as the general civil society, has viewed Nigeria's role in Africa from a hegemonic prism. Post-independence political elites have been consistent in articulating the centrality of Africa to Nigeria's foreign policy objective. The phrase 'Africa as centre-piece', coined by the Adedeji Report of 1976, has become the mantra of Nigeria's involvement in African affairs. Gambari placed two strategic variables at the heart of this approach: population and oil.⁴ With a total population of 162.5 million (2011 figures), Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. About one out of every five Africans is a Nigerian. This has translated into a relatively large human resource and military (Nigeria has about 94 500 army personnel).⁵

In addition, Nigeria is the largest oil-producing country in Africa, producing about two million barrels of oil per day, and supplying about 5 per

cent of the total United States' crude imports. In addition to oil, Nigeria has huge gas reserves and solid minerals. As a result of its oil wealth (which accounts for over 90 per cent of its total foreign exchange earnings), Nigeria is the biggest economy in Africa, with a GDP that stands at US\$509 billion (2013 figure). These two factors, despite the critical challenges (which are discussed below), have emboldened Nigeria to occupy the driving seat in addressing African issues and thus feeds into its foreign policy-making agenda.

With its oil wealth and population, Nigeria views itself as a natural leader, in both the West African sub-region and in Africa as a whole. Nigeria has been careful to exercise its hegemonic status in a peaceful manner. As Souare observed, '... Nigeria's dominant status in the region has never pushed it to be expansionist. It has never even tried to blackmail or coerce weaker neighbours into accepting its views and policies over any matter'.⁶ However, Nigeria's hegemonic role is not completely devoid of controversies. Adebajo pointed out the objection of some African states to Nigeria's 'penchant for a unilateral diplomatic style' and the expelling of three million West-African immigrants between 1983 and 1985.⁷ Although the latter action was carried out during a deepening economic crisis, it was a clear violation of the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement of persons.⁸

In spite of its many internal contradictions – mainly as a result of bad governance, mismanagement and ethnicity issues – Nigeria has devoted considerable human and financial resources to regional integration matters.⁹ The consistency of Nigeria's Africa-centred foreign policy is a positive factor. It is, however, problematic when such consistency does not translate into much substance or have the desired impact. The link between Nigeria's contribution and the development of continental integration is discussed below.

NIGERIA'S APPROACH TO CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION: AN OVERVIEW

At the core of Nigeria's Africa-centred foreign policy approach is the level of its human and material contribution to issues of African integration. At both the sub-regional and continental levels, Nigeria has distinguished itself as a key financier and driver of the integration process. Before looking at Nigeria's contribution, it is important to begin with the nature of Nigeria's approach to continental integration.

Nigeria's approach to continental integration is defined through an incremental framework. In other words, Nigeria has always championed a position that favours a gradual, step-by-step approach to the attainment of continental integration. This was captured by a statement made by Nigeria's first Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, to the Nigerian House of Representatives in 1960:

To talk of a political union first before the necessary understanding and before knowing exactly what our problems are, I think is too premature now. So although I will not rule out the possibility of a political union of some sort sometime in the future ... I still cannot see my way clear now to an easy and stable political union between different African states.¹⁰

This conservative approach has influenced every measure of Nigeria's engagement with continental integration initiatives. As such, Nigeria always aligns itself with countries that prioritise a minimalist/incremental methodological approach. Such methodology emphasises the importance of regarding sub-regional organisations as the building block of continental integration. Nigeria's central role in the formation of ECOWAS, and its continued contribution to its development, derives from this ideological approach.

In the process leading to the formation of the OAU in 1963, Nigeria played a critical role in ensuring that the organisation and its Charter reflected inter-governmental cooperation, rather than a supranational political union.¹¹ Nigeria played a similar role in the process of transforming the OAU into the AU. Opposed to Muammar Ghaddafi's proposal of a supra-national continental organisation, Nigeria and South Africa were instrumental in the creation of an inter-governmental AU.¹² Both Nigeria and South Africa were also at the forefront of the rejection of Ghaddafi's plan for the creation of an 'African Union Government' at the 2007 AU Summit in Accra, Ghana.¹³

Despite its gradualist approach, Nigeria continues to contribute both human and financial resources to the continental integration process. Nigeria's contribution to the OAU and the AU budget remains commendable. Nigeria and five other African countries contribute 75 per cent of the AU budget. The other four are South Africa, Algeria, Egypt and Libya. The pivotal role of the then presidents of Nigeria and South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki, in the institutional development of the AU is another factor. Both parties were central to the establishment of NEPAD and the APRM frameworks as the defining features of the change from the OAU to the AU.¹⁴ Nigeria's contribution to peace-keeping and peace-making efforts at the sub-regional and continental levels remains significant as well. These include interventions in Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Darfur.¹⁵

THE CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION CONUNDRUM

As mentioned above, Nigeria's Afrocentric foreign policy has catalysed both its interest and contribution to integration efforts. This position lends itself to a critical question: have these contributions made any significant impact on the development of continental integration? In order to answer

this question, it is important to look at two issues: the current state of the continental integration process and the factors that militate against Nigeria's qualitative contribution.

The state of continental integration has been far from impressive. The shift from the OAU to the AU has not brought about the desired substance in the context and tone of the continental integration process. While the AU's institutional architecture is more extensive than that of the OAU, it has not been able to achieve much in terms of deepening integration.¹⁶ The potential of critical institutions, such as the AU Commission, APRM, the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), is diminished by the inability of member states to transfer requisite powers and competencies to the AU.¹⁷ The promotion of governance standards, harmonisation of policies of regional economic communities, promotion of sustainable development, and the integration of African economies cannot be achieved by the AU, without the comprehensive transfer and distribution of powers.

Another key problem is the appalling level of commitment to AU standards by member states. Member states routinely disregard standards of rule of law, democratic governance, electoral management and the respect of fundamental rights. Various reports on democracy and governance show that while some progress have been made, there still exists serious concerns about how some African states continue to adopt repressive laws and tactics to diminish fundamental rights.¹⁸ There is very little that AU institutions can do in this regard, since they lack real monitoring and enforcement powers.

The issue of financial resources is another major constraint. This factor undercuts the effectiveness of the capital-intensive integration process. The continental integration process is essentially beholden to external donors.¹⁹ Development partners contribute 56 per cent of the total budget of the AU, and also contribute 97 per cent of the budget of key integration programmes.²⁰ In spite of these contributions, the AU operates each year with only 50-60 per cent of its required finance.²¹

At this juncture, it is important to consider the factors that limit Nigeria's contribution to the qualitative development of the continental integration process. At the core of Nigeria's inability to effectively shape the continental integration agenda is its myriad of internal problems. The history of post-colonial Nigeria is littered with issues of monumental economic mismanagement, ethno-religious conflict, political instability and electoral chicanery. Its oil wealth has proved to be a burden, rather than a stimulant for wide-scale development. Since independence, Nigeria cannot account for an estimated US\$380 billion of its oil wealth.²² This is despite the fact that the country lacks basic transport and electricity infrastructure, which

is coupled with endemic poverty. The dire state of governance and democratisation has also spurred violence and insurgency in parts of the country. Niger Delta militias agitate against marginalisation and corruption in terms of management of oil resources; there is recurring ethno-religious conflict in parts of northern Nigeria; and religious fundamentalists, such as *Boko Haram*, continue to wreak havoc in the north. Unlike many of its smaller neighbours, Nigeria continues to struggle with holding transparent elections. These factors cumulatively undercut Nigeria's capacity to be effective on the continental stage in two critical ways. First, it is a major distraction that limits its focus and economic capacity to champion the integration agenda. Second, it diminishes its moral authority to exert any meaningful influence. As Adedeji rightly quipped:

No nation that is confronted with a long period of political instability, economic stagnation, and regression, and is reputed to be one of the most corrupt societies in the world, has a moral basis to lead others; if it tries to, it will be resisted.²³

Another problem is the elitist formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy.²⁴ Since independence, very little effort has been made to build foreign policy around the need of general civil society.²⁵ Rather, foreign policy has been an expression of the need and aspirations of elite politicians, business people, the military and bureaucrats.²⁶ The corollary of this is a lack of broad-based ownership and, consequently, legitimacy of the foreign policy.

The lack of conceptual clarification of the Afrocentric concept of Nigeria's foreign policy is another obstacle. According to Pine, the concept of 'Africa as the centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy' lacks deep and profound philosophical reflection.²⁷ He remarked:

Since the phraseology appeared on the Nigerian foreign policy scene, it has continued to reproduce itself, like the ever recurring mathematical decimal. The foreign policy elite and the political leadership of successive governments seem to be carried away by its philosophical allure rather than its rational ideation. In this sense, therefore, consideration of economic benefits, continental political leadership, national interests, and military partnership and strategic engagements are sacrificed on the altar of good neighbourliness and psychological gratification.²⁸

The point derives from the inability to engage in broad-based formulation and articulation of foreign policy. As mentioned earlier, such a missing link strips the Nigerian foreign policy of legitimacy and strategic focus.

The shortage of skilled personnel in the Nigerian Foreign Service is a serious limitation.²⁹ The articulation and implementation of a strategic policy on continental integration requires a highly professional, motivated and specialised foreign service. The recruitment and training policy in the Foreign Service, with particular emphasis on specialisation, has remained defective over the years. This has resulted in a dearth of officials that are well versed in the nuances of continental integration and how to re-shape Nigeria's strategic role in achieving this objective.

Last is the *modus operandi* of Nigeria's engagement with the policy of continental integration. As mentioned, since independence, Nigeria has favoured a gradualist approach to continental integration. While this is not necessarily negative, it is problematic in the sense that Nigeria has no clear articulation or strategic framework on how to achieve integration. As a regional hegemon, Nigeria should present its vision of a gradual approach to continental integration and work assiduously towards building consensus around such a framework. The absence of this kind of framework is the cumulative consequence of the above-mentioned points.

A RE-DEFINED CONTINENTAL HEGEMON: POLICY PERSPECTIVES

In the last five years, Nigeria has experienced a noticeable decline in its assertive role in continental politics. Unlike the Obasanjo administration's visibility and significant mark on continental integration policies and projects, the Yar'Adua and the current Jonathan administrations have played a less dynamic role.³⁰ A case in point was the poor handling of the election of the Chairperson of the AU Commission. Despite Nigeria's insistence that regional hegemons should not vie for this post, it was unsuccessful in mobilising African countries, particularly member states of ECOWAS, to vote for its preferred candidate. ECOWAS member states, such as Cape Verde, Liberia and Benin reportedly voted for South Africa.³¹ Analysts viewed this as a signpost of Nigeria's declining supremacy, and consequently, the triumph of South Africa in continental politics.³² In recent years, South Africa has enhanced its status as not only a continental force, but also a global player. Its membership of BRICS, IBSA and the G20 are part of the goal to position itself as an essential part of the global decision-making architecture and also the voice of Africa on the international plane.³³ South Africa is a serious contender for permanent membership at the UN Security Council, a position Nigeria also covets. With its citizen at the helm of the AU, South Africa has demonstrated its intention to shape the continental agenda.

The stunted development of the continental integration process provides the avenue for a critical reflection of how Nigeria should reposition its

hegemony. Against the backdrop of the issues raised in the foregoing discussion, it is appropriate to offer some policy recommendations on how Nigeria can adopt a nuanced focus and approach towards continental integration.

Any discussion on the shift of Nigeria's policy approach to continental integration should begin with the crucial need to address its many problems. Issues of large-scale corruption, ethno-religious conflict, electoral fraud and dilapidated infrastructure continue to stifle the development of the country. A fully democratic Nigeria is important for not only enhancing national development, but also for providing moral leadership across the continent. The governance architecture of the AU requires a Nigeria that has effective democratic institutions and the capacity to sanction errant member states. The democratisation effort should underline the crafting of Nigeria's national interest in relation to its foreign policy.

The first issue deals with the need to set a new agenda for Nigeria's approach towards continental integration. Such an agenda should be the result of sustained and broad-based consultation with the wider civil society. Universities, students, labour unions, business and the media should be engaged in the process of crafting a framework that clearly defines Nigeria's role in the calculus of continental integration. Pertinent issues should be seriously considered, such as an audit of Nigeria's financial and human contribution to continental integration, the benefit derived (and to be derived), implications for ordinary citizens, specific articulation of the kind of role Nigeria should play, an institutionalised reporting and appraisal mechanism of Nigeria's engagement, and the methodology of engaging the masses in the decision-making process on continental integration. The importance of building popular consensus for Nigeria's foreign policy cannot be de-emphasised, as it speaks to the legitimacy and sustainability of the process.

The second issue deals with the centrality of the Nigerian Foreign Ministry in this process. In order to provide a strategic institutional focus, it is crucial to establish a specialised unit within the Ministry, tasked with co-ordinating all government and non-governmental activities relating to issues affecting continental integration. Staffed by adequately trained and competent officers, the unit should track and assess measures that could enhance Nigeria's contribution to integration efforts. In this regard, this unit should be involved in creating a platform through which civil society could contribute to the debate. Through awareness campaigns, seminars and conferences, efforts should be made to capture the opinions and reflections of the Nigerian people. The unit should also be able to liaise effectively with other government departments, in order to develop a multi-sectoral framework for continental integration. It should also develop close working relationships with continental and sub-regional institutions, and with similar national institutions in other regional hegemonies. The importance of this measure

lies in the fact that it allows for the sharing of ideas and, most importantly, the efficient channelling of Nigeria's ideas into a trans-national framework.

Thirdly, Nigeria should intensify efforts to strengthen its ties with other regional hegemons, especially South Africa. Both countries should enhance existing frameworks of co-operation to include specific areas of collaboration in respect of continental integration. These should include measures such as: synergised implementation of key integration initiatives; consultation with other African countries on integration issues; increased financing of the integration process; proper assessment of areas of divergence and possible alignment of focus; nuanced engagement with external partners; the feasibility of creating a concert of regional hegemons to drive the integration process; and articulation of an implementable roadmap for continental integration.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria's role as a continental hegemon is guaranteed by its huge population and vast natural resources. Despite its many internal problems, Nigeria has remained consistent in its approach to continental integration. However, Nigeria's contribution has not made a significant impact in advancing continental integration. This is due to a number of factors, such as the lack of political will to commit to integration standards by member states, Nigeria's inability to lead by example in terms of democratisation, a lack of popular consensus behind Nigeria's foreign policy, a shortage of skilled personnel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the absence of a clearly articulated vision for continental integration. In this respect, this chapter proposed certain critical policy measures for addressing these factors. These include the creation of a mechanism for broad-based formulation of foreign policy, the establishment of a national specialised unit dedicated to continental integration, and enhanced co-operation with South Africa and other regional hegemons in achieving the goals of continental integration. Nigeria's ability to contribute effectively to the process of continental integration is ultimately dependent on its ability to get its house in order, and thus be able to lead by example.

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Female Youth in Africa and their Involvement in Political Activities

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INTRODUCTION

Globally, women are said to be marginalised in almost all spheres of life, and literature abounds regarding the extent and dimensions of the disparities women face within their social milieu.¹ Within the political domain, it is obvious that women are not well represented in various forms of political activity, and a number of social, economic and cultural factors have been attributed to this marginalisation.² While various explanations and solutions are being sought on a daily basis regarding the challenges women face within the various spaces that they find themselves in, especially regarding political participation (which is the focus of this study), not much has been done to examine the activities of women at the youth stage. Examining their activities in this discourse is crucial, as it throws more light on their plight, with the aim of addressing it.

Generally speaking, statistics regarding young women in Africa vis-à-vis political participation is not encouraging, except in Rwanda.³ Research has established the general neglect of women globally and in Africa. Extending this frontier through an exploration of the kind of activities young women engage in within the political space thus becomes critical in this chapter. The chapter therefore seeks to understand what young people do as far as political participation is concerned. Further, a critical examination of the activities of the African Union in addressing this plight becomes pertinent, considering its place in Africa. As a starting point, it is pertinent to explore the place of young women in politics vis-à-vis their male counterparts.

POLITICAL CONTOURS AND FEMALE YOUTH

One of the challenges regarding women and politics is that young women's activities are often merged with women's statistics.⁴ Thus, getting correct

data regarding them might be a bit cumbersome. From the available data on women's participation, the number of women who have participated in one form of political activity or the other is very small compared to that of men.⁵ For instance, before 1990, studies showed that only five women had assumed key leadership positions in cabinet.⁶ Overall, between 1960 and 2000, a total of 148 women assumed one form of leadership position or the other.⁷ As of 2012, it had increased to 21.2 per cent. Young women do aspire to occupy available political positions.⁸ Yet, their impact on political activity has not been felt. A number of factors are responsible for this. First, data regarding the activities of young women vis-à-vis political activity is lacking. Second, women only contest slots allocated to women, i.e. the position has been reserved for a woman.

Beyond contesting elections, studies have revealed that young women have shown an interest in other political activities,⁹ but they have been limited by a number of factors. For example, in the area of voting during elections, Owino¹⁰ stated that young women have constituted about 60 per cent of voters in Kenya, but their decisions are often influenced by patriarchy. This is based on the assumption that women lack the requisite knowledge and discernment skills to choose the right person for political office.

Tracing the political activities of young women from the pre-colonial era to date, a key issue that cannot be ignored relates to a lack of rigorous study regarding their political activities. Within some African societies, during the pre-colonial era for instance, the concept of a female youth was unknown. The transition period from childhood to adulthood was a rather short one and based on the demands of society in terms of marriage and child bearing.^{11, 12} Rituals and ceremonies usually centred on how girls and young women could become wonderful wives and mothers. In some cultures, a girl was expected to be in her husband's house by the time of her second menstruation; while in some places, early marriage and betrothal were common.

These social and cultural dynamics during the pre-colonial era made the concept of female youth and political participation a difficult concept. For young men on the other hand, a number of ceremonies/rituals were put in place to prepare them for adulthood, and this, in the long run, tends to extend the length of their youthful stages compared to that of females. (This does not suggest that such ceremonies did not exist for females; rather, in most instances, it was to prepare them for motherhood.) In some cultures, some of the social and cultural experiences enjoyed by young males were not enjoyed by female youths. Thus, a female youth, in most cultures, was already an adult by virtue of her position as a wife and mother. Even in the post-colonial era, physiological and cultural issues still made a clear conception of female youth difficult.

The central argument regarding the activities of the female youth was that men colluded with colonialists during this period to perpetrate inequality between men and women^{13, 14, 15} In Kenya, for instance, the origin of the loss of political power among women stemmed from the loss of access to and control of the land during the colonial era. Women at this period thus became more economically dependent on men.¹⁶ This led to an intensification of domestic patriarchy, which was reinforced by colonial social institutions.¹⁷ Land alienation reduced the economic independence enjoyed by women by compromising their economic productivity. As colonialism continued in Africa, the perceived importance of female agricultural contribution to the household diminished, as their vital role in food production was overshadowed by the more lucrative and male-controlled cash crop cultivation.¹⁸ In addition, the politically stifling conditions women were subjected to affected their participation; it affected young girls' enrolment in school, as children of the 'elites', who were connected to mission schools and the government, had the opportunity to be enrolled in school. A large number of young women, who could not further their education, thus engaged in domestic duties, with colonialists and African 'elites' who held white-collar jobs in the cities. This trend became so popular that a number of young women in the villages looked forward to going to the city centres in order to serve as maids and house-help.¹⁹

Activities during the post colonial era regarding young women still remained the same, due to the influence of patriarchy and colonialism. However, awareness regarding the plight of women increased and several governmental and non-governmental organisations increasingly fought for the cause of women. In spite of this, the marginalisation of young women is still an issue, due to a number of factors, ranging from the ones highlighted above to the recent introduction of youth as a concept of study in Africa. Presently, the level of awareness regarding the plight of female youths is still low, compared to the kind of attention male youth receive at present. While the level of education of female youths has increased compared to what was attained during the pre-colonial and colonial era, the gap in terms of their political participation compared to male youths is still wide.

EXPLAINING LOW PARTICIPATION OF YOUNG WOMEN IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Using a particular theory to explain the marginalisation or low participation of young women in political activities may appear cumbersome, considering the myriad of challenges that bedevil these youngsters on the continent. From the feminist perspective, for instance, a number of scholars have put

forward their perceptions regarding the position of women vis-à-vis their male counterparts and exploring all of these perspectives is well beyond the purview of this discourse. Notwithstanding this, a major argument of feminist scholars regarding the level of female representation in political activities has to do with differences among women, including issues like class, ethnicity, race and generation. The assumption is that all these issues have a great impact on their interests and priorities.²⁰

Clark²¹ highlighted a number of issues regarding the low participation of women in politics, among which is sex-role socialisation, which is related to the gender role structure. Women and men are taught different roles in life: the home is the women's area, and politics and public life are seen as the man's world. Aside from this, the theory of descriptive representation, explained by Clark,²² also becomes crucial, considering its explanation that the exclusion of any group from the position of power has unpleasant implications for policy decisions and political outcomes. This is because substantive representation of women in political activities also determines their level of influence.²³

Beyond the feminist theories, Rothstein's²⁴ Structure and Actors theory also becomes insightful to this discourse. According to him, structures, institutions and actors function in a reciprocal interchange, where actors' activities are limited by the current structures. Actors work within fixed structures, but actors are also the creators of the structures.²⁵ Two main structures that influence gender within a society include socio-economic structures and culture.²⁶ A country's socio-economic structure has great impact on women's condition in society. In countries with a modernised socio-economic structure, the gender roles are not as obvious as in the more traditional ones.²⁷ There is also a co-variation with culture and socio-economic structure, which makes it more difficult to differentiate the influence on women's conditions in society.²⁸ Thus political parties, women's organisations and policy makers constitute the rational actors. This is because they are critical actors who describe why women are not fully represented in political activities. The political parties, for example, control nomination procedures and they decide candidate quotas.²⁹ By implication, these groups constitute a very strong actor within political processes and are the main link between decision makers and civil society.³⁰ Women's organisations are generally regarded as core initiative takers on issues concerning gender and politics. Within the global setting, and especially on the continent, they constitute a force to be reckoned with, considering the myriad activities being undertaken by them.

Given the explanations above regarding women and the low levels of participation in political activity, it is obvious that the root cause can be found in the social, cultural and economic arrangements of society. This

was corroborated by other feminist scholars when they attributed the cause to macro and micro factors.³¹ Resnick and Casale³² itemised these factors as including social and economic factors, political awareness and civic engagement, performance of the government in power, institutions and the party system.

As much as one agrees with these scholars on the itemised points, what becomes critical at this point is a decisive examination of these factors in line with the current level of young women's participation in political issues. Socially, young women appear informed: their input to entertainment and music (among others) has improved tremendously. But this has not translated to political participation. Currently, a large percentage of young girls in Africa still live in poverty. In the northern part of Nigeria, for instance, some of the challenges still facing young girls include: early pregnancy and unsafe childbirth; a lack of direct economic assets; failure to complete education; and violence against girls and women.³³ All these speak volumes regarding poverty levels on the continent. A large number of young girls are face restrictions based on these cultural and religious factors.³⁴

Young people constitute more than half the population in many African countries and very few of them have access to education. According to a recent report, about 16 million girls are denied access to education.³⁵ In Sudan, for instance, only 8 per cent of children are literate. Sub-Saharan Africa ranks the lowest in terms of school enrolment, with boys being more likely to attend school than girls.³⁶ Several reasons stop girls from accessing educational facilities, including the cost of education, violence and a preference for having a son attend school.³⁷

Further, in the area of political awareness and civic representation, the roles being played by young women is nothing to write home about.³⁸ A number of young women appear uninterested in knowing who is the district head or the governor and who occupies political positions within their territory. Discussions that centre on politics are usually uninteresting to young women and it is usually seen as men's territory. To a number of them, politics is a 'no go' area, based on the level of violence and deceit pervading the political arena in Africa. The economic situation also makes the matter worse, as access to electronic media may be difficult, and sometimes impossible, due to incessant power outages. The lack of access to technology is particularly acute among a large number of rural young women in comparison with urban residents. Aside from this, many young women in rural areas and the informal sector grapple with survival needs. Raising interest in political activities may be a challenge considering the demanding nature of their jobs. The role of political appointees makes the matter worse. A large number of the political appointees are usually seen during campaigns and elections. As soon as victories are consolidated, they are no longer

within reach, as they disappear into thin air. Equally, in some instances where a few young women take an interest in political matters, they may face discouragement from peers, as they may be seen to be encroaching on territory belonging to men.

Governance on the continent is another major hurdle. The majority of political office holders in Africa have performed below expectations. Challenges range from corruption to violence and conflict (among others) and have made it difficult for these governments to deliver on expectations. The Economic Commission for Africa³⁹ submitted that 'corruption remains the single most important challenge to the eradication of poverty, the creation of [a] predictable and favorable investment environment and general socio-economic development in Africa'. Generally, it is obvious that we only have politicians who are not democrats. A number of individuals are willing to contest elections without being willing to abide by the rules and regulations that guide conducting elections. On assumption of office by these politicians, the meager resources are wasted on frivolities, while any attempt from any quarter at challenging their excesses is usually met with stiff opposition. This is the case in Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe has been in power since 1980 and he is still not willing to relinquish power.

The violence in some parts of the continent is still fresh in one's memory. For example, election violence in Kenya, which revolved around ethnicity, led to loss of lives and property; the 2011 election violence in the northern part of Nigeria is another case in point. There, the eruption of violence was attributed to the rigging of election results. In the process, lives were lost and property worth millions of naira was destroyed. At present, Nigeria is still battling with the insurgence of Boko Haram,⁴⁰ which has always worked against Western education in the country. Some of their ideologies include that young women are forbidden to move around unaccompanied in public. If they need to go anywhere, then they must be accompanied by a male relative. Unconfirmed reports suggest that the main reason behind their agitation is because of dissatisfaction among northerners regarding the marginalisation of particular ethnic groups by government. All these challenges relating to governance have made a number of young women scared of engaging in governance. Generally, women detest violence. Violence within government, coupled with other challenges, may be a major factor pushing young women away from political participation.

Challenges emanating from the party system could also constitute a major threat to political participation for young women. Violence, as a result of manipulating young men to perpetrate their selfish ambitions, has been the notorious feature of political parties on the continent. The last election in Ghana is a case in point, where a number of youths were used as thugs to perpetrate election violence in some parts of the region. During election

violence, arson, murder, rape and other social vices were perpetrated, due to the influence of alcohol and other substances. The activities of bodies charged with conducting elections in some parts of the continent may not be encouraging either. This is because some of them have been indicted for collaborating with some parties to rig elections. A number of them are corrupt and do not abide by the professional ethics guide for an election. Albert⁴¹ captured Bamfo's⁴² analysis regarding the activities of electoral institutions in Kenya and Zimbabwe as follows:

The violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe seems to have begun when the electoral commission in both countries, the ECK and ZEC, respectively, withheld announcing the results, ostensibly under orders from the party in power. Events that unfolded in Kenya and Zimbabwe after the elections showed that the incumbent party can use the electoral commission to keep power through the back door even when the electorate had decided differently. In Zimbabwe, the ZEC's missteps seemed glaring and eroded any trust the opposition MDP had for the commission. The counting of presidential votes was moved to a 'secret' location and despite seeking a court injunction to compel the ZEC to release the results it still took more than one month to do so. The ZEC apparently, was under duress to tow ZANU-PF's line, since one of its officials, the director of training and development, who attempted to stop postal ballot rigging ahead of the June run-off elections, was kidnapped and murdered, possibly by state security agents ('Body of Whistle Blowing', 2008). Despite that, the ZEC's failure to announce the results of the March election fuelled speculation about vote rigging and elicited condemnation from human rights groups. In contrast to the wanton delay in March, the ZEC promptly released results of the June elections which the opposition boycotted to allow President Mugabe to be sworn into office for another five-year term.

Aside from this, the majority of political parties do not have concrete programmes for young people interested in their political affairs. In most instances, male youths are often favoured, due to the fact that they satisfy their ulterior motives of election rigging. Also, young females have not been able to find their feet within these political parties. A number of these parties are weak and lack ideologies that women can relate to. Aside from this, the inordinate jostle for leadership positions among these parties has made it impossible for them to stick to certain ideologies and principles that can be easily understood and related to – especially by women. In addition, training is not a popular phenomenon among existing political parties in Africa. A number of political parties do not have procedures for educating their members on the ethos of their parties. The mode of operation of these parties does not encourage participation by women, as it is often patriarchal

in nature. There are cases of such experiences in Nigeria, where the founder of a political party usually has the last say on issues affecting the party. Democratic principles are usually not favoured, as political parties are extensions of patriarchal control. The implication is that women have no say, and a decision to include them or not would thus depend on the decision of the party leader and not on the wishes of party members.

A major issue has to do with mentoring. While a number of women have been appointed to political positions lately in some African countries, they have not been provided with the necessary mentoring for young women to secure political appointment in the future. Some of them have instead followed the path of corruption, like their male counterparts. A case in point is the recent corruption allegation leveled against a female politician in Nigeria.⁴³

More important, the role culture plays in further perpetrating these factors cannot be over-emphasised. Lewis,⁴⁴ while theorising about how a culture of poverty develops, argued that this kind of culture manifests itself when populations that have been marginalised develop a pattern of behavior necessary to keep their disadvantaged position. He further argued that such behavior includes low aspirations, political apathy and helplessness.⁴⁵ To him, once these lifestyles or cultural traits are established, they tend to develop mechanisms that perpetuate them, even if structural conditions change. While this theory tends to emphasise how poverty becomes a lifestyle (and in spite of its shortcomings in the area of 'mechanisms perpetuating culture'), it has, critically, shown that when you marginalise an individual within a certain area, different patterns of behaviour tend to develop. Young women have been marginalised over time, and the apathy, loss of interest and helplessness, coupled with the features of political participation discussed above, are already established among them. In addition, different mechanisms in the areas of values and attitudes have been developed to perpetrate this marginalisation.

Gertz,⁴⁶ when defining culture, referred to it as the kind of suspended webs of significance humans spin; in other words, culture is a reflection of humans in terms of the array of events within a man's environment.⁴⁷ So many webs of significance have been spun by women over the years. The present disposition is a reflection of the events from the pre-colonial period to date. Refusal to be involved (by young women) in political activities has become a lifestyle and a culture that is being passed on from one generation to the other. Any significant understanding and explanation regarding political participation among young women must therefore move beyond some of the features discussed above. Thus it appears that young women are only acting out the scripts that society has written regarding their way of life. Culturally, a young woman or girl in a household is expected to be in

the kitchen. She is expected to learn how to care for her immediate family and to reproduce for society – and so the cycle continues. When important issues are being discussed among men, she is expected to keep quiet or, as a sign of respect, to withdraw to inner chambers, because her opinion may not be relevant.

In post-colonial African societies, these scenarios still exist, but in a refined way. While at school, girls would rather join activities that enhance and promote their established ways of life. They are seen joining associations like the cooking association, fashion clubs and religious associations, which further establish them within the culture of reproduction and family care. Political associations/meetings and student unionism are the boys' world – and thus girls are rarely seen participating in politics. When young women are seen contesting an election within a campus, it is to 'fulfil all righteousness' of the gender balance. They usually occupy positions like vice-president, which means they usually have no say in what goes on in the political life of the campus. The same way of life occurs outside the school setting for young women. They become leaders when it is only women contesting such positions.

From the foregoing, what becomes clear is that there are a number of constraints facing young women on the continent. The question that comes to mind at this juncture is: What have been the roles of local and international bodies, especially the African Union (AU), in addressing this challenge?

We shall take the African Youth Charter, one of the documents published by the AU, in this discourse and examine how far it has gone in addressing issues relating to young women, especially in the area of political participation on the continent.

AFRICAN YOUTH CHARTER (AYC) AND YOUNG WOMEN IN AFRICA

The African Youth Charter⁴⁸ (AYC) was a document presented to the AU on 2 July 2006, during the 7th ordinary session of the Assembly in Banjul Gambia. The document can be categorised into two parts: the first part, consisting of 28 articles, explains the rights and duties of the youth in member states; while the second part deals with the *final provisions* of the youth charter.

The Charter undoubtedly explains the roles, responsibilities and rights of the youth on the continent, taking into consideration international and local documents regarding youth. From this document, it is evident that the youth occupy an important place in the heart of the AU. More important, Articles 11 and 23 deal with young females and explain issues relating to participation and equality between young men and women. This document demonstrates the commitment of the AU to the welfare and interests of the

female youth in Africa. However, in spite of the provisions of a well-laid out document on the youth in general, one of the main flaws of the Charter relates to implementation. This is, of course, a recurrent challenge regarding AU documents. One of the questions that one needs to ask is how far the AU has gone in implementing the issues raised in the charter. While an appreciable number of African leaders have ratified this Charter, implementation of the Charter has been a challenge for them. Some members of state parties do not even have youth policies for their own country and, where they do, these have not been updated to reflect the issues raised in the Charter. Rather, the youth on the continent are still treated as infants who have no sense of direction and who must remain quiet and learn from adults.

For young women, culture still hinders them when it comes to the decision-making process. The charter recognises this disparity regarding participation in decision making among the youth, but the procedure put in place to address it may not solve the problem. This is because there is an existing traditional disparity regarding the participation of young men and women when it comes to decision making within the family structure.

Article 23 highlighted about 14 measures regarding young women and girls. One of the measures is that state parties shall 'ensure that girls and young men are able to participate actively, equally and effectively with boys at all levels of social, educational, economic political, culture, civic life and leadership as well as scientific endeavors'. The question is: how can this be possible and what are the efforts being made in this regard? There is no clear-cut procedure aimed at addressing these issues, especially the one relating to culture. Presently, boys are at an advantage when compared to girls in terms of political participation. Ensuring active, equal and effective participation for girls must involve identifying the issues that create these disparities and finding ways to bridge them. In Nigeria, for instance, there have been no clear-cut programmes aimed at ensuring that young women participate in political activities; instead, attention has been focused on HIV and other health programmes.

The Charter further stated that the AU shall institute programmes that will make girls and young women aware of their rights. But, in the seven years since the promulgation of this Charter, nothing substantial has been done by member states in this regard. Rather, these youngsters are pushed further away from instruments that could guarantee their participation in political matters. Education for girls has not improved. Violence against women is on the increase. Poverty is on the increase, and females are further limited by violence under the disguise of religion, which further limits them in accessing their rights. Boko Haram in Nigeria is a very typical example and this is spreading to other parts of West Africa, where young women, who used to enjoy freedom of speech, movement and association,

are gradually being restricted, because of the activities of these religious fundamentalists. Within the school setting, awareness programmes and a change of curriculum to actualise some of these changes are still lacking. What the AU is doing to ensure that the agreement reached by member states is upheld and respected is another issue begging attention.

The article also claimed that member states within the AU would introduce legislative measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination. But, in the last seven years, nothing much has been done in this regard. The article states that legislative patterns shall be introduced to eliminate all forms of discrimination against young women. While this development may be the first step in the right direction, one issue of concern is how legislation can effectively eliminate existing behavioural patterns that are embedded in norms, mores and values of a society when such laws are not even known and understood by the communities where such behaviour exists? How does legislation affect early marriage? Legislation alone may not address the real issue. A large number of young women and their parents are not aware of existing legislation regarding young women and girls. In situations where they are aware, enforcing these laws may be difficult, due to the influence of religion and other factors. Further, most parliamentarians on the continent appear not to comply with these documents. How do you explain a senator (law maker) marrying a 13-year-old girl in the name of religion when there is legislation that forbids early marriage?⁴⁹ The attitude of the people in power seems not to support the freedom of these young women, especially when it clashes with religious and cultural beliefs. In Africa, it appears that when any issue or legislation threatens the beliefs of those in power, the religion of the people is brought out and it is always the latter that wins.

The third aspect discusses the need to 'institute programmes that make young women aware of their rights and of opportunities to participate as equal members of the society'. Within the school system, nothing significant can be seen to have been done regarding this measure. A number of schools are still guided by religious factors, with boys and girls not being allowed to interact freely in a mixed school. One therefore becomes curious as to how equality can be ensured when there is no opportunity for meaningful interaction. Aside from this, awareness alone may not solve the problem on the ground. Awareness without the concrete means of achieving equality may not yield the desired result.

THE WAY OUT

From this discourse, one thing becomes clear: young women who will eventually become adults within their respective spaces are not faring as well as their male counterparts, as far as political participation is concerned.

Proffering solutions to the challenges of young women participating in politics is straightforward yet difficult. In my view, one of the ways is to address what I call 'women culture'. By this, I refer to a lifestyle that has been presented to women over time through norms, values and other social facets of society. Individuals do not just act; actions are a result of established norms that society has set at different points – where it matters and where it can direct our behaviour. This is what some scholars refer to as 'cultural frames'.^{50, 51} To them, no individual simply sees things the way they are; every action is based on a set of cultural frames that highlight certain sides and hide others.⁵² By frame, Snow and Benford⁵³ mean 'an interpretive (schema) that simplifies and condenses the "world out there", by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of action within one's present or past environment'. This debate actually is a product of the work of Kant,⁵⁴ where he distinguished between noumenal and phenomenal worlds; the world as it is differs from the world we represent to ourselves, and as human beings, we are only able to access the world we represent to ourselves.⁵⁵ It follows that bringing the desired change through some of the solutions and measures highlighted by the AU may not bring the desired solution. The first step, therefore, would be to understand some of the ways of life that made women lose interest in politics and find a means of making them unlearn this. Promoting any change regarding political participation must therefore involve a thorough understanding of how society has shaped the lifestyle of women over the years, with a view to finding out how these lifestyles can be addressed. The AU and other agencies that are desirous of attracting women into political participation need to take note of this.

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What, Fundamentally, is Pan-African Education?

A De-colonial Epistemic Perspective on Education and Development in Post-colonial Africa

Morgan Ndlovu

INTRODUCTION

That education is central to development is both fundamental and foundational. However, the manner in which education (as a system of knowledge production) contributes to development is dependent on various considerations. One of the most important considerations in determining the contribution of education towards development, in any part of the world, is that of relevance. What a particular kind of education system can do in one context is not necessarily the case in a different context.

In Africa, the question of whether or not the current education system contributes to development is quite a contested one. Thus, despite the fact that a number of post-colonial African states, such as Nigeria, Ghana and Zimbabwe, have intensified and prioritised education programmes since they gained independence, there is still no concrete and clear evidence that education has contributed to the development of these countries. This state of affairs, therefore, calls for interrogation into whether or not the nature of the education system, which African states adopted after the demise of a rather explicit juridical-administrative colonial domination, are appropriate for the progress of the African continent.

This chapter's point of entry is that the manner in which the education system in post-colonial Africa is conceived and/or implemented needs decolonisation in order to contribute positively to the development of the continent. This chapter, therefore, begins by articulating the myth of a de-colonised post-colonial Africa, in order to advance its case for the need to decolonise the discourse of pan-African education, in order to achieve what Gordon has come to describe as 'concrete manifestation of freedom' on the continent of Africa.

THE MYTH OF A POST-COLONIAL AFRICA AND THE QUESTION OF COLONIALITY VIS-À-VIS DECOLONIALITY

One of the fundamental questions confronting the idea of pan-African education and the development of the African continent today is that of coloniality. Thus, the question is whether the present education systems in Africa are African-oriented or whether we have a Eurocentric system of education in Africa. In other words: does the fact that the indigenous peoples of Africa constitute a larger group of learners and educators in schools and universities mean that we can now comfortably declare our education system pan-African; or does the education system remain outward looking, even if the individuals that dominate its administration, teaching staff and studentship are the indigenous peoples of Africa? This question is quite significant, but also controversial, since the state of being African has itself become underlined by the complexities of formation, deconstruction, transformation, continuity, heterogeneity, entanglement, uncertainty and instability after a long period of colonial encounter between the coloniser and the colonised.

In spite of the complexities and controversies that underpin the idea and the reality of Africa and being African itself, the need to define pan-African education remains a compelling one. This is mainly because Africa, like all other spatio-temporal constructs throughout the world, depends on knowledge production for its progress. For Africa, the question of knowledge production is even more critical in that the continent has been duped by succeeding colonial, apartheid, nationalist and neo-colonial systems that, while they promised Africa 'salvation', they brought about oppression and exploitation. Thus, for instance, when the colonial powers promised Africa civilisation, they instead brought about slavery and colonialism. This is the same with other 'salvationist' promises, such as those of human rights, good governance and development, which have come to serve as a pretext for aggression towards African states such as Libya, which saw the death of its leader, Muammar Gaddafi, in 2011 in the name of human rights and good governance. It is from such experiences that Africa needs to be more vigilant when it comes to issues such as received knowledge and other 'salvationist' promises that serve to cover the ulterior motives of the global super powers outside the continent of Africa.

While the idea and reality of the African identity is 'as vast and complex as the continent itself',² there is no doubt that one of the common denominators that unite Africans is the experience of colonialism. The African colonial experience involved a process that subjugated and inferiorised African knowledge and world views. It is from the auspice of common colonial experience across the continent of Africa that we must begin to question such

ideas as pan-African education in the aftermath of juridical-administrative colonialism, because the agenda that underpinned the sub-alternisation of indigenous African knowledge, voices and world views in the processes of knowledge production had much to do with the interest of the coloniser, rather than the colonised subject. The question that confronts us today, therefore, is that in light of noble ideas, such as pan-African education, can we confidently proclaim that the entire colonial project disappeared with the advent of the now so-called post-colonial Africa? Indeed, to scholars such as Spivak, the whole of the so-called post-colonial world today simply resembles a 'post-colonial neo-colonialized world'.³

This article is predicated on the premise that colonial domination did not evaporate with the demise of juridical-administrative colonialism in Africa. Thus, as Grosfoguel has put it, '... the most powerful myth of the twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonization of the world'.⁴ This mistake, of reducing the problem of colonial domination to an issue of power contestation over juridical-political boundaries of state in national liberation and socialist strategies of anti-colonial struggle, has led to the myth of a 'post-colonial' world. Thus, it is within this false premise of a 'post-colonial' world that, although 'colonial administrations' have been entirely eradicated in developing states and independent state-hoods celebrated throughout the Third World, the non-European peoples are still living under what Grosfoguel refers to as 'crude European/Euro-American exploitation and domination'.⁵ This means that the concept of colonialism, which became the basic template of anti-colonial struggle throughout the Third World, was, from the outset, too simplistic to deal with the complexity of colonial domination, whose architecture boasts heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years.⁶ Rather than remain trapped within purviews of colonial domination that are espoused in the limiting critique of 'classical colonialism', which tended to underpin the ideology of nationalist and socialist anti-colonial struggles throughout the Third World, progressive scholarship by Latin American scholars, such as Quijano⁷ and Grosfoguel,⁸ has called for an understanding of colonial domination through the conceptual lens of 'coloniality'.

The concept of coloniality, unlike the critique that underpinned classical colonialism, unveils the mystery of why, after the end of colonial administrations in the juridical-political spheres of state administration, there is still a continuation of colonial forms of domination. This is mainly because the concept of coloniality addresses the issue of colonial domination, not from an isolated and singular point of departure, such as the juridical-political administrative point of view, but from a vantage point of a variety of 'colonial situations' that includes cultural, political, sexual,

spiritual, epistemic and economic oppression of subordinate racialised/ethnic groups by dominant racialised/ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial administrations.⁹ This holistic approach to the problem of colonial domination allows us to visualise other dynamics of the colonial process, which include 'colonization of imagination',¹⁰ 'colonization of the mind'¹¹ and colonisation of knowledge and power. These dynamics of colonial domination enable us to grapple with long-standing patterns of power that were and are 'maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of people, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience'.¹² Thus, Maldonado-Torres' position concurs with that of Quijano, which states that coloniality operates on every level, 'in every arena and dimension (both material and subjective) of everyday social existence, and does so on a societal scale'.¹³ In other words, coloniality is a power structure that, in the African context, was introduced by imperialism and colonialism.

As a result of its heterogeneity, coloniality as a power structure survives the end of direct colonialism and continues to sustain asymmetrical power relations and dichotomous conceptions of humanity through racial hierarchisation. It is because of the existence of coloniality as a power structure that decoloniality becomes an epistemic project that seeks to destroy various colonial situations, in order to bring about a pluriversal world where all knowledge has the right to influence the world in every corner of its location.

There is, indeed, a difference between colonialism and coloniality. According to scholars such as Maldonado-Torres:

Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to a long standing pattern of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that defines culture, labour, intersubjectivity relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day.¹⁴

Decoloniality can, therefore, be understood as liberatory thought that emerged from the numerous struggles against coloniality. Thus, as Maldonado-Torres puts it:

By decoloniality it is meant here the dismantling of relations of power and conceptions of knowledge that foment the reproduction of racial, gender, and geo-political hierarchies that came into being or found new and more powerful forms of expression in the modern/colonial world.¹⁵

In other words, decoloniality is a cocktail of liberatory projects of critical thought from the ex-colonised epistemic sites that seek to make sense of the position of ex-colonised people within the current world system, which Mignolo described as a Euro-America-centric, Christian-centric, patriarchal, capitalist, heteronormative, racially-hierarchised, modern world system that came into being in the fifteenth century.¹⁶ Thus, through what Santos has referred to as 'abyssal thinking'¹⁷ in Western thought, the modernity that came to characterise the new world order since 1492 demarcated and hierarchised the global human population according to race, resulting in those with white skins constituting and inhabiting the 'zone of being', where they enjoy the fruits of modernity, and those with black skins, whose humanity was questioned, constituting and inhabiting the hellish 'zone of non-being', which is characterised by deficiencies. Thus, in his description of how the people in the 'zone of non-being' are negatively characterised and treated by those in the 'zone of being', Grosfoguel argued that:

We went from the sixteenth century characterization of 'people without writing' to the eighteenth and nineteenth century characterization of 'people without history', to the twentieth century characterization of 'people without development' and more recently, to the early twenty first century of 'people without democracy'.¹⁸

Africa has, since the advent of the modern world system that divided the world according to 'zones' existed in the 'zone of non-being'. The critical question, therefore, is whether it is appropriate for a spatio-temporal construct such as Africa (which is located in the 'zone of non-being' that is characterised by a catalogue of deficits and a series of lacks) to have a similar system of education as those spatio-temporal constructs found in the 'zone of being', where they systematically reap all the fruits of modernity: from the sixteenth century 'rights of people' to the eighteenth century 'rights of man' and the late twentieth century 'human rights'.¹⁹ This question is quite important, because if African states have adopted the same education system as countries located in the Euro-North American world, i.e. in the 'zone of being', this would mean that Africa is not producing knowledge from where it is located – the 'zone of non-being'. This point brings us to the important point of what Grosfoguel referred to as the 'locus of enunciation'²⁰ – meaning 'I speak from where I stand'.

In decolonial critique, the question of 'locus of enunciation' is quite an important one to examine, because, as noted by scholars such as Haraway have indicated, our knowledge is always situated,²¹ but the Euro-American world view projects itself as unsituated to hoodwink the peoples of the non-Western world. Dussel has referred to the situated-ness of knowledge as the 'geopolitics of knowledge',²² while Grosfoguel refers to it as the 'body-politics of knowledge'.²³ The problem arises when the subject that speaks and its location is decoupled in Western philosophy and sciences. Thus, according to Grosfoguel:

By delinking the ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location from the subject that speaks, Western philosophy and sciences are able to produce a myth about a Truthful universal knowledge that covers up, that is, conceals who is speaking as well as the geopolitical and body-political epistemic location in the structures of colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks.²⁴

This is important to understand, because by projecting a universal, God-eye view knowledge, the Euro-American world has succeeded in making the subjects that are socially located in the oppressed side of colonial difference think epistemically, like the ones that are located on the dominant side. This 'point-zero'²⁵ perspective, which represents itself as being without a point of view or as being beyond a particular point of view, has historically allowed Western man to represent his knowledge as the only one capable of achieving a universal consciousness. In the process, as Grosfoguel has noted, non-Western knowledge came to be dismissed as particularistic, and thus unable to achieve universality.²⁶ In this way, a hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge and people was constructed. It is therefore essential that, in our quest for pan-African education, we do not reinforce the hierarchical order in knowledge production that places the 'body politics', 'ego-politics', 'theo-politics' and 'geo-politics' of indigenous peoples of Africa in an inferior position.

In the light of the above discussion, one of the critical tasks of decoloniality is to unmask and reveal the darker side of modernity/coloniality, especially in non-explicit sites of colonial domination, such as in knowledge production, which currently continues unabated even after the demise of juridical-administrative colonialism. Thus the concept of decoloniality is capable of helping us ask questions about the politics of knowledge generation, such as who generates what knowledge and for what purpose. It helps us develop questions about the relevance and irrelevance of knowledge and about why Africans are failing to 'unthink' knowledge of equilibrium, which helps to sustain rather than subvert long-standing asymmetrical global power relations. These questions (among a vast range of others) that

can be asked through the conceptual lens of decoloniality, clearly indicate that if we can fully understand the coloniality of knowledge, then we can successfully engage the agenda of decolonising things, such as curricula in schools, colleges and universities in order to develop a decolonised pan-African education system.

Finally, the rethinking and/or the unthinking of the idea of pan-African education in order to resonate with the world views and aspirations of the African peoples, particularly the indigenous peoples, whose knowledge, world views and experiences have, for a long period, been oppressed, subalternised and inferiorised, cannot be a fruitful exercise, unless the exercise also involves rethinking and/or unthinking 'development' as a discourse, a concept, a process and practice on the continent of Africa. This is mainly because the purpose of education, as a means of knowledge production, is to advance development of the people in any particular context across the world. Thus, the process of decolonising education in Africa needs to be accompanied by that of decolonising development, so that there is no mismatch between the education that is imparted to the peoples of Africa and the manner in which they conceive development.

This article's point of departure is that development cannot be what one group of people located in one context can do to other people in a very different context. Thus, the major question facing African development in the aftermath of juridical-administrative colonialism is that of whether or not the discourses, ideas and practices of development that Africa adopted are free from the colonial matrices of power that underpin coloniality. This question is quite important, because development was historically conceived within colonial discourse and meant opening up the African continent for economic exploitation and the destruction of African religious beliefs and tradition (among other negative connotations associated with colonial capitalism and the civilising mission). Thus, in the process of colonial development, Africans were dispossessed of their land, forced off their land and transformed into peasants, workers and domestic servants, while white settlers became the owners of land, minerals and other valuable resources. In the course of implementing colonial development projects in Africa during the colonial era, 'the colonial state did not hesitate to resort to brute force in dealing with natives, to destroy the forms of social organisation that previously existed, or even to co-opt these forms in the service of ends other than those to which they had been directed'.²⁷ In a nutshell, development was delivered in an authoritarian fashion and as colonialism.

In post-colonial Africa today, it can be argued that there seems to be more continuity than change in the manner in which the idea of development was conceived, debated and implemented in the past and in the present. In explanations of why the African post-colonial state is well known for repression,

brutality, corruption and inefficiency, some scholars (such as Chabal and Daloz) have chosen to push for the 'African exceptionalism'²⁸ thesis, which tends to arrive at the conclusion that development in Africa is informed by a different logic to that which shaped the Western world. While the question of a different logic might be true to a certain degree, the assertions that development in Africa is generally underpinned by short-term politics of the belly, that Africans have a tendency to rely on outsiders and that what appears to be disorder to outsiders is, in fact, order to Africans, tend to ignore the fact that it is coloniality that makes it difficult for development to take place in Africa, because of entrenched Western interests on the continent. As Cheru has put it, 'What is normally accepted as 'development', in Africa has been essentially an imperial project, derived and financed by dominant Western power to serve Western needs'.²⁹ Thus, according to Cheru, under Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), 'policy making, an important aspect of sovereignty, has been wrenched out of the hands of the African state. This is colonisation, not development'.³⁰ What all this entails is that what needs to be decolonised in Africa is not only the means of achieving development, such as education, but also the idea of development itself, which is caught up within global imperial designs.

PAN-AFRICAN EDUCATION AND THE QUESTION OF EUROCENTRISM IN AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES

Universities are important repositories of knowledge throughout the world. Universities, as academic institutions, serve as places where future decision makers, knowledge producers and leaders in all spheres of life are produced. According to Odora Hoppers and Richards:

... a university is a place where people think. Researchers produce knowledge. Teachers communicate knowledge. Students acquire knowledge, skills, values, and professional qualifications. If all goes well everyone in the university community serves humanity. None of this could happen without thinking.³¹

The question that emerges from the above analysis of what universities are, throughout the world, is that of what kind of 'thinking' should underpin African universities. Thus, in Africa, the major question that faces universities, as academic institutions of knowledge production, is whether we do really have African universities or merely Western universities in Africa. This question is quite significant, because the issue of the identity of an African university has a bearing on the nature of graduates that

universities in Africa produce – and therefore, on the direction of development that the continent of Africa is heading towards. However, before we even discuss the question of identity in relation to universities as institutions of higher learning in Africa, it is imperative to first tackle the question of why Africa requires a different system of education after several years of colonial encounter with the West. What empirical evidence do we have to support the cause for a different education system from that of the Western world?

While it is true that apart from the violence of Euro-American-centred political and economic oppression and domination, the indigenous peoples of Africa suffered epistemological violence and colonial domination in knowledge production that left them with almost no original thinking tradition to which they can go back to, the possibility for kinds of thinking that reflect the pluriversity of historical processes outside the purviews of Western epistemology remains real.³² Thus, apart from domination, post-colonial theorists such as Bhabha have reminded us that the colonial encounter was also characterised by other processes, which included resistance, negotiation, mimicry, hybridity and alienation.³³ These complex and dynamic processes, which characterised the colonial encounter beyond domination and hegemony categories, point to the fact that, rather than overwhelmingly altering African ways of living and thinking, colonial domination left behind a patchwork of ‘geo-political’, ‘ego-political’, ‘theo-political’ and ‘body-political’ forms of knowledge that may not necessarily fall within Western philosophy of what constitutes knowledge. Thus, even though scholars such as Spivak have questioned whether or not the subaltern can speak,³⁴ and Hobsbawn and Ranger have stressed the ‘invention of traditions’,³⁵ it is too simplistic to view the impact of colonial encounter as though it were homogenous and as if it left no stone untouched in committing ‘epistemicides’ on the colonised peoples of the Third World.

By and large, the impact of direct colonial domination on epistemologies of the colonised varied from place to place and time to time. Thus, according to Quijano:

The forms and effects of cultural coloniality have been different as regards to times and cases. In Latin America, the cultural repression and colonization of the imaginary were accompanied by a massive and gigantic extermination of the natives, mainly their use as expendable force, in addition to the violence of the conquest and diseases brought by Europeans. The cultural repression and massive genocide together turned the previous high cultures of America into illiterate, peasant subcultures condemned to orality; that is, deprived of their own pattern of formalised, objectivised, intellectual, and plastic or visual expression.³⁶

Quijano's position is that Latin America became the most extreme case of cultural colonisation by Europe. Thus, he argues that Latin America cannot be compared with Asia, the Middle East and Africa because:

In Asia and in the Middle East high cultures could never be destroyed with such intensity and profundity. But they were nevertheless placed in subordinate relation not only in the European view but also in the eyes of their own bearers.

In Africa, cultural destruction was certainly much more intense than in Asia, but less than in America. Nor did the Europeans there succeed in complete destruction of the patterns of expression, in particular of objectification and of visual formalization.

What the Europeans did was to deprive Africans of legitimacy and recognition in the global cultural order dominated by European patterns.³⁷

What emerges from Quijano's analysis of the impact of colonialism across the regions of the Third World is that in Africa, the process of colonial domination did not totally annihilate and exterminate indigenous African ways of thinking, knowing and patterns of expression: it merely subalternised and inferiorised them in the global cultural order. What then needs to be done to reverse the status quo is to deliberately exalt the subaltern knowledge through formal education, especially in institutions of higher learning, such as universities. Thus, Quijano's analysis of the effect of colonial domination on African cultures and knowledge systems resonates with Odora Hoppers and Richards when they argue that:

Two centuries of politicised and scienticized denial of the existence of the metaphysics of indigenous people has not eradicated their knowledge systems, their rituals, and their practices ... at least not completely. Whenever we look deeply at African society, or indeed most indigenous societies, the empirical fact that stares back at us is a reality of life lived differently, lives constituted around very different metaphysics of economics, of law, of science, of healing, of marriage, of joy, of dying, and of co-existence. The problem before us is therefore that the academy has not adapted to its natural context, or has resisted adaptation epistemologically, cosmologically and culturally – with immense ensuing cognitive injustice to boot!³⁸

The above analysis by Odora Hoppers and Richards clearly indicates that the colonial encounter did not alter everything and everybody in Africa, as scholars such as Comaroff and Comaroff would like us to believe when they argue that the colonial encounter altered everything and everybody in Africa.

Indeed, the above empirically-based evidence provided by different scholars about Africa's existential differences from the West means that the continent of Africa needs an education system that fits its context, rather than one that was imposed by colonisers. Thus, according to scholars such as Gutto:

Education in Africa needs a fundamental paradigm change which entails, among other things, focusing on confronting, with a view of correcting and departing from, hegemonic knowledge and knowledge systems that are predicated on racist paradigms that have deliberately and otherwise distorted, and continue to distort, the reality of who Africans really are.³⁹

In spite of the significance of the many calls for paradigm shifts in order to rehabilitate African education, so that it serves the developmental aspirations of indigenous African communities, the biggest challenge remains the question of whether or not it is possible for the colonised, Westernised-educated African elite to unlearn and unthink the education system that produced them, even on the African continent itself. This question is quite important, because the calls for transforming education in Africa in order to suit the contextual needs of the African peoples is not anything new, but so far this problem is yet to be rectified.

In spite of the ongoing Eurocentrism in the majority of universities in Africa, Africans have not been mere passive spectators of the making of university education in Africa, but have responded in various ways to rectify the situation. Thus, one of the recent developments that needs closer analysis in the quest for pan-African education is the idea of a Pan-African University. Upon realisation that education is the most important tool for equipping African peoples with the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes (in order to drive the African Union's vision of an 'integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, an Africa driven and managed by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena'), the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the African Union launched the Second Decade of Education for Africa EX/CL/224 (VIII) Rev. 2, which identified tertiary level education as one of the seven priorities to be focused on for the time period 2006–2015. This call was made explicit in the Addis-Ababa Declaration of 2007, when the African Heads of State and Government called for the 'revitalization of African universities' as they adopted the Consolidated Plan of Action for Science and Technology in Africa. It was with this vision and background that, in 2008, the African Union Commission proposed the creation of the Pan-African University (PAU), which came to be located in five geographic sub-regions of Africa, namely: Northern Africa, Western Africa, Eastern Africa, Central Northern Africa and Southern Africa.

While the spirited effort by the African Union to transform and revitalise university education in Africa, through a noble idea such as that of the Pan-African University needs to be applauded, one of the critical questions that needs urgent attention is that of how pan-African the Pan-African University is. Thus, one of the issues with the idea of a Pan-African University pertains to the location of its institutes within existing universities in Africa, whose institutional infrastructure for research and teaching is generally characterised by what Collins viewed as a Eurocentric, masculinist, knowledge-validation process, whereby certain types of knowledge, theories and methodologies are validated, while others are invalidated.⁴⁰ What is at stake with the location of Pan-African University institutes within the already existing universities in Africa, is that there is a high possibility that these institutes will inherit the Eurocentric knowledge validation processes that tend to marginalise African world views and aspirations, particularly when it comes to the generally marginalised indigenous African communities.

In addition to the problem of its location within existing academies of higher learning in Africa, such as the University of Stellenbosch, which served to prop up the apartheid regime in the past, the Pan-African University can also be criticised on the basis of its prioritisation of programmes of study. With specific reference to its Southern Africa node at the University of Stellenbosch, the Pan-African University's choice of 'space sciences' as its area of focus falls far beyond expectation. The question is whether space sciences can be viewed as the first priority for the majority of the indigenous peoples that are found in the cartographic space known as South Africa today or whether there are other priorities that could better serve the interests of the majority of the indigenous peoples of Africa at large and in South Africa in particular. With rampant poverty and vast other socio-economic challenges, which emanate from the inequalities that presently characterise the post-apartheid nation-state in South Africa, it is clear that the Pan-African University's Southern Africa node would better serve the interests of indigenous peoples by providing programmes that could bridge socio-economic inequalities or bring about a better understanding of them.

The third problem with the idea of a Pan-African University relates to its funding. Being funded externally, particularly by European states such as Germany and Sweden, it is highly possible that the Pan-African University will not bring about educational programmes that serve the developmental needs, interests and aspirations of indigenous communities in Africa. Thus, in accordance with the wishes of its sponsors, the Pan-African University cannot escape the temptation of pursuing Eurocentric societal beliefs. In addition, the fact that the Pan-African University did not take an ideological position and commit to consciously recruit teaching

and research staff with an interest in the decolonisation of knowledge in Africa means that we cannot expect it to be different from any other Eurocentric university found in Africa. Thus, even though the Pan-African University has made a commitment to recruit Africans to provide teaching and research services, the social location of teachers and researchers from Africa does not always relate to their epistemological location as Africans. Thus, as Grofougel puts it:

The fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations, does not automatically mean he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern epistemic location. Precisely, the success of the modern/colonial world-system consists in making subjects that are socially located in the oppressed side of the colonial difference, to think epistemically like the ones in the dominant position.⁴¹

This clearly shows that in order for the Pan-African University to transform the heavily Eurocentric education model in Africa, it is not enough to recruit Africans: it needs to consciously exalt the African knowledge that has for so long been subalternised through recruiting Afrocentric scholars, as well as opening up space for indigenous knowledge in the curriculum.

CONCLUSION

For true pan-African education to come into being in the age and space dubbed 'post-colonial Africa', it is important for Africans to note that colonialism is not dead and its legacy still lives with us. Thus, as Small has concluded, this means that since 'the past is not dead; we still live with its legacy – thousands of racist books and articles in libraries that are still being read – while so much of the literature developed by progressive writers has had to be dedicated to challenging the nonsense of the past'.⁴² For pan-African education to emerge successfully, the challenge is not only to rectify the damage that was brought about by colonial education systems, but to 'unthink', 'unimagine' and 'unlearn' colonial education. Another world, outside the colonially constructed one, remains possible.

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Promoting a Pan-African Education Agenda by Shifting the Education Paradigm

Oscar Brathwaite

INTRODUCTION

No matter where we are, on the continent or in the Diaspora, our condition is the same. We are at the bottom and descending ... We Africans, however have not viewed our problem holistically ... First we must see ourselves as an African people ... Secondly, we must understand not only the role that white supremacy has played in our subjugation, but also the role that we ourselves have played ...¹

Few social issues generate more debate and controversy than that of formal education/schooling and the role it plays in socialising and shaping individuals to take their rightful place in the world. Historically, the education of Africans has always been controversial. The crux of the controversy is about Europeans' obsession and determination to influence and control the minds and actions of Africans worldwide. For centuries, due to colonialism, enslavement and unbridled racism, Africans were either denied formal education, or they were subjected to an inferior quality of education that prepared them for subjugation and an inferior status. This chapter argues that African scholars must develop an educational framework that will provide Africans with a holistic education that enables them to free their minds from the state of mental slavery and amnesia.²

One of the postulates advanced here is that quality education could be the panacea that enables Africans worldwide to collaborate and liberate the continent from its predicament and simultaneously close the wide divide between continental Africans and diaspora Africans. The right type of education would provide the foundation for the continent to become powerful enough that it would be able to determine its own destiny and withstand all outside interferences or influences that are not in its best interest. When this is accomplished, Africans globally will be in a stronger position to

demand their overdue respect and dignity in the global arena. Africans cannot or should not rely on any other racial group to extricate them from the dilemmas that entrap them. Marcus Garvey intimated in his writings that, ultimately, Africans are responsible for their own self-determination and the liberation and unification of the continent, and that they cannot rely on other people to do that for them. It is essential that Africans establish their own frame of reference or other people will do it for them. They will definitely get those things that others construct for them in the absence of their own efforts to construct their future.

Educational outcomes are determined by the construct of the type and quality of education that is provided to students. In the context of a paradigm shift, quality education is defined as education that provides Africans worldwide with the type of foresight, knowledge, skills, experiences and passion that enables them to make significant contributions to the development of the continent and the diaspora. Implicitly, the type of quality education that is envisioned, at this juncture, is an education that would assist in breaking the rigid socio-economic and political grip that outside entities have imposed on the continent and on the diaspora over the centuries. It is imperative that Africans develop and apply the correct roadmap to extricate Africa out of the dilemmas that entrap it. If Africans fail to find the right roadmap, at this juncture, then the continent's future will continue on a path of subjugation, domination and exploitation by external entities. This spectre would be detrimental to the continent and Africans worldwide in the twenty-first century.

For purposes of this discourse, the term 'quality education' may further be defined, in addition to the preceding working definition, as the type of education and schooling that fosters independent critical thinking, and uplifts and educates all Africans, especially students and the youth. The educational model that is envisioned will lead to the psycho-social development of Africans who: understand and appreciate their history and culture; have a better self-image and greater self-confidence and self-reliance; and who have the insight to co-operate and collaborate universally with other Africans. The chapter proposes a Pan-African Educational Framework based on Afrocentric/Africentric/African-centred principles. This means a paradigm of re-centring Africans, their history, culture and experiences in all discourses that involve Africa and Africans.³ The scope of this framework is to provide quality education to Africans at all levels of the educational continuum in the diverse educational systems on the continent and in the diaspora.

Moving forward, the resolve would be to work toward the development of the continent and the empowerment of Africans worldwide. The pan-African education paradigm negates and debunks the Eurocentric paradigm that influences and permeates scholarly discourse about Africa

and Africans. Research indicates that some educational systems are still trapped in the Eurocentric philosophy that tends to indoctrinate Africans with the belief of their inferiority to other racial groups. The Eurocentric paradigm produces negative outcomes, including poor self-image, inhibited critical thinking, and diminution of Africans' global connectedness, and it tends to foster xenophobia among Africans worldwide. The intended ambit is a comprehensive educational approach to promote pan-Africanism as the ultimate goal and to use the formal school system as the instrument to shift the educational paradigm from Eurocentrism to pan-Africanism. The distinguished African American educator and historian, Carter G. Woodson said, 'If a race has no history, if it has no worthwhile tradition, it becomes a negligible factor in the thought of the world, and it stands in danger of being exterminated'.⁴

OUTLINE OF CHAPTER

Firstly, the chapter overviews some of the many issues and realities that continue to affect African students globally. It addresses challenges such as: high dropout rates; teachers' low expectations and biases; low self-esteem; under-achievement; and marginalisation of Africans. It also focuses on the outcome and aberration in the different educational systems, where African students are educated and often 'mis-educated', and on the impact this has on students and youth. The chapter primarily surveys research that points to the challenges of African students, particularly those in Canada, with references to other countries, including England and the USA. Secondly, it examines historic and contemporary examples of pan-African-based education initiatives. The goal is to present empirical evidence of implemented educational programmes, i.e. curricula and pedagogies that have been developed to address the blatant marginalisation of African diaspora students. Thirdly, it proposes recommendations to establish a global pan-African education framework and network to address the needs of African diaspora students towards progressive outcomes and a promising future. In this chapter, the terms Afrocentric, Africentric and African-centred are interchangeable.

BACKGROUND

For the last 150 years, pan-African scholars and educators across a wide spectrum, from Edward Blyden (in the second half of the nineteenth century) to Molefi Asante (at the beginning of twenty-first century), vociferously advocated (through their writings and publications) the need for impartial

education systems that inspire all learners to succeed at their optimum capability, irrespective of their race, ethnicity or religion. Over the centuries, the prevalence of a colonial and racist ideology made it impossible to attain quality education. Therefore, African scholars and educators continued a relentless struggle by advocating for an educational paradigm shift from Eurocentrism to Afrocentrism. Renowned African scholars and leaders kept advocating, arguing consistently in their writings and publications against the Eurocentric education paradigm. We find advocacy included in the works of: W.E.B. Dubois, *The Souls of Folks*; Carter G. Woodson, *The Mis-Education of the Negro*; Marcus Garvey and Garveyism; and George S. Dei's, *Theory of Anti-Racism Education*. Their arguments against the Eurocentric paradigm are based on the premise that Eurocentrism coerces and indoctrinates Africans globally into believing and accepting the racial doctrine of European superiority and African inferiority.

Quality education within an African-centred paradigm, as envisioned, would resolve some of the ominous problems that inundate the continent and the diaspora. These problems have the potential to inhibit development and cause socio-economic and political instability on the continent. African policy makers must address these critical problems, especially those that affect students and youth on the continent and in the diaspora. These problems vary, depending on the locality, but they could morph into a social pathology that affects African students and youth at different levels on the continent and in the diaspora. For instance, the areas of major concern include chronic unemployment, under-employment, under-achievement, the school dropout rate, and job skills deficit. These trends tend to obstruct African youth from successfully competing in the job market of the twenty-first century and predispose them to different negative stereotyping and social deviations.

OVERVIEW

It is an undisputable fact that education is a critical factor to enlighten the mind and assist people to advance. The African-American educator, Asa Hilliard, states that, 'The reawakening of the African mind helps us to understand why education is critical to African liberation and advancement'.⁵ Studies show that an educated population creates a favourable climate and enticement for investment, development and growth in communities and/or countries. Other studies show that the higher the level of education individuals acquire, the greater their earning power over a lifetime, and subsequently their quality of life improves significantly (USA Census Bureau, 1998-2000). According to a 2010 United Nations report, 'Education

is a major catalyst for human development; through an exhibition and side event at the High-level Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) demonstrated how rapid advances in education can help to achieve all of the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals]'.⁶ The international community surmises that quality education is an important factor in the socio-economic equation when evaluating the quality of life in this modern era.

From that perspective, we can agree that all people, irrespective of race, ethnicity, gender or religion, are entitled to quality education so that they can develop to their optimum capacity and enjoy a good quality of life. Hence, it is the responsibility of policy and decision makers across all political spectrums to put mechanisms in place that will ensure no barriers stand in the way of quality education for African students globally. This chapter addresses the issue of quality education from a holistic premise, that is, the primary goal of education is to enrich the quality of life for the individual on multiple levels, including social, economic, cultural and spiritual. Africans can achieve these objectives of quality education by putting in place an educational framework that includes appropriate educational programmes, unbiased and relevant curriculum content, qualified human resources, adequate physical resources and other educational learning resources that would optimise learning outcomes. This framework will inspire learning and reverse the trend of African students' disengagement, under-achievement, the drop-out syndrome, and subsequent chronic unemployment. The international community, under the mandate of the United Nations Education Scientific Cultural Organization (UNESCO), established some achievable millennium development educational goals. To achieve the Millennium Development Goals MDGs in education at the beginning of this decade, UNESCO (2000) made the following declaration:

Education is a fundamental human right' and 'an indispensable means for effective participation in the societies and economies of the twenty-first century'. We are morally obligated to 'create safe, healthy, inclusive and equitably resourced educational environments conducive to excellence in learning and socialization with clearly defined levels of achievement for all. Such learning environments must include appropriate curricula and teachers who are appropriately educated and rewarded.'⁷

There is the general assumption that formal education and schooling is designed to benefit all students equally by enabling them to learn and understand the world and their place in it. If we extrapolate the assumption that formal education is an enabling component in students' development, then education should be the inspirational variable in the equation that prepares

learners to acquire those characteristics that enable them to mature and develop to their full potential. Horace Mann, the nineteenth-century educator, said, 'Education, beyond all other human devices, of human origin, is the great equalizer of the human condition of men, the balance-wheel of the social machinery'.⁸ How much credibility should be given to Mann's lofty declaration?

In this discourse about shifting the education paradigm, it is essential that we pose three fundamental questions in our assessment of the role of formal education and the school system in relation to Africans students worldwide. 1) How successful are the school systems in meeting the fundamental needs of African students on the continent and in the diaspora? 2) Is the education provided to African students holistic and enabling, and does it actually contribute to their intellectual, spiritual and moral development, which would provide them with valuable life skills? 3) Does the education foster within its ambit positive self-confidence, self-image and other valuable human characteristics, or does it negate those elements and inadvertently cultivate self-hatred, low self-esteem and a feeling of unworthiness? These important questions require in-depth discussion and analysis in our search to provide quality education for Africans worldwide. The answers will enable us to construct the right type of educational roadmap for African students.

In some countries, including Canada, England and the USA, there is evidence that the prevailing influence of Eurocentric doctrine permeates the content of school curricula and pedagogies, which adversely affects the learning outcomes of diaspora African students.⁹ The diminished outcomes are evident in students' disengagement from the learning process, their under-performance, low achievement and the subsequent drop-out syndrome. The reason for the dismal outcome is a biased curriculum, which fails to acknowledge and/or include the students' heritage, culture, history or experiences as being relevant. There are mitigating factors in the pedagogy, including the practices and attitudes of some teachers, especially teachers' low expectations that become self-fulfilling prophecies. For instance, if teachers expect students from certain socio-economic and racial backgrounds to perform at a certain level, then the expectations could be the outcome.¹⁰ African diaspora students who are constantly exposed to negative learning environments tend to lose interest in school, become disengaged and eventually drop out of school.¹¹ This is unfavourable for establishing the foundation for promising careers. Consequently, these students leave school with an abysmal deficit in job skills. This results in chronic unemployment, under-employment and unacceptable social behaviour that tends to bring the unemployable youth into conflict with law-enforcement agencies.

Poor achievement in the formal school system is a contributing factor to producing African youth who the systems perceive to be dysfunctional and non-contributory members of society. These labels eventually lead to other antisocial-behaviour aberrations, including estrangement and exclusion from the society. Scholars surmise that one of the reasons for under-achievement of African students in Canada, England and the USA is the embedded bias in the school curriculum. The bias tends to marginalise African students by omitting their history, culture and experiences as being unimportant. These flaws in the curriculum have the inclination to demoralise African students, smother their motivation for active participation in the learning process, and contribute to the under-achievement syndrome. The intended or unintended marginalisation also erodes students' self-image, self-esteem and self-confidence. In the seminal book, *Educating African Canadians*, which analysed the Canadian school system, K. Brathwaite and C. James surmise that the school system in Canada does not inspire African Canadian students to learn. They say, 'The education of African Canadians is one of the most contested areas of education in Canada today. Much of this contestation is due to the fact that the education system has failed, and is failing, to meet the needs of African Canadians'.¹² The literature on African Canadian students' experiences reveals similar findings, i.e. that the quest for equal education opportunities continues to remain an elusive dream for African Canadian students. For instance, in the book, *Revisioning Canadian Perspective on the Education of African in the Late 20th Century*, D'Oyley and James, draw the same conclusion about the obstacles African-Canadian students encounter in the public education system.¹³

African diaspora students' academic achievement is a cause of great concern. Decades of research chronicles African Canadian students' struggles in the Canadian public school system. A research study, titled *Post-High School Pathways of Immigrants Youth* shows that much attention is now being focus on the under-achievement of Black/African Canadian students in the public school system. For instance, the Toronto District School Board, the largest in Canada with approximately 280 000 students, indicates that 40 per cent of Caribbean-born students and 32 per cent from East Africa drop out of school.¹⁴ A study, titled *Drop Out or Push Out*, analyses the dynamics of black students in the Toronto school system and the dismal disengagement and drop-out rate from schools in the Toronto area.¹⁵ The Black Learners Advisory Committee Report discusses and highlights the causes and solutions to redress inequality and empowerment of black learners to succeed in the Nova Scotia school system. It is a system that has historically marginalised African Nova Scotians for more than 150 years. Transformative changes to the school curriculum are critical for addressing the effects of inequalities and racism in the society and its impact on students' future

in particular.¹⁶ The Canadian Alliance of Black Educators (CABE) Report of 1995 discusses the causes of students' disengagement, the dropout rate and solutions to rectify the problems. We can deduce from research findings that flaws in the schools' curriculum and pedagogy impact students' behaviour and are major factors for dismal learning outcomes. Dei, in his analysis, states, 'Current practices in Canadian schools do not address satisfactorily the problem of students' disengagement and dropping out ... I consider a non-hegemonic Afrocentric education (curriculum and pedagogy) as one means to address the educational needs of specifically (but not exclusively) Black/African-Canadian students'.¹⁷ These statistics are systemic in other jurisdictions beyond the borders of Canada, including Brazil, England and the USA.

Coincidentally, in England, research shows comparable critical disparities in the achievement level of African diaspora students in the public school system. An article in the prestigious Guardian Newspaper, titled *Black Boys Betrayed by Racist School System*, says that according to a report of 2004, 'Black school boys have been betrayed by the education authorities for almost half a century and are struggling to overcome racism from many of their own teachers, according to a damning new report out today'.¹⁸ For many decades, concerns were expressed about the unfortunate happening in Britain's schools in the way they continue to fail black British school-children. This concern was articulated in the seminal book, *How the West Indian Child is Made Educationally Subnormal in the British School System*. It surmises that students believe the school system, through its curriculum, make African students feel inferior, and it diminishes their motivation to learn.¹⁹ 'On average Afro-Caribbean pupils tend to achieve less well than whites, and the achievements of Afro-Caribbean young men are a particular cause for concern ... Quite often, the black child has been blamed for his or her failure to achieve. But there is the matter of false perceptions'.²⁰ The curriculum content tends to ignore Africans students in many significant ways, because the reading materials, including the textbooks, often contain only white people. When black people are included, their normal depiction is in subservient social roles.

The outcome of low achievement in the public school system results in a high dropout rate, chronic unemployment and other types of social pathologies. 'Almost one in five black men in Britain are now out of work as the recession bites, and charities have seen a flood of requests for help from ethnic minorities struggling to find a job'.²¹ A research study, titled *Black Young Caribbean Men's Experiences of Education and Employment Ambition*, shows that a significant percentage of diaspora African students encounter major problems when the time comes to seek meaningful employment²² - especially in the job market of the twenty-first century, which is

changing at a rapid pace and requires much higher levels of education, analytical skills and technical knowledge than in the past. A study, titled 'Defining a Twenty-First Century Education', estimates that two-thirds of all new jobs created in the first two decades of this century will require post-secondary education or training.²³ The literature reveals that Afro-Caribbean young men in England are a group subject to ready stereotyping in the public media, sometimes playing the role of a folk devil in public discourse. Unlike their white peers, when they do not perform well, or when they are rebellious at school, the reaction they encounter, when mediated through these stereotypes, is likely to be far more severe in its results. Although all poorly qualified school-leavers face problems, these Afro-Caribbean young people face the extra problems of prejudice in schools and discrimination in the labour market.²⁴ The fundamental problem is that in Brazil, Canada, England and the USA, a significant percentage of African diaspora students are 'pushed out' of school without the basic qualification to compete in the highly competitive job market of the twenty-first century. The evidence indicates that a remedy for the pathology is needed urgently, and an Afro-centric/African-centred education paradigm is the solution to this endemic problem.

AFRICENTRIC EDUCATION IN PERSPECTIVE

African scholars and leaders continue the unrelenting struggle to find the right educational roadmap for Africa and Africans worldwide. The literature on educating African students, especially in the diaspora, shows dissatisfaction among African scholars and educators with the quality of education that has been available to Africans over the centuries. It justifies their continuous advocacy for a paradigm shift in educating African students/learners. For example, 150 years ago, while living in West Africa, the pan-Africanist Edward Blyden cautioned Africans against the indiscriminate adoption of European culture and values. 'He urged the British to allow Africans more autonomy in political and church matters, and argued against the imposition of European culture ... As early as 1872, Blyden called for an independent West African University to be run solely by Africans, teaching African languages, cultures, and values'.²⁵ This indicates that he was cognisant of the important role that a people's language and culture play in enhancing and sustaining their self-image, self-esteem, survivability and advancement. Another pan-African scholar, Alexander Crummel, debunks the Eurocentric myth and pseudo-scientific theories about Africans' inferiority in his book *The Future of Africa*. In continuing his advocacy for a paradigm shift, 'In 1897, at the age of 78, Crummel founded the American

Negro Academy, an organization of black intellectuals who through speeches and writings sought to repudiate the “scientific racism” of the day, which purportedly described black inferiority’.²⁶

In analysing and writing about inequality of educational opportunities for African Americans in the book, *‘The Soul of Black Folks’*, Dubois argues that African Americans were indoctrinated by the educational and information systems to see themselves through a Eurocentric lens. He wrote, ‘The Negro is a sort of seventh son born with a veil, and gutted with second-sight in this American world which yields him no self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world ... always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others’.²⁷ At the turn of the twentieth century, Dubois also wrote that the ‘problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line’. In today’s world we can agree that the problem of the colour line remains unresolved in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. In fact, the problem of the colour line has become more insidious in its domination in this era. It has morphed into the major problem for Africa and Africans in this era, because outside entities are now collaborating in dominating and exploiting Africa’s resources and marginalising Africans worldwide. Over 100 years ago Dubois stated that, ‘The quiet insidious persistent attempt to keep the mass of the Negroes in America in just sufficient ignorance to render them incapable of realizing their power, or resisting the position of inferiority into which the nation is determine to thrust them was never stronger than today’.²⁸

At the International Convention of the Negroes of the World in 1920, Marcus Garvey in his declaration of the rights of the ‘Negro People’ wrote, ‘We demand that instructions given Negro Children in schools include the subject of Negro History, to their benefit’.²⁹ This presupposes that Garvey understood that knowledge of self is important, because a people without knowledge of their past can be led anywhere, at any time, by anyone, irrespective of whether it’s a friend or foe. The African-American educator, Carter Woodson, contends in his book, *Miseducation of the Negro*, that Eurocentric scholars ignored and/or misrepresented the role of African Americans in history and culture. Therefore, it was necessary to correct these omissions or African Americans, who out of acquiescence, would have accepted the social stratification to which they were relegated. Woodson proclaims, ‘If you can control a man’s thinking, you don’t have to worry about his actions. If you can determine what a man thinks, you do not have to worry about what he will do. If you can make a man believe that he is inferior, you do not have to compel him to seek an inferior status, and he will do so without being told’.³⁰

The theory of Africentricity evolved out of relentless struggles of African Americans for recognition and equality in their country. Molefi Asante

is among one of the leading advocates of Africentricity as a philosophical concept in the discourse on education. The term is now in the lexicon of education theories. He argues that an Africentric education model is the best roadmap to reverse the damage inflicted on the African psyche over centuries of Eurocentric indoctrination. Africentricity analyses issues about Africa and African people from an African-centred perspective. Asante states unequivocally, 'I have advanced the theory of Afrocentricity to confront all forms of African discentredness and marginalization, with a special interest in self-conscious recovery of the collective African selfhood'.³¹ George Dei, another advocate of Africentricity defines the term thus, 'The Afrocentric paradigm provides a space for African peoples to interpret their experiences on their own terms rather than through a Eurocentric lens ... Black students at Afrocentric schools perform better on tests, skip class less often, and show greater respect for authority and elders'.³² Turner articulates the need for an African-centred education from this perspective, 'Afrocentrism is a specific effort to redress the imbalance between blacks and whites, and is primarily directed at black children's self-confidence ... From the day white 'kids' walk into school, they are told that they are heirs to the greatest achievements of humankind'.³³

This chapter argues that an African-centred/Africentric paradigm in education is the best solution to the problems of disengagement and dropping out from the formal education system. Asa Hilliard succinctly explains that to recentre and reawaken the African mind, 'One must ensure that the goal of education, and the socialization process must be to understand and live up to African cultural principles, values and virtues'.³⁴ Metaphorically, this paradigm would reawaken the African mind from a state of acquiescence and free it from mental slavery. We can argue that this state of mind comes after centuries of indoctrination by an oppressive entity.³⁵ The chapter takes the position that an Afrocentric paradigm is necessary to enable African learners to become critical thinkers. Eurocentrism indoctrinates Africans to value their sense of self, based on European standards, models and norms. Hoskins puts it succinctly, 'Europeans do not want African people to see themselves from their own authentic, original, Africa-centered perspective and context'.³⁶ This perspective is retrogressive and detrimental to Africans in the search to free their minds from the entrapment of mental slavery.³⁷

AFRICAN-CENTRED EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVES IN CANADA

The dilemma of quality education is an ongoing concern for African Canadians as they search for solutions to rectify endemic socio-economic problems that inundate their communities. The general assumption is that a good-quality

education is the stepping-stone to socio-economic mobility and status in society. Over the last 45 years, African Canadian educators have established organisations in different regions of Canada to address the challenges that overwhelm African Canadian students in the public school system.

During this period, a number of organisations instituted mechanisms to shift the educational paradigm from a rigid Eurocentric practice to a more learner-friendly African-centred environment. One of the unified primary goals is to create a learning environment that will inspire, empower and enable African Canadian students to reach new academic achievement levels. Among the organisations are: the Black Educators Association, founded in Nova Scotia in 1969; and the Quebec Board of Black Educators, founded in Montreal in 1973. In Toronto there is the Canadian Alliance of Black Educators (CABE) and the Organization of Parents of Black Children, both founded in 1980. The African Heritage Network of Toronto was established in 1987; and the formation of The National Council of Black Educators of Canada came in 1992. The latest organisation to help in this ongoing education reformation is the Africentric Learning Institute of Nova Scotia, established in 2011. These organisations are a necessity in these heavily populated urban centres, as opposed to rural communities where the African Canadian population is less visible. They also serve as anchors to decentre and bring African Canadian students back into equilibrium and avoid them being trapped in a permanent cycle of marginalisation in Canadian society.

Interwoven in the goals of the organisations is the aim to enable and empower African Canadian students to succeed at all levels of the Canadian educational system. For example, the Canadian Alliance of Black Educators holds as its primary goal to promote the analysis and application of shared knowledge towards the eradication of problems that stand as obstruction to quality education for African Canadian students, as well as the elimination of racism/Eurocentrism in education. The Africentric Learning Institute in Nova Scotia promotes Africentric education leadership through research and practices in the areas of policy analysis and curriculum and professional development for educators.³⁸ The Quebec Board of Black Educators promotes the development of supplementary programmes and curriculum materials that are African-centred, and inspire African Canadian students to re-engage and become more motivated towards succeeding at all endeavours. The Organization of Black Parents is a conduit between the educational system and African Canadian parents, articulating the parents' needs and expectations from the school system, and interpreting the school system's policies and inner workings to African Canadian parents.

These Canadian educational organisations established a network that collaborates with other African educators outside of Canada, including the National Alliance of Black School Educators in the USA. The network

provides opportunities for educators and leaders to share and exchange best practices in educating African students. The network is a potential incubator for the development and strengthening of a vibrant, functional international pan-African educational network in the diaspora and on the continent. For example, in 2011, at an international conference in South Africa, a small group of educators from Canada, England, South Africa and the USA convened a sidebar meeting to analyse some of the pressing educational problems that affect Africans on the continent and in the diaspora. The outcome of the meeting was the formation of a framework for the establishment of the Pan-African Solidarity Education Network (PASEN). Since its inception, PASEN has broadened its base, with representatives/educators in other African, Caribbean, North American and South American countries.

At the governmental level in the diaspora, there are paradigm shifts from a Eurocentric to an Afrocentric approach in educational systems. For example, recently, the Barbados Minister of Education stated that, 'It wants to see African Studies incorporated into more Barbadian primary schools ... to give the youth the opportunity to understand where they came from and where we are going'.³⁹ Another initiative for a paradigm shift comes from Brazil. The government mandated that the school curriculum must reflect the history and culture of African people and it must be made more relevant to the needs of Afro-Brazilians.⁴⁰ These two examples are incremental steps forward. The paradigm shift would improve the dismal learning outcome for Afro-Brazilian students. These incremental steps serve a dual purpose. Firstly, they provide African diaspora students with a more enriched African-centred learning environment; and secondly, they will bring closer ties and a better understanding and knowledge of and between continental Africans and diaspora Africans.

RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations are based on the premise that, after centuries of Eurocentric indoctrination, there is a dire need for a paradigm shift to debunk the myths that have entrapped Africans. It is on this premise that the following recommendations are made. African educators and scholars must co-operate and collaborate to:

1. Establish an international pan-African-based educational organisation ('think-tank') with the vision, mission and capacity to contribute and bring to fruition the goals of the African Union.
2. Develop strategies to promote and disseminate information among scholars, educators and policy makers of the need for a paradigm

shift in educating Africans globally about their history, culture and connectedness to all Africans globally.

3. Take the initiative to bring about transformation in educational systems that are responsible for, but are not meeting, the fundamental education needs of African learners in the diaspora and on the continent.
4. Collaborate in designing and developing educational policies, programmes and curricula that are adaptable to different settings and regions in the 'African world'.
5. Establish local, national and international forums where African scholars, educators and policymakers could discuss, analyse and develop appropriate educational strategies to empower Africans worldwide.
6. Collaborate in the development of educational programmes, curricula and best pedagogical practices/principles, which would provide and prepare African students across all levels of the educational system, with the necessary skills to function and compete in the globalised world of the twenty-first century.

CONCLUSION

The chapter recommends that co-operation and collaboration between Africans on an international level is the best roadmap to develop, advance and strengthen the African continent's position, so that it can compete in the globalised world of the twenty-first century. It advances the notion that quality education is extremely important to human development, in general, and to marginalised people in particular. It defines the characteristics of quality education from an African-centred frame of reference and emphasises that this could be the panacea for the African continent's development, advancement and unification. Likewise, it argues that the type of quality education being envisioned be grounded in Africentric principles, which could serve as the right instrument to propel Africans back into synergy, thereby empowering Africans worldwide.

The contention is maintained that there is a need for paradigm shifts in some educational systems where African students are educated and in some instances 'mis-educated'. There is an urgent need for paradigm shifts, especially in those countries and educational systems influenced by Eurocentric doctrines of racial superiority and inferiority. The chapter asserts that even though Africans may be not responsible for the prevailing dilemmas that entrap them, they are ultimately responsible for collaborating and remedying the situation. It highlights past and current strategies by Africans to

change the conditions that entrap and impede advancement and progress of Africans. It proposes recommendations that would accelerate the empowerment of Africans worldwide and assist in the liberation and unification of the continent. Finally, the chapter implores Africans worldwide to pay heed to Marcus Garvey's mantra that 'Negroes' cannot and must not depend on any other racial group to solve their problems, and they must take the initiative and responsibility to solve the problems that stand in the path of progress.

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A Paradigm Shift in Mental Models Processing

A Systems Approach

Amos Otieno Ahenda

INTRODUCTION

Despite its richness in natural and human resources, sub-Saharan Africa has continued to suffer immensely from poverty, war and disease, attracting tags such as ‘the cursed continent’, ‘the shackled continent’, ‘the dark continent’, among others. Whereas different authors have argued that Africa’s current state is a product of its history under colonisation, and that there is a general expectation that the former colonisers should contribute to the development of Africa, a persistent question that runs through this chapter is whether Africa’s woes are purely historical or whether it is a victim of its own shackled mental models. Using the Kenyan example, this chapter attempts to demonstrate that a change in mindset is an essential step to help African people gear up for lift-off and sustained development, using a controlled version of Adam Smith’s theory of the ‘invisible hand’ controlling free markets. The education sector has an important role to play in this approach, but it can only work if there is a system-wide approach.

LITERATURE REVIEW

MENTAL MODELS AND THE ROLE OF EDUCATION

The ratification of the Education For All (EFA) framework of action (among others) by the African Union critically stamps the role that mental models developed and retained within a population play in human development. Further, the Second Decade of Education for Africa (2006-2015), in building on gaps identified in the first education plan, has moved beyond primary school enrolment to a more holistic approach to education, including gender, teacher development and tertiary and vocational education.¹ The report further notes that though net primary enrolment in Africa has increased by 20 per cent, reaching 84 per cent in 2009, the completion rates have remained

less than 70 per cent regionally. Additionally, it is still projected that the current target of Universal Primary Education (UPE) by 2015 will be missed by Africa as a whole. Of greater concern, though, is the observation that the quality of education received is falling short of that needed to provide basic literacy and numeracy skills for primary children, nor preparing older youths sufficiently for the labour market. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the region with the lowest youth literacy rate in the world, at 71 per cent in 2009.

The importance of education in Africa could be pegged on the degree to which it helped to address the major concerns ravaging the continent as identified in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Chief in the list is to achieve departure from abject poverty, as well as lead the continent to better health and a sense of well-being, and provide opportunity for personal growth and development in all fronts.² Based on the above, this chapter argues that propagation of an educational system that merely enhances rote learning is a waste of valuable resources. The educational system should have pragmatic value with respect to uplifting Africa from its myriads of problems, especially by transforming the structural inefficiencies that fuel them. Africa's education must aim to critically analyse and destabilise the existing frames of reference and to establish mental models that will effectively evaluate and offer solutions in the areas targeted by the MDGs.

This would be in line with the second meeting of the Magna Charta Taskforce on the Idea of the University of the Future (Luxembourg, 2006), in which a three-fold purpose of education is postulated: reproduction of the existing, critique of the existing, and expanding the understanding of the existing. The central thesis of this chapter is that Africa's education seems fundamentally guided by the first consideration: reproduction of the existing. However, the challenges of the global world today demand a good balance of all three purposes. Africa especially needs to ensure the development of academics and leaders who could spearhead and nurture a critical thinking mentality that understands and critiques the existing.

But this is only possible if care is taken to ensure there is real development at the personal level. The Council of Europe proposes to look at the purpose of education from this different angle by maintaining that, 'the full range of purposes of education' needs to be addressed. These include preparation of individuals for the labour market, preparation for life as active citizens in democratic societies, personal development, and the development and maintenance of a broad knowledge base.³ The scenario in sub-Saharan Africa, however, would suggest that the educational experience may, to a large extent, not be achieving these ideals, leaving large masses of dependent people who are vulnerable and unable to convert knowledge into self-improvement. This could be expected, given the entrenchment of the dependence culture right from the birth of these countries at independence, as

evidenced by reliance on donor funding to implement even such mundane things as the much needed educational reforms, as in the implementation of the Free Primary Education programme in Kenya. Some authors have attributed this unconscious dependence to the colonial legacy of the continent. The advent of independence left African countries vulnerable and economically dependent on external forces.

According to proponents of this school of thought, dependence affects African economies up to today, preventing meaningful progress in economic development, as illustrated by the effects of changing international commodity prices. The instability that results has frequently led to harsh economic times for the populace⁴ and this has subsequently led to the growth of the aid industry targeting intervention programmes in Africa. It is also asserted that colonialism intervened profoundly in the economy for the benefit of the mother European countries, leading to the under-development of indigenous communities. This legacy of statism was eagerly seized upon and rapidly enlarged by an emergent African political class after independence; and mushrooming state ownership and economic control, and the consequent emergence of the state as the primary basis of dominant class formations, was to have profound consequences for the nature of African politics – and hence development patterns.⁵

Against this background of resource depletion (that by and large benefits the West in general and the former colonialists in particular) and the neo-patronism structure of leadership copied from the oppressive colonial regimes, Africa has struggled with little success to develop its populace out of abject poverty and the ravages of natural disasters and disease. Meanwhile, the population growth rate has steadily risen, putting immense strain on already diminishing natural resources and threatening environmental sustainability. In view of all these issues, this chapter proposes that if Africa is to progress it must radically reform the mental models that inform its current state, and that this must take a systemic approach for the success to be sustained. These mental models are the ‘deeply ingrained assumptions, generalisations, or even pictures and images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action’.⁶ A change in mental models is a significant function of an education system in a country; and it could be the only hope to empower African citizens to free themselves and radically change the current retrogressive and dominant mental models in the ruling class.

In view of Richard Dowden’s (2009) perception of Africa as a misrepresented continent, painted in dark shades by a Western media not keen on understanding events in the context in which they occur,⁷ Africa has a lot to prove regarding its ability to stand on its own feet. This may not easily come by playing the victim of historical injustice, but it may come by radically revamping its own image and how it interacts with other world players.

Dowden and other development writers believe that sustainable development in Africa must be initiated and led by Africans themselves. This may, however, be difficult to achieve, given limiting mental models informing development decision making, especially the pegging of interventions on external donor funding.

The line of argument that depicts Africa as an entity trapped in mental models that facilitate dependency and corruption and that stifle innovation has been echoed (at times indirectly) by different authors. William Easterly's (2006) 'The White Man's Burden' seeks to explain why the West's efforts to aid the rest of the world have done so much ill and so little good. From his perspective, aid has been administered by planners who are out of touch with the reality on the ground and who have a tendency to copy best practices from theory and other places into African situations, without due regard to context, local input and control of the process.⁸

Dambisa Moyo's assertion that the past fifty years have seen well over US\$1 trillion pumped into development-related aid from rich countries to Africa, with no reciprocal improvement in people's lives, for instance, is even more disturbing. According to her, the model of aid for Africa is fundamentally flawed and she believes, rather radically, that aid to Africa should actually be stopped, for it chokes off economic growth, sponsors corruption and fosters financial dependence on foreign donors.⁹

Whereas Easterly and Guest adequately capture the dynamics of the development process in Africa, it is Moyo who encapsulates the spirit behind the continent's entrapment, in her proposal that aid to Africa should actually be stopped. Indeed this proposal has received expected criticism, but its value is in the way it captures a fundamental principle, disregard of that which may see Africa unable to overcome its development challenge: Africa needs to change its mental models to acknowledge and embrace the immense potential inherent within its borders. This line of thought seems to be supported by George Ayittey who, though believing that Moyo's proposal for aid to be stopped is impossible to attain, departs from Moyo's assertion that Africa's problems may end if it realigns itself with other potential partners, like China. According to him, the foreign aid resources Africa desperately needs to launch into self-sustaining growth and prosperity can be found in Africa itself, not in China, as Moyo believes.¹⁰

RETHINKING INSTITUTION-BUILDING: A PRE-CONDITION FOR DEVELOPMENT TAKE-OFF

Aid would only work in Africa if it was tied to the development of a few critical institutions, including: an independent central bank to ensure monetary and economic stability; an independent judiciary that is essential for the rule of law; a free and independent media to ensure free flow of information;

an independent electoral commission 'to avoid situations where African despots write electoral rules, appoint a fawning coterie of sycophants as electoral commissioners, throw opposition leaders in jail and hold coconut elections to return themselves to power'; an efficient and professional civil service, which will deliver essential social services to the people on the basis of need and not on the basis of ethnicity or political affiliation; and the establishment of a neutral and professional armed security force. Ayit-ey is emphatic that the establishment of these institutions is necessary to empower Africans to instigate change from within.¹¹ This is well captured in the case study of Singapore, one of the so-called East Asian Tigers.

According to George Yeo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Singapore's strategy involved prioritisation of security improvement, delivery of basic justice and the provision of jobs, which makes people feel more hopeful about the future. This solid substratum helps new institutions take root in people's hearts and minds, influencing their mental models positively towards development. Only when this solid substratum is set, can a pathway of success (that builds on other successes) be constructed. Singapore chose this pragmatic approach, without which no new institutions could take root in the hearts and minds of ordinary people. 'Ideology was a luxury we could not afford. We had to do first things first and get our priorities right. Then, as the economy took off and life got better, we could be more refined and sensitive in public policy'.¹²

These sentiments point to the importance of recognising that sustainable change involves modifying people's mental models, but that this change requires certain 'pre-flight' conditions, as visualised by Rostow, which, in this case, includes institution building. Institution building improves people's self-confidence and hence determination for development; and, as shall be seen from the China example, a bottom-up approach is important – everyone who is to be affected by a process needs to be engaged effectively. The argument of this chapter is that institution building is a conscious and deliberate process that can only occur if the ruling class buys into the idea, by whichever means; and this is a function of changed mindsets that can be propagated through a revamped educational system.

RADICAL MINDSET CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT – THE CASE OF CHINA

China's economic success story is remarkable in demonstrating the power of mental models in directing change and development in a sustainable way. China, for a long time, was a closed economy and opening it up to the outside has led it to strong and steady growth in the last 32 years. The key factors in this success, according to Ambassador Wu Jianmin, Chairman of the Shanghai Centre for International Studies, and WDR Advisory Council

member, are the use of a bottom-up approach, gradualism, and a principle to pilot reforms and measure their impact before debating whether or not they should be national policy. China's economic reform is reported to have been started first in the countryside (World Development Report, 2011). In 1978 China's urbanisation rate was 17 per cent. In that same year, with an overwhelming majority of the Chinese population in the countryside, 18 peasants from Anhui province, Xiaogang village, decided to break away from the centrally planned economy, signed a secret contract and divided the land at their disposal into small pieces, with each peasant responsible for his small piece of land and agricultural production. This contract provided a powerful incentive for them to produce more food, so that they could enjoy a better return. The provincial government was very supportive of this initiative of the 18 peasants. At the same time, in Guangdong province, some people started private businesses with the local government's tacit agreement. However, other provinces were very skeptical about it. They believed that that kind of reform was wrong, 'capitalistic', and incompatible with a socialist China. Evidently, a violation of Chairman Mao's philosophy, this was a classic example of imprisoned ideology codified in shackled mental models. Breaking from a traditional approach of problem solving requires a shift in mental models, which ultimately enables innovation.

Without coercion from the central government, other provinces followed the Anhui example when, three years down the line, it emerged that the reforms in Anhui province had led to increased food production.¹³ This provides a classic case of the impact that good leadership may have in influencing a shift in mindset and, consequently, the development process. Smircich and Morgan conceptualise leadership as a social construction of negotiated meaning between the leader and the led, which results in certain individuals implicitly or explicitly surrendering their power to define the nature of their experience to others. They help frame experience in a way that provides a viable basis for action, by inventing images and meanings that provide a focus and new attention, and by consolidating, confronting, or changing prevailing wisdom. Through these diverse means, individual action can frame and change situations, and in so doing change prevailing wisdom.¹⁴ Without belabouring this point too much, it is evident that a change in mindset is a critical factor for a country that aims for growth and development – and that the sustainability of this change resides in a bottom-up approach. This scenario could be well enhanced if there is a concomitant investment in transformative education at the grassroots level.

It is what Peter Senge referred to as 'shared vision'. When there is a genuine vision, as opposed to vision statements and other political fads (like Kenya Vision 2030), people excel and learn voluntarily. The practice of shared vision involves the skill of unearthing shared 'pictures of the future'

that foster genuine commitment and enrolment, rather than compliance – as was the case with China's Aihui province. In mastering this discipline, leaders learn the counter-productiveness of trying to dictate a vision, no matter how heartfelt. It is argued here that Africa's education experience, whether formal or informal, should be instrumental in opening up individuals' ability to comprehend and project visions of a desired future.¹⁵

The educational experience should move beyond the mere management of examination to the development of suitable mental models for socio-economic development. It is the responsibility of leadership, be it academic, civic or religious leadership, to articulate vision with clarity and lead into them. But this capacity to articulate vision by the leader, and also to respond to vision by the follower, is intricately tied to mental models existent in a population, hence the need for deliberate effort in identifying existent mental models, negotiating a desired vision, developing the necessary mindset for its actualisation, developing personal mastery, working on its actualisation in a participatory manner and giving the desired change a systemic approach, as envisioned by Senge.¹⁶

This may not happen in the absence of competent leadership. Leaders may create situations in which individuals are crippled by purposelessness and inaction when left to guide efforts on their own. Leadership may actually work against the development of self-responsibility, self-initiative, and self-control. The implication of this mental construct is immense for academic leaders, as they process the mental models of learners, and it is argued that, since leaders may create individuals crippled by purposelessness and inaction when left to guide efforts on their own, there is a need to develop self-responsibility, self-initiative and self-control as an integral part of any personal change effort for greater development. In the event that this does not happen, Ayittey's words may appear to hold true: 'Africa is poor because it is not free';¹⁷ its institutions will remain shackled to their colonial legacy, as would the mental models driving the development process.

UNIVERSITIES: THE CRADLE OF DEVELOPMENT

Bowen, William and Schwartz argue that universities have a primary role to play in shaping collective efforts at responding to the existential crises in political, economic, technological, religious, moral and environmental spheres – many of which leave societies politically divided and in conflict. The human intellect and the knowledge it produces comprises the primary adaptive mechanism of the human species: that the advancement of knowledge is the key to solving, ameliorating or adapting to the crises. The aim of universities is to create, preserve, transmit and find new applications for knowledge. It is to protect the free and open expression of ideas, beliefs, and

opinions, as well as protect the rights of individuals to seek self-fulfillment and the attainment of truth. It also aims to provide for open discussion in legitimate democratic decision making, and to enable flexibility and adaptation to change. The consequence of this is the creation of the conditions most conducive for endogenous economic development and perpetuation of the values of civil society.¹⁸ But, as noted by Namuddu, the overrated belief in the contribution of qualifications, experience, references and transcripts by most academics within universities, underrating the role played by values and attitudes, may actually undermine productivity within these institutions. There is a need to inculcate inter-disciplinary approaches in knowledge acquisition and utilisation, as it is noted that most academics are well educated in their areas of specialisation, but often too poorly informed about other fields of knowledge.¹⁹

Namuddu further observes that Africa is in need of academics with capabilities clustered into four, namely: 1) capabilities pertaining to advancing knowledge of the discipline; 2) capabilities pertaining to advancing effective knowledge transfer and nurturing scholars; 3) capabilities for interfacing with policy and the public; and 4) capabilities concerned with participation in institutional management. But in her assessment, given the relatively low productivity in African academic institutions, the possession, manifestation and use of these capabilities appears to be limited. She observes with concern that most African universities have concentrated their efforts disproportionately on the first cluster, with only an eclectic smattering of skills from the other three clusters.

In well-resourced academic institutions, emerging scholars acquire these capabilities as a matter of course through the multiplicity of activities and experiences in highly supportive environments. In resource-starved academic institutions, however, the development of most aspects of the clusters becomes stunted, unless specific focus is directed towards their development through the provision of special resources programmes. Because there are major disparities in the institutional culture, ethos, attitudes and work ethics that come to predominate in resource starved environments, the training of next-generation scholars must purposefully equip the post-graduate student, who is going to work in a resource-starved African academic institution, with an appreciation of the realities and challenges therein and what it will take to become a successful and productive first-rate scholar, researcher and academic in that environment.²⁰

THE CASE OF KENYA

Kenya has attempted to take a grip on its education system since independence, signifying the importance with which its contribution is held in

terms of national development. Right from independence, and in recognition of the need for fundamental reform in the education sector, various commissions of inquiry have been formed to evaluate the state of education in the country. The first commission produced the Ominde Report of 1964, which sought to reform colonial education. It proposed a system that would foster unity and create human resources for national development. This was closely followed by the Gachathi Report of 1976, which redefined policies and emphasised national unity and the socio-economic and cultural aspirations of Kenya. The Mackay Report of 1981 removed A-Level education and established the Moi University, 8-4-4 and the Commission for Higher Education. The Kamunge Report of 1988, on the other hand, focused on education financing, quality and relevance. This led to cost sharing. Lastly, the Koech Report of 1999 proposed a 'Totally Integrated Quality Education and Training' approach in education. This report was, however, rejected by the government almost in its entirety.²¹ Despite heavy expenditure on these commissions, the degree to which their reports have been implemented successfully has been wanting, and many concerns have been raised continuously about the quality of education right from primary school through to the university level.

Against this background of deteriorating academic experience (especially in the public institutions), the country has gone ahead with articulating an ambitious master plan, christened Kenya Vision 2030, which aims to catapult the country into a middle-income economy by the year 2030. Achievement of this, as envisioned in the document, is to be hinged on three main pillars: a political pillar, an economic pillar and a social pillar. Within the social pillar, various aspects of education and training have been captured, underscoring the important role that level and quality of education plays in the social, economic and political development of a country.²²

But Namuddu's contention that most of these institutions' environments are characterised by confusing fundamental purposes, misapplication of expertise, and the erosion of self-reliance, puts into question their ability to produce effective graduates who can be relied on to be globally competitive and able to sustainably drive development within their societies. Because there are many centers of competing interest in African academic institutions, the foundation on which to build strategy, management, operational activities and pretty well everything else that happens in an academic institution, remains confusing and constantly amenable to power struggles and conflicting interpretation by and among a wide range of legitimate stakeholders. Further, academic institutions, being a microcosm of the national ethos, tend toward reflecting the society that forms them and it is hardly surprising that the ruling elite, at various levels, sometimes behave in a fashion similar to that of the political elite. 'For instance, the national malaise requiring

that almost everything should be funded by donors has more or less been patented by academic institutions when it comes to research'.²³

Consequently, if this is the kind of environment within which the next generation of academics and business leaders are to be processed, it would be an uphill task to produce graduates with mental models that reflect values and practices different and superior to those within the learning institutions. For instance, whereas the Kenya Vision 2030 has been hyped across the country, its actualisation is threatened by its elitist top-down execution, hinging on a human resource base guided by the same enslaving mental models. Peter Senge's view of a human resource base well built in their personal mastery, based on transformative mental models and working in a team context would be the ideal in actualisation such goals.²⁴ Issues of prevailing negative cultures predominant in current mental models have not been adequately addressed, save for a casual mention of Kenya Vision 2030 and how it aims to transform life in the country. This vision may not be sustainable while the public educational system is systematically being eroded due to increased enrolments resulting from Free Primary Education and the rising competition from private schools in response to market dynamics.

Though this may not be explicitly expressed, Vision 2030 appears to follow Rostow's linear model of development. Having gradually moved from a traditional society and having started to court pre-flight conditions, the Kenyan case appears to have stagnated there, and Vision 2030 – proposed by technocrats from the National Science and Economic Council (a top-down approach) – was formulated to attempt a flight into a middle-income economy.²⁵ Much foreign aid has been poured in to facilitate this, but the lift-off is not yet in the horizon. This is where development aid writers like Dowden, Easterly and Moyo would have a problem with African development relying entirely on external aid. But an analysis of Rostow's Model in the context of Africa implies that the movement from one stage to another, especially the first two, would need an external intervention, a state that, it is argued, would keep perpetuating the dependency syndrome chronic within the continent.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Africa, characterised by low scores in the achievement of MDGs, is in dire need of improving the livelihood of its growing population without degrading its environment. As has been discussed in this chapter, it is not just enough to have great plans on how this should be achieved. It is important to adopt a systems approach to tackling the problems bedeviling the continent. Fundamental to this, it has been established, is the need for destabilising

and destroying the enslaving mental models that guide its development, right from the leaders to the followers. For instance, the over-reliance on foreign intervention to bail the continent out of its woes, though appealing to the leadership of the countries and to foreign bodies that use it as a life-line, just confirms that, by and large, African mental models still draw heavily on its colonial legacy and may be a major limitation to its growth.

The university system should be re-examined to ensure adequate nurture and development of mental models useful for not only understanding existing knowledge, but also for critiquing existing knowledge and generating new knowledge. Above all, knowledge should be used to solve existing challenges; and this must not be lost in the process of developing the minds of the next generation of academics and leaders.

Whereas there is a major preoccupation with developing policies that guide government operations and economic development, lessons learned from China and Singapore show that institution building is a mandatory pre-flight condition that enables confidence building among the citizenry. This is essential in providing the stability that develops mental models ready for development. Institution building should precede any other activities aimed at development.

RECOMMENDATION

It is ultimately proposed that Africa should embrace a REDEEM paradigm shift in processing its mental capital through the education system, in order to elevate itself to a success path by following in the steps of the East Asian Tigers. It must develop mental models flexible enough to *Respond* to environmental variables and opportunities as they arise. The mental models must empower the mind with curiosity to *Explore* and make *Discoveries* in uncharted waters, without the fear of failure – for in so doing the existing is understood, critiqued and innovations are generated. When discoveries are made as a way of life it is possible to benchmark them and create a culture of *Excellence* which creates the much needed thrust to *Extend* Africa's *Market Value* for sustainable development. When this happens, it will be Africa's turn to dominate the global economy.

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University Education in Africa Since Independence

Tuntufye Mwamwenda

INTRODUCTION

Over 100 years ago, an American Christian woman, by the name of Ellen G. White, stated that we have nothing to fear for the future, except that we will forget the way God has led us in the past.¹ As Africans and others present here, we are here today, because we have not forgotten our past; we are here because we have no fear of the future for the continent of Africa.

If, prior to independence, African countries worked and struggled for political and economic independence, then, during post-independence years, they have truly worked towards educational independence, which is an emancipating force in all human endeavours.²

Over 20 years ago, a Canadian visiting professor, David Baine, and myself, published a paper on Education in southern Africa while at the University of Transkei: *Current Conditions and Future Directions in the International Education Review*. It states:³

Southern African countries have placed high priority on education as key to individual and national development. Correspondingly, large percentages of government budgets have been allocated to education. As a result since independence, African nations have made monumental improvements in spite of enormous limitations of resources: economic, human, technological and material. A recent World Bank report stated that African educational development since independence has been spectacular and impressive.⁴ According to Heyneman, the expansion of the educational system is unique in human history.⁵ In the past fifteen years, the educational growth rate in Africa has doubled that of other developing countries in Asia and Latin America.⁶

Yes, African nations have made a monumental improvement in the world of education, which is impressive, spectacular and unique in human history,

and which exceeds what happened in Asia and Latin America. In no uncertain terms, the cited education endeavours have been superseded by leaps and bounds, in light of what has taken place in the last three decades. God bless Africa and her people.

Secondary school students are the sole source supply to meet the demand at tertiary/university level, otherwise higher learning institutions might as well close down. This brings to memory the Tanzanian experience shortly before independence in 1961. President Julius Nyerere made a recommendation to the soon-to-depart British government for the establishment of a university in Tanzania.⁷ They did not build a single university in the forty or so years that they governed the country. Their response was one of ridicule and they asked Mwalimu Julius Nyerere where he was going to get students to admit into such a university.

Their answer was based on the fact that there weren't any students in the country who could justify the creation of a university. But this did not reduce his determination to establish a national university. Therefore the University of Dar es Salaam was established the same year that the British granted independence to the Trust Territory of Tanganyika. But the British were not that far off the mark in their answer, as the University College of Dar es Salaam had no more than seventeen students!

More than fifty years ago, most African countries attained their independence from whatever foreign nation had the reigns of governance.⁸ Prior to independence and during independence, thousands of African students were sent to Europe, Asia, Australia and America for further studies, in preparation of their participation in the governance of their respective countries. On completion of their studies, thousands returned to serve the role for which they were sent to further their studies. Others chose not to come back.

Prior to independence and, for some, even after independence, they had no university of their own at all. The few countries that had such institutions may have had one or two. After independence, most of them made sure that they had at least one university to cater for their national needs. The one or two established then were a monopoly, as they remained the only universities for over two decades, with very little increase in enrolment, for various reasons, but particularly because of financial reasons and manpower limitations. Such universities were almost exclusively staffed by expatriates for many years.

Yes, that was the reality of higher education then and it remains part of the history of higher education in Africa. In the past three decades, the landscape of higher education has undergone a total transformation⁹ steered under the leadership of Africans themselves, in charge of their destiny.

Three decades later, there is hardly a single country that has no university of its own. Those that had one or two, which monopolised the scene

of higher education for close to two decades, have been surpassed at a supersonic speed. Nigeria, which had three universities at independence, now has 110; Tanzania has 40; Kenya has 53; Zambia has 19; Rwanda has 30; Ethiopia has 22; Ghana has 24; Egypt has 17; and others have a number of universities that far exceed those they had at any time in their history of higher education.¹⁰ In brief, below is an account of each of the 15 participating countries:

BOTSWANA

The University of Botswana was the first one in the country, after it had been part of the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and then the University of Botswana and Swaziland, followed by the University of Botswana as an independent institution of higher education in the early 1980s. The University of Botswana remained the only institution of higher learning in the country for over two decades. During these years, enrolment increased from 800 students to over 10 000 in the early 1990s. Today, the university no longer enjoys the status and prestige of being the national university, as there are now five universities. Three of them are government-owned and the other two are private universities. When the University of Botswana was established, it was intended to serve as the primary source of higher-level manpower in as many fields as possible (among other things).

NAMIBIA

There are two institutions of higher education, namely the University of Namibia and the Polytechnic of Namibia, both located in the national capital, Windhoek. At each one of these institutions of higher learning, enrolment has been rising on an annual basis, given the growing demand for higher education in Namibia. Even before independence, there were several Colleges of Education, which were recently incorporated into the Faculty of Education at the University of Namibia. This has been undertaken as a strategy for improving the quality of teaching at primary and secondary levels. It is assumed that improving the quality of teachers will similarly raise the quality of education at the schools in the country.

CAMEROON

The first university, Federal University of Yaoundé, was established in 1953. Since then, more universities have been created by many organisations in the country. However, the increase in universities has not satisfied the demand for university education, as more high-school graduates aspire to

further their education at university level. It is also important to note that learners from poor socio-economic backgrounds are unable to pursue their education, because it is unaffordable. When the University of Yaoundé first opened, there was an enrolment of 500 students. Currently, there are eight state universities, each with an enrolment of 15 000 students. This excludes the private universities, of which there were 12 in 2010.

Some of the challenges faced are a lack of basic resources, such as lecture theatres, scientific equipment, libraries and a limited number of committed academics. Brain drain is a problem, as many educated people immigrate to Western countries in search of better opportunities, making Cameroon an exporter of both natural and human resources.

RWANDA

Tertiary education in Rwanda is delivered by 30 institutions, a tremendous achievement, given that there was only one university for many years. In terms of enrolment, the number of students has been phenomenal. 1,900 students completed their studies at the National University of Rwanda (NUR) during its 30 years of existence from 1963 to 1996. This is in contrast to the fourfold surge of graduates to 11 000 in half the time between 1995 and 2010. During the past decade or so, more public and private universities have sprung up. In 1980, there were more than 1 200 students enrolled at NUR. By 2001, enrolment at six public and eight private universities had shot up to 17 000. The growth rate in universities and enrolment is higher in the private sector than in the public sector. In 2010, the 30 institutions of higher learning commanded an enrolment of 60 000 students.

EGYPT

There are 17 universities owned by the government and a student population of 2.5 million. In 1999 there were two private universities; this shot up to 14 in 2009, with an enrolment figure of 29 852 students. Going back in the history of university education, it is significant to note that in 1952 there were three universities and an enrolment of 50 000 students.

This changed following the revolution of 1952, which emphasised social justice and economic development through expanding education opportunity. In 1971 it was guaranteed that all eligible secondary-school students would be granted admission to university and that university criteria would be used as a yardstick for all; fees were abolished and there was a guarantee of graduates' being employed in the civil service. In 1981/82 the number of universities rose from 146 to 266. In 1999/2000 the student enrolment rose from a rate of 82 per cent to a rate of 137 per cent.

KENYA

University education is intended for those completing high school and educating and training high-level manpower needed for the country's economic development. Moreover, it is charged with the role of teaching, research, service to society and creating, preserving and disseminating knowledge.

The University of Nairobi was the only university in the country for decades. This changed as more universities started emerging through the combined efforts of government and private initiatives. By 2010, the number of universities, both public and private, had risen to 53, with a huge enrolment of 118 230 during the 2007/08 academic year. Enrolment in 2008-2010 rose by 44.7 per cent, from 122 849 to 142 356 in 2008/09.

ZAMBIA

Following the attainment of independence in 1964, the University of Zambia in Lusaka was established and dominated the higher education scene for over two decades. In the 1980s, another university (University of the Copperbelt) was established. In the 1990s, only 2.4 per cent of students eligible for university had access to university education. Since then, this has changed, as 16 private and one public university opened, between 2000 and 2010, the last as recently as 2008 – adding up to three government universities and totalling 19 universities across the nation.

GHANA

The university landscape has undergone changes over time. The University of Ghana was established in 1948. Just over 20 years later (in 1971), an additional two universities opened, namely Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology and University of Cape Coast. Currently there are six public universities and 18 private universities.

UGANDA

For many years, Makerere University dominated tertiary education as the one and only institution of higher education (since 1922). But that is past history, which has been overtaken by an unprecedented mushrooming of over 100 tertiary institutions across the nation, offering post-secondary education. Such institutions may be categorised as public and private at university and college levels. 17.9 per cent of universities are categorised as public, compared to 82.1 per cent privately owned universities. The total enrolment in 2010 was 103 341 students.

SOUTH AFRICA

Over the last 20 years, South Africa has not constructed new universities, though it has experienced a tremendous growth in enrolment. In 2009, 834 000 students were enrolled at university, compared to 670 000 who enrolled in 2000.

Of the registered students, 82 per cent was at the first degree level; 5 per cent was at the Master's level; 1 per cent was at the Doctoral level; and 8 per cent was at the Honours level. Between 1990 and 2008 enrolment at university doubled, in what has been referred to as the 'massification of higher education'. For example, in 1990 enrolment stood at 56 475; it then increased dramatically to 133 420 by 2008.

South Africa's rate of participation in higher education was 16 per cent for the period 2004 to 2007; this has remained stable for the past decade. This 16 per cent average participation rate is significant in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, but lower than the participation rate of 31 per cent and 25 per cent in the Caribbean and Central Asia.

ZIMBABWE

Tertiary education started with the establishment of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which following independence in 1980 became the University of Zimbabwe. It was followed by the Open University of Zimbabwe and the National University of Science and Technology in Bulawayo.

Presently, there are nine public universities and three church-based universities that are administered by the Methodists, Seventh-Day Adventists and Roman Catholics.

The Harare Institute of Technology offers degree-based courses, in addition to certificates and diplomas. Other colleges offer teacher education courses, which are also available in the Faculty of Education at university level. Degrees awarded are geared to teaching at the secondary and high-school levels.

TANZANIA

Tertiary education may be experiencing the fastest growth in the national system of education. For over two decades, following the attainment of independence in 1961, the University of Dar es Salaam reigned supreme as the centre of higher education. From the 1980s to date, Tanzania has prided itself in having 40 public universities, private universities and university colleges spread across the country.

LESOTHO

Following independence, the National University of Lesotho was the only institution of higher education in the country. However, the introduction of the Limkokwing University of Creative Technology was seen recently.

The highest number of students is registered at the two universities and the College of Education. In terms of enrolment in tertiary education, female students outnumber male students substantially. For example, in 2009/2010 at the National University of Lesotho, there were 8 044 females, compared to 3 093 males.

NIGERIA

At independence in 1960, Nigeria had three universities. By 2013 there were 125 universities. Last year saw an increase by six universities, providing one university per zone.

Apart from South Africa, Nigeria has the largest and most diversified tertiary education system in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1998, the General Education Requirement (GER) stood at 6.1 per cent, which was higher than the GER then (2.3 per cent) for sub-Saharan Africa. However, it was lower than that of developing countries (9.6 per cent) and South Africa (then 15.9 per cent).

ETHIOPIA

Higher education started with the establishment of the University College of Addis Ababa in 1900, with an enrolment of 1 000 students. Following this, more than half a dozen colleges in various fields sprang up. These institutions amalgamated to form the well-known Haile Selassie University in 1961. This was not the end, as more colleges were founded in the country. However, this did not adequately satisfy the demand for secondary school completers seeking admission to such colleges. Today there are more than 22 public universities and it is predicted that soon there may be as many as 33 universities. Enrolment in 2005/06 was 173 560 and rose to 420 387 shortly thereafter.

THE VALUE OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFRICA

It is not only the expansion of universities in the geographical sense, but it is also the gifted men and women who enrol in the universities that have made such an increase in enrolment statistics. They hold the future of Africa, as a trust in their hands. If there is nothing else that Africans can be

proud of, they ought to take pride in this spectacular achievement, as it is truly the work of their own hands and minds.

There are numerous reasons why Africa is investing so many billions of dollars in tertiary and university education. Higher education is a public and social good, which develops, advances, preserves and disseminates knowledge and provides stimulation for intellectual life.¹¹ Moreover it develops physical and intellectual skills towards self-reliance and problem solving at various levels of human endeavour, be it at a personal, family, regional, national or international level.¹² Higher education leads to the appreciation of one's personality as well as of others and of one own environment and that of others. It also promotes scholarship, community service and national, regional and international interaction and understanding.

Most important, it serves as a reliable source of middle- and higher-level manpower for the national and economic development of any given country on the continent of Africa. Prior to independence, so many Africans had to go abroad to acquire higher education in order to serve their countries. Such an approach was too costly and unsustainable. It is inconceivable how African countries could have maintained a workforce in numerous areas of the labour market without the students who have graduated from African universities.

One wonders how so many thousands of African students have managed to study at university, when it is so costly to pursue a higher education. The majority of students pursuing higher education come from families that cannot afford to educate their children at university level.

The answer is a simple one and has stood the test of time, since its implementation: at independence and a number of decades later, respective African governments financed the education of every African student who qualified for admission to university. This included a generous monthly allowance. For the last decade or so this policy has been modified, in some countries, as they have adopted the principle of cost sharing, whereby a student or parent pays the proportion that is within his/her financial means; the rest of the required funds is given as a loan, to be repaid after joining the world of work. When this was initially introduced there was resistance, which was short-lived, and the new policy is in operation.

HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFRICA AND ITS PRESENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

At a conference of African Union Ministers of Education and a range of other Education experts, higher education in Africa was stressed as being crucial for the development of Africa during the twenty-first century.¹³

Education is vital for the diversification of growing African economies, in the reduction of dependence on natural resources extraction, and the reduction of unemployment levels that currently stand at approximately 7 to 10 million – these young people are searching for employment, aiming to make up for the lack of education and the shortage of the skills required to work.¹⁴ Good quality and relevant education at the higher-education level will lead to the production and availability of employable graduates and professionals, such as doctors, nurses, lawyers, engineers, entrepreneurs, agriculturists, teachers, academics and environmentalists, who are currently in high demand.¹⁵

At the 2009 World Conference on Education held in Paris, France, the South African Minister of Higher Education and Training, Dr Blade Nzimande, made reference to the Second Decade of Education for Africa, as the blueprint for the education agenda, which includes higher education.¹⁶ The Minister was of the view that, in the past two decades, much had been achieved in higher education and at such a rate that it was certain that, by 2015, the set objectives would be achieved. His stance was substantiated by the increased enrolment of students who previously had no access to higher education. This is due to a rapid increase in institutions, both privately and publicly supported, and a remarkable record of thousands of African students pursuing further education in foreign countries, because of internationalisation/globalisation.¹⁷

Notwithstanding the remarkable achievements in higher education, it must be conceded that Africa is a continent that is faced with the serious challenge of meeting the education objectives set by itself and the international community.¹⁸ Africa operates in a challenging environment, given that it is blighted by hunger, illiteracy in some countries, poverty, and diseases such as HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria.

While there have been improvements at the higher education level since the 1990s, challenges include: infrastructure that is inadequate for the increased student enrolment figures; lecture halls that are overcrowded to the point that some students have nowhere to sit during lectures; inadequate laboratories and libraries; poor living conditions; and, in many instances, the use of information, communication and technology that is very poor or non-existent.¹⁹

During the Conference of Ministers of Education, it was reported that only 5 per cent of those in the relevant age group have access to higher education, compared to the world average that is five times that of Africa. For Africa to catch up to the rest of the world, it must accelerate its pace of development. This means governments should not be the sole funders of higher education. Increased private sector involvement is key to establishing and funding more higher-education institutions, in addition to those

already in existence. In addition, the contribution of both parents and students towards students' education is essential, because 100 per cent sponsorship of scholarships is no longer sustainable for governments.

Minister Nzimande further expressed concern that African universities tended to be consumers rather than producers of knowledge in the areas of research, productivity and innovation.²⁰ Production of knowledge continues to be monopolised by Western institutions, which undermines the development of a truly multi-cultural environment in higher education, since existing partnerships tend to favour donors and their funding entities.

The Minister further pointed out that gender balance in African higher education tends to favour men, not only in student enrolment figures, but also in the distribution of academics at various ranks, as well as in leadership positions.²¹ As a result of limited access to higher education in Africa, there has been internationalisation of higher education. Though a positive feature, the downside is that of human capital flight to the developed world. Many African students remain in the countries where they study, thereby contributing to the workforce of those particular countries at the expense of their own country.

The Nigerian Minister of Education, Prof. Ruqayyatu Rufai, expressed grave concern that African universities lag behind other world universities. For this reason, the African Union resolved to invest in universities in each of the five regions, so as to improve the quality of higher education.²² In West Africa, the University of Ibadan was designated as the centre of excellence for Arts and Life Sciences, to which students from different African countries would be drawn to pursue their advanced studies. This, however, is only a gesture, rather than a solution to the problem of research productivity.

The serious concerns expressed by the Ministers of Education of Nigeria and South Africa are supported by the research carried out on social sciences research output in sub-Saharan Africa, which focused on the past 15 years.²³ It was revealed that research at most African universities, with the exception of South Africa, is on the decline. Reasons for this include a lack of funding by the World Bank and other donors, rapidly rising student enrolment rates, a brain drain and political instability. South Africa has dominated research output in the social sciences, particularly since 2004.²⁴ Other reasons for low research productivity in sub-Saharan Africa are: un-maintained infrastructure of laboratories; outdated library resources that are without the latest, most relevant journals and books; scarce research funds that are dependent on dwindling foreign donor funds. Many African governments simply have no money for funding research.²⁵

In the light of the expansion of higher education in various African countries, concern has been expressed regarding its quality, given that African

countries have different systems of education and experience problems in harmonising various qualifications for purposes of admissions, transfer of credits for employment purposes is often difficult. In view of this, the African Union, as part of its Second Decade of Education for Africa agenda, is committed to addressing this challenge.²⁶ It aims at fostering co-operation in the exchange of information, synchronising procedures and policies practised in higher education, as well as adopting a system of comparing qualifications across countries.²⁷

CONCLUSION

Attempts have been made to present an objective perspective of university education in Africa, in terms of its positive dimensions and the challenges being encountered. However, the conclusion remains the same: and that is that Africa has made tremendous achievements in higher education in as short a space of time as possible. As such, there are hardly any other country that can boast similar achievements in the last 100 years. The challenges being encountered are not insurmountable, as they will be resolved in due course.

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Anti-Colonial Education and Climate Change

A Case Study Examining Attitudes to Indigenous Knowledge and Development in Tshongwe

Caroline Marks Madongo

INTRODUCTION: AN ANTI-COLONIAL PERSPECTIVE

Many pan-African scholars acknowledge that while there continues to be a lack of African-centred education, the misconception persists on the continent today that development and modernity mean becoming westernised at the cost of one's cultural heritage. The question remains whether or not there is much benefit to the African and the African's worldview if development on the continent is viewed and sought from a foreign perspective, which continues to harm the African's self-perspective. Woodson states the following:

When you determine what a man shall think you do not have to concern yourself about what he will do. If you make him feel that he is inferior, you do not have to compel him to accept an inferior status, for he will seek it himself. If you make a man think that he is justly an outcast you do not have to order him to the back door. He will go without being told, and if there is no backdoor his very nature will demand one.¹

Anti-colonial thought challenges the coloniser's sense of reason, authority and control, and encourages the colonised to interrogate the interlocking systems of power and dominance.² If incorporated with education for development, it has the potential to educate African people about social inequalities that stem from power and economic politics which exist between the urban and rural sector and the global North and South alike. The question remains as to whether or not the idea behind basic education, which is sought through the Education for All (EFA) agenda, is sufficient for African people today, as it is open to the criticism of being an engine to drive and reinforce neo-liberal cultural values.³

Matunhu argues against the self-appointed responsibility of the metropolitan states to develop an Africa that is founded upon the belief that Africa and African people need to be enlightened.⁴ In criticism of this self-appointed responsibility of Westerners, Clarke states that:

People think that their whiteness in itself makes them an authority on everything Black, they think that they can proclaim something to be so, without knowing what they are proclaiming.⁵

The consequence of Western influence shaping development in Africa is that the programmes being initiated by foreign agencies target not the root of Africa's problems, but the symptoms that manifest as on-going conflict, civil war, poverty, hunger, mass unemployment and poor education. Furthermore, the Eurocentric worldview communicated through these agencies is driven by Eurocentric scholarship which is designed in a way that conceals from Africans their past achievements and capabilities. This influence will continue to promote the idea that being educated, developed and modernised is to be attained through a mind-set shaped by Africa's colonisers rather than through seeking mental emancipation and pursuing an African-centred worldview.

BACKGROUND TO TSHONGWE

Tshongwe is a remote village situated in the Matabeleland South province of Zimbabwe. While many rural communities have utilised agriculture as a means to aid development, dry climatic conditions have made this impossible in Tshongwe. There is no existing irrigation system and therefore the community cannot rely solely on agriculture, either as the main source of food production or for commercial purposes. Today, development is affected by severe drought, human capital flight, poor-quality public services, low goods production and low returns on education.

In 2012, the Government of Zimbabwe opened The Gwanda State University School of Mines and Science and Technology in Matabeleland South. During the same year, the primary school at Tshongwe was electrified for the first time and a library was built. These developments have created an opportunity for the community to embark upon sustainable development programmes. When tied with the needs of the regional population, universities play an important role in aiding local development by providing new possibilities for innovation take-off.⁶ It has, therefore, been felt that there is an urgent need to prepare the community and create links with the newly established university in the local region.

The population of Tshongwe is approximately one thousand. The primary school enrolment is 130 children, of which 67 are girls and 63 are boys. The government of Zimbabwe offers the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM), which caters for orphans and vulnerable children, but, due to insufficient funds, not all children who qualify are in receipt of BEAM. There are no education-focused charities working in the community, although the primary school has adult literacy classes in primary education. Most of the students enrolled in these adult classes are women aged between 25 and 50. Other adults from Tshongwe, who are mainly women, are informally enrolled at a nearby secondary school, where they receive lessons in O-Level education.

The community has realised the importance of education for development, but projects require funds and most of the funds that the village receives are spent on purchasing food and livestock, rather than on education and development. A few young people engage in gold panning, but the equipment they use also requires funds, which are hard to source. There are no village-run schemes that aim to generate income for the community, but women have started individual-run garden projects around boreholes, poultry and goat rearing and money saving- and money-lending schemes. They receive knowledge and skills training from an organisation called Empretec Zimbabwe.⁷ Other women are also involved in Food for Work Programmes, which are sponsored by CARE International and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as World Vision and the Area Development Programme (ADP).

PURPOSE AND AIMS

The researcher would like to (1) understand the factors that have slowed development in Tshongwe and those that are impeding the process today; and (2) look for ways to move forward in terms of meeting Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), while being educated about the role that neo-colonialism plays in shaping the difficulties that African people encounter today. In the light of this cause, this research has examined educational issues and development attempts made by the Tshongwe community, including the barriers and challenges that the women, young people and the general community have encountered over the years. This information is crucial in organising and co-ordinating action research in the future, with a development centre established in the community that works in partnership with regional universities, colleges and community groups, government and NGOs (national or international) to empower the community and enhance their lives through the use of innovative technology.

The primary aim of this research is to find out how new knowledge and innovation can aid indigenous knowledge (where agriculture is concerned) and to gain insight into how the community can generate income that can aid the development process and sustain livelihoods. This research has looked into attitudes towards aid, how the community interpret themselves as recipients and how they can be inspired to seek solutions for their development problems. It has examined participants' attitudes to development and indigenous knowledge.

The secondary aim of this study is to analyse the kind of information being imported into the village, through an anti-colonial lens, how this knowledge contributes to their understanding of development, and how the community can best use this knowledge and information to enhance their educational and development needs.

This research will contribute to the gap in literature, where an anti-colonial perspective on development is under-documented and not frequently used in educational settings for African people. The field is saturated with Western-backed development reports and theory implementation. The benefit of an anti-colonial approach to development in Africa is that, as opposed to a Eurocentric one that continues to fracture, disfigure and belittle the African's identity and fulfil the interests of the colonisers, it examines development from a platform that acknowledges and validates an African-centred world view.

The main themes that will be focused upon for the purpose of this study are rural disadvantage, poverty alleviation and indigenous knowledge. A review of literature on education and development issues at the periphery has produced the following questions that this research aims to answer:

1. What are the main education and development issues in Tshongwe?
2. How is new knowledge and technology affecting the participants' lives, their self-conception and their understanding of the world?
3. What steps can be taken to prepare the community educationally for sustainable development projects?

LITERATURE REVIEW

RURAL DISADVANTAGE

Giroux, *et al.* have questioned the effect that globalisation has on reducing or reinforcing urban bias in sub-Saharan countries.⁸ They examine the gap that continues to grow between urban and rural attainment at school to understand if the divergence is mainly driven by individual merit-based factors or

structural disadvantages linked to rural people's background. Their research concludes by stating that disadvantages could stem from both individual circumstances and those related to social inequity. A question is raised about why it is important for the rural sector and the global south, in a wider context, to receive an education that is not biased against their needs.

The main strength of this argument is that it generates thought on how globalisation can be used as a tool to aid development in Tshongwe. There is an urgent need to: (1) compensate the loss incurred from human capital flight and the lack of main centres of commerce in Tshongwe; and (2) to understand how both individual and structural disadvantages have slowed development at the village.

Acho-Chi reports findings from a quantitative study carried out in rural Cameroon, which sought to identify factors that influence effective self-help rural development programmes.⁹ The study has mainly researched issues such as gender, attitudes towards mutual help, socio-economic and socio-cultural factors that the community experience.

The author concludes by stating that rural development programmes can yield successful results, if they are carefully planned. Emphasis is laid on preparing people's attitudes first, before focusing on physical and sustainable development projects. This study draws attention to the issue on how similar groups in Tshongwe influence attitudes towards education, reciprocity amongst community members and how transparency and democracy are maintained within community groups. A description of the content of educational programmes run at the village in Cameroon would have been insightful.

POVERTY ALLEVIATION

Carr argues that if the measures taken to analyse the causes of poverty are flawed, then the solutions to address the issues will not be as effective. The chapter does not openly provide a strong criticism against the methods and strategy that Western institutions use as leaders and decision makers in the direction that the global economy should take. Recommendations are limited to providing solutions to make poverty alleviation more robust, but within the confinements of the same system that has caused poverty and disrupted indigenous people's livelihoods for centuries.¹⁰ Arguably, it is felt that this would help people more in developing countries to shift global injustice, rather than to give more aid.

The strength of this chapter is that it provides a lens that allows the reader to understand how poverty alleviation has become politicised, marketised and romanticised, at both grassroots and international levels. Also questioned is the role that outside intervention (either in the form

of systematic aid or through governmental organisations and NGOs) plays in development at the periphery and how much outside agents of change understand the issues hindering development in affected communities.

Hershock writes about the role of education as a driver of poverty alleviation and acknowledges that education can help the poor to deal effectively with their situation, but argues that education will neither alleviate poverty nor fail in this area because of a lack of or inadequate funding and access.¹¹ This failure is pinned to the standard of educational aims and practices and the system of free market economics that have failed in becoming a principal driver of global inequity. The chapter analyses strategies that are used within the current dominant educational paradigm to alleviate poverty. These strategies are criticised by the author as not being designed to challenge nor change the direction of global inequality.

Poverty alleviation cannot shift social injustice, but poverty alleviation can yield benefits to impoverished communities, if it is used as a driver of a cause beyond increasing capabilities. This research aims to find ways to alleviate poverty in Tshongwe, in order to meet the basic needs of the community and therefore allow them to participate to their full potential in anti-colonial educational programmes – both for conscientisation and innovation for development purposes.

A gap was identified in the literature reviewed on international development: research looking into people's understanding of the causes of poverty, including research on education that teaches about the causes of poverty in Africa¹² (from a perspective other than a Eurocentric one), is under-documented.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE

Two main debates have been identified in the literature reviewed within the field of indigenous knowledge: (1) the role that imperialism has played and continues to play in diminishing indigenous knowledge of colonised people¹³; and (2) the crucial role that indigenous knowledge could play in aiding development in undeveloped and developing societies.¹⁴ In what follows, the discussion will centre on these two debates in order to identify gaps in the literature reviewed.

Sammy and Opio in their research paper show how a development initiative based on a Western paradigm has affected the lives of indigenous people in the Okavango region of Botswana.¹⁵ They show that this paradigm has had a detrimental effect on Ncoakhoe traditional and cultural practices, although the government has benefited from the natural resources from the region. The study mainly offers solutions on how the Ncoakhoe, an organisation called The Kuru Development Trust (KDT) and the Government

can work in partnership. With regard to indigenous knowledge and how it is portrayed in education, one of the main challenges the Ncoakhoe face is that non-indigenous education, which is represented as modern, is given more regard in educational settings while indigenous cultural education is integrated with less importance. Having said this, the importance of modern education is not doubted, but the issue is how it is portrayed in comparison to the indigenous education. For example, it is stated that the Ncoakhoe value modern education, but view it as conflicting with traditional values that are crucial for their belief systems and immediate survival needs. Passing down indigenous knowledge is affected, as young people are absent from the village for long periods of time, making traditional education impossible.

Klein writes about indigenous knowledge and education for community-run projects amongst the Nama of Namibia.¹⁶ The Traditional Life Skills Project was initiated in 2003 by The Institute for Education and Career Development (IECD) and developed further (with representatives from local communities along with The Ministry of Education (MoE), Karas Region and the Namibia Association of Norway (NAMAS). The TLSP sessions are held for up to four hours on a weekly basis and the most popular activities are handicrafts, agriculture, and collecting herbs and plants to be used for traditional medicine and cosmetics. In order to share skills and knowledge between the various communities, parent-teacher workshops have been held.

The two studies presented here on the Ncoakhoe and Nama people share a common problem on the issue of African indigenous education being side-lined by a Eurocentric one. The dominance of Eurocentric education in African schools is challenged here. For example, it is questioned if the school curriculum would teach the Nama the history of their country from an African or a European-centred view – where the Jewish holocaust will be given more attention in History class than the German holocaust in Namibia. Will the continued dominance of a European presence on the continent be challenged in the classroom?

The purpose of indigenous knowledge in schools is also challenged. For example, Kossler gives an account of the genocide in Namibia, from an African-centred view, detailing how the Nama and their traditional systems were brutalised and affected and how African history is distorted and misrepresented.¹⁷ If indigenous knowledge is passed down, without reflecting critically on arguments pertaining to the current debates within the field (such as why it is now being channelled into the education curriculum as desirable knowledge, yet it was deemed uncivilised and abhorrent during the colonisation of the indigenous), then it will be criticised as being romanticised.

Nevertheless, the role that the TLSP project and the KDT play in supplementing formal education with indigenous knowledge cannot be completely side-lined. These programmes have a positive aspect on the way in which indigenous knowledge is used and how it shapes young people's attitudes about themselves. They also show that indigenous knowledge projects can be run alongside mainstream education and can benefit participants, if a community (as a whole) are willing to take part and share that knowledge. This research also teaches that there is a high possibility of combining indigenous knowledge with new information to create new technologies. New technology can be used successfully for development purposes if the people concerned have a positive attitude towards each other, the development plans, indigenous knowledge and the new information being borrowed. There is a need to build confidence in cultural-specific knowledge, if it is to be used to its full potential in meeting and aiding development needs.

A gap has been identified, as programmes that use indigenous knowledge as a driver for macro objectives of knowledge and liberating educational purposes are under-documented. This research aims to examine participants' attitudes to indigenous knowledge, investigate how it is currently being used and analyse the benefits that indigenous knowledge could bring to the village participants, if it was focused upon from an African-centred world view, as discussed above.

METHODOLOGY

An interpretivist paradigm was used to conduct this research. A questionnaire that used open-ended questions, which enquired about education and development issues, was completed by a knowledgeable elder at the village. It sought background information concerning recent developments, initiatives and programmes being run at the village, including current problems faced by the community, which focus on education and climate change. The researcher lacked background knowledge on development in Tshongwe and this information provided an overview. Further questionnaires were completed by six participants, who were selected as follows: two education facilitators; two elders who are well-informed and experienced in indigenous knowledge systems; and two adults who have been more exposed to the pressures and processes of globalisation.

The British Educational Research Association's¹⁸ ethical guidelines for educational research were implemented and one benefit to the participants of carrying out this research is that they felt that they were being noticed, not only as aid recipients, but as people whose opinions about their development and future prospects mattered.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

RURAL DISADVANTAGE

This section generally enquired about: education and its role in shifting social inequalities; attitudes towards aid; their self-conception as aid recipients; and how they use ICT devices at the village. The participants were asked how they felt about the adult classes, what they understood about shifting social inequalities and their prospects for the future.

It was found that although education does not specifically guarantee jobs in the community, which is affected by high unemployment rates, it is mainly pursued for self-help purposes, in a bid to increase capabilities. However, they experience capital-related set-backs. There appears to be a general sense of optimism about education, but the participants experience challenges in their daily lives, which (as individuals) they have little control over. These challenges range from the lack of opportunities upon completing compulsory education, the availability of good learning resources and balancing priorities between family commitments and adult education. Having little control over aspects such as education facilities, which are important for successful learning at school, means that local students will receive basic education, while those in the urban sector (who might have access to a wide range of resources and extra-curricular facilities) will benefit from the space to be creative.

There is a general sense of loss and helplessness felt by four participants, although they all appear to be welcoming of aid and appreciate the job opportunities created by aid donors. The remaining two participants depend less on aid, as they are in full-time employment. The participants' views show that one's position affects one's outlook on circumstances and self-perception as an aid recipient. The younger participants appreciate aid, but they also have a need to be self-sustainable.

The concept of liberating education and its role in shifting rural disadvantage is challenged in the findings and it is questioned whether or not the Tshongwe community possess the basic requirements necessary for emancipatory education to take off. The findings show that education in Tshongwe is sought foremost for self-help purposes, rather than for shifting rural disadvantage. Self-help initiatives, which aid economic growth in the rural sector, are established and operated for individual purposes, rather than to benefit the community, as families have an immediate need to feed, clothe and educate themselves first. Nevertheless, the findings show that this community has the transferable skills and qualities necessary to develop interests of their own in the rural sector. For example, they have a strong sense of helping others in times of crises, they have good networking skills,

they acknowledge the importance of education for development, and they are developing a culture of educating themselves for self-help purposes.

POVERTY ALLEVIATION

The literature reviewed on poverty alleviation raised much interest in what steps the participants and community at Tshongwe are taking to address the hardships that stem from under-development. The researcher sought to find out if the participants belonged to micro self-help groups in the community, how they contribute and benefit from their membership, how the participants interpret poverty and how it is influenced by globalisation, and, lastly, if there were any community-based groups that aim to invest in equipment for projects run with electricity.

It was found that while the female participants belonged to money-generating self-help groups, the males mainly got involved in the community in times of bereavement, in which women were also actively involved. Interestingly, two male participants openly showed a gendered regard towards micro self-help groups and it would be interesting to find out from a gendered perspective how these groups help women to organise the community, and what their role is in development and as agents of change in Tshongwe. The women participants were tied to these groups through family, religious and work connections, which indicates that a link to a particular self-help group is highly likely to be based on one's standing in the community and one's social capital.

The participants were asked how information and communication technology (ICT) influences their lives in Tshongwe and about their use of ICT to assist them in creating or sustaining self-help initiatives at the village. Their responses showed that television is used for socialising purposes and for feeding their general interest in world affairs. Mobile phones allow the participants to connect with family members who have migrated to the urban centre and neighbouring countries. The elderly participants seem to use mobile phones to connect socially with family, whereas for the younger participants, telecommunication has the benefit of enabling networking and assisting in self-help initiatives that are largely reliant upon maintaining contact with the extended family.

Overall, it appears as though the participants feel that the benefits of self-help groups are mainly short term and small scale. It also appears as though the financial profits gained from membership depend upon how much capital they have to invest. These self-help groups may increase capabilities, but they are not sustainable enough to support rural development schemes in Tshongwe, despite having members of the community who have acquired life-long transferable skills. The participants' responses show that

it is very difficult to save money for a project and this appears to have been one of the issues that affect development in Tshongwe.

The participants generally understand that poverty is not having the means to live a quality life and being unable to change one's circumstances. It appears as though they have very little in terms of material and financial wealth, but people's understanding of poverty is also based on individual interpretation. It also appears as though this community would need education on poverty alleviation that would provide them with a theoretical understanding of the causes of poverty and the practical skills to alleviate poverty. But they must feel that they are being empowered by this knowledge and the skills training in order to change their circumstances, or motivation may be short lived and this may affect how they understand change and their power (as a community) to drive that change.

They appear to be aware that their inability to change the quality of their lives lies in power struggles that, as individuals, they have limited influence over. It would be interesting to know if they believe that they can influence a shift collectively, as a community, or if they believe that this shift will only occur through outside intervention, for example if the school being electrified was a decision made by the urban sector and not a community driven campaign.

With regard to their views on how poverty is influenced by globalisation, it appears as though the participants draw their understanding from issues that they observe in society. For example, there is a general understanding that education plays an important role in social stratification, but they do not have access to quality education. There is an awareness of colonialism, corruption and greed and this knowledge is supported by their interest in world and current affairs and through their personal experiences. These findings point to a need for adult classes to focus on the macro objective of knowledge for poverty alleviation in Tshongwe. It would be interesting to find out why fewer men are enrolled in adult classes and also to find out how they would contribute to classroom dialogue from a gendered perspective, in order to understand the knowledge capital that men could also contribute to a development scheme, if one is to be established at the village.

INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE

The two debates on indigenous knowledge presented in the literature review developed an interest in the following: the participants' attitudes to indigenous knowledge, how they apply it to their daily activities, and how it is evolving to meet social, traditional and lifestyle requirements in a changing environment. Therefore, the participants' attitude towards indigenous knowledge was sought, how intergenerational transmission occurs and

if young people are being encouraged to expand and develop indigenous systems. They were also asked about their attitudes towards universities acting as drivers for developing indigenous knowledge.

Much of the participants' traditions are based on indigenous knowledge. They use it in their day-to-day lives at the village, but its use is dependent on individual circumstances. For example, traditional methods are preferred in socialising the young and in chores such as cattle herding. However, concerning drought, it appears as though their indigenous knowledge has, firstly, not developed effectively enough to adapt to changing climatic conditions and, as a result, they are overcome by their environment in times of climate change. Secondly, there is a missing link where indigenous systems have been altered by colonialist structures.

The general attitude portrayed by the participants is that their indigenous knowledge is mainly bound by their rural lifestyle. They feel that beyond the village, there is very little that their knowledge can contribute to. Living conditions at the village also appear to affect the use of indigenous knowledge. For example, modern appliances, tools and knowledge are preferred over traditional ones and possessions often reflect social status. The participants believe that the younger generation is more interested in new forms of knowledge, such as technology, as it enhances their understanding of the world and provides a gateway. It would be interesting to examine young people's experiences and views on borrowing from new forms of knowledge and ideas to help enhance their lives and aid development at the village.

It appears as though the knowledge dynamics occurring in the village take place in a system whereby the participants borrow from new knowledge when their own is either not as effective or when it is lacking. There appears to have been an innovation gap where they have not developed new methods to assist the advancement of the indigenous knowledge that has been handed down by past generations. It also appears as though this has made the community mass consumers of foreign knowledge.

Indigenous knowledge is passed down in educational settings although it is done in an instructive manner rather than through one which allows critical reflection and evaluation on how its advancement and their traditional way of life has been affected by the Western paradigm of development. It appears as though human capital flight continues today at the village, and although there are many underlying push and pull factors, the result is that development and advancement, including inter-generational conveyance of indigenous knowledge, is affected. This happens when children complete school and, rather than progress to higher education to find solutions to the problems faced in Tshongwe, they have to struggle to find employment and cater for their immediate needs, which the participants have shown are those of survival before development. Nevertheless, in Tshongwe it appears

as though rural disadvantage has affected the students where learning facilities are concerned and participants also believe that, as rural people, they have less chance of being educated due to low social capital.

The participants' responses on their attitude towards university research and developing indigenous knowledge show that they are welcoming towards the idea of universities working in partnership with the community to develop indigenous knowledge and assist in development issues. The issues of understanding the missing link between universities and Tshongwe include low-quality educational facilities in their schools, ethnic divisions in the country and human capital flight, as a few fortunate people who managed to receive a university education have not returned to develop the village, but have moved permanently to the city and abroad.

CONCLUSION

This study has shown that although the participants have the skills necessary for planning and successfully running rural development projects, their knowledge about agriculture will have to advance to meet changing climatic conditions. It would also be advantageous if new ideas are considered to aid innovation in this cause. A development centre would help the community to focus on development goals and organise the community, but this would require dedication from both the agents of change and the general public. There will be many burdens to overcome, such as obtaining funds to start projects and obtaining manpower, but most important would be motivating the people to seek an African-centred view of development. Identifying aid donors from the prominent African community could assist the village financially to begin development-focused groups that will allow the community to tap into resources elsewhere in the country and encourage domestic trade.

Tshongwe has recently been electrified and change will slowly begin to take place in terms of people's lifestyles. Although there is room for change, it will be slow, due to the high cost of goods and electric power, as well as the lack of skilled people. Nevertheless, there is urgency for the community of Tshongwe to start making use of the opportunities brought by electricity, before others from neighbouring settlements, who already have accessible capital, take advantage of these opportunities at Tshongwe by establishing entrepreneurships in the village that will deliver no returns to the local community. The Tshongwe community can begin to make use of globalisation by seeking aid from charities and organisations that would be willing to help. In 2012, the African Union accepted the diaspora as the 6th region of Africa and it would be beneficial if community-based groups in Tshongwe

were able to establish links with African-led organisations in the diaspora to obtain skills and financial aid.

The discussion on the findings in previous sections raises the idea that goods production and entrepreneurship are a good starting point to generate income to boost development. Additionally, further transforming Tshongwe into a centre for African-centred knowledge, which aims to develop indigenous knowledge systems, using research and new knowledge could benefit some of the driest regions of Africa.

In drawing a conclusion, this research has satisfyingly answered the questions it set out to address and the following has been found: the main educational and development issues in Tshongwe are human capital flight, lack of quality education facilities, drought, hardship due to expenses, death, poor employment opportunities, self-help schemes that are based on social capital, an absence of a local development centre and education-focused groups. New knowledge and technology provide opportunities for networking, information on current affairs and a gateway to the outside world. The community must be empowered with self-knowledge to seek and counter power struggles, such as those that stem from urban bias. They must be motivated and taught how to use their transferable skills and group-work skills (gained from self-help groups) to manage and take part in community-based projects.

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Early Childhood Education

Afrocentric-based Montessori School

Carol Williams

INTRODUCTION

Education is a very important aspect of human existence and it is the vehicle used to transport information. How one's culture is passed down, for instance, is through education. We know what we know through observation, through patterning and through our own internal psyche or realisation based upon experiences, maturity and so on.

Education can initiate change or stunt it. It can build a nation. The African nation needs rebuilding. One way to rebuild it is through an education methodology that understands the African child's condition and provides possible solutions to end the poverty, improve health and well-being, build self-esteem and awareness and foster creativity and free will. It is building partnerships with pedagogies that are culturally based and who are willing to respect the uniqueness of the African child while exhibiting both empathy and compassion. To rebuild a nation we must start with early childhood education which is the seed of the nation. So often, there is a focus on youths to bring about social economic and even political change among African people. However, if education is a tool for change, then we must not neglect the needs of our youngest members of society, who will be our future youth, adult and leaders of change.

Building bonds with African-centered or Afrocentric Montessori early childhood education will be the connection or creative link that will create a new affiliated pedagogy to further reinforce and fulfil the need for greater holistic academic achievement of the African child around the world.

OVERVIEW OF MONTESSORI PEDAGOGY AND ITS RELATION TO AN AFRICAN-CENTERED ENVIRONMENT

'Excuse me,' said a child to a visitor commenting in a classroom that this was the method where children do as they liked, 'I do not know if we do as we like, but I know that we like what we do'.¹

Dr Montessori shifted the focus from a traditional teacher-centered classroom environment to a child-centered environment. In the Montessori classroom, the teacher follows the child's interests. Contrary to what one might conclude, following the child does not create an unstructured, chaotic, do-as-you-like environment. However, it does encourage the child to feel free to move around, discover and familiarise himself or herself with his or her new environment. The environment is prepared by the teacher to facilitate concentration, which in turn facilitates self-regulation and enjoyment of 'work'. In the Montessori environment, we do not say the children are playing, we say the children are working. They are about the business of work, as they are learning and building on the requirements of what will assist them in becoming a purposeful human being.²

Dr Montessori developed a prepared environment and self-correcting materials to guide children in their journey in gaining mastery over their new environment. Her attention to detail, based on her keen observation, influenced her to provide child-sized furniture to foster independence, self-reliance and a sense of pride in the classroom. As a principal and former Montessori teacher, I have often witnessed children in a Montessori classroom announcing 'I did it!' It is an expression of accomplishment and pride. It is also an indication that they've found comfort, joy and mastery in their classroom environment. The curriculum areas in the Montessori classroom reflect the child's interests and also their developmental stage. For example, the curriculum area called Practical Life utilises materials that the child sees in everyday life and materials used in the home as part of the adult's everyday mundane routine. Actions such as pouring water, button or unbuttoning one's coat, tying shoelaces or sweeping the floor are activities that are transported to the classroom to guide the child and satisfy his or her developmental requirements and burning desire for independence.

Movement is also an integral part of the Montessori pedagogy and it could very well hold one of the keys to the academic achievement of the African child in the diaspora. Dr Montessori emphasised that the child's growth is dependent upon both physical and psychic influences.

Through movement he acts upon his external environment and thus carries out his own personal mission in the world. Movement is not only an impression of the ego but it is an indispensable factor in the development of consciousness, since it is the only real means which places the ego in a clearly defined relationship with the external reality. Movement or physical activity is thus an essential factor in intellectual growth, which depends upon the impressions received from what we receive from outside. Through movement we come in contact with external reality and it is through these contacts that we eventually acquire even abstract ideas.³

Therefore, upon observation of a Montessori environment, you will notice the children moving from one activity to the next or engaging in activities that require movement. A simple activity such as *Colour Tablets 2: Environment*, requires the child to match the tablets and then find the colours (that correspond with the colours of the tablets) one by one in the classroom. This particular activity creates movement and satisfies language, while engaging the sensorial element of sight and touch and responding to the child's sense of order.

Other curriculum areas of the Montessori methodology include Language, Mathematics, Sensorial and Culture. Sensorial is a cross between Mathematics, Language and learning through the senses. The curriculum area of Culture includes Biology, Geography, History and Science, and provides a good opportunity for both teachers and students to expand upon the African child's experience. It is in this area that one would have the opportunity to discuss pre-slavery, glorious stories and civilisations.

In contrast to the 'factory model' or 'behaviorist' philosophy of perceiving the child as an empty vessel or drone, Dr Montessori perceived the child as an active, willing participant in the development of his or her education. Many scholars and researchers have found that the traditional or behaviorist approach to education is failing the African child and that the Montessori pedagogy is more suitable, as it adheres to a self-directed approach that respects the child. Research ascertained that some of the under-achievement of the African child is based on:

... over reliance on direct instruction, socially and culturally irrelevant curriculum, excessive classroom discipline as well as lack of student self-discipline. Research literature also associates these student hurdles with their out of school lives, e.g. the disintegration of the traditional family unit, poverty, gang violence, community fragmentation and scarce community resources.⁴

Intellectuals of disciplines in education, sociology and psychology assert that the African child requires a varied range of instructional methodologies in order to succeed in the educational system. These methods must include:

positive self-image; critical thinking instruction; freedom and flexibility in the classroom; culturally and socially responsive curriculum; strong self-esteem building activities; cooperative learning environments; use of the four learning modalities; responsibility for actions and decisions; building strong relationships with school and community; personal responsibility and autonomy.⁵

The Montessori pedagogy appears to fulfil the academic deficit being experienced by the African child by creating a 'prepared environment' that nourishes the African child's abilities. When self-pride intertwines with sound interactive game activities that correspond with movement, choice and respect, then the African child will have a greater chance of academic success. However, we should not wait for the African child to become a teenager to encourage or provide this culturally prepared, liberated environment: we should start from what Dr Montessori calls 'the sensitive period ages 0-6yrs old', when the child's ability to learn and retain information is at its peak.

There is another cognitive plan which determines the unique emotional and intellectual qualities of each child. These qualities develop through what Montessori referred to as 'the sensitive periods'. Each sensitive period is a specific kind of compulsion, motivating young children to seek objects and relationships in their environment with which to fulfil their special and unique inner potential. Montessori believed that children will develop to their full human potential when everything in the environment is 'just right'. Everything, food, furniture, learning activities, social relations, clothing, routines, and rituals must all be 'just right' in order for them to develop their fullest potential as human beings. Young children are neither consciously aware of nor capable of directly communicating their interests and developmental needs. In Montessori Early Childhood programs, teachers are charged with providing learning environments in which everything is 'just right'. For almost one hundred years, Montessori educators have observed a set of motivations shared by young children around the world. What Dr Maria Montessori discovered in the St Lorenz Quarter in 1907 was that children are self-motivated to learn from their environment. Borrowing a term from biology, she called these stages the sensitive periods, after similar developmental stages in animals. The idea seemed revolutionary at the time, and took many years, following Piaget's extensions of Montessori's initial explanation, to become generally accepted in child psychology. Today, whether we use Montessori's terminology or not, the description of child development she first presented at the turn of the century rings true. Each sensitive period is: A period of special sensibility and psychological attitudes. An overpowering force, interests, or impetus directing children to particular qualities and elements in the environment. A period of time during which children center their attention on specific aspects of the environment, to the exclusion of all else. A passion and a commitment. Derived from the unconscious and leads children to conscious and creative activities. Intense and prolonged activity which does not lead to fatigue or boredom, but instead leads to persistent energy and interest. A transitory

state once realized, the sensitive period disappears. Sensitive periods are never regained, once they have passed.⁶

CULTURAL RESPONSIVE CURRICULUM AND CULTURAL CONGRUENCY AND THE MONTESSORI METHODOLOGY

While the traditional Montessori curriculum fits the mould of the African child in improving his or her education status, I think introducing the element of cultural identity from an African-centered or Afrocentric point of view is relevant to the child's continued academic success.

What is the rationale of having a culturally relevant education? Studies have shown that a culturally relevant education improves the overall well-being of a child; coupled with the Montessori teacher approach this will result in producing a dynamic well-adjusted child.

What does culturally relevant education mean and what is its goal? Stacy York describes culturally relevant education as:

... 'work to consciously establish a program approach which both assists children to function in their own cultural community and builds their competence in the culture of the larger society'. Culturally responsive care honours and meets the needs of today's changing families. In a culturally responsive program, children maintain their personal power and sense of identity. The child's family is supported and enhanced. Children don't experience daily conflicts or confusion. The purpose of child care is to foster children's healthy identity development as a member of a family and a cultural community. Culturally responsive programs share three important components: curriculum is based on children's lives; activities incorporate children's home language; activities encourage children to learn about their family and home culture.⁷

There are cases where amalgamating the Montessori methodology with culture-responsive or relevant education suggests and proves academic achievement. In 2006, Schonleber completed her thesis on *Culturally Congruent Education and the Montessori Model: Perspectives from Hawaiian Culture-based Educators*. She found that Montessori pedagogy, combined with the Hawaiian culture-based education, helps to improve the academic achievement of Hawaiian students. She asserts that there are still many challenges along the way and that they still have a long way to go in marrying and examining other pedagogies that might also be suitable for the Hawaiian child. However, her research indicated that Hawaiian children who are in a classroom environment that focuses on their culture or that is Hawaiian culture based, do better than their classmates who are in a

classroom that is not Hawaiian centered. The influence of a culture-based curriculum was also evident in the attendance rate. Attendance of children who attended Hawaiian culture-based schools ranged from 95-100 per cent, while their counterparts continued to display high rates of absenteeism.⁸

In addition, Schonleber points to further research that indicates:

A substantial body of research indicates that knowledge of content and knowledge of pedagogy are both important factors in the achievement of high academic outcomes for children. How educators teach is as important as what they teach.⁹

This is a very important point and supports my argument regarding the African child: that an African-centered education, combined with Montessori pedagogy, will be effective in improving the under-achievement problem of African children in the diaspora. While Montessori may follow the child's interests, it is still very important that its approach pays special attention to the child's culture. In Montessori, the teacher is considered a guide, but she or he is also instrumental in prompting and engaging the child in broadening his or her knowledge base. The concept of following the child still has certain stipulations that the teacher adheres to, so that the child is able to blossom and grow to his or her full potential. So it is very important for the teacher to be aware of the child's cultural practices, so that he or she doesn't just prepare an environment, but prepares a culturally appropriate environment that is reflective of and compatible with the child's everyday life. By following the child from, for example, an African-centered perspective, the teacher will put theory into practice.

Gandhi advocated the inclusion of practical and cottage skills, such as traditional weaving and agriculture, into the basic British model in force at the time. Similarly, in the U.S. today, some Native American writers and activists suggest that one key to the regeneration of the political power of their people and culture lies in a reorganization of political structures and educational systems to reflect indigenous knowledge, ways of learning and ways of being.¹⁰

So whether African children live in a city or village in Africa, in Canada, in the Caribbean or in Latin America, they require an education system that acknowledges the significance of their culture and learning styles and that customises programmes to suit their needs from a holistic perspective. The Afrocentric-based Montessori answers the call. If we want the state of the African people everywhere to improve, I think we must look to its children, and if we begin at the beginning, which is early childhood education, we

provide ourselves with the opportunity of making an impact on our present condition, our children's future and then on every child's future.

Amos Wilson discusses the African child and Afrocentric society:

Children are born into social systems, societies. They are an integral part of a full social system for they are its beneficiaries and grow up to be its benefactors or malefactors. Therefore, children are not merely born into a family or are the mere products of their parents' procreative efforts. They are born into a society. They are gifts to society. Nurtured by their family and society, they can represent that family's greatest gift to the social world ... Beneficent Afrikan intelligence cannot be nurtured in a cultural vacuum or in cultural confusion. Therefore, it is of vital importance that the nurturers of Afrikan children – mothers, fathers, and/or other caregivers and caretakers – be assimilated into Afrikan culture and values.¹¹

In other words, Dr Amos is clearly emphasising that teachers, parents and society in general must have a strong knowledge base about the African child. The more authentic these are, the more they will be able to contribute to the success of the African child. The child's surroundings, both in and outside of the home, should reflect and celebrate the joys, love and admiration of its culture. Cultural pride boosts self-esteem and a sense of responsibility to one's general surroundings.¹²

AFRICAN PRIDE

Creating an environment that nourishes self-pride produces a more positive and well-rounded child. This could also be said of the African child, if he or she is situated in an enriching environment. Studies continue to examine the benefits of racial pride and examine the concept of colour blindness. One such recent research study done at Harvard University was completed by Wang and Huguley regarding African pride and its effect on the African-American child.

Our findings challenge the notion that 'race blindness' is a universally ideal parenting approach, especially since previous research has shown that racially conscious parenting strategies at either extreme – either 'race blindness' or promoting mistrust of other races – are associated with negative outcomes for African-American youth ... When African-American parents instill a proud, informed, and sober perspective of race in their sons and daughters, these children are more likely to experience increased academic success.¹³

As the African-American child represents a large body of people of different socio-economic backgrounds, Wang and Huguley made a special effort to include a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds in their research, as opposed to only focussing on low-income families, to further authenticate the final findings of their research.

Using a combination of questionnaires and face-to-face interviews of both students and parents, the study examines the home and school racial experiences of 630 African-American high school students in a diverse but mostly Black urban area on the East Coast of the United States.

Unlike other studies that focus on low-income families, this project involved participants who came from a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds. The median household income range was \$46,000-\$50,000, and 40% of the parents or guardians had a college degree.

Overall, the study found racial pride to be the most powerful factor in protecting children from the sting of discriminatory behavior. It directly and positively related to three out of four academic outcomes – grade-point averages, educational aspirations, and cognitive engagement – and was directly related to resilience in the face of discrimination. Preparation for bias was directly related to only one outcome – the sense of belonging to a school.¹⁴

Even though the research depicts the importance of racial pride and its effects upon the academic achievement of the African child, one cannot ignore or negate the fact that poverty is a real issue for the African child around the world, and that it presents many challenges, even when a compatible pedagogy is identified.

RECOMMENDATIONS: THE WORLD IS YOUR CLASSROOM

Montessori methodology utilises didactic hands-on materials to facilitate learning. Due to its popularity, Montessori materials are very expensive and unfortunately some will be inaccessible to the many African children who cannot afford to attend a Montessori School. There are charter schools in the USA who adopt the Montessori principle and so some children will have the opportunity to attend a Montessori school on a lottery system. This idea of ‘subsidising’ a Montessori school under the umbrella of public education is also seen in England. In Canada, Montessori is a private education system, with high tuition fees. In the city of Toronto, one school in a low income area is provided with Montessori methodology in the classroom up to approximately grade one. These are some of the ways in which the

African child can have access to some form of Montessori practice, if he or she is unable to afford the tuition fees in a private setting.¹⁵

I have personally spoken to teachers in the Caribbean at the Discovery Bay Infant school in Jamaica, who indicated that teachers are provided with some form of Montessori training as a professional development programme. These teachers then incorporate some of the tools they learn in the infant schools in their communities to assist children who would otherwise not be able to afford a Montessori education.

One of the strengths of Montessori is that as a teacher or guide you can use your imagination as well as the imagination of the children to create materials from your surroundings. There are also materials within the Montessori classroom that can be made by hand or the concept can be replicated to create a whole new material that is still within the principles of Montessori.

Language:

- For purposes of writing, a child can use his or her *finger to trace in sand*; instead of using a pencil, one can use sticks of various sizes to trace in the sand. The various sizes will help to strengthen fine motor skills and practise the pincer grip.
- Montessori pedagogy utilises phonics by way of a teaching material or instrument called the Moveable alphabet. In cases where the Moveable alphabet cannot be purchased, a substitution would be as follows:
 - Spell through movement and rhythm: one clap for consonants and two claps for vowels to spell three letter words; or stomping of the feet, jumping and skipping, with the same movement for consonants, but a different movement for vowels. Say the sound of the letter out loud then clap or skip, etc.
 - Sew two pieces of cloth together like a mitten, one side pink to represent consonants, the other side blue to represent vowels. By rotating the palms, one could learn to spell and formulate three letter words.

Mathematics:

- Counting objects in your immediate environment.
- Gathering seeds, leaves or pebbles for general counting.
- Gather stones, fruit and marbles according to size and identify them as units, tens, hundreds, thousands, etc.

Culture:

- Identify different types of leaves and shapes in the environment.
- Planting a seed and observing its growth.
- Examine leaves and label parts of it orally with teacher.
- Discuss African symbols and their meanings and the passage of time.
- Story telling is a great way to teach passage of time; making it personal to the child is an added bonus.

Sensorial:

- Touching and smelling fruit, flowers and trees and identifying their texture (smooth, rough, soft).
- Identify colours around you in clothing, birds, etc.

Practical life:

- How to greet a friend, teacher, parent and an elder.
- Folding clothes.
- Braiding or combing hair.

Children can also play games like guess who or guess what. With these activities you close your eyes and use other senses to identify the person or the thing. Games are wonderful teaching tools when there is a lack of resources available to the African child around the world.

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

Free education; no required uniform; a flexible dress code; breakfast and lunch clubs; teachers to be provided with Montessori training; free health care; partnerships with Montessori schools across the world. There are Montessori schools that can provide gently used and unused extra Montessori materials. Use the craftsman in your country to recreate the Montessori materials.

CONCLUSION

Ironically Dr Montessori started teaching orphans and children who were the outcasts of society; now her methodology is almost inaccessible to society's most impoverished. Nevertheless, the principles and philosophy of Montessori have stood the test of time.

Throughout this chapter I have discussed the importance of African children, particularly children within the early childhood setting, being exposed to the culture-based curriculum, while utilising the core Montessori principles. I have highlighted studies of other cultures to show that the Montessori methodology within a cultural-based curriculum is effective in improving academic achievement.

Research shows that early intervention to introduce educational principles, such as the Montessori pedagogy with its freedom and choice, does have an impact on academic achievement. Research evidence supports the idea that the Montessori approach is a good fit for the African child and children in general.¹⁶

As more and more research indicates the significance of the first six years of a child's life, we must start paying more attention to the early years of the African child, in order to make a difference the future.

To assist with a solution, I have provided a synopsis of materials a teacher could use when resources are limited. Following the Montessori principles, teachers can create their own materials.

In conclusion, Montessori is not static, so it is time to build upon it and create the Afrocentric Montessori methodology for early childhood education, so that African children on the continent of African and in the diaspora can benefit from its practices.

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From African Union of Governments to African Union of Peoples?

Rethinking Democratic Governance and Development in Africa

Samuel Oloruntoba and Solomon Akinboye

From the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 to the current African Union (AU), the promotion of democracy and development has been one of the driving objectives. However, it is paradoxical that the structures of these organisations have been such that decisions are made essentially by the Heads of States and Governments without adequate, if any input, from the citizens. While it may be argued that these Heads of States are representatives of the people and are therefore empowered to make decisions on their behalf, we contend that there is a democratic deficit at the AU. And this affects its ability to drive the process of democratic governance and development on the continent. Instances abound where the continental organisation has concluded decisions before seeking the views of the people. A typical example was the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), where the three initiatives of the Presidents of Nigeria, South Africa and Senegal were fused to form the programme without adequate, if any, input from the civil society.¹

Such tendencies obfuscate the possibilities, qualities and prospects that policies and programmes that emanated from robust dialogue with the citizens hold for development on the continent. The preoccupation with the pursuit of the interests of the Heads of State and Governments at the AU could be said to be responsible for the inability or unwillingness of the continental body to take decisive actions against sitting Presidents that manipulate the electoral process in their favour. Examples of these incidences abound in Zimbabwe, Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire.

It is the central argument of this chapter that before the AU can succeed in fostering socio-economic and political development in Africa, its structures and philosophy must be re-organised to reflect strong democratic credentials and make it an African Union of Peoples. This will involve

engaging the citizens at various levels of discussions before making decisions. Interested citizens should also be allowed to participate actively in the meetings of the organisation. Also, against the backdrop of the failures of many democratic states to bring about development to the people, the AU should strengthen the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) under NEPAD, not just to monitor compliance with some governance standards but provide an avenue for prosecuting those who are found to have used state resources to amass wealth or subvert the democratic process. This chapter proposes a continental-wide enforcement mechanism, such as an African Court of Justice, to deal with cases of political and economic corruption, which are so pervasive on the continent.

INTRODUCTION

At the formation of the OAU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 25 May 1963, some of the overriding objectives of the leaders of the continent at the time were the eradication of all forms of colonialism on the continent and emancipation of the people from all forms of oppression.²

This aspiration was essentially important as some countries on the continent were still under the direct control of colonial powers such as France, Britain, Germany, Belgium and Portugal. The idea of unity among the various sovereign states was given prominence by key political leaders. One of the protagonists of unity in Africa was Kwame Nkrumah, the former President of Ghana. He expressed his desire for a continental unity on the basis that this would help the continent to build a solid alliance against its perpetual control by former colonial powers. He stated that:

At present, most of the independent African states are moving in directions, which expose us to the dangers of imperialism and neo-colonialism. We therefore need a common political basis for the integration of our policies in economic planning, defence, foreign and diplomatic relations. The basis for political action need not infringe the essential sovereignty of the separate African states. These states would continue to exercise independent authority, except in the fields defined and reserved for common action in the interests of the security and orderly development of the whole continent.³

Nkrumah's vision of a politically united Africa was truncated by the gradualist approach of the Monrovia group of which Nigeria is a key member, which prefers that economic integration and cross-cultural understanding among the peoples of Africa should be developed before a wholesale formation of a political union.⁴ There is no doubt that the (OAU) achieved its main

of objective of decolonisation on the continent as no country remained under colonial rule today. However, the organisation failed in its objectives of fostering economic development and liberating the people from the shackles of poverty.⁵ More than 10 years after the change from the OAU to the AU, the problems of the people as encapsulated in a lack of improvement in the standard of living and a lack of access to good health, education and other indices of human development, remain unaddressed.

Despite the establishment of various institutions and the launching of various bold initiatives for improvement in governance standards to which many of the countries subscribed, the performance of African leaders is still below the desired level. Corruption is rife, insurgency is on the rise, and political institutions in many of the countries remain patently weak. The failure of governance at the state level has impacted negatively on the welfare of the people. Paradoxically, the expectation that the AU will be able to influence national leaders of member countries to abide by its charter has proved to be a misplaced one.

Section two of the chapter contains a historical sketch of the trajectory of the external forces that shape the emergence of the states in Africa and the search for self-discovery that informed pan-Africanism as a social-cultural and political construct, as well as the derailment from the noble objectives that informed such construct. Section three examines some of the institutions of the AU and how they involve the peoples of the continent. Section four contains an analysis of the development challenges of the continent and the factors that limit the AU in effectively addressing these challenges. Section five concludes with recommendations.

FROM PAN AFRICANISM TO AFRICAN UNION: HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF EXTERNAL FORCES AT PLAY

The formation of what is today known as the AU is the culmination of a series of processes and activities that started with the need to rediscover the identity of the black man, who from various historical accounts has been treated as a chattel, subject to perpetual exploitation. The struggle for liberation in Africa was informed by the oppression, exploitation and domination that the continent has suffered under slave trade and colonialism. After about three successive centuries of slavery in which millions of people were forcefully evacuated from the continent to the new world in the Americas, the imperial powers pursued their 'legitimate trade' in a mercantilist manner that saw to the slicing up of the continent among themselves. Indeed, in what passed as a competition over the possession of a people and their God-given resources:

Africa was sliced up like a cake, the pieces swallowed by five rival nations – Germany, Italy, Portugal, France and Britain (with Spain taking some scraps) – and Britain and France were at each other's throats. At the centre, exploiting the rivalry, stood one enigmatic individual and self-style philanthropist, controlling the heart of Africa: Leopold 11, King of the Belgians.⁶

The Berlin Scramble for and Partition of Africa Conference of 1884-1885, was where, according to Adebajo Adekeye,⁷ the legal and political effect was given to the slicing up of the continent through some treaties and agreements. The imperial forces that organised the Berlin Conference had, as part of their objectives, the promotion of the civilisation of the African natives through opening the interior of the continent to commerce and free trade. However, Dani Nabudere argues that the real motive for organising the conference was to create a veritable avenue for the mercantile satisfaction of the imperialists. He notes that 'there was no concern for the interests of the native people' by the imperialists. The aptness of this argument will become clearer later in this work.

However, suffice it to state at this junction that the artificial states that were created by the imperial powers in Africa have by their nature and character fail to incorporate the interests of the people. The crisis of underdevelopment that arise out of the nature and the character of the state in Africa, and how this problem continues to obfuscate autonomous development on the continent, has been a subject of much debate by scholars.⁸ A salient part of the argument is the inextricable link between the colonial state and the post-colonial state, both in origin, content and context. This strand of argument also correctly situates the contradictions inherent in the promotion of African unity and its inability to galvanise development on the continent within the context of the over-developed, externally dependent and exploitative state structure on the continent.⁹

Paradoxically, agitation for the rediscovery of the dignity of the black man did not start in Africa. It started in the diaspora as the blacks, the descendants of former slaves, saw the need to seek more recognition for themselves and the people back home.¹⁰ As Dani Nabudere states, 'despite its links to the African continent, pan-Africanism as an articulated philosophical and political statement as well as an attempt at developing an agenda has been located in the diaspora'. He further conceptualised pan-Africanism, under which the AU can be encapsulated as:

An expression of African identity and as such is deeply rooted in the people's historical, cultural, spiritual, artistic, scientific and ontological legacies from past to the present. It was and continues to be the basis of their struggles against slavery, colonialism, racism and neo-colonialism.¹¹

From the first pan-African Conference of 1900 in London to the Manchester Conference of 1945, pan-Africanism was a rallying point for all black people to face problems that are common to them as a social category. After some of the countries in Africa became politically independent from the 1950s, especially with the independence of Ghana in 1957, the idea of pan-Africanism got some fillip from leaders on the continent. With Nkrumah's vision of the United States of Africa, a Pan-African Peoples Conference was convened in Ghana in 1958 to discuss the common problems of the people of the continent. Nkrumah's belief in the sacrosanctity of political union as a *sine qua non* for social-economic development in Africa is legendary. In his words:

Our essential bulwark against such sinister threats and other multifarious designs of the neo-colonialists is in our political union. If we are to remain free, if we are to enjoy the full benefits of Africa's rich resources, we must unite to plan for our total defence and the full exploitation of our material and human means, in the full interests of all of our peoples. To 'go it alone' will limit our horizons, curtail our expectations and threaten our liberty.¹²

The threats that Nkrumah was referring to here were and are still from the former colonial masters who have continued their policy of divide and rule over Africa. The fact that they grudgingly granted political independence to the continent has not debarred them from formulating all manners of economic, social and political ideas and theories, which keep Africa in the throes of conflict, poverty and underdevelopment.

It is instructive that even though pan-Africanism started through the vision of individuals like Marcus Garvey, Henry Sylvester Williams, and W.E.B. Dubois among others, it soon became an agenda for the sovereign states on the continent of Africa.¹³ The inability of the successive organisations, the OAU and the nascent African Union, to connect intimately with the peoples of Africa started when matters that pertain to the affairs of these organisations became that of the governments of the independent states.

To elaborate, for almost 40 years of its existence, the OAU was largely a toothless bulldog that could bark but could not bite. In what seems to be a predetermined cause for inertia and elite conspiracy, the OAU charter contains issues of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Consequently, the organisation was helpless as country after country took its turn to produce various versions of tyrants, power mongers and predatory rulers. From Idi Amin of Uganda, Mobutu Sesekou of Zaire, Sani Abacha of Nigeria to Bokassa of the Central Africa Republic, African leaders subverted the will of the people, primitively accumulated their collective wealth and frustrated genuine efforts towards developmental democracy. Yet, the organisation looked on without batting an eyelid.

The word 'Unity' as part of its name became nominal as the continent remained essentially divided along the line of former colonial masters and their interests. The search for inclusive development and the need for the people of Africa to assert their sovereignty under a continental political arrangement that can act independently of external pressures necessitated the transformation of the OAU to the AU in 2001.

AFRICAN UNION OF GOVERNMENTS OR PEOPLES? A CRITIQUE OF AU INSTITUTIONS

The formation of the AU as a successor organisation to the OAU is a reflection of the gap in expectations on what the latter was established to do and what it was able to achieve during the period of its existence as a continental body. The AU came into existence in furtherance of the vision of one of the founding fathers of the defunct OAU for the establishment of a United States of Africa. Although the late Libyan leader, Maummar Gaddafi, was the spearhead of this idea in the twenty first century, the role of late Ghana President, Kwame Nkrumah, remained indelible. As Adejumbi argues:

The emergence of African Union ... must be grounded in Nkrumah's radical Pan-African vision. This is to say that it must reflect and must be strengthened by a new Nkrumahist inspired political will such as that exemplified or reincarnated in the leading role of Muammar al-Gaddafi.¹⁴

Just as it was at the beginning when countries like Nigeria objected to the immediate formation of a United States of Africa as envisaged by Nkrumah, there were also objections by South Africa and Nigeria to the idea that the AU should be a basis for a political union of the continent as advanced by Muammar Gaddafi. These countries prefer a gradualist approach which incorporate regional integration, customs union and cross-continental development of institutions before the establishment of a political union.¹⁵

The African Union Act provides for nine organs that are geared towards meetings its objectives of fostering democratic governance and economic development on the continent. These include: Assembly of the Union, Executive Council, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), Court of Justice, the Commission, the Permanent Representative Committee, the specialised technical committees, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, financial institutions, the Peace and Security Council and NEPAD. With the exception of the PAP, virtually all these institutions are manned by heads of states and government and their representatives. The exclusion of the civil society and the generality of the people in the key organs of the organisation is an

eloquent testimony to the scant regard that the leaders have for the people in Africa. Although there are rhetoric about development and empowerment of people through the organisation, these are mere words without substance.

Since it is the same set of leaders who have failed to transform the social and economic conditions of their citizens in their respective domains that dictate the policy direction of the AU, it is difficult to see complementarity in their promises (as enunciated in the AU Act) and their practice. Indeed, fine words borne out of the need to be politically correct will not solve any problem that the people of Africa are currently enmeshed with, neither will those words lead to the empowerment of the people to participate meaningfully at national, regional and continental levels. What is needed is a strong political will to translate the various promises into reality.

The AU has various institutions through which it drives its activities and as previously noted in this work, most of these institutions are essentially state-centric. One of the institutions that are expected to incorporate the people, both in the degree of participation and reflection of their views on policy issues in Africa is the PAP. According to Article 1:¹⁶ 'The Pan-African Parliament is specifically designed to ensure the full participation of African peoples in the development and integration of the continent'. This legislative institution was established to have full legislative powers with representatives from member states. The Protocol establishing it declared in its preamble that the formation of the Parliament was informed by a 'vision to provide a common platform for African peoples and their grass-roots organisations to be more involved in discussions and decision making on the problems and challenges facing the Continent'.¹⁷

Other people-sensitive issues, such as the promotion of human rights, democracy, peace, stability, self-reliance and economic recovery, encouragement of good governance in member states, familiarising African peoples with the AU, facilitating co-operation between parliamentary forums of regional economic communities, and the strengthening of continental solidarity, were also covered by the PAP Protocol.¹⁸ Despite these wide-ranging roles, the powers of the PAP are essentially deliberative and to that extent very limited. This is particularly so as the activities of the Parliament are still subject to the approval and discretion of the Assembly.¹⁹ Whereas it is the norm in democracy for the parliament to supervise the executive arm of government and perform an oversight function, the AU Act turned the table round and made the PAP subject to it. The limited role that the PAP has on economic matters such as NEPAD also reflects the democratic deficit in the AU. Notwithstanding, the AU is still evolving and with much pressure from the civil society groups, it may yet respond to the yearnings of the people by strengthening this important institution. The issue of how members of the Parliament are to be selected or elected has been examined in literature.²⁰

The fact that members are not elected directly and that as soon as their term expires in their country's parliament, they are no longer eligible, is as problematic as it is questionable. It is problematic because such conditionality will definitely affect continuity as well as impinge on the need to have experienced hands in the Parliament. It is our opinion that election into the PAP should be done independently of the national parliaments.

The second important institution through which the AU seeks to incorporate the people in its activities, especially as it relates to democracy and a good-governance agenda, is the establishment of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the Union. It was established by Article 22 to act as an 'advisory organ' to the Constituent Assembly of the organisation. It has 150 members of the civil society organisations within and outside Africa as follows: two civil society organisations (CSOs) from each member state, 10 CSOs from regional level, eight from CSOs that are operating at the continental level, 20 from the Africans in the diaspora and six members to act in an ex-officio capacity.

This last group are nominees of the Commission. While this step is salutary in the effort of the AU to be people friendly as it created a unique opportunity for the CSOs to influence the AU to ensure that its member states comply with their commitments to the organisation, the immanent contradictions in the composition, objectives and modus operandi of the CSOs in Africa may affect the nature of their influence on AU activities. This is against the background of the fact that many CSOs are mere fronts for donor organisations seeking to implement personal or group agendas on the continent. Also, the fact that their activities in the AU are restricted to a mere advisory capacity limits the influence that they might wield on the leaders.

AFRICAN UNION, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

Since the colonial period, African people have struggled to achieve a socio-economic and political structure that can guarantee freedom, peace, justice, political participation and development. This struggle succeeded to some extent as there is currently no country on the continent that is under colonial control. As we noted above, the OAU had this feat as one of its rare success score cards. However, it is paradoxical that most of the people that fought for independence from the colonial masters turned out to be tyrants and dictators over their own people. Rather than working to ensure better lives for the struggling people of Africa, the emergent political leaders lost their self-confidence for assertive development planning and execution in the hubris of the contradiction of slavery and colonialism in their newly

independent status as post-colonial states.²⁰ In a bid to be relevant in the geo-politics of the Cold War era, many African leaders played into the hands of the imperial powers both in the West and in the East.

The imperial powers enthusiastically played African leaders up against one another, thereby causing conflicts, wars and violence which ultimately defined the African landscape in the 1970s and 1990s. Countries such as Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among others, were involved in blood-letting and fratricidal conflicts. Political instability became the order of the day. In this process, the people suffered and still suffer. Preoccupation with survival and self-perpetuation in the office made politics to be played on the principle of a zero-sum game.

One of the pillars on which the Charter of the AU is based is the promotion of democracy.²¹ However, unfolding events since the establishment of the organisation shows that (with few exceptions such as Botswana, post-conflict Mozambique, Mauritius and increasingly Ghana) democracy has become a means of legitimising political leaders that are far removed from the pains and the feelings of their people. Elections on the continent have become what Terry Karl called the 'fallacy of electoralism'. This is because, as the case of Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe showed in 2003, 2007 and 2009 respectively, those elections did not reflect the will of the people. As Manga Fombad argued, 'Most post-1990 elections in Africa appear to have been organised to give some semblance of democratic legitimacy to satisfy internal and external public opinion and reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without actually running the risks of democratic uncertainty'.²²

Added to this is the fact that the type of democracy that African leaders of the 1990s willingly subscribed to, that is, liberal democracy, is not the type that can bring about the development that the people need. It is a market democracy that only caters for the interests of the Transnational Capitalist Class and the African political elites.²³ The good governance mantra that accompany liberal democracy and which the AU and its leaders are 'passionately pursuing' are mere market enhancing, rather than growth enhancing governance. Whereas market-enhancing governance is primarily concerned with the protection of capital and investment, growth-enhancing governance focuses on job creation, social policies and preservation of the environment. Consequently, despite many years of democracy on the continent, Africa continues to lag behind other regions of the world in all indices of development. The high hope that the third wave of democratisation would lead to the second liberation of African people from their internal colonisers has not translated into reality. It is being turned into a mirage.

Many leaders that are signatories to the AU Charter and who appeared to be championing pan-Africanism and African unity were tyrants who brook

no opposition or dissenting voices from their citizens. Many, like Paul Biya of Cameroun, Compaore of Burkina Faso, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Omar Bongo of Gabon and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya (until Mubarak and Gaddafi were deposed in a peoples' revolt and until Bongo's death) have ruled for decades. Paul Biya is still alive and muzzling all voices of dissent and stifling democratic processes. It is therefore not difficult to see that African union continue to validate the result of elections that other election observers (both local and foreign) judged to be below international standards. President Robert Mugabe, who recently called for the re-introduction of the idea of the United States of Africa, has refused to allow a transparent election to be held in his highly impoverished Zimbabwe.

If African leaders acting under the umbrella of the AU have failed to improve the lot of the people on the continent at the political level, the score card of the organisation at the economic dimension does not show any comfort either. Although there are various programmes such as the NEPAD, through which the leaders hope to realise the goal of a continental renaissance and dignity and empowerment for the people of the continent, the contradictions in the conception and implementations of the programme has left it more or less like the previous initiatives taken under the defunct OAU to galvanise development on the continent.

NEPAD was another programme that was launched in 2001 without adequate input from the citizens. As many scholars have argued, it is not materially different from the Bretton Wood Institutions' inspired structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s, which effectively crippled the economies of the countries on the continent. Despite the huge opportunities that African countries can tap from developmental integration, African leaders have only succeeded in paying lip service to integration agenda on the continent. Various deadlines set for achieving integration have been missed and many protocols that could fast-track integration, such as the free movement of people, goods and services, have not been implemented. Paradoxically, African countries trade more with former colonial masters than with other countries on the continent. The benefits that could have accrued to the people in terms of employment, the creation of a continental identity and the development of a stronger voice at international forums are lost. There is a new romance with China, which portends both opportunities and challenges. Despite the impressive economic figures that are emanating from this relationship, there are concerns about the activities of Chinese companies with regard to labour rights of African people as well as environmental issues, especially in the extractive industrial sector, where they have most of their activities. Yet, the AU possibly lost sight of such concern while allowing China to build its new secretariat in Addis Ababa in 2012. In summarising this section, it is our contention that the AU has not acted in the

best interest of the people of Africa; rather, the personal goal and ambition of the respective leaders of the countries have been paramount. For as long as the right kind of democracy has not been adopted in its pristine form, development will be a mirage for the people of Africa.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the AU in its historical and contemporary contexts, especially in relation to how far the organisation has helped to advance the cause of the people of the continent in terms of social, economic and political development. Although the whole idea of pan-Africanism and the promotion of African unity originated from blacks in the diaspora, it was soon taken over by African leaders such Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, immediately after gaining political independence. The chapter contends that though the first pan-African organisation, the OAU succeeded in ending colonialism on the continent, it did little to exert positive influence on the various member countries to pursue people-oriented development. On the contrary, what obtained for the period that the organisation lasted were high incidences of one-man rule, kleptocracy, and primitive accumulation of state resources, as well as high incidences of human-rights abuse. The cumulative effect of the long period of mis-governance has been the high rate of poverty and extensive marginalisation of the continent in the global scheme of things.

The need to solve the problem of poverty and enhance the welfare of the people through participative and inclusive governance, as well as the need to promote African unity in a world that is defined by geo-politics and national interests, necessitated the transformation of the OAU to the AU at the Sirte conference of 2001. The AU Charter promises promotion of democratic governance and economic transformation of the continent. In order to achieve these objectives, various institutions were put in place. The most prominent and relevant to the realization of these objectives are the PAP and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council.

Despite the potential that these institutions have to empower the people of Africa, they are limited by the terms of the AU articles that establish them. Consequently, the interests of the people have not been adequately taken care of. In order to address this problem and ensure that the people occupy a central place in the operation of the AU, we recommend the following:

First, the basic tenets of democracy must be observed so that the people can freely exercise their will to choose their leaders. This will require that democratic institutions, such as political parties, election management

bodies, the judiciary, security and the media are strengthened and oriented towards the preservation of democracy. Impartiality in relating with political gladiators should be the watchword of these institutions. This is necessary to ensure transparency and credibility in the electoral process.

Secondly, there is a need to revisit the type of democracy that is being practised in the various countries. As we have argued above, liberal democracy and development seem to be incompatible with the realities of the African situation. Consequently, social democracy, which pays regards to the cultural and historical circumstances of the people, should be adopted. If this is adopted at the state level, the AU can leverage on its status to ensure that it works for the interests of the people at the continental level.

Thirdly, there is an urgent need to change some of the terms on which the operations of some institutions of the AU, such as the PAP and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council are based. Members of the PAP should be elected directly as it is done in the European Parliament. This will enable them to perform their oversight functions more effectively without fear or favour. The status of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council should not be limited to the current advisory status. Rather, the input from civil society should be made more central to the activities of the AU. Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms should be strengthened to ensure that the various institutions of the AU operate in consonance with the objectives of the organisation.

Fourthly, for the AU to be more people oriented, it must have control over its funding. Depending on donors for funding as it is currently the case will limit the autonomy of this pan-African organisation in policy making and choices to be made in the interest of the people.

Lastly, there is a need to focus more attention on realising the continental integration as agreed in 1991. We recommend a new thinking on the integration agenda of the continent. Rather than following the euro-centric market approach to integration, a developmental approach which incorporates infrastructural, cultural, social and industrial integration of the continent should be vigorously pursued.

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The Economic Partnership Agreements and the Role of SADC in the African Economic Community

Are they Mutually Exclusive?

Marumo Nkomo

INTRODUCTION

Regional integration is of great importance in the African context. It is seen as a rational response to the difficulties faced by a continent with many small national markets and landlocked countries.¹ Indeed, 47 nations in sub-Saharan Africa are defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as least developed countries (LDCs), while 12 have a population of less than 2 million – and per capita income levels in the region are among the lowest in the world.² It is little wonder then that African governments are pursuing many economic integration initiatives to address these economic challenges. Perhaps the broadest and most ambitious being the African Economic Community (AEC).

The African Union (AU) and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community of 1991 (Abuja Treaty) recognise the Southern African Development Community (SADC), along with seven other regional trading blocs, as building blocks for the AEC.³ SADC, the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) have agreed to form a tripartite free trade area (TFTA), which is outside the scope of the Abuja Treaty, but in line with the underlying objectives of that instrument, in particular, strengthening regional economic integration on the continent.

Against this backdrop, the European Union (EU), on the one hand, and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, on the other, concluded the Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 2000 (CPA). This agreement was necessary to bring the trading regime in operation between the EU and former colonies in line with legal obligations in certain World Trade Organization (WTO) treaties.

The CPA mandates the negotiation of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) between ACP countries and the EU. For the purposes of EPA

negotiations, the participating African countries have been divided into sub-groupings or configurations. For various reasons, which the chapter will explore, these configurations have been criticised as having the potential to derail existing regional integration efforts on the continent. This is despite the wording of the CPA, which states that the 'negotiations of the EPAs will be undertaken with ACP countries which consider themselves in a position to do so, taking into account regional integration processes within the ACP'.⁴

This chapter examines the objectives of the Abuja Treaty and analyses whether or not the EPA negotiations have to date been supportive of the Treaty's objectives. Where shortcomings are identified, solutions are proposed. The chapter is structured as follows:

Part 1: This section introduces the regional integration approach adopted by the AU. Salient features of the Abuja Treaty are described, focusing particularly on aspects that seek to consolidate existing regional integration efforts on the continent. This will be done with a specific emphasis on SADC.

Part 2: This section gives the history and background to trade relations between the EU and SADC countries. The discussion is placed in the context of the WTO law relevant to this relationship and explains the necessity of negotiating the CPA.

Part 3: This is the major substantive portion of the chapter, commencing with a comparison of the underlying objectives of the Abuja Treaty and the CPA. This will be followed by an analysis of pertinent issues in SADC-EPA negotiations, the aim being to determine whether or not implementation of the CPA has been supportive of the Abuja Treaty and the creation of an AEC.

Conclusion: In the final section of the chapter, conclusions are drawn and recommendations proposed.

1. REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA – WHERE DOES SADC FIT IN?

This section of the chapter will set out the framework that is being used in Africa's pursuit of economic integration. The approach adopted by the AU will be unpacked and the specific role of SADC honed in on.

The AU is following the linear model of regional economic integration.⁵ This form of integration seeks the elimination of barriers to trade among states, so as to widen the market space for goods produced in the territories involved.⁶ The linear model is characterised by evolution in stages through progressively deeper forms of economic relations among contracting states. These are: a free trade agreement (FTA),⁷ a customs union,⁸ a common market,⁹ a monetary union,¹⁰ and finally, a political union.¹¹

Another model of economic integration, espoused by economists such as Ostergaard, is neo-functionalism.¹² In the neo-functional model, international co-operation is based on co-operation in areas of interest to the region, like trade, transport, security and communication. Progress in co-operation is pushed by interest groups, most significantly the private sector. This model entails a sector by sector approach to co-operation and assumes the alienation of economics from politics.¹³ It is submitted that this form of integration could bring much benefit to Africa, given the continent's specific sectoral challenges, such as transport and infrastructure. Regrettably, however, private actors have, to date, not taken a leading role in regional integration on the continent.¹⁴ This responsibility has fallen on governments that, as will be explained below, have been ineffective in their attempts to achieve this end.

The Abuja Treaty came into force in May 1994. It was preceded by the Lagos Plan of Action, The Final Act of Lagos and the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity of 1963 (OAU Charter).¹⁵ The Abuja Treaty sets out the roadmap for integration under the linear model. It lists key principles, such as inter-state co-operation and harmonisation of policies and integration programmes.¹⁶ The most salient objectives of the Abuja Treaty include the integration of African economies and the co-ordination of policies among existing and future economic communities in order to foster the gradual establishment of the AEC.¹⁷

The modalities for operationalising these principles and objectives are laid out in Article 6. According to this provision, co-operation between member states is to evolve from an FTA to a monetary and economic union in six phases, culminating in the establishment of the AEC. These phases are to be implemented over a transitional period that should not exceed a cumulative period of 40 years.¹⁸

Advancement through the six phases of linear progression outlined in Article 6 is dependent on the strengthening of existing regional economic communities (RECs) as a cornerstone for regional integration and establishment of the AEC.¹⁹ To this end, the Treaty enjoins member states to refrain from any unilateral action that may hinder the attainment of the said objectives.²⁰ It also obliges member states to promote the co-ordination and harmonisation of the integration activities of RECs of which they are members with the activities of the Community.²¹

SADC is one of the existing RECs recognised as a building block for the AEC and it will be the focus of this chapter.²² The southern African assemblage provides an excellent case study, as it encapsulates much of the ambitious strategy (yet flawed implementation) that has characterised regional integration efforts in Africa. This is evident in both south-south and north-south relations that the bloc has entered into.

SADC was preceded by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which was established in 1980 following adoption of the Lusaka Declaration. This organisation was different to SADC in that its main aim was to reduce dependence on Apartheid South Africa; whereas the present day institution seeks to harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of member states.²³

Where economic integration is concerned, the SADC Protocol on Trade seeks the liberalisation of intra-regional trade in goods and services on the basis of fair, mutual, equitable and beneficial trade arrangements and the establishment of an FTA in the SADC region.²⁴

The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) is an important policy document developed by SADC. It builds on the Trade Protocol by providing strategic direction to the plans and objectives laid out therein.²⁵ The document is indicative in nature, meaning it is not legally binding. The RISDP sets out a timetable for market integration through the following progressive stages: an FTA to be established by 2008; a customs union by 2010; a common market by 2015; an economic community with a central bank by 2016; and the development of a common currency by 2018.²⁶ The SADC Summit²⁷ commissioned a study in 2011 to monitor progress made on trade liberalisation in the region and identify the challenges being met.²⁸

According to the key findings of the study, much progress has been made with implementation of the set targets, the most significant being the establishment of the FTA in 2008, when 85 per cent of flow of trade in goods within the region attained duty free status.²⁹ A total of 12 members are currently participating in the FTA³⁰. The phasing down of tariffs on sensitive products is yet to be attained though.

A customs union was to be launched in 2010; however, this did not take place. It will not be possible to conclude the customs union (and so proceed to the next phase of linear progression, as envisaged in the RISDP and mandated by the Abuja Treaty) until various challenges are addressed. The challenges facing regional integration in SADC are three-dimensional: historical, legal and implementation related.³¹

The historical challenges are rooted in the inability or unwillingness of states to cede sovereignty to a supra-national body. This is a particularly acute issue in Africa where, until comparatively recently, most states lacked the right to self-determination. Surrendering it so soon after independence is a complex issue. The RISDP provides a roadmap for integration; however, it is merely indicative. Sovereignty stands in the way of integration, with member states often undertaking obligations that remain unfulfilled. National priorities have tended to take precedence over regional ones. There is a need to align national policies with those of the region.

This national versus regional tension is illustrated, *inter alia*, by the difficulty being experienced in harmonising the customs policies of member states. This is one of the problems that sovereignty brings, as member states would each like to determine what policies work for their respective countries. The adoption of a single tariff nomenclature would require a willingness to reduce national industrial policy space on the part of members.³²

The wording of the SADC Treaty appears to exacerbate the inherent tension between sovereignty and deference to a supra-national authority. 'Upholding sovereignty of member States' is one of the underlying principles of the Treaty.³³ This creates a conflict between the underlying principles of the Treaty and implementation of the obligations it sets out.

As far as the legal-related obstacles are concerned, some of the provisions in constitutive instruments are ambiguous. The SADC Treaty does not preclude states from entering into new trade agreements with third parties. One of the impacts of this particular ambiguity has been overlapping membership in RECs by SADC member states. This is a well known issue and has been dubbed by leading economist, Jagdish Bhagwati, as the 'spaghetti bowl' effect to describe how a number of SADC members are party to other regional groupings, with their own and sometimes conflicting obligations.³⁴

Bhagwati argues that the multiple regional and bilateral trade agreements are a stumbling block, rather than a building block, as they complicate trade procedures, resulting in higher cost of transactions.³⁵ More tellingly, though, in the context of the current discourse, overlapping membership complicates the attainment of a customs union. Countries with membership of both SADC and COMESA are an example, as the respective RECs have different schedules for the phasing down of tariffs.³⁶ Moreover, the need to co-ordinate the common external tariff to be applied by the regional trading blocs will assume great importance. While COMESA and EAC have undertaken to do so, the practical application of this accord will be crucial.³⁷ SADC will need to follow suit if the region is to advance linear progression. The spaghetti bowl effect, and in particular its manifestation in EPA negotiations, will be discussed at length in Part 3.

Another legal issue is the indicative, unenforceable nature of the RISDP. A customs union was initially set to be established in 2010, but member states failed to bring this to fruition. The failure of individual member states to meet their respective commitments stunts the progression of economic integration of the region as a whole. For instance, some countries still lag behind with implementation of their liberalisation commitments, despite the launch of the FTA. Malawi is one example: the country is still phasing down its tariff barriers and is currently at the level it committed to achieving by 2004.³⁸ Tanzania is still applying tariffs on sugar and paper

products, which it intends to continue with until 2015; and Zimbabwe was given leeway to extend its phase down period until 2014.³⁹

The nature of market integration requires full implementation of one stage in order to trigger the move to the next stage.⁴⁰ Therefore, the customs union can only be launched when the FTA is fully implemented by all member states participating in it. The unenforceable nature of commitments under the RISDP is thus a stumbling block. Another challenge to the attainment of a SADC customs union comes about due to the existence of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) within the SADC region.⁴¹ Since SACU already applies a pre-existing CET, there will have to be a high level of co-ordination with SADC member states that are not party to SACU.⁴² On the one hand, this could prove advantageous, since the SACU CET could serve as a starting point for the formulation of the SADC CET, not to mention the existing experience and institutional knowledge at SACU. However, the curtailment of their flexibility in formulating customs policies could sour relations with SADC members that are not privy to SACU.

Regarding the formulation of the CET, the summit will need to decide whether the CET should be prohibitive of imports, in order to protect the region from foreign competition, or low enough to help make local industries more competitive, in order to facilitate the integration of the region into the global economy.⁴³ This has always been a difficult issue for SACU to contend with, particularly where the revenue sharing formula is concerned. South Africa seeks greater global competitiveness, while the BLNS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) favour a higher CET in order to receive greater revenue. This tension played itself out recently during negotiation of the preferential trade agreement between SACU and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR).⁴⁴ The addition of more countries, with divergent policy objectives, under the SADC formation will be even more challenging.

Trade relations with countries from outside the region raise another complication in the progression towards market integration. This relates to both south-south relationships and north-south relationships. Regarding south-south relationships, the spaghetti bowl effect mentioned above is problematic.

In an attempt to resolve the issue of multiplicity of membership of RECs, the organisations COMESA, EAC and SADC resolved to merge and form a T-FTA that will eventually lead to the formation of a customs union;⁴⁵ negotiations are still underway. A T-FTA is not provided for in the Abuja Treaty, but, in principal, it undoubtedly holds great potential to facilitate the attainment of the AEC.

The north-south relations dynamic involves the Trade and Development Co-operation Agreement of 1999 (TDCA) between South Africa and the EU

and, more crucially, the negotiation of EPAs between ACP configurations in Africa and the EU.

As far as the TDCA goes, the concern is the unilateral granting of concessions by South Africa, which could have major implications (from a CET perspective) for her SACU partners, as well as SADC, when the region becomes a customs union. This is most likely inconsistent with Article 5(1) of the Abuja Treaty, which requires that members refrain from any unilateral action that may hinder the attainment of the Treaty's objectives. Operation of the TDCA is set to intensify following the very recent resolution of disputes between South Africa and the EU regarding European export subsidies for cheese products.⁴⁶

With regard to EPAs, this chapter is concerned with the impact that the configuration of negotiating groups is likely to have on the strengthening of RECs, called for by the Abuja Treaty. SADC is particularly affected by this issue, as will be explained in Part 3.

2. THE EU-SADC PREFERENTIAL TRADE REGIME

Trade relations between the EU and Africa have a long history. Long before the EU was created as a way of facilitating peace in Europe, countries from that continent were trading with African states. Trade between the two continents pre-dates the colonial era and continues to date.

This relationship has come under tremendous scrutiny since the advent of the multilateral trading system, which has necessitated transformation in how preferential trade is conducted between Europe and Africa. This section briefly describes the genesis of post-war trade relations between Europe and her former colonies, and explains the need for alterations to be made in order to conform to the norms of the global trading regime.

FROM YAOUNDÉ TO LOMÉ

In 1957 the European Common Market was established under the Treaty of Rome. Although the objective of the Treaty was to eventually establish a common market among European countries,⁴⁷ Part IV was added to form the legal basis for the granting of preferential treatment to imports from former colonies. The EU-ACP trade relationship has since been regulated by several international instruments, from the Yaoundé conventions to the CPA.

The Yaoundé Agreements preceded the Lomé Conventions and were aimed at fostering economic co-operation between the European Common Market and the Associated African and Malgache Countries (EAMA).⁴⁸ These Agreements created a trade regime that granted goods from former European

colonies preferential market access to the European market.⁴⁹ Britain joining the European Economic Community led to the signing of the first Lomé Convention in 1975 between the Community and ACP states.

The Lomé Conventions span Lomé I to Lomé IV and incorporated trade as a tool for development.⁵⁰ Under these conventions, trade preferences were given to imports of bananas, sugar, beef and veal from the ACP countries. After Lomé IV, the Protocol on bananas and sugar entered into force and ensured duty-free entry of imports of bananas from some ACP countries.⁵¹

The EU continued with the system of unilateral preferential treatment of ACP states under the Lomé Convention until the *EC Bananas* case, when the trade relationship came under scrutiny at the dispute settlement body of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT).

GATT/WTO CONSIDERATIONS – THE NEED FOR THE CPA

The most favoured nation (MFN) doctrine is one of the most important principles of the multilateral trading system. It permeates the major agreements of the WTO and its forebear, the GATT. Article I of the GATT provides broadly that any trade concessions granted by a GATT contracting party must be immediately and unconditionally extended to all contracting parties.

There are, however, certain derogations from MFN that are permitted by the GATT. One of them is Article XXIV, which is necessary to cloak RECs in legality, as they necessarily entail members granting each other treatment that is more favourable than what they afford third parties. Another important derogation is special and differential treatment (S&DT), in terms of which it is recognised by contracting parties, *inter alia*, that developing countries and, in particular, the least developed among them, require flexibility with regard to the implementation of their obligations.

S&DT became fully operational in the operations of the GATT when the contracting parties adopted the 1979 Tokyo Round Decision, which has become known as the 'Enabling Clause'.⁵²

The trading regime under the Lomé Agreements, however, was held by a GATT Panel to not fall within the permissible exceptions to the MFN doctrine in the GATT or the Enabling Clause;⁵³ it could therefore not be justified by those provisions. The stumbling blocks identified by the panel were that the Lomé Convention gave preferential market access to ACP countries over and above what was provided to other developing countries pursuant to the GSP and did not require reciprocity in the granting of preferential market access to products from the ACP states.⁵⁴

The EC then sought a waiver of obligations under the GATT to allow the continued granting of preferences to the ACP States. The waiver was granted in 1994 and was to expire in 2000.⁵⁵ The parties to the Lomé Conventions

sought to make their relationship WTO compliant and this resulted in the signing of the CPA in 2000. The EPAs are currently being negotiated under the aegis of the CPA. Part 3 will analyse salient features to determine whether or not the EPAs are supportive of the regional integration process under SADC and, in turn, the Abuja Treaty.

3. DO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CPA COMPLEMENT THE SADC TREATY?

The SADC Treaty is an important constitutive document when it comes to regional economic integration in Africa. It provides the mandate for the integration of Southern African economies in conformity with the Abuja Treaty. The CPA, on the other hand, forms the basis of the EPA negotiations. This portion of the chapter will compare the underlying objectives of the constitutive documents, in order to determine whether or not they are compatible. This will be followed by an analysis of key implementation issues that have emerged during the EPA negotiations. This will be done with the aim of identifying barriers to the compatibility of the AU and EU-ACP processes.

The ultimate objective of the CPA is that of poverty eradication in the ACP states and their integration into the global economy.⁵⁶ Having said this, the agreement was concluded primarily to bring the EU-ACP preferential trading regime into conformity with the multilateral trading system. Hence, the need to conform to WTO norms features prominently throughout the CPA.⁵⁷

The SADC treaty and, in particular, the common agenda, which is found in Article 5, seeks to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development, with the ultimate objective of poverty eradication in SADC. In the context of regional economic integration, it seeks, *inter alia*, to: develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the peoples of the region;⁵⁸ improve economic management and performance through regional co-operation;⁵⁹ promote the co-ordination and harmonisation of the international relations of member states.⁶⁰

The RISDP builds on the SADC Treaty and Trade Protocol, calling for co-operation and harmonisation of trade policies through market integration.

The objectives of the CPA and the constitutive documents for regional economic integration in SADC are complementary. They have the same ultimate goal of poverty eradication in the region and the eventual integration of the region into the global economy. Article 35 of the CPA emphasises the importance of existing regional integration initiatives of its ACP partners as instruments for the inclusion of the ACP states into the world economy,

stating: 'Economic and trade co-operation shall build on regional integration initiatives of ACP States'.⁶¹

Despite the complementary features that the underlying aims of the respective constituent documents share, it is questionable whether the CPA parties embraced the same understanding of how integration should be implemented. SADC prioritises economic integration of member states through linear progression; while under the CPA, economic and trade co-operation is implemented through the EPAs. Some key issues where EPA negotiations have been at odds with the existing integration efforts of SADC are discussed below.

Before these issues can be addressed, it is necessary to briefly give some background information on the participation of SADC in the EPA negotiations.

As mentioned above, the CPA was signed in 2000. It has since undergone two substantive revisions, pursuant to Article 95.⁶² The CPA designates ACP member states as parties to the EPAs⁶³, which are being negotiated in regional groupings, although ratification will be on a bilateral basis between the EU and each contracting party.⁶⁴

There is currently an Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPA) in place, which creates an FTA between the EU and SADC.⁶⁵ The FTA aims to progressively liberalise trade between the EU and the REC on a reciprocal basis, utilising the principle of asymmetry commensurate with the specific needs and capacity of the individual SADC countries involved.⁶⁶

The IEPA will eventually be replaced by a full EPA. This is in line with Article XXIV(5) of the GATT, which provides for interim agreements necessary for the formation of FTAs or customs unions. Negotiation of full EPAs between the EU and ACP countries, which will constitute FTAs under WTO law, is ongoing and the deadline of 1 January 2014 (for completion of negotiations) was recently extended to 2016.⁶⁷ With the exception of South Africa (which benefits from the TDCA) and LDC members of SADC (which benefit from the 'everything but arms' (EBA) initiative),⁶⁸ the conclusion of EPAs is imperative for SADC countries. This is because, in the absence of a WTO consistent replacement to the Lomé regime, ACP countries will need to compete with much more efficient developing countries for access to the European market under equal conditions.⁶⁹

Due to overlapping membership of RECs in Africa, these groupings could not be used as negotiating forums for the EPAs.⁷⁰ Therefore, the 15 SADC member states are not negotiating the EPAs as one block. Only seven members are negotiating an EPA under the SADC EPA group. These countries are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa.⁷¹ The other eight SADC member states (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania,⁷² Zambia

and Zimbabwe) are negotiating in other regional EPA configurations. The configuration of the EPA negotiating groups raises serious questions where compatibility with the market integration being pursued by SADC is concerned. It is among the issues that affected the progression of the SADC FTA to a customs union in 2010.⁷³ The initialling of the IEPAs is not problematic *per se*: the difficulty lies in the implementation of the IEPA in light of regional integration. The remainder of Part 3 will analyse some of the issues that have been identified as most contentious by negotiators and in the scholarly literature.

LACK OF UNIFORMITY IN LIBERALISATION COMMITMENTS

A uniform external tariff is required in order for an FTA to make the progression to a customs union. However, liberalisation of tariff barriers to EU imports under the SADC-IEPA does not reflect this reality. The IEPA calls for BNLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) to liberalise 86 per cent of EU imports between 2008 and 2012. This timeframe corresponds with South Africa's liberalisation commitments under the TDCA; but this is not so in the case of Mozambique, which must liberalise 80.5 per cent of imports from the EU by 2023.⁷⁴ So even within the SADC-EPA configuration, there are uneven liberalisation commitments. South Africa's position is even more complicated.

Lack of homogeny in liberalisation commitments is even more evident when one considers SADC countries that are negotiating EPAs outside the SADC-EPA configuration. Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe are negotiating EPAs as part of the ESA configuration, notwithstanding their SADC membership. The ESA group has been given until 2022 to liberalise their tariffs – substantially longer than the four years afforded to SADC – and there is a lack of coherence in the group's liberalisation schedules.⁷⁵ The same incoherence applies to the CEMAC-EPA, under which the DRC is negotiating.⁷⁶ The IEPA calls for 80 per cent of tariffs on EU exports to be liberalised. Only the EAC configuration, to which Tanzania is privy, applies identical liberalisation schedules, although the items excluded from liberalisation differ.

Lack of coherence in liberalisation schedules and exclusion baskets will prolong the process of formulating the CET necessary for the progression of SADC to a customs union. This is exacerbated by the reality that most SADC countries are negotiating EPAs in other configurations, with contrasting liberalisation commitments and obligations. Tariffs applicable to goods emanating from the EU must be aligned to those applied to all other imports, thereby delaying the tariff harmonisation process and retarding the progression of regional integration.

Such considerations have led a number of commentators to conclude that the SADC customs union is a casualty of the EPAs.⁷⁷ However, this ignores the reality that overlapping memberships in RECs, with incoherent liberalisation commitments and obligations, was a serious hindrance to linear progression of regional integration in SADC long before EPA negotiations were initiated. In fact, EPA negotiations have forced SADC member states to think strategically about their membership for the first time – resulting, for example, in Tanzania withdrawing from the SADC-EPA configuration after assessing the pros and cons. The ability of EPAs to induce this kind of constructive engagement could yet aide, rather than hinder, the regional economic integration efforts of SADC.

POLICY SPACE RESTRICTIONS

The EPAs have been criticised for taking a neo-liberalist approach that seeks to sustain neo-colonialism or bring in new dimensions of imperialism and ‘lock in’ neo-liberalism within SADC.⁷⁸ Neo-liberalism calls for minimal state intervention in the economy.⁷⁹ This is being done through a reduction of the policy space available to member states to implement policies that they deem appropriate.⁸⁰ Two provisions in the EPAs are most relevant in this context; these are ‘the MFN clause’ and the ‘standstill clause’.

An MFN clause is present in all IEPAs to which SADC member states are privy. These provisions require that any concessions made to third countries that are major trading economies, pursuant to an FTA, be extended to the EC. A major trading economy is defined as any developed country or any country accounting for more than 1 per cent of world merchandise exports or any group of countries accounting for more than 1.5 per cent of world merchandise exports.

The MFN clause also gives parties the right to request consultation with the EC if they can demonstrate that they have received a concession from a third party that is not offered by the EC. In the SADC EPA, this applies where the party has received more favourable treatment from any third party. Where the CEMAC instrument is concerned, it only applies where the third party is a major trading economy. The ESA-EPA excludes the application of the MFN clause where trade agreements with other African countries are concerned; while the EAC instrument adds the Caribbean and Pacific groups to this exclusion.

The MFN clauses could potentially restrict the ability of SADC countries to enter into preferential trade agreements with major trading economies besides the EU, since the benefits that the third country would receive are likely to be eroded by the obligation (in the EPAs) to extend any concessions granted to the EC. This could have negative implications for intra-SADC

economic integration, as South Africa, which is negotiating under the SADC-EPA configuration, but is not a signatory to the IEPA, could be tempted to move alone in concluding preferential trade agreements with major trading nations such as India. The southern African hegemon has the flexibility to do so, since the TDCA does not have an equivalent to the MFN clause in the SADC-EPA.

The standstill clause is the other provision with the potential to restrict policy space available to SADC member states. It provides that no new customs duties may be introduced in trade between SADC-EPA states and the EC, and that those already in existence may not be increased. It is feared that this provision will exacerbate the deduction of tariff revenue received by SADC countries as a result of the reciprocal nature of liberalisation required by the new preferential trade regime.

Operating on the basis of this view, however, would raise questions about the commitment of member states to liberalisation and gradual integration into the global economy. Increasing trade barriers, as opposed to reducing them, is contrary to professed ideals of seeking enhanced global competitiveness.⁸¹ Having said this, it is important (from a developmental perspective) to allow for the protection of infant industries where necessary. The EPAs do provide for this, while the SADC and ESA configurations are currently negotiating strengthened infant industry protection provisions, in the form of safeguard measures.⁸²

CONCLUSION

The EPAs must be concluded if developing country SADC members are to retain their preferential access to the EU. The negotiation of these instruments takes place against the backdrop of existing regional economic integration efforts in Africa that are aimed at the eventual establishment of an AEC.

On the face of it, a number of challenges are presented by the EPAs; lack of uniformity in liberalisation commitments and a reduction in policy space are among the most pressing. The fact of the matter, however, is that overlapping membership, disharmony in trade policies and the like were not created by the EPAs. Regional integration efforts in Africa have long been characterised by these phenomena. Channelled correctly, the EPAs could potentially result in a more strategic and co-ordinated approach to the assumption of liberalisation commitments by SADC member states.

As far as the reduction in policy space is concerned, it is unclear how raising tariff barriers would contribute to regional integration and, as such, criticisms of the standstill clause appear somewhat fanciful. MFN

provisions, however, are potentially damaging to the ability of SADC countries to enter into FTAs with third countries.

Linear progression or any type of regional integration requires serious commitment by member states and, to a certain degree, the willingness to cede sovereignty. The effect of EPAs on regional integration in SADC, to a large extent, will depend on implementation by member states.

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- 9 A common market builds on the previous two stages by introducing the free movement of factors of production, such as labour and capital.
- 10 Here, a single currency, or different currencies having a fixed mutual exchange rate, are monitored and controlled by one central bank or a co-ordinated collective of central banks.
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Economic Partnership Agreements

Another Tool for the Scramble for Africa
or a Viable Undertaking for the Continent's Development?

Serges Djoyou Kamga

INTRODUCTION

The European Union's (EU) trading arrangements with African and Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries have traditionally been informed by numerous treaties,¹ which, though at the margin of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) regime, permit unilateral preferences to ACP countries in the EU market. However, since 2002, the debate on the establishment of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and ACP countries was followed by their inclusion in the world trading system. According to these agreements, new trading relations will be informed by reciprocal preferences between the parties. Though compatible with the WTO regime, the EPAs raise questions on the extent to which they can be a solution to Africa's development challenges.

The aim of this chapter is to critically examine the impact of EPAs on Africa's development. The chapter argues that EPAs constitute a roadblock for the continent's development, because they hinder the prospects of development through trade; undermine equal partnership between Africa and the West; and hinder regional integration on the continent. In making its case, the chapter starts with a brief overview of EPAs. Secondly, it examines the extent to which EPAs support the pillars of development of the continent, that is, (fair) trade, equal partnership and regional integration. Finally, the chapter provides concluding remarks.

THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS: AN OVERVIEW

In a nutshell, in aligning EU and ACP trade relations with the WTO regime, EPAs aim to ensure market access for ACP countries (on a reciprocal basis); foster trade and development; and ensure regional integration and

development co-operation. Although in these agreements both partners will open up their markets, ACP countries should be allowed to open theirs progressively and at their own pace.

Furthermore, not only does the flexibility of EPAs enable ACP countries to protect their vital products (for example agricultural products), it also allows the EU and ACP countries to protect 'infant industries' or growing industries from competition. From this perspective, ACP countries would be empowered to restore protectionism in these industries when necessary.²

In addition, in terms of services, investment, and intellectual property, EPAs aim to provide a conducive environment for foreign investment and facilitate integration into the regional and global economy.

However, due to the complexity and disagreement of parties on issues such as export tax, free circulation of goods, regional preferences, rules of origin and others, EPAs could not be finalised by 2007 nor come into force in 2008, as initially planned. Nevertheless, in ACP regions where the agreement was not signed, interim EPAs have been adopted 'to safeguard preferences and move forward with talks'³ on finalising the main agreement.

As of December 2012, the EU was either in the process of or has already signed interim full EPAs with 36 countries out of a total of 77 ACP countries. The other 31 are Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and therefore benefit from free access to the EU market, without having to reciprocate under the EU's 'Everything but Arms' provisions. It is also important to note that the EU is in discussions with ACP countries in six different regional blocs, but, in a number of cases, interim EPAs have been signed by individual countries to protect their market access.

The next section addresses the vital question under investigation, that is, the extent to which an EPA is the solution for Africa's developmental problems.

ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS AND AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT

In examining the prospects for Africa's development through EPAs, the chapter assesses the extent to which these agreements foster the pillars of the continent's development, which revolve around (fair) trade, 'true' partnership between Africa and the West, and regional integration.

ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS AND TRADE

An investigation into EPAs and trade for the continent's development should start by looking back at the reason why ACP agreements provided for preferential treatment for ACP countries in the first place. In fact, after

their independence in the 1960s and 1970s, African countries claimed the establishment of the New International Economic Order, in which fair trade would be conducive to their development.⁴ In addressing this question, the European Commission (EC) decided to make temporary arrangements, which provided free access to its market to developing countries. Although this was a violation of article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),⁵ these arrangements were fair and found their way into ACP agreements. Under the EU-ACP agreements, ACP countries had free access to EU markets and had the right to protect their producers from subsidised EU exporters. This agreement was informed by the need to provide a framework for the development of ACP countries. Nevertheless, most of these countries – and those in Africa in particular – are still the poorest in the world. It is therefore submitted that revision of the ACP agreements happened too early. There was a strong need to renew the agreements to enable developing and African countries (in particular) to reach an acceptable level of development.

Nevertheless, architects of EPAs portray the new plan as the solution to the continent's development challenge. However, as indicated above, EPAs remove preferential rules of trade for African countries. This will arguably have a devastating effect, because rich and powerful countries from the EU will trade on an 'equal' footing with small and fragile developing countries.⁶ For instance, France will trade on an equal footing with Lesotho. EPAs expect both partners to open their markets equally to each other, as if they were at the same level of development. Developing countries and African countries, in particular, do not have the capacity to face heavy competition from an EU that subsidises its farmers. Furthermore, free trade between the parties will not change the situation in many African countries. In this regard, research shows, for example, that EPAs 'will not meaningfully improve access to the EU market for Ghana's exporters'.⁷

Moreover, notwithstanding the 'infant industry clause', which protects young industries in ACP countries, if these countries open up their markets to EU exporters, they will be bombarded with manufactured goods and this will hinder industrialisation of the developing world (in general) and Africa (in particular). The former president of Botswana, Festus Mogae, stated, 'We fear that our economies will not be able to withstand the pressure associated with liberalisation'.⁸ Opening Africa's markets will expose African traders to heavy competition from European goods. In addition, as correctly noted by Patel (in his analysis of Ghana and EPAs), African farmers would be 'adversely affected by cheaper and (often heavily subsidised) EU agricultural exports'.⁹

Though it could be argued that the aim of EPAs is to harmonise the integration of ACP countries in the world economy, it is important to note

that pushing for free trade between Europeans and ACP countries will swallow custom revenues, which are the main source of government income in Africa. For example, a country like Uganda that relies on its trade taxes, which represent 48 per cent of its total revenue,¹⁰ would not be able to operate, even if some revenues were still collected from some EU imports¹¹ to Uganda, or even if Uganda obtained tariff revenues on other third country imports, as proponents of EPAs would suggest. The mere reduction of what was collected previously will be problematic for the state. A similar analysis applies to Tanzania, which would lose up to 32.5 million US dollars annually due to tariff elimination. The increase in imports would lead to tariff losses of about 62.4 million US dollars¹² when the EPA is fully operational – almost 90 per cent of Tanzania's tariffs will be on EU imports.¹³

This important loss of revenue will hinder the ability of Tanzania and other African countries to keep domestic production of export goods going,¹⁴ and will constrain these countries' ability to finance their budgets. Ultimately, African countries will not be able to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Koffi Anan, the former UN Secretary General, argues that EPAs will jeopardise Africa's ability to realise the MDGs. He notes:

A major concern is the impact that the trade liberalisation to be wrought by EPAs would have on fiscal revenue. The prospect of falling government revenue imposes a heavy burden on your countries and threatens to further hinder your ability to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.¹⁵

However, the architects of EPAs argue that the EU will provide adjustment costs through the European Development Fund (EDF), which was a practice in assisting ACP countries to cover health care, education and other infrastructural expenses, and which was disbursed in five-year cycles. In 2006, the EU committed itself to increase the amount under the EDF funding cycle (2008-13) to 22.7 billion Euros.¹⁶

Nevertheless, as Oxfam rightly pointed out, instead of using the EDF to fund development costs (education and health care), most of the money would be used to fine-tune to EPA arrangements.¹⁷ This is not strengthening ACP countries. Moreover, the EDF is not always delivered fully or timeously. For example, in the 1995-2000 five-year cycle, 14.6 billion Euros were promised, but the first payment was made in the third year, and by the end of the cycle only 20 per cent of the money had been paid out. In a similar vein, in the 2001-2006 cycle, from the 15 billion Euros in aid promised to ACP countries, only 28 per cent was paid out by the end of the cycle.¹⁸ Consequently, it could be claimed that the funds to be paid in terms of EPAs adjustment will never be a substitute for tax revenues. In fact, the situation

is catastrophic, because the EU recently decided that African countries will not be allocated EDF funding for the 2008-2013 cycle, which was the vital period when support is needed for EPA implementation.¹⁹

In spite of numerous concerns about the viability of binding agreements on investment in EPAs for Africa's trade, proponents of EPAs are of the view that these agreements will bring in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Nonetheless, there is no proof that investment agreements are the solution to attract FDI. The latter is generally linked to a broad conducive environment, comprising of respect for the rule of law and good governance (amongst other things). According to Patel, binding agreements on investment, competition and government procurement, under EPAs, could actually be detrimental to African governments' 'ability to regulate key sectors for development reasons'.²⁰ Therefore, the focus of African governments should be to improve their ability to deal with competition in trade related matters in these agreements.²¹

All in all, in spite of the rhetoric on the need to ensure that an EPA 'does not take precedence over the overall aim of sustainable development',²² the reality is that the thrust of EPAs is to ensure compatibility with article 24 of GATT, which is far from being the solution for Africa's development at present. Zenawi, the former Ethiopian Prime Minister, observes:²³

We in the ACP are concerned that while the process made so far with respect to the EPA negotiations may be compatible with WTO rules, they are not adequately compatible with our development needs. We need to address those concerns in a spirit of understanding of each other's interests and accommodation.

In fact, it could be argued that EPAs do nothing to ensure that ACP countries develop through trade, but provide a new institutional framework to secure trade domination by European countries. Therefore, it is submitted that, far from empowering Africa, trade, as described under EPAs, is another tool for the scramble for the continent. According to Benjamin Mkapa, the former President of Tanzania, an EPA is like 'a poisoned chalice and the second scramble for Africa that ought to be rejected'.²⁴ These agreements are another instrument to ensure the economic hegemony of European countries. This is demonstrated by the asymmetric character of the partnership using EPAs.

ASYMMETRIC PARTNERSHIP IN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS

Originally, the concept of partnership came from the radical solidarity movement of the 1960s and 1970s that was based in Latin America.²⁵ This movement argued that 'international solidarity lay at the heart of

development ideology'.²⁶ Accordingly, partnership is informed by the principle of equality between states and mutual commitment, shared responsibility and the equitable sharing of benefits. According to Chowdbury and De Waart, partnership is based on the 'principle of equality'²⁷ between states. They state that:

[t]he principle of equality (substantive and participatory) intends to bring about a just balance between the diverging and converging interests, particularly between the developed and developing countries ... since all states are legally equal, they have the right to participate fully and effectively in the international decision-making process for the solution of the economic, financial and monetary problems as a matter of participatory equality.²⁸

The significance of partnership for Africa's development is underscored by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) that stands for equality between partners.²⁹ However, partnership in EPAs has a different characteristic. Research shows a worrying imbalance of trade between ACP countries and the EU. In this regard, less than 2.5 per cent of EU imports are from ACP countries, with most of them coming from the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) group, which alone covers half the EU's total imports from the entire region.³⁰ Meanwhile, almost 30 per cent of all ACP countries' exports enter the EU.³¹ More importantly, some African groupings' exports to the EU are more significant. For instance, Central Africa (ECCAS) exports almost 38 per cent of its goods to the EU.³²

Furthermore, not only do ACP countries export to the EU, but they also import from it. Hence, while 28 per cent of all ACP countries' goods originate from the EU, 53.5 per cent of EU products go to ECCAS, and 37 per cent to ECOWAS.³³ This dependence by ACP countries – and African countries in particular – is telling in terms of which partner benefits more from import tax revenue. In summarising the impact of EU goods free of charge in Africa, Bacar Dia, the former Senegalese Minister of Information says, 'When we are asked to open our borders to allow in products from the north without any customs barriers, without taxes, it's almost like declaring nuclear war on us'.³⁴ Indeed, while this asymmetry of trade hinders Africa's development, it enhances the EU's, especially in circumstances where subsidised agricultural products from the EU enter African countries' space and send the unsubsidised local farmer out of business. EPAs are 'based on "a horse and a rider" relationship'.³⁵

Another highlight of this asymmetrical relationship between the EU and ACP countries is that the latter are constantly kept under pressure by the former. This was the finding of a research study, in which of 13 ACP countries' representatives interviewed: 'Eight felt that the European Commission

did not listen to ACP concerns or proposals'; 'Eleven felt that they had been put under pressure to negotiate trade-related issues by the European Commission'.³⁶ In a similar vein, the African Union observes:

[T]he process leading to the conclusion of Interim Economic Partnership Agreements did not build on what was negotiated earlier and in particular that political and economic pressures are being exerted by the European Commission on African countries to initial Interim Economic Partnership Agreements.³⁷

As a result of the intensive pressure put on ACP countries, the latter cannot benefit from EPAs, because they sign these without consultation with civil society, the private sector and even members of parliament, who have the responsibility to mainstream the agreement into national laws and policies. Consequently, EPAs processes have not been mainstreamed into national policies in the ACP countries, and in some countries they have resulted in a general outcry.³⁸ In the process, the EU's interest is always paramount, and the development of ACP countries is sidelined. This was expressly acknowledged by Michel, the EU Development Commissioner, who, in addressing South Africa's unwillingness to accept the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) clause,³⁹ argued:

Evidently, it is a question of national sovereignty. But it's also a question of sovereignty for Europe. The European Commission and our member states provide 56% of all development assistance in the world. It is difficult to say that Europe should let our partner countries treat our economic adversaries better than us. We are generous but not naïve.⁴⁰

This express acknowledgement of the 'true aim' of the EPA, by one of its founders, confirms that this agreement is an instrument used to ensure that the EU dominates Africa and other developing countries.

The situation of ACP countries is worsened by their incapacity to negotiate issues related to EPAs. Though this capacity question is catered for by ACP agreements that provide for a window period, during which ACP countries will be capacitated to enter into EPAs,⁴¹ the architects of these agreements do not comply with the requirement. Consequently, ACP countries that are not well prepared and are not capable of negotiating effectively, are forced to sign the agreement with the EU without a clear understanding of the implications.⁴² An ACP country negotiator correctly observed:

The balance of power in terms of economic clout and resources – meaning experts – is horribly tilted against the ACP. So it's very hard to see how to

have a balanced negotiation in the circumstances. So it's neither a partnership nor a negotiation.⁴³

Besides being bullied into signing EPAs, ACP leaders also lack the necessary political leadership to mainstream EPA issues in their countries and in regional grouping policies, before requesting EU support.⁴⁴ In addition, ACP leaders are not given enough time to plan and strategise regarding EPAs. These leaders have no say in setting deadlines. For instance, interim agreements in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon were agreed on the basis of draft texts proposed by the Commission at the last minute. As a result, these countries had no time to consult their citizens and could not even air their views.⁴⁵ In fact, the EU has set an ultimatum for countries that are yet to sign EPAs to do so by the first of January, 2014, which was revised on 24 January 2014 to 1 October 2014. Calls from President Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia on the EU to remove the ultimatum related to the signing of EPAs fell on deaf ears, as the Head of the EU delegation to Namibia, Ambassador Raul Fuentes Milani, replied, 'We took the plea very serious, but the EU's position stands for the talks to be concluded by 2014'.⁴⁶ It is important to note that this response was accompanied by a threat to cut Namibia's market access by January 2014, if the country did not sign the agreement.⁴⁷

Other aspects of the asymmetrical relationship between ACP countries and the EU are exposed when regional groupings table their proposals. In these situations, the EU frustrates its ACP partners with unnecessary delays. For example, during 2006, in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region, EPA negotiations were practically frozen because the EU could not provide a response to the proposal, which was attended to only in 2007.⁴⁸ Similarly, the EU displayed the same attitude in its dealings with the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) region on issues related to agriculture and commodity protocols under the EPAs.⁴⁹

Despite claims that the EU will ensure Africa's development and that it is not too late to set up a real partnership,⁵⁰ it is contended that an EPA 'is just another form of colonialism, because Europe is imposing conditions, not seeking home-grown solutions'⁵¹ – to use Machemedze's words.

In attempting to resolve the problem, ACP countries call for the process to be 'inclusive and consultative, conducted at national and regional levels' and to underline the need to consider 'the structure, process, and substance of the negotiations, the trade and development dimensions, as well as the capacity and preparedness to conclude the EPAs'.⁵²

For EPAs to be meaningful for African countries, it is imperative to ensure that they are negotiated in a 'spirit of true partnership'⁵³ that is characterised by common and mutual interests, with the emphasis on the

development needs of the poorest countries. Unfortunately, so far, such an approach has not been included in the negotiation process.

On the contrary, ACP countries are put under tremendous pressure to sign EPAs or face consequences in the form of additional tariffs. To use Oxfam's words, 'Developing countries were forced to choose between guaranteeing existing exports to the EU on the one hand, and safeguarding small farmers' livelihood and future economic growth on the other; and 'it was an impossible choice'.⁵⁴ In this vein, during a ministerial conference with the EU, the European Commission threatened to postpone the programming of regional EDF payments and increase tariffs to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)⁵⁵ level, unless ACP countries signed the EPAs.⁵⁶ In fact, the price of not signing is higher than signing. According to Mandelson, some African countries are signing EPAs because, 'They don't have an alternative and don't want their trade disrupted'.⁵⁷

Overall, the asymmetry in an EPA cannot enhance the prospects for Africa's development. Rather, it is a mechanism used for the scramble for Africa. Vitorrio Agnoletto from Italy, Member of the European Parliament, clarifies this in these terms: 'The [EU] Commission has been able to apply the notion of divide and conquer ... I think this is the logic the European Commission will continue to follow'.⁵⁸ This statement, from an architect of the EPAs, describes the real motive of the agreement, which happens to be another tool for European imperialism. Mkapa excellently captures the similarities between the EPAs and the Berlin Conference that divided Africa between Western powers. He said:

Unlike the Berlin Conference of 1884 to 1885 which balkanized Africa among 13 European powers as guaranteed sources of raw materials and market, the current contraption under the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) spearheaded from Brussels are the modern day equivalent of the Berlin Conference. At issue in both Berlin and Brussels is whether or not Africa can be allowed latitude to conduct trade, industrial and development policies for her own development or for the development of Europe. A major difference is that the 'agreement' will now be signed by free people, under supposedly democratic regimes, and in contexts where the African people again have neither voice nor choice.⁵⁹

REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Regional integration was the core element of the Cotonou Agreement. Article 35(2) underlines that economic and trade co-operation shall be built within the context of regional integration of ACP countries for their ascension into the world economy. More importantly, article 37(5) makes a commitment

that negotiations will take 'into account the regional integration process within the ACP'. Similarly, the EPA commits itself in these terms, 'Economic and trade integration shall build on regional integration initiatives of ACP States'.⁶⁰

However, the EPA commitment is mere words on paper. ACP countries have no choice but to negotiate through the EPA regional bodies established by the EU. ESA, ECOWAS, SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) are the EPA negotiating bodies in sub-Saharan Africa; while the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) and the Pacific ACP Group cater for the Caribbean states and the Pacific region, respectively.⁶¹ Nevertheless, and more importantly, the SADC's EPA regional body is different from the well-known SADC. Under the EPAs, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe are moved from SADC and are grouped under ESA. In this regard, when pointing out Africa's disintegration by EPAs, Oxfam (in its 27 September 2006 briefing note) quoted an ACP representative's observation:⁶²

The EC's insistence on trying to determine what is best for the ACP and how we should configure our economic space seems more than a little disingenuous. It is difficult to see how the [European] Commission can reconcile its current negotiating approach with the statements made by various Commission officials that it is up to ACP regions to determine the pace and priorities of their *regional integration*.

In the same vein, the AU called upon the:

... European Commission to honour the commitment made by the Council [of Europe] in Brussels on 27 May 2008 to make EPAs an instrument for the promotion of development, support to *regional integration*, and gradual integration of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of States in the world economy, and urges the European Commission to fully reflect this commitment in the negotiation and conclusion of full and comprehensive EPAs.⁶³

These calls were ignored, as SADC's EPA bargaining body put the non-least developing countries (non-LDC) (such as Botswana and Swaziland) in the same group with LDC ones (Angola for instance). Such an approach hinders regional integration, because under the 'Everything but arms' (EBA) agreement, LDC countries already enjoy free access to EU markets for everything excluding arms. Consequently, LDC countries do not need new agreements, which open their markets to basically nothing. In fact, if they reject EPAs and stay with their Regional Economic Communities (RECs), they will still suffer from EU imports entering their countries through their non-LDC

regional neighbours. Furthermore, having dual and overlapping memberships to an EPA regional group and to an African regional community is the recipe for regional disintegration.⁶⁴

Moreover, in scrambling the continent, EPA engineers move from signing the agreement with regional blocs to dealing with individual countries, offering various incentives to disenfranchise them from their original groupings. For example, while Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland agreed to 86 per cent liberalisation to be implemented step by step for many years and 44 per cent sensitive tariff lines with liberalisation scheduled for 2015, Mozambique agreed to liberalise 80 per cent of trade immediately and 100 tariff lines by 2018. This approach pushes African countries to focus on their self-interest, which leads to the disintegration of RECs. Sanoussi and Steven are of the view that, '[t]he European Commission has been trying to play regions and countries off against each other'.⁶⁵ In this vein, while Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho are calling upon their neighbours to accelerate negotiations with the EU and intend finalising full EPAs, Namibia is cautious and intends to renegotiate the interim EPAs before final ratification, and South Africa simply opts out. Similar conflict exists in terms of RECs where the Southern African Custom Union (SACU) and the SADC do not agree on the way forward.

The disagreement is not unique to southern Africa. It was reported that Mamadou Diop, the former Minister of Trade and Industry of Senegal, had openly criticised Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire for agreeing to the interim EPAs.⁶⁶ These various discrepancies show that EPAs are resulting in 'disintegration and not regional integration'.⁶⁷ In fact, even regional trade will disintegrate, because locally made goods will compete with European ones and may become less attractive in the region.⁶⁸

The AU has called on 'African negotiating countries and groups to remain united in their engagement with the EU Commission on EPAs'.⁶⁹ It has urged the RECs and African Negotiating Groups that have initialled interim agreements to make sure that final agreements are consistent with their regional integration plans.⁷⁰ The challenge though, is that African countries (in general) and their RECs (in particular), as demonstrated earlier, are given no choice but to sign the EPAs or deal with a greater economic consequences. Overall, EPAs are a tool used by the West to divide the continent, conquer and rule it.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The aim of this chapter was to investigate whether or not EPAs are a viable undertaking for Africa's development or another tool for the scramble of the

continent. The chapter found that EPAs were unfortunately another tool for the scramble for Africa. In reaching this conclusion, the chapter examined the impact of trade, the nature of partnerships and the role of EPAs in terms of Africa's regional integration.

On the subject of trade, the chapter showed that revision of the Cotonou Agreement came too early, as it had not achieved its objective to develop ACP countries. Consequently, advocacy for free trade, with reciprocal preferences between countries that are not at the same level of development, will favour rich countries and crush the poor ones, because they will be deprived of much needed customs revenues to finance their budgets. Under EPAs, trade is informed by the search 'for raw materials and markets for European goods'.⁷¹ This does not develop Africa, but, arguably, accentuates its poverty and under-development.

As far as partnership is concerned, EPAs stand for inequality between partners, with Europe at the top of the ladder and Africa at the bottom. The chapter demonstrated that the EU imports less from Africa and sells more to Africa. In addition, African countries are constantly pressurised by the EU to sign EPAs through ultimatums, threats to cut market access and high tariffs. These EPAs are presented to African countries without consultation in a 'take-it-or-leave-it-manner'⁷² and this approach can equate to the new scramble of Africa.

On the subject of regional integration, the EPA is a roadblock to regional integration on the continent. The new agreement will change the structure of regional blocks by moving Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe from SADC to ESA, for example. Under EPAs, the conclusion of the agreement with individual countries and regional blocks at the same time disintegrates the continent and regional trade, as it encourages countries to focus exclusively on their self-interest and not the region's. This is the application of the 'divide-and-rule' approach by the EU. This approach is another form of the scramble of Africa and is another reason for the continent's continued under-development.

Overall, EPAs are not a roadmap for Africa's development. On the contrary, they will lead to the downfall of the continent. This was aptly stated by Dr Jean Ping, the former Chairperson of the AU Commission, in these terms:⁷³

The assessment of these Interim EPAs indicates that, contrary to the objectives set for EPAs in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, they cannot serve as effective instruments for the promotion of sustainable development, the eradication of poverty, the reinforcement of African regional integration initiatives, and the gradual integration of the continent into the global economy. Not only have the Interim EPAs not adequately addressed the development

dimension; they have had the implication of complicating rather than assisting Africa's integration efforts.

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Foreign Direct Investment and Intra-Africa Trade

The Role of African Governments in the Context
of the African Renaissance

Vusi Gumedede and Kagiso Pooe

INTRODUCTION

As the twenty-first century gradually draws to a close, we contend that the twenty-first century, socio-economically, will most likely be remembered as one that firmly established the ascent of the Asian subcontinent and economies like the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as well as the subsequent rise of South American and Latin nations (for example the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Chile and the United States of Mexico). The twenty-second century is about 80 years away. In this context, the chapter takes forward an argument advanced in Gumedede¹ that Africa needs a robust socio-economic development model as a foundation for capturing the twenty-second century. The logic of the argument for a new or different socio-economic development model for Africa was first explained in Gumedede.²

Given frequent debates about Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and intra-Africa trade, the chapter explains that a deeper analysis into the contentious matter of FDI in Africa warrants that African governments should play a calculated role in the development of a new African socio-economic development narrative. The chapter advances a perspective that privileges an African Renaissance as the *motif force* to anchor Africa's socio-economic development agenda. Fifty years since the founding of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), we argue that Africa has not had its own robust socio-economic development approach. Going forward, it is argued, intra-Africa trade and development should be prioritised, within the context of a new approach to socio-economic development in Africa. This is not to say that there have not been any initiatives to further advance socio-economic development in Africa. In fact, we discuss some of the previous initiatives as forming the foundation for our proposals.

It is important to note that the argument made in this chapter does not in any way suggest that the socio-economic shift in power will render the so-called old continent (Europe and the United Kingdom), the so-called new continent (United States of America and Canada) and other western hemisphere states redundant. The London School of Economics (LSE) professor, Robert Wade, recently acknowledged that a socio-economic shift in power is taking place, as observed in the rise to prominence of many developing economies. As Wade puts it:

Certainly, over the past decade many developing and transitional countries have grown faster than developed countries. The middle-income countries (including India as well as China) grew at 6 percent a year or more between 2005 and 2010, while the high-income countries grew at 2 percent or less. A growth-rate gap of this size in favor of developing countries is unprecedented.³

While acknowledging the rapid socio-economic rise of developing nations, Wade also points out that the rise in power of nations like the People's Republic of China or other developing economies shouldn't be over-exaggerated.⁴ Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, Jim Yardley, in a New York Times article, argued that whilst developing nations (most notably the BRICS, that is, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are growing economically, certain internal problems in those countries need to be resolved before those countries can surpass the United States (US), Germany and similar countries.⁵ Overall, however, there appears to be consensus that Asian, South American and even most African economies are strengthening and could ultimately challenge the established economies of the Western world.⁶

The next section discusses African Renaissance (AR) as a conceptual framework that could underpin Africa's development. It is followed by a discussion that addresses an often ignored question: To whom does the twenty-first century belong? Then follows a section that proposes what needs to be done to ensure that Africa puts in place a firm foundation in order to capture the twenty-second century as *the* African century – we make proposals on what should be the roles of African governments, in the context of further advancing Africa's renewal.

AFRICAN RENAISSANCE AS A PHILOSOPHY FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT

Cheik Anta Diop popularised the concept 'African Renaissance' in a seminal text titled *Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in Culture and Development, 1946-1960*. In essence, the AR is a call and programme of action

for the renewal of the African continent. One of the modern proponents of this concept is former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, who argues that:

We speak about the need for the African Renaissance in part so that we, ourselves, and not another, determine who we are, what we stand for, what our vision and hopes are, how we do things, what programs we adopt to make our lives worth living, who we relate to and how.⁷

There have been debates about the concept or notion of African Renaissance.⁸ There have also been various applications of the meaning behind the term African Renaissance. Gumede, for instance, advances the notion of *African Economic Renaissance*.⁹ In the main, we argue that it is important to revisit Africa's rich historical narrative and analysis of socio-economic development. The continent has enough of an historical legacy to put together its own socio-economic development policies and institutions for purposes of advancing Africa's development. This argument is most articulately expressed by Mahmood Mamdani, who states:

Let us recall that every major development of historical significance must rethink and rewrite history, and thereby redefine its place in history so as to give itself a sense of self-worth and a renewed sense of agency. Only those who have little to hope for from historical change can refer to great movement for changes in consciousness as a 'brain-washing' exercise.¹⁰

We argue that African governments and citizens should play an active role in re-thinking Africa's future. As Mamdani¹¹ and others have argued, new socio-economic narratives or models need to be developed and implemented. It is for this reason that AR, as a philosophy, is critical to Africa's future development, as shall be deduced when we discuss the issues of FDI and intra-African trade and development.

WHOSE CENTURY IS THE 21ST CENTURY?

South American countries will continue to progress in their socio-economic development trajectory in the coming decades, taking their place alongside Asian developing nations such as South Korea and China. And, while they might not experience spectacular economic development to the degree that certain Asian countries have, South American states stand poised to close out this century or even begin the twenty-second century as key figureheads in developmental discourse.

This chapter argues that when the twentieth century is revisited, it will most likely be remembered as the century that saw the ascent of the Asian continent socio-economically. The ascent of Asian countries like India, Vietnam, Malaysia and certain Gulf States suggests that Africa should rethink its developmental approach. The Asian development approach suggests that an effective developmental state is critical and that democracy and economic growth do not always go together.

Before the economic rise of the Asian economies, it had become common practice, academically and intellectually, to envision the growth of nations and economies as being linked to market forces.¹² The rise of Asian economies and societies has proved to be a momentous shift in how economics is conceived and interpreted. It is now no longer taboo to argue for the state using its various apparatuses to lead economic development.¹³

Within the African context, Mkandawire contends that the state-led development model is neither new nor unheard of. Mkandawire argues that a thorough understanding of the early post-independence period shows that early African leaders/states made attempts to implement rudimentary development states.¹⁴ Argued differently, early (post-independent) African states succeeded in creating an early edifice of what subsequent Asian development states could look like. What the Asian developmental state model did differently was that Asian development states were able to successfully marry concepts like the following to their advantage: (1) government planning; (2) pre-planned economic development strategies and local population buy-in; and (3) tactical usage of human capital.¹⁵

As other scholars have propounded, the notion of a developmental state is not new. However, Asian states like Japan and Malaysia have been able to make the developmental state model function better than African states; hence Asian states captured the twentieth century.

Another point is that the Asian development model will most likely be remembered for its ability to challenge the notion that democratic rule equates to economic growth and prosperity.¹⁶ Without a doubt, Asian countries have shown that economic growth and democracy are not always synonymous and that sometimes it is possible to improve the level of citizens' socio-economic standards without having democratic institutions or practices. Rohwer argued that despite Asian states being able to produce an educated and economically vibrant middle class, the majority of this class is prepared to tolerate the non-existence of Western style democracies in exchange for positive economic gains.¹⁷

It is in this context, and also in the context of the notion of Asian developmental states, that we argue that the Asian continent will most likely be

remembered as the continent that claimed the twentieth century, ahead of Africa. Asian states have been successful at laying claim to the twentieth century, in the main, due to their leaders and development models being able to construct an Asian narrative of development.

SOUTH AMERICA

Arguably, the reform of failed political and economic systems and the changing face of democracy in South America are the two main reasons for the ascent of South American countries. Few regions or continents have experienced as tumultuous a history with the twin concepts of political and economic development as have South America and Africa. South America's recent rise to economic prominence has been drastically shaped by many years of military dictatorship (as exemplified by the cases of Chile¹⁸ and Brazil¹⁹) and by encounters with the failed neoliberal economic policies of the 1980s and 1990s.²⁰ It is worth noting that South American countries such as Brazil and Chile were once considered pariah states, in much the same way that certain African states have been viewed as patrimonial states.

A closer analysis of the development of South American nations, Bermeo²¹ explains, confirms that it is possible to transition from military dictatorship rule to a modern democratic state. Also, by virtue of historical circumstances, transitions from authoritarian rule to democratic practices (whether in South America, Africa, America or even Europe) can yield a peculiar citizenry and political system unique to that region or country.

Bermeo explains that from the beginning (and in South America in particular), 'state terror ... reduced all its opponents, generally on the left, but also many liberals, to their common denominator as unprotected and frightened human beings. Civil society was born out of this experience of fear ... and democracy began to emerge as a core value'.²² These experiences, we argue, have resulted in certain (if not most) South American citizens coming to understand that the '*democratisation*' process can operate in one of two ways: 1) home-grown dictators can rise to power using undemocratic tools, like the military, to gain power; 2) Western democracies and their sponsors have the ability to delegitimise local democratic rules and choices, if they are not properly understood. As such, it would seem that South American citizens have come to understand that finding and defining what course their democratisation process takes is as important as voting. This process has allowed unorthodox or populist leaders to occupy some of the highest political positions in society and also play an actively role in reshaping the policy processes. Leaders like Evo Morales, Cristina Kirchner and the late Hugo Chavez embody this South American practice, which sees the state play an active developmentalist role in developing society socio-economically.

POLITICAL REFORM

While we tend to focus on nations like Chile, Brazil and Mexico to a large degree, it is critical to understand that one can use these nations as generalised examples to make the argument that the political reform of South American states has, by and large, succeeded in them becoming more democratic.

However, Navia and Walker allude to the fact that South American citizens are prone to electing charismatic leaders, who they find to be a dangerous prospect: 'Because we understand populism as personalistic leadership that weakens institutions, there is an obvious tension between the strength of institutions and the appearance of populism in Latin America'.²³ While Navia and Walker might be justified in worrying that elected populist leaders could become a danger to citizens (as were former military dictators such as Getúlio Dornelles Vargas (Brazil) or Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar (Cuba), we argue that South American citizens have come to understand their political history and problems in a nuanced manner and do factor in such concerns.

Notwithstanding the above criticism, we argue that what the South American political reform experience shows to other developing regions (like Africa) is that political development or even democratisation is a complex process. However, its complexities need not be understood through only trying to resolve them by using 'the correct' tools, as prescribed by the West or so-called established democracies. The crucial point is that democracy need not conform to some form of prescribed format and that any outcome of the democratic process should be judged by the citizens. Arguably, countries should determine the kind of democracy that works for them.

ECONOMIC REFORM

Much like the political arena, the economic policy domain in South America has had its ebbs and flows, depending on the leadership's goals and philosophical leanings. Dayton-Johnson, Londoño and Nieto-Parra explain that:

After the bankruptcy of the import-substitution model and the debt crisis in the 1980s, most Latin American governments embarked on a process of market liberalisation, often referred to as the Washington Consensus Reforms or the first-generation reforms. These growth-promising reforms [were] undertaken by both left-wing and right-wing governments ...²⁴

This period in the development of South American states like Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina resulted in many states coming to the realisation that economic policies (much like political decisions) require more localised

pragmatism²⁵ – especially with the realisation that the Washington Consensus approach did not yield the intended results and that some of the goals of the Consensus are actually counter to what citizens need.²⁶ What this did for certain South American states was to encourage a shift in their thinking: some sought or saw economic development as a dynamic issue and attempted all manner of developmental models.²⁷

We do acknowledge that South America's economic rise won't mirror that of the Asian continent and we note that South America faces numerous socio-economic tensions and problems. It cannot, however, be denied that South America's social and economic indicators position it above the African continent and it therefore stands alongside Asia in being poised to capture the 21st century.

WHAT HAS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DONE IN AFRICA?

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has become one of the key pillars on which the African development agenda has sought to build its economic development. The recent *FDI in Africa* report explains that:

Over the past two decades, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has become a vital source of economic development for the African continent. With an increase from approximately US\$9 billion in 2000 to US\$18 billion in 2004 and US\$88 billion in 2008, FDI has become a major source of finance for Africa's development.²⁸

The increase in FDI has led more African countries to want to ensure they are seen by international investors as viable avenues of investment. Some of the steps taken by countries like South Africa, Angola, Burundi and Kenya have been to utilise the expert skills of continental and international institutions.²⁹ Despite the economic downturn that took place during 2008 to 2011, the African continent continues to attract FDI, as the 2013 United Nations World Investment Report indicates: 'FDI inflows to Africa grew to \$50 billion in 2012, a rise of 5 per cent over the previous year'.³⁰

The fundamental question that needs addressing, however, is whether or not FDI into Africa has been qualitatively and quantitatively measured, for the purpose of understanding how African states and societies have used FDI for socio-economic development purposes. In seeking to improve how knowledge of FDI should be approached to better improve African countries' chances of conquering the twentieth century; it is critical to understand what the prevailing approaches have been. And one of the key issues that need to be understood, from a research point of view, is what has and is FDI

being used for by African countries. To start with, the 2013 United Nations World Investment Report explains that:

... increase in FDI inflows translated into increased flows to North Africa, Central Africa and East Africa, whereas West Africa and Southern Africa registered declines. FDI from developing countries is increasing. There is a rising interest in FDI by private equity funds in Africa, but the level of investment is still low. FDI oriented to African consumers is becoming more widespread in manufacturing and services but will remain relatively limited in the near term.³¹

Whilst this information is later explained, using a numerical breakdown of each region's FDI inflow, we find the UNCTAD³² narrative problematic for purposes of trying to understand whether or not FDI entering African countries has aided or impeded socio-economic development. It is unhelpful to simply conclude that the FDI that enters a country ends up being absorbed into the tax department of African countries or that African countries seek to want to create flexible tax programmes to attract FDI.³³

If African countries are to take their place alongside Asian and South American nations, more research needs to be done in documenting whether or not a clear visible narrative exists on whether or not FDI has resulted in socio-economic development. We argue that to simply have academics or publications advocating or exploring what makes FDI enter Africa (for example good governance, stable financial institutions, a skilled workforce and so on and so forth) tells only one part of the narrative of development.

While we agree with the narrative that assumes that FDI is a welcome variable of development in Africa, we don't subscribe to the notion that it is the panacea for the socio-economic development of African countries. Furthermore, this chapter contends that more research should be pursued in order to better ascertain what FDI means to Africa's future development. One other reason for the need to have more directed research regarding FDI is that certain conflicting reports about FDI in Africa would be better understood. Research should be able to allow Africa and African governments to formulate policies and models to better ensure FDI works for them, in the same way it assisted certain Asian governments.

INTRA-AFRICA TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

Assessing the state of affairs pertaining to Africa's trade and investment environment can be viewed in one of two ways: the first perspective explains that 'the level of intra-African trade has grown in nominal terms,

rising from \$45.9 billion in 1995 to \$130.1 billion in 2011 ... It [Africa] experienced positive growth in all years except for 1998-2001 and 2009. Such negative growth spells coincided with world recessions...'.³⁴ This perspective seeks to explain a narrative that suggests that Africa is on the rise economically and that this rise is premised on its economic performance. The second narrative contends that 'over the period from 2007 to 2011, the average share of intra-African exports in total merchandise exports in Africa was 11 per cent compared with 50 per cent in developing Asia, 21 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean and 70 per cent in Europe'.³⁵ This line of argument acknowledges that certain African countries have made strides economically. However, it argues that for Africa to progress to the level needed, Africa needs sustainable socio-economic development and growth, and the key to this is an increase in intra-Africa trade and investment.

Africa should vigorously pursue intra-Africa trade. If African countries fail to promote intra-trade and investment, Africa will continue to lag behind their Asian and South American counterparts. It thus becomes imperative that long-running continental plans, like the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty, not be discarded. Rather, these plans need to inform new initiatives like the African Union's (AU) 2063 Agenda. Building on the Lagos Plan of Action, the Abuja Treaty and other continent-wide initiatives should assist in ensuring that Africa captures the twenty-second century. This view is informed by an understanding that the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty (in particular) present well considered perspectives regarding regional integration in Africa. Intra-Africa trade has been a standard thread in many of the continental programmes, such as the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty. In addition, the Abuja Treaty (in particular) committed the continent to infrastructural initiatives and the utilisation of educational processes and systems.³⁶

REVISITING THE ROLE OF AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS

We argue that the role of African governments needs to be re-imagined in order to take the continent forward. The role of African governments needs to be an active one in matters pertaining to socio-economic development within Africa. This viewpoint has not been readily accepted by mainstream economic theorists and philosophers like Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek and Adam Smith, among others, who argue for socio-economic development predicated on a dominant role for the free market (*laissez faire* capitalism), rather than state involvement.³⁷ However, as we have argued, in the context of South America, governments can and do have the ability and instruments to develop their countries socio-economically and improve the lot of citizens.

The experiences of some South American and Asian countries indicate that African governments should decide, per locality, what each government and country can and should do economically. Secondly, African governments must link any discussion of FDI and national socio-economic policy to regional African development. Finally, and most importantly perhaps, African government plans/policies need to privilege and construct their development initiatives around the concept of intra-Africa trade and development. As stated earlier, intra-Africa trade and development have been increasing. While the increase in intra-Africa trade is laudable, more work needs to be done in order to assist (more practically and economically) African government's coffers to grow in order to convince citizens that intra-African trade and development is in their best interest and a viable developmental tool.

In the context of Africa capturing the twenty-second century, intra-African trade and development could be a possible catalyst for African governments to finally launch Africa into the twenty-second century. Africa and African governments already have the necessary foundation, particularly in the context of the initiatives discussed above (such as the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty). Furthermore, developmental institutions like the African Development Bank could be used to advance intra-Africa trade and development initiatives and projects. Africa should also think creatively and innovatively about different modalities for accelerating continental integration and intra-Africa trade.

CONCLUSION

Fifty years since the founding of the OAU, intra-Africa trade is still very low. Also, although FDI has been pouring into many African countries, it would seem that FDI has not contributed to Africa's development or that FDI has not been effective in terms of Africa's renewal. Intra-Africa trade and development should be prioritised, within the context of a new approach to Africa's socio-economic development. For Africa and its citizens to capture the twenty-second century, a dominant and relevant *motif force* needs to be the AR philosophy. It is encouraging that various initiatives under the auspices of the African Union appear to be informed by the AR philosophy. A critical aspect, however, of renewal of the African continent, is African unity, which appears to continue to elude Africa. If the continent was better united, most likely there would not be a need to make the argument for intra-Africa trade, as we do in this chapter and as others have done.

In short, we have argued that more continent-based research needs to go into tracking what effect FDI has on the continent's developmental agenda.

We have used the AR philosophy and argued that Africa should accelerate intra-Africa trade and development. To do this, African governments should be more hands-on in pursuing socio-economic development in Africa. Admittedly, the chapter has not dealt with other related topical issues, such as the modalities or methodologies for increasing intra-Africa trade. Similarly, the highly debated issue of illicit financial flows falls outside the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to say though that African unity should assist in addressing challenges such as illicit financial flows and also guide the modalities for accelerating intra-Africa trade. In the main, we are of the view that Africa can learn from the recent development experiences of the Asian and South American regions. Essentially, in the quest for an effective developmental model for Africa, aspects of African pre-colonial socio-economic life should be better understood so as to see what worked well and to deduce that which could be applied in the current context, perhaps in a modified form, to ensure that Africa indeed captures the 22nd century as the African century.

Lastly, Africa needs to revisit some of the proposals, from various leading African scholars, regarding what should be done to further advance Africa's development. One of the proposals made in the past and repeatedly is Samir Amin's delinking hypothesis, which can be an answer to the further renewal of the African continent. Amin explains that 'delinking is the refusal to submit to the demands of the world-wide law of value, or the supposed rationality of the system of world prices that embody the demands of reproduction of world capital. It, therefore, presupposes the society's capacity to define an alternative range of criteria of rationality of internal economic options'.³⁸

Similarly, concepts such as Africanity, as espoused by Archie Mafeje, should guide our thinking and interventions to taking the continent forward. Mafeje argues that 'Africanity is an assertion of an identity that had been denied; it is a pan-Africanist revulsion against external imposition or refusal to be dictated to by others. In this sense, it is a political and ideological reflex which is meant to inaugurate an African renaissance... As [combative] ontology; it is inseparable from the projected African renaissance. It is a necessary condition for the mooted African renaissance'.³⁹ Arguably, both the delinking hypothesis and the pursuit of Africanity, among other views and or proposals, should be revisited and or reconsidered with the view of further advancing Africa's development.

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Twinning Diaspora Associations and Local Councils to Boost Africa's Development

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INTRODUCTION

From the very creation of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa in 1963, to hatching the idea of the African Union (AU) in Sirte in 1999, the organisation envisaged (amongst others) accelerating the process of integration on the continent and addressing the social, economic and political problems of African nations. The overall objective of the OAU was to move the continent and its peoples forward. Consequently, different strategies and approaches were adopted to pave the way for Africa to move ahead and maintain its position in quite a challenging and competitive global environment. But the road so far covered has not been an easy one.

Over the years as water moved past the bridge of history, the challenges were not only daunting but also mature in intensity and complexity.¹ From the early difficulties of coping with post-colonial problems and setting up new and vibrant administrations, the institution has had to deal with problems of international co-operation and competition, an increase in the number of nations under the Union and a consequent increase in population, orchestrating a growing demand for basic services and amenities.

Close to fifty years after the birth of the institution, the institutional mutation (Councils, Committees, and Commissions) that the Union has witnessed is a clear indication that the road so far covered has been a dreary one. Noteworthy is the change of name from the OAU to the AU, which was obviously in response to the changing realities, as well as to the aim to remain focused on the objectives of its creation.² Today, Africa is faced with the problems of an unstable political climate, famine, difficult regional co-operation ties, and challenging technological advancements that inhibit almost all sectors of our growing economies. As a result, the development question in Africa has become one that is not only a major preoccupation for the AU, but one that may elude existing strategies, unless they are

constantly adjusted to adapt to new situations. Asante³ attempts a description of this situation:

In many respects African countries and the continent as a whole now stand at crossroads as far as development is concerned. Past strategies would appear to demand a thorough re-examination so that the potential opportunities available for higher and more stable rates of growth can be exploited. Hence the desperate search in recent years for new approaches and methods which should not be based on a poor imitation of the strategies and life style of societies with different historical, cultural, economic and political backgrounds.

The active search for new approaches or strategies to tackle the development question in Africa is one of the major concerns of the AU and the launching of a programme on diaspora participation in Africa's development reflects this effort. This attention to diaspora participation now stands out as one of the concrete realities and major cornerstones of the AU. This particular domain harbours important stakes and would require concerted efforts by all stakeholders to develop the idea.

Dealing with diaspora concerns would certainly assist in healing the wounds of the colonial slave trade, speed up action to preserve a common heritage that exists between Africa and its diaspora and formulate new strategies for development, through the development of capital markets in their countries of origin.⁴ These, among other key issues identified, obviously led to the materialisation of the engagement bond between the AU and its diaspora. From the institutional framework and other policies of the AU, to its activities, one clearly notices that the diaspora question has become a major area of concern and axis of action for the AU.⁵ Africa must move forward, with the contribution of all its sons and daughters, or will risk losing out in a very fast growing and changing world. This chapter recognises the role that the diaspora can play to exemplify and concretise the maturity that goes with the golden jubilee of the OAU/AU.

THE PLACE AND ROLE OF DIASPORA NETWORKS IN AFRICAN ECONOMIES

The AU has defined a diaspora as:

Consisting of people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union.⁶

The reflections in this section, set out on the strong recognition that this call for papers asked contributors to reflect on issues focusing on Africa's development, gave pride of place to a sub-theme on the 'African Union and African Diaspora Engagement'. Also, placing it under an engagement bond, suggests more than a mere commitment; the aim is to establish and instigate a forum for the African diaspora, within African economies by the Union.

The movement, notwithstanding other actions hitherto carried out by the Union, recognises diaspora concerns as a major area of interest. We can cite for our purposes the 2003 decision of the AU extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State, to integrate the African diaspora into the policy framework of the AU.⁷ The document recommends amending the constitutive Act, to provide a new article that invites and provides full participation of the African diaspora as a region of the continent. Secondly, the AU/World Bank IDF Support Programme, relevant AU decisions, ordinary and extraordinary summits and ministerial conferences also highlight this point.⁸

The effective coming into force of the amended Act and its full implementation is still a challenge to the AU. This may be due to the problem of inadequate ratification by a two-thirds majority, as prescribed by the 2003 Protocol. However, the same constitutive Act, under its Principles and in Article 4(c) provides, as one of its major principles:⁹ 'Participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union'.

This principle clearly establishes, without distinction, the participation of all African people, wherever they may be found, in the activities of the AU. It therefore goes without saying that the platform for effective participation of diaspora associations or networks for African affairs has been established by its mother organisation, the AU.

Yet, like every human endeavour, our goal is to examine further possibilities, through which this win-win situation could be made to function better or even *increase* in scope. It could be more compelling, for example, to fully integrate the diaspora question within the framework of specialised technical committees of the AU. This will obviously orchestrate a fusion of ideas and people, having as the main goal the development and well-being of our continent. The outcome would be a platform where the basic tenets of participatory development can be effectively pursued.

THE GLOBAL AFRICAN DIASPORA SUMMIT

The summit held under the theme, 'Towards the Realization of a United and Integrated Africa and its Diaspora', was a key event related to the subject of this chapter. This summit, held in May 2012 in Sandton, South Africa, had as its major objectives:¹⁰

- The production of a skills database of African professionals in the diaspora.
- The establishment of the African Diaspora Corps.
- The foundation of an African Diaspora Investment Fund.
- The development of a programme on the development marketplace for the diaspora, as a framework for facilitating innovation and entrepreneurship among African people and the diaspora.

Through such programmes, the objective of the AU was to create incentives for investment and foster a more conducive business environment on the continent, which would stimulate diaspora participation par excellence.

It was also expected that one of the key outcomes of the Summit would be the identification and implementation of 'bankable projects', through appropriate and effective implementation plans or a framework of action. Projects were aimed at fostering the spirit of innovation and entrepreneurship between Africa and its diaspora. In this way, south-south co-operation could be fully developed, orchestrating the exchange of technology and knowledge-based projects between the AU and its diaspora. Seen from this perspective, we could well go beyond a simple presumption that the AU has indeed created a place for its diaspora.

THE AU COMMISSION AND WORLD BANK SUPPORT PROGRAMME

As outlined by the white paper on the AU commission document,¹¹ and like every other parent organisation trying to militate for the needs and interests of its target groups and members, the AU endeavours to look out for varied opportunities and avenues. The aim is to bring solutions to the different demands of the multitudes of Africans, in and out of the continent. Consequently, on 14 July 2008, the AU Commission (AUC) and the World Bank signed an agreement¹² for an Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant of close to US\$500 000 for 'strengthening the African Diaspora Programme of the African Union Commission'. Following this, the AU requested World Bank support of its Global Diaspora Programme in the following areas:

- Completing the regional consultative process to include the Middle-East, Australia and Asia, working in close co-ordination and co-operation with AU member states.
- Creating a consolidated Africa skills database.
- Mobilising the skills and resources of the diaspora to enhance institutional capacities.
- Supporting the role of the AU Commission as the focal point and co-ordination hub of all diaspora initiatives on the continent.

Diaspora matters were to be a standing issue on AUC programmes and summit agendas. The AU Commission Directorate tasked with diaspora matters had to be strengthened financially and with commensurate human resources. The major components of this programme had in view an increase in the participation of members of the diaspora in the affairs of the AU. It also envisaged the organisation of summits and conferences in and out of the continent.

As a result, a number of nations and governments developed fully-fledged departments or programmes in this area. Several countries created ministerial departments or incorporated necessary innovations into existing ones to cater for diaspora concerns. Such institutional adjustments, however, ought to be accompanied not only by a strong resolve, but also a commitment to bring about effective economic development. The experiences that followed proved that some strong political structures were put in place as a result of this programme in some African nations.

Sierra Leone

The government of Sierra Leone looks to its diaspora to assist in rebuilding the capacity of its governing institutions. Civil service, local government and other sectors are at the centre of the government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The government established the Directorate of Diaspora Affairs in the Ministry of Presidential and Public Affairs (MOPPA), to: help mobilise the diaspora for the country's development; co-ordinate efforts to improve the relationship with the diaspora; harness the diaspora's expertise and resources for development.

Uganda

In July 2009, the Government of Uganda requested bank support for developing and implementing a national diaspora engagement policy framework. President Museveni also directed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to create a Diaspora Department, to: undertake programmes for Uganda's diaspora; support organised Ugandan diaspora associations to carry out some development activities; work closely with Uganda's foreign missions to identify and facilitate professionals who could return to Uganda and contribute to national development. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working with other development partners, like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to seek other sources of funding.

Ethiopia

The Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs (EEA) Directorate General has been actively working with the Government of Ethiopia to establish a legal status for the Ethiopian diaspora. Consequently, Ethiopian nationals who hold

non-Ethiopian nationalities have been entitled to an 'Ethiopian origin ID card', which grants them all the rights and privileges of an Ethiopian national. The programme reports hold that this act alone has been by far the most important incentive enabling Ethiopians in the diaspora to engage with their home country through various activities, most notably through investment and knowledge transfer.

Kenya

In 2007, the government of Kenya established the Diaspora Affairs Directorate in recognition of the significant contribution to its national development made by Kenyans living abroad. Specifically, it established the International Jobs and Diaspora Office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to specifically deal with diaspora matters. A participatory approach to projects has been adopted, as this can help generate a feeling of common ownership and militate for the greater success of eventual projects.

Mali

In 1991, the government created a Ministry In-charge of Diaspora Affairs and a Secretariat, 'Le Haut Conseil des Maliens de l'Extérieur', through which Malians abroad can make their voice heard. The country has a policy aimed at encouraging constant contact with and investment in their home country for Malians living abroad. Highly skilled experts are particularly scarce in higher education and other circles in the Malian economy. This is made even worse by the flight of qualified nationals in search of new avenues beyond the national borders. A major component of the programme was to attempt a reversal of the outflow of skilled experts.

Apart from these, other independent but commendable efforts also exist, that fall within the domain of developing relations between African nations and their diaspora associations or networks. Cases in point are those of Nigeria and Eritrea.

Nigeria

President Olusegun Obasanjo initiated the Nigerians in the Diaspora Organisation (NIDO). In 2001, in order to tap into the resources of offshore talent, the Nigerian government, through its embassies and High Commissions around the globe, set out to encourage Nigerians in the diaspora to come together under an independent umbrella to contribute to development efforts in Nigeria. The country has a large emigrant population in Africa, Europe and North America. The skills and other potential of such individuals will be lost to their home governments if efforts are not made to get them back or to get them to contribute through exchange programmes.

Eritrea

About 90 per cent of eligible Eritreans abroad voted in the 1993 referendum on independence. Diaspora Eritreans then helped to draft the constitution, which guaranteed them voting rights in future elections. Paradoxically, while it may be an indisputable advantage for an Eritrean citizen to live and work abroad, it is also true that some of them have contributed to the much regretted 'brain drain' phenomenon.¹⁰

However, for these institutional supports to act as effective checks and balances for the brain drain, committed political will needs to be developed and worthwhile policies put in place, to help hold African experts at home or ensure the return of some of our most cherished human resources from elsewhere on the continent. As the venerable Nelson Mandela indicated in his address to the joint Houses of Parliament in the UK on 11 July 1996: 'To this day we continue to lose some of the best among ourselves because the lights in the developed world shine brighter'.

Evidently therefore, even though the AU has done a lot to create several avenues for Africans in the diaspora, it is up to diasporans to seize the opportunity and play their role. Great possibilities exist. To borrow from Mandela, we could still make the lights shine brighter at home, to push the temptation further. After all, no other organisation in Africa today holds a mandate as strong enough as that of the AU to undertake such action.

FROM POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENT TO DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES

As underlined above, the creation of departments, ministries and special secretariats by some African governments is aimed at attending to diaspora affairs. This, no doubt, is an important resolve to address the concerns and integrate the aspirations of citizens of those countries in the diaspora. Yet, if these are not made to serve as concrete developmental opportunities, they will remain important, but unproductive, political achievements. In the words of the renowned African economist, Adebayo Adedeji:¹³

Development is not merely a transformation of structures and material attributes of a society. Authentic, self-reliant processes of development inevitably result in the transformation of the people who bring about change, their culture, their attitudes to work, their saving and investment habits, their concepts and skills and their social systems.

Consequently, our suggestion is that these measures should be accompanied by other action that directly involves the beneficiaries, in this case, members

of the diaspora, who will actively participate to put in place envisaged programmes. One particular advantage of getting members of the diaspora engaged in the design and implementation of programmes is that it leaves them with the clear understanding that it has their interests at heart.

From the 2003 AU resolution on the diaspora's participation to the particular IDF grant programme and other pertinent examples, we can decipher some positive political action. However, when the mandate holder for most of these actions and policies remain the central state, it raises some issues about the cumbersome intricacies for these groups or associations to freely cue in, perhaps due to a divergence related to procedural issues. A few examples also exist of foreign investors who do not find it easy to start businesses or invest in Africa, owing to some of these centralised procedures. Whether for want of a proper understanding of our procedures or as an expression of a genuine concern, it is important to take these issues into consideration. However, this chapter does not present a categorical denial of the merits that may go with a centralised system; rather, it presents a realisation of the fact that divergence of views on procedural issues is key to the success of such endeavours.

Evidently enough, some eminent and prominent sons and daughters of African descent in the diaspora are, of their own volition, already taking great interest in the developmental and policy issues of Africa, irrespective of the systems in place. Some are making impressive contributions in the form of: scholarship grants; the provision of equipment to structures like hospitals, markets and schools; sponsorship of sports competitions, trade fairs, cultural manifestations, agricultural shows, health campaigns, etc.

What is needed is an institutional and formal framework, to cement such endeavours and increase the interaction and opportunities. In adopting a scheme that is based on local governance, it would have greater capacity to identify local needs, greater responsiveness to those needs and a greater sensitivity to local political demands. This could be done through twinning local councils to diaspora networks or associations. It is an arrangement that, if given careful thought, could act as a sampling framework and an eventual model, which could be replicated from one community to another. Quite a number of examples and experiences of similar kinds of twinning co-operation do exist and have consequent positive results.

In December 2012, Finance and Development (F&D) magazine,¹⁴ in profiling President Bill Clinton, presented another very rewarding experience. The senior statesman shared his experience of the Clinton Global Initiative as follows:

We're making the most progress in places where people have formed networks of creative co-operation – where stakeholders from government,

business and civil society have come together to do things better, faster and cheaper than any could alone ... Through vigorous discussions, leaders from different sectors forge and develop innovative solutions to our modern challenges. For example, for the past two years Coca-Cola has lent its expertise in supply chain management to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.

The classical approach is to examine the potential inherent in this other form of partnership (twinning councils and diaspora associations) or cross-border co-operation, in the hope that it could become a confidence-building mechanism for the AU and its diaspora and an arena to boost development in Africa. Above all else, it offers a simple and more understandable paradigm for developmental co-operation, wherein both parties are close to equals and wherein the stakes involved can possibly be evaluated by each party to the engagement. The other unique factor about this suggestion is that the socio-economic environment for any eventual investment is well known to the parties in the twinning relationship. What then could be the content of such an engagement? What conditions could constitute its success parameters? What temptations should be avoided?

TWINNING AS A CONCRETE AND WORTHWHILE APPROACH

The long experience and practice of twinning African cities, communities or councils to some cities in the West offers itself as a prompter and concrete basis on which to examine this argument. Twinning local councils to diaspora associations is by far a better and a more sustainable approach to development, than are several other development strategies. Council authorities have had to travel miles across continents, spending hard-earned currency, in search of municipalities with whom they can draw up partnership agreements or contracts. Very often, little is known about the particular history or performance indicators of some of these Western municipalities or the veiled interest which some of these arrangements may represent. The only underlying factor is that they belong to more developed economies than those of the seeking councils.

But our twinning will constitute a network of investment opportunities all over Africa, through which councils and their diaspora groupings can better evaluate the performance of mutually beneficial projects, by their regular presence within the communities that harbour them. It has the peculiarity of using the local governance approach, offering a more efficient management solution to both parties. We earlier highlighted the importance of decentralising action (aimed at ensuring diaspora participation) from the

central level to decentralised public entities. Decentralisation constitutes the major driving force for the promotion of development, democracy and the advancement of good governance at the local level.

Aside from this, African communities still have and enjoy the peculiarity of existing within their ethnic and tribal origins. As such, whether belonging to the Zulus, Masai, Ibos, Kikuyus, Tutsis, Betis, etc., the issue of identity is still very strong and a unifying parameter among the African people on the continent or among Africans in the diaspora. Quite evidently too, one notices that our diaspora associations often begin as developmental groupings that are formed on the basis of these ethnic or tribal leanings. Clear examples of these ethnic networks for development are: the Bali Cultural Association (a cultural grouping of north westerners from Bali, Cameroon, living in the United States) (BCA-USA); the Barfaws and Manyu diaspora groupings of the South West Region of Cameroon.¹⁵ Created in 1988 in Atlanta, Georgia, BCA-USA serves 'as a forum dedicated to promoting the social, educational and cultural well-being of the Bali people in the Diaspora'.

A look at the design and particular constitution of our municipalities or council areas shows that they quite often meander around these ethnic and tribal boundaries, as if to portray an obvious and umbilical link between the two. It would thus certainly raise a lot of curiosity among these diaspora groupings and networks if the offer were made to tune them in to these same council areas. It is quite evident that almost all properly organised diaspora organisations are, in a way, carrying out some kind of programme within their original communities or council area; or at least entertaining some form of relationship with these same institutions, if not with those living within its peripheries.

This arrangement holds the uniqueness and peculiarity of the importance of home and the feeling of acceptance. This chapter could well have been captioned: 'Twinning Diaspora Associations to Home Councils'. In this way, Africans outside the continent know that they have a home away from home. It takes away the outsider stigma or feeling that may sometimes be expressed by nationals at home or inhibited by their fellow folks away from home. There is evidence that, sometimes, members of the diaspora are not readily accepted in their own original communities as much as are local nationals with the same potential. This is not a mere perception, as instances of this outsider consideration have been documented.¹⁶

A close look at another school of thought on the influences and role of local authorities in the promotion of collaborative endeavours within developing economies is quite elucidating. In their e-discussion on 'Local authorities' involvement in migration and development', Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA),¹⁷ an international organisation for migration on Africa, stated that:

In addition to initiating and supporting concrete actions in developing countries, local authorities are key actors for mobilizing different stakeholders to work together. They are at the forefront of promoting collaborative approaches and policy coherence. Local authorities have the advantage of being close to their constituents and of having a territorial presence. Local authorities' knowledge of local needs and the fact that they often provide the social services which are key to integration, such as education, health care and social assistance, as well as their innovative efforts to increase civic participation on the part of migrants' communities, mean that they are often at the forefront of efforts to involve Diasporas in development – be it through targeted support to migrants' groups, fostering public-private schemes or twinning partnerships with institutions in developing countries.

Besides, mayors and municipal authorities, as a whole, are elected representatives of the people; in contrast to appointed officials, they consequently directly enjoy the mandate of those they govern. Elected representatives are also voted for on the strength of the programmes and projects that they present to their electorate. Their difficulties usually emanate from having to cope with the scarce resources available to fully execute these programmes. To tune councils with diaspora associations will expose the councils to the financial and material strongholds of the latter to finance the projects and accompany same with the required mental and technological know-how. Many councils do not have a number of technical departments running because of a lack of adequately trained human resources in those areas.

The end result will be to generate a database of projects between the twinned parties and to examine ways and means of carrying out these projects. Once several of the partnerships have been put in place, it will offer the AU Commission an opportunity to envisage an evaluation mechanism to examine different experiences and capitalise on best practices or to set benchmarks. With this possible mechanism in place, a yearly evaluation forum could be organised in order for countries to learn from each other's experiences. This would, no doubt, serve as an important approach to regional integration and fruitful co-operation. The most successful programmes from one nation could be repeated in others. Besides, this would also help fight the brain drain and improve the transfer of technology from destination countries to origin nations.

It could help capitalise on the advantages and benefits of a reduction in the quantity and cost of remittances, which would eventually be replaced by the proceeds of investment in countries with these twinning programmes. Put differently, consequent investment would not only control impressive capital at home, but enable the proceeds of such investment to become an

even more important resource for continuous re-investment in destination economies. Remittances, which are a permanent life-line between members of the diaspora and their relatives at home, could well be replaced by such proceeds and save the huge costs involved in sending money home. Traveling home for holidays, anniversaries or other such events would no longer require carrying huge sums of money.

Gibril Faal,¹⁸ Chairman of the African Foundation for Development, which was started by African experts in the UK, to broaden the diaspora's contribution to African development, opines:

Setting up a business enables individuals of the diaspora to transfer – profitably – the knowledge, skills, experience and opportunities gained in countries of destination. Businesses are also vehicles through which the diaspora can make substantive contributions to innovation, production and development in their countries of origin. These businesses are practical means of facilitating voluntary return, brain-gain and transitional citizenship.

He is also founder of Remit Aid, a tax rebate programme for immigrants transferring funds to developing countries. His knowledge and advice about these issues therefore stem from his practical experience in dealing with these problems. He could certainly be an inspiration to many Africans in the diaspora who may be seeking investment opportunities at home.

From every indication, remittances are a key issue to be dealt with, both by Africans in the diaspora and by the economies receiving these remittances. This is so because, if well channelled, these amounts could afford tremendous benefits for our growing economies. In September 2011, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report estimated transfers of more than US\$40 billion in 2010.¹⁹ It was indicated that:

The true size of remittance flows, including unrecorded flows, is believed to be significantly larger. Remittances are the most tangible link between migration and development. Remittances are a large source of funding in many African countries: in Lesotho, they are close to 30 per cent of GDP; in Cape Verde, Senegal and Togo, they are more than 10 per cent of GDP. In Egypt, remittances are larger than the revenue from the Suez Canal; and in Morocco they exceed tourism revenue.

Channelling these amounts into various co-operation agreements or twinning arrangements with African councils would certainly convey greater benefits and even guarantee sustainability, as eventual investment would become a permanent source of income. Partnership agreements may also enable these sums to be sent home in the form of medical equipment or

other supplies, which could benefit from fiscal exoneration and reduced remittance charges if done through councils.

Mercer, *et al.*,²⁰ pointed out that, every year, some US\$240 billion is sent to developing countries in the form of remittances. This by far surpasses all official development assistance combined. Looking in particular at Cameroon and Tanzania, these authors argue that building civil society in Africa must be understood in tandem with the political economy of migration and wider debates concerning ethnicity and belonging. The book engages critically with the current enthusiasm among policy makers for treating the African diaspora as an untapped resource for combating poverty.

Twinning offers a worthwhile opportunity for the sharing of experiences in various domains, as well as an avenue to examine practices by sister cities. To date, almost every African nation has a city with a twinning agreement. Regional partnerships even exist, like the Eastern Africa sister cities, to explore ways and means for the improvement of these twinning arrangements. From the rebuilding of links between countries, to the development of socio-cultural ties, it has moved to a true engagement of partners in development. This long experience and practice is clearly open to African states and cities, as well as their diaspora groupings, for consideration and exploitation. The benefits would be, beyond doubt, a win-win situation for both parties.

Early examples of twinning are reported as far back as the post-Second World War period, when rebuilding links between countries was more necessary than ever. Twinning links were established between Germany and France during this period and currently is common knowledge, as can be seen in the common European economic block (EU). This somewhat justifies twinning as an option that is not only strategic, but sustainable. Twinning also ranks as one of the simplest and most affordable forms of international partnership and co-operation. The parties could conclude such arrangements during any of the holiday periods of members of some of these diaspora associations at home, or during visits by the council authorities, which should be organised by both parties. The two know each other and understand the environments in which they intend to invest.

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF THIS TWINNING ARRANGEMENT

No good endeavour goes without its accompanying challenges. The most significant issue, however, is that of recognising the greater opportunities that go with this endeavour and then transforming the other challenges into positive achievements. Our twinning suggestion clearly harbours some of these challenges and it would be important to examine them in order to

have a clear roadmap to any eventual project. Certainly, other examples are available for quick referencing, but they are purely not of the same nature as our suggestion to twin councils with organised diaspora networks.

The first and most important issue would be a committed and a sustained effort, by African state governments (through the AU), which could accommodate such an endeavour. It would be important to look at the status of migrants, whether nationals or not, and the role they could play in the different spheres of public and private life within the accommodating economies.

Rannveig and Newland²¹ closely examine the issue of mistrust as a major challenge. Home governments are sometimes suspicious of a hidden agenda being harboured by diasporans, while diasporans mistrust the established functional systems and institutions put in place in their home countries. It would be of significant importance therefore, to put in place programmes and policies that leave no room for doubtful intentions. The element of trust can also be seen in the fact that most successful diaspora linkages have occurred through close family and friendship ties to individuals living abroad, who can make in-kind donations, such as land donations or volunteering their time to projects.

The dual nationality question, voting rights, the creation of investment avenues and the surrounding conditions are all issues of major concern today – both to Africans in the diaspora and to African states. Apart from a few examples on the dual nationality question, many African countries are still to take a decision on this important issue. According to the IMF:²²

Allowing dual citizenship can encourage greater diaspora participation in their origin countries by facilitating travel, avoiding the constraints foreigners face on some transactions (for example, temporary work or land ownership), and providing access to public services and social benefits. More broadly, dual citizenship can help maintain emotional ties with the origin country, thus encouraging continued contact and investment.

Nonetheless, it must be underlined that the AU has gone a long way towards seeking ways and means to bring about a decisive participation of diaspora associations in affairs of their home governments. From the 2003 initiative, inviting the diaspora to participate in the building of the AU, to ministerial conferences on the development of diaspora concerns and the May 2012 Diaspora Summit,²³ much has been done.

If several African governments now have ministerial departments, particular secretariats or other organs to deal with diaspora affairs, it is to a great extent due to the efforts of the AU. Yet the road that lies ahead is still quite long. Far from a commensurate political willingness, as earlier

underlined, concrete action and initiatives ought to see the light of day, as should a committed resolve to increase and concretise the expected participation of diasporans in African affairs.

However, the AU can still help, in collaboration with African embassies and High Commissions abroad, to put in place a co-ordination hub, or an apex organisation in each country, that will be responsible for managing diaspora affairs. Through this medium, one would possibly know the number of groupings that exist in each country. It would then become feasible to mainstream the activities and envisage the domains of intervention. The particular constitution and proper functioning of these bodies is an indispensable prerequisite to have them function with other bodies. If we are to dream of any lasting arrangement, it must be between two properly constituted bodies.

The opportunities and avenues that lie unexploited on the continent can be counted among some of the most important developmental opportunities in the globe. As some would describe it, Africa is half virgin and half explored; if this is not the case, then it is more virgin than explored. These unexplored opportunities are evidenced in all the sectors: from training opportunities, to the acquisition of necessary equipment, the development of industry, real estate development, public and amusement parks and the provision of basic services – they are ready to accommodate new endeavours.

The fact that a greater part of our diaspora population is closer to private sector initiatives means that we could measure the efficiency gains that go with integrating them in a working relationship with our local public entities. It would consist of an evolving approach, geared towards local democracy, better management and the implementation of reforms. This would also offer a significant potential for technological transfer, brain gain and the building of local capacity. Also, it is expected that because of their familiarity with the home environment, their perception of risks, with regard to investment would be significantly lower than that of foreign investors.²⁴

It is important that the diaspora should not be left with the impression that the purpose and intention of national agencies is only to source their financing capacities and outlets. The AU could do much if it would militate for the effective participation of the diaspora in the formulation, design and implementation of policies and projects: there is no better way to make them feel really committed and not merely involved in the process.

The possibility of allocating a number of seats on council boards for members of the diaspora should be carefully considered. It is this evolving approach, already mentioned, that would let them effectively participate and remain involved in the process of governance, and ensure a reliable gateway to sustainable development. In the long run, it is also clear that

the final destination for most of those in the diaspora would be their origin countries.

Home councils will be responsible as local government agencies for the putting in place of all administrative requirements and simplified procedures, so as to expose attractive environments that leave no potential investors indifferent. This will be done through a clear examination by expert agencies that could eventually be set up for these purposes.

Twinning would thus be a fine mix of worthwhile knowledge and material transfers from external sources to destination countries, without any attempt to erode existing values or established socio-cultural norms. It would be a contribution to building and/or positively transforming existing systems for optimum results. There should be clear avoidance of the temptation to fall prey to the basic importation of models that do not suit the destination environment, which would result in a situation in which context could be mistaken for content.

BRIEF EXAMINATION OF SOME DOMAINS FOR POSSIBLE INVESTMENT

The investment and development questions have been talked about and considered so much that it would appear everything has already been said. Yet, Africa still has to grapple with the obvious realities of poverty and low human development indicators. The highly industrialised West is not only a challenge to the African reality, but sometimes a threat to it. These realities thus leave one with the feeling that the scope and nature of our investments still have to be reconsidered.

This opinion can be understood especially when we consider the investment opportunities that still offer themselves through our local government agencies, or councils. The area of control devolved to these agencies and their largely insufficient intervention capacities clearly expose the huge unexploited potentials that are open to new investors.

Evidently our administrative systems are also not designed to enable foreign investors to deal directly with local governing structures, especially when it concerns investment of an industrial or strategic nature. Council administrations are also charged with the responsibility of offering services of a social nature, especially for the well-being of the community. Investment of this nature may therefore not attract many foreign investors.

Inversely, members of the diaspora will certainly not consider their investments within their origin council areas as foreign investments. They are also heavily involved in granting aid, providing necessary support and other philanthropic endeavours. What else could therefore be more coherent than opening up to this same category of individuals, investment opportunities

that go with upgrading the livelihood of their communities? Take for example the fire or rescue services of councils. Many African councils are unable to provide these services, because of the cost of equipment.

Consider the creation and running of council educational institutions, on the other hand. Investment platforms do exist in this domain in most of our council areas and this could well provide an opening to our diaspora communities. It will not only offer an opportunity for them to invest in building and running schools in collaboration with the councils, but in the particular design of academic programmes in such institutions. What could be more rewarding than to have members of our diaspora spend some time in their home country and take part in the training programmes of some of these schools? This would certainly be an enviable reversal of the brain drain.

Closely linked to this is the development of information centres or public libraries that could offer beautiful settings for the promotion of diaspora literature. Quite a number of these investment opportunities or co-operation ties are not developed because information on diaspora groupings and their activities are not available at public information centres, public libraries and other facilities that are, in most cases, still to be put in place. Why not give the challenge to our diaspora communities to engage in such an investment opportunity that would foster progress for both parties?

Now consider the provision by diasporans of heavy construction or road equipment for hire to improve the intervention capacity of councils. This would help in opening up many landlocked localities. This is still a major challenge to councils. Roads and communication networks, as a whole, are understood to be at the heart of every development effort. Our poor road infrastructure accounts for a major part of the development concerns of African nations. It reduces or even hinders cross-border or adequate regional co-operation. It accounts for major road accidents, contributes to insecurity and even impairs rescue endeavours.

Other investment domains include urban regeneration and the planning of towns and cities. The particular insecurity problem and the living standards of most Africans communities are both closely linked to the visible and poor design of some of these towns and cities. For the political or economic capitals of most African nations, much is still left to be done with regard to cities and towns of the hinterlands of these countries. Particular designs and architectural know-how are not the most available of things. But with the exposure of Africa's diaspora to some of these developed communities and their eventual partnerships with councils, a number of these worries could be laid to rest.

A lot of raw materials and natural resources are still present within our national territories. Sourcing a good market for these resources would

entail just looking at some of the destination environments of our diaspora communities or cross-border council markets. As such, they combine both knowledge of what is available and the markets where these resources are needed. They are also open to the current technological developments for the exploitation of these resources. It would thus be most interesting, and of course profitable, for diaspora concerns to invest in these varied domains, if assisted by the councils that are the principal benefactors.

Take the treatment or transformation of waste material, which is an obvious challenge to African cities today, or primary production or food processing and other extractive industries that are still to be significantly developed within African economies: they all constitute attractive, affordable investment potential for our diaspora networks. Local dairy industries to reduce the importation of milk and cheese are also areas with huge potential. Furthermore, food processing industries have countless fruit varieties that could be exported to offset existing trade imbalances.

Even the development of tourism and leisure facilities still holds unexploited potential. The close of the year 2012 and particularly the month of December witnessed euphoria of no ordinary nature in the small locality of Bafut, in the North West Region of Cameroon. The scene that offered this much curiosity is a little hillside resort, known as The Saddle Hill Ranch. It is a tourist outlet with lodging, conference and catering facilities that offers an incredible view. It was borne out of genuine aspirations for the transfer of knowledge and ideas to their home community by some brothers in the United Kingdom.

Side by side with this kind of venture could be the development of cultural artifacts, crafts or art for export. A lot of talent still underlies African painting, sculpting, bronze or silver design, smelting, etc. Skill-based training could be housed in youth development centres, and programmes could be put in place by major diaspora groupings, within council areas, with the intention of developing this talent. The spoils from these ventures would have, as destination markets, different African or Western economies.

Another worthwhile kind of service and an investment opportunity that is not yet really developed in the African environment is services to older people. Homes for the old are a real service and investment opportunity that is largely unexploited. It could include a health care insurance scheme similar to several Western models, which experience is available to members of our diaspora communities. The old are also a major preoccupation and concern for most council administrations.

Above all, members of the diaspora could be involved with research and design within council areas for the interest of other major investors. Demographic studies are not readily available for most council areas and this could serve as a marketing or advertising instrument to investors. Many

councils do not have departments with the capacity to do these and other studies, because of the lack of available human resources in this domain. Simply identifying these openings could provide useful co-operation arenas between diaspora associations and local councils.

Nonetheless, clear identification of these avenues cannot enable the action to come about without a proper *modus operandi*. Also, the poor infrastructural development, the power crises and an outsider feeling or treatment at home will all impede the return of some of Africa's best and work against the much desired brain gain – and consequently development. For this not to occur, a suitable approach has to be adopted. Consider Adebayo Adedeji's opening statement to the February 1990 Arusha International Conference on Popular Participation, organised by the Economic Community for Africa (ECA), in which he stated unequivocally:²⁵

The democratization of the development process – by which we mean the empowerment of the people, their involvement in decision-making, in implementation and monitoring process – is a condition *sine qua non* for socio-economic recovery and transformation.

Commenting on this, Asante suggests some steps and measures to accompany effective development:²⁶

Development is profoundly a collective enterprise. Therefore, steps have to be contemplated to make the process of development genuinely participative and democratic. This can be achieved only when people have real, not notional access to power and resources. For development has to be engineered and sustained by the people themselves through their full and active participation. Development should not be undertaken on behalf of the people, but by them; it should be the organic outcome of society's value system, its perceptions, its concerns and its endeavours. As such, to achieve and sustain development, it is necessary to ensure the education and training, health, well-being and vitality of the people so that they can participate fully and effectively in the development process.

Linking diaspora associations to local councils therefore correlates as a fruitful investment partnership that may not be impossible, but ineffective, should one of the parties try to undertake it single-handedly. For, as outlined in a conference paper at the second Globelics Conference in Beijing China:²⁷

Because development depends on learning and learning on searching, development invariably depends on aligning the domestic economy to the larger,

foreign world – for even the strongest economies quickly rediscover (if they ever forget) that they cannot generate all world beating ideas in isolation.

I strongly believe that this twinning process could afford one of the best solutions that Africa's development endeavours has ever had.

POSSIBLE PLATFORM OR OPERATIONAL APPROACH: BUILD, OPERATE AND TRANSFER (BOT)

It would be out of place, to think that any particular approach could hold or contain all the answers to any particular scheme. Obviously however, there can be no clearly defined way forward, if an approach is not adopted. Aside from this, particularly tried and tested approaches become a reference after such trials and looking at the consequent results. Our preference for this scheme derives from the Build, Operate and Transfer model as a particular practical framework, but most especially, from a paper presentation of The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat on 'Public Private Partnerships and Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) and Suchlike Schemes'.²⁸

It defines BOT as a model or structure that uses private investment to undertake the infrastructure development that has historically been undertaken by the public sector. In a BOT project, a private company is given a concession to build and operate a facility that would normally be built and operated by the government. In most cases, at the end of the concession period, the private company transfers ownership of the project to the government. BOT operations find extensive application in infrastructure projects, which is one of the major setbacks of our growing economies. Using the Chengdu Water Supply Project in the People's Republic of China as the first BOT water supply project in that country, it was demonstrated that this approach can be successfully implemented at the municipal level and financed externally without government guarantees.

The chapter examines particular schemes of the Fiji Islands and South Africa and the attendant advantages. It highlights different options that could be opened to council and diaspora partners. Openings could range from service and management contracts, to concessions, divestiture and leases. These options may vary, depending on ownership, operations, financing, risk allocation, duration and maintenance. Efficiency gains arising from innovation, management and marketing skills offered by the private sector, as well as greater incentives for the control of construction, operating and maintenance costs, are evident. The provision of additional finance for infrastructure projects enables projects to be brought forward in time, thus generating earlier economic benefit.

The example of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in financing the Chinese water project and the first power generation project in Bangladesh, gives indications about the role the African Development Bank (AfDB) could play in financing eventual projects. ADB sources reported that the first power generation project to be financed by the private sector in Bangladesh now supplies power to agriculture and industry in several parts of the country. This bank also indicates that in 2003, the project enjoyed the prestige of having the lowest power tariffs in the world.²⁹ Advantages would also include shared or transferred risk, training of on-the-spot resources or simple transfer of technology, local and foreign funding possibilities, home and foreign markets for eventual goods produced, softer loan conditions through councils and increased investment opportunities.

Yumurtaci and Erdem³⁰ discuss the advantages that could emanate from eventual investment discounts in the BOT model, stamp-tax deductions and customs-duty exemptions. In BOT approaches, and particularly with councils, there could be direct investment in infrastructure development. This could help reduce public spending and budget deficits. The new sources of capital could also reduce the loan situations of numerous small economies, which frequently look to international funding bodies. The use of private sector capital goes with consequent initiative and know-how. This would accelerate development that would otherwise have to wait, as well as share the risk and burden that goes with the investment. Very often, financing opportunities by private commercial banks is not as open to government agencies as it is to private endeavours. The parties in the twinning relationship would then benefit from each other with institutional advantages on the one hand and necessary financial and human resources on the other. Benchmarks would thus be established from the most successful ventures.

As already discussed, several approaches do exist to render operational partnerships fruitful. Having also clearly stated what the particular positive marks are inherent in the BOT approach, it may not be necessary to belabour the point by insisting on the use of this single approach. There are also other approaches with their positive aspects and their own pitfalls.

SUGGESTIONS

1. Create a monitoring and evaluation commission at the level of the AU to regularly report on important strides made by different African governments in the domain of diaspora participation.
2. Encourage local councils and other local government institutions to enter into free and fruitful partnerships or agreements with constituted diaspora associations.

3. Encourage and integrate the fact that African diaspora associations could have as a destination any African economy of their choice and not necessarily their country of origin, on condition that they understand and respect the existing legislation of the country in question.
4. Work on eradicating or reducing the outsider phenomenon by getting members of our diaspora associations to participate fully in the design, formulation and implementation of community projects.
5. Advocate for the possible reserve of a number of seats on council boards to be contested by members of the diaspora, in order to enlist their active participation in policy formulation at the grassroots level. This will, in a way, maintain the idea of a possible or eventual return.
6. Consider a portfolio to deal with diaspora issues at the level of the AU commission – and a ninth Commissioner in the same regard.
7. Militate for the existence of permanent contacts between diaspora associations and developmental or social networks within accommodating economies, in order to keep the discussion on investment opportunities alive.

Other suggestions from Mohamoud,³¹ following a study conducted by Sahan Consultancy, on commission from AfroNeth with regard to diasporas in the Netherlands, recommend the following:

1. That stakeholders in Africa's development recognise the impact of remittances transferred by Africa's diaspora, on pro-poor finance, poverty alleviation and emergency aid in Africa.
2. Call upon the African diaspora and other parties to initiate the establishment of a diaspora bank (or fund) in the Netherlands to pool diaspora remittances, to help set up similar diaspora banks (or funds) in African countries and thus create a banking network that generates savings for investment in Africa.
3. Propose that Nederlandse Bank, the Dutch government and commercial banks assist the diaspora to devise a regulatory system that makes the transfer of remittances easy, inexpensive, tax deductible and conducive to investment in Africa.
4. Promote a climate that fosters dialogue, celebrates success, builds confidence and creates momentum.
5. Propose a yearly project information-sharing conference for African diaspora groups (or organs) to exchange their experiences and to learn from each other.
6. Recommend that African diaspora organisations and mainstream agencies set up partnerships with regard to Africa, such as country expert groups and joint development projects in Africa.

7. Recommending the creation of an independent think tank with full participation of knowledgeable African diaspora examples, achievements and best practices upon which alternative positions, strategies and policies regarding Africa can be formulated that would lead to better future results.

Rannveig and Newland³² indicate that some degree of caution will have to accompany eventual partnerships. This is so, owing to the fact that there may be unsuspected political or other divisive tendencies that may be borne of negative influences coming from individuals or diaspora groups. Rules will have to be strictly respected to avoid any suspicion of corrupt intentions. Slow and unreliable legal systems are a case in point. Diaspora communities will also have to be given a clear picture of the current state of events. Though these council areas are their original communities, their long stay away may not enable conjecture of an exact picture of current realities. This could lead to frustration and help to discourage future ventures.

CONCLUSION

Having examined this co-operation forum between local councils and diaspora associations as a unique development shuttle for the AU, we are only left to see it tried and implemented on the continent. It carries with it various challenges, as already indicated. Yet the positive claims are far from being representative and as such compensate for any eventual shortcomings. What is more, any initial investment required for this kind of endeavour could really be affordable.

It will require more of a committed resolve than huge material and financial resources to see this dream come true. The AU will have to work on encouraging and improving the current state of diaspora network associations. It will have to foster the integration and participation of these networks by African governments in examining and exposing the best options for possible partnerships. It will have to present laudable initiatives in this domain, as benchmarks for governments or communities to follow. The AU could even pioneer awards or grants, for exemplary cases.

Facilitation and persuasive strategies should not only be undertaken by councils at their level, but should be supported by decisive initial action by the AU. This may be undertaken through the launching of new and interesting schemes that can attract organisations to carry out activities which are judged to benefit the local communities and yield reasonable profits. This could be through grants to voluntary local organisations, or loans to small businesses, persuasion, promotion or advocacy.³³

The various investment opportunities explored depict an Africa with interesting unexploited potential. On the other hand, the concern of members of the diaspora has been focused on the search for investment openings or the domains through which to channel readily available financial resources. However, the problem has too often been the uncomfortable ambient environment that offers itself for such investment. It is on the basis of these realities and others, as well as the future that is identified in this particular kind of twining relationship, that the suggestions are made here. However, only an effective trial can enable us to get home with a clear understanding of this relationship.

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Immigrants' Social Welfare

A Route Towards *Real* Regional Integration

Christal Oghogho Spel

INTRODUCTION

After 50 years, one of the challenges the African Union (AU) needs to focus on, is to send the message to all Africans that the underlining principle for a stronger Africa unity is that 'Africans better hang together or they will assuredly hang separately'.¹ Although this statement was made with reference to nations 'hanging' together, the challenge for a strong and progressive integration is for it to be transmitted to the individuals that make the nations. Using the tool of social policy, the AU can become engrossed in the business of developing bottom-up African integration. This chapter is a contribution to the efforts geared towards bottom-up African integration. It takes a pragmatic, 'everyday-living-at-the-lower-level' look at the situation of African immigrants in Africa. It argues that there is a need for the AU to become more involved in providing and guaranteeing the social welfare and security of Africans in Africa, without the fuss or red tape of national bureaucracy.

Focusing on the problems and challenges that African immigrants are facing in African countries, it argues that the responsibility for appropriate migration policies (that respect and protect the human dignity and social rights of ordinary immigrants) falls on the AU. It emphasises the positive difference the AU can make and the role local individuals can play in the drive for regional integration. With nations overwhelmed by their national challenges, the AU is in a position to offer an overarching umbrella that could strengthen the feeling of belonging and overshadow national structural exclusions for African immigrants in African countries. This chapter is about practice, experiences and the way the AU can become more involved in the *real* life of Africans. In this vein, it is timely and critical to ask questions about the relevance of ordinary individuals to the goals of African regional integration – and vice-versa. Indeed, after 50 years of pursuing

integration goals, it is reasonable to expect that each adult African should be able to relate to the AU in a practical and useful way. It is also critical to ask this question because recent happenings around the world have shown that the political and economic gains of regional co-operation can be undermined and destroyed if local people are not carried along and they act in contrary ways. More so, if after 50 years of organising for African unity, we still hear local cries of 'Zimbabweans must go' and 'Nigerians must go' resounding in various countries, then we must critically review the past integration focus. Historically, regional integration has often been spurred by national governments' concerns and efforts to improve their countries political and economic security and well-being, within the global context. Still, while governments focus on a nation's security and well-being, it is the will and the actions of ordinary citizens that fuel the impetus for the 'real' integration of nations. Although not reflected in the gross domestic product, the will and actions of ordinary citizens embodies the spirit, the vive and the force of integration. Ordinary citizens can demonstrate their power for or against integration, either through voting (in a politically correct way) or else through informal protest and riots (without regard for political rules and regulations). This should be the reason for a focus on the ordinary African as the motor for regional integration.

CONTEXTUALISING AFRICAN MIGRATION

If they remove the borders, what will happen? Now they treat us like cows, you take the cows to eat grass in the morning and return them to the kraals in the evening; they stay there until you come again to take them out ... I blame the Whites, they are dividers and only know how to divide and the blacks are worse, they just follow ...

Interviewee²

Migration is as old as the human race. People have always moved around for several reasons, including the search of food, security or belongingness. Today, with technological advancement, movement has been made relatively easier and quicker; with the right interplay of push-and-pull factors, people are able to move in large numbers across places. However, while migration is not new, modern political and economic arrangements have combined to create a systematic way of controlling the movement of people. History has told us about how humans (and animals) tend to migrate once their immediate environment is not conducive for well-being and their lifestyle. So, migration has been a way of adapting to their changing world and taking charge of the business of keeping alive. In African countries, due

to the various political and economic challenges that have fostered poverty and insecurity, the urgency is strong to search for a place where one can profitably engage in providing for self and family.

Thus the countries (with a focus on urban centres) in Africa that can (relatively speaking) boast of a stable political climate and a growing economy tend to act as a very strong pull factor to the numerous individuals who are searching for a place to make a living. The urge (and subsequent action) to leave an unfavourable place to go to a place where one can make a living is a natural and normal response. However, governments, in their attempts to provide and secure the well-being of their nationals, try to control and exclude others who are not considered national members of their states. Over the years, governments and states have developed several political systems, rules and regulations that have created systems for including 'others' and encouraging movement into their states. In perfect conditions, states will only have migrants that perfectly match the nation's human resource needs.

However, attempts to control migration across states are quite ineffective in Africa and globally. There are millions of undocumented individuals living and working all over the world. With the present global economic crisis, governments in developed nations have become preoccupied with controlling and managing their borders, with the goal of reducing the movement of unwanted people across their borders. In cases where borders cannot be controlled effectively, the strategy to discourage the movement of unwanted individuals turns to institutionalised forms of social exclusion. Furthermore, in the African context of national poverty and macro-economic challenges, migration becomes a highly politicised issue. The migrant is politically and locally conceptualised as the 'criminal other', 'the job stealer', 'the free rider', 'the wife snatcher' and any other unsavoury, criminalised and socially derogating made-up term that effectively embodies an unwanted 'other'.³ In all of these, the undocumented immigrant fares worse, as it is impossible to access any form of succour from formal agencies.

It is widely agreed (by governments and locals) that there is a huge and growing number of undocumented Africans living in popular migration destinations in Africa, such as Johannesburg, Lagos in Nairobi and Cape Town. There are several reasons for this: firstly, inconsistent, inadequate and poorly co-ordinated immigration laws and regulations easily create barriers (administrative or personal) to visa renewal, acquisition or approval. Thus, when the push factors are strong enough and there are insurmountable barriers to legally acquire access or approval, migrants will resort to clandestine or irregular means of staying in the countries and the cities of their choice.⁴ Secondly, national borders between nation states are highly porous, creating huge opportunities for determined migrants to easily (however precariously) cross into the chosen country. Thirdly, one can

easily argue that the global economic crisis has increased anti-immigrant sentiments in other international migration destinations (e.g. Europe), with a corresponding 'fortification' of borders and an increase in restrictive policies. These have greatly reduced and discouraged the otherwise determined migration option for migrants, especially economic migrants, forcing them to seek alternatives within Africa.

Nevertheless, while documentation on migrants shows a huge and growing problem, the 'stock' of immigrants that populate informal sectors in popular migration cities in Africa are a mix of undocumented, 'over-stayers', refugees and 'shuttle'⁵ migrants. Although their legal status and formal privileges and responsibilities differ, they share similar socio-economic challenges. Even in cases where there are legal rules and regulations that guarantee access to certain privileges, benefiting migrants can still be excluded or cut-off from access through the action of malicious and hostile officials and locals. Thus, while certain categories of migrants can be legally protected and guaranteed minimal social welfare, in real terms they are all likely to face severe socio-economic conditions. In this situation, African immigrants who are 'surviving' in the informal sector (thus outside the formal protection of employment laws and regulations) are highly exposed to a tense and precarious context in their host communities. In their delicate situation of balancing social justice with economic viability, national governments tend to emphasise their need to utilise national resources for designated citizens or nationals. In this situation, there is a gap that exists and is felt at the practical, everyday life experiences of the immigrants at the community level.

Acknowledging the above context of mobility across borders in Africa, one can argue strongly that, for the good and development of Africa, there is a need to refrain from adopting a restrictive and hostile approach to migration across borders. It is the reality in Africa that there are ethnic groups divided by colonial borders; and, under the mask of nationality, such traditional ethnic groups engage one another with discriminatory violence and xenophobic attitude. Examples are the traditional Ndebele ethnic group (presently located in South Africa and Zimbabwe) and the traditional Sotho people (now found in Lesotho and South Africa). Furthermore, the violent ethnic rivalry and clashes can be confronted and improved by a strong feeling of oneness under the umbrella of our 'Africanness'; although one can argue that for administrative, political, economic and other practicalities, it may not be realistic to consider obliterating the borders as they exist now. Also, for the same reasons, it could be unrealistic to consider re-drawing or negotiating new borders in place of existing ones. However, there are ongoing academic discussions on the need to undo the colonialist borderlines in Africa as a symbol of real independence from colonial rule.⁶ Nonetheless,

there is the possibility of developing relevant service, administrative and socio-economic provisions that operationally obliterate or disregard the divisions created by borders in Africa. This is already being done on several fronts at the macro level, through regional co-operation between nations.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION, MOBILITY AND IMMIGRANTS' WELFARE: THE GAP

Governments have been quite active in improving the experience of Africans who are interested in crossing national borders, even though the attention has been on the movement of formal labour and commerce. The objective of the regional integration effort is to facilitate the smooth and free movement of people and their rights of residency in central economic communities in Africa. The signing of the Abuja Treaty (that established the African Economic Community) was one such move. Bett⁷ recognised that regional arrangements to govern international immigration are gaining popularity globally. States are increasingly realising that a unilateral approach to managing immigration cannot achieve optimal results. In Africa, such initiatives abound: Article 2 of the 1989 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) treaty seeks the progressive implementation of the free circulation of persons, services, goods and capital.

Article I of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) Abuja Treaty (of June 1991) encourages member states to adopt measures that would guarantee facilitating the freedom of residence, work, ownership and economic activity. The protocol of Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) was first signed on 16 March 1994 and was revised on 25 June 2008, with attention being paid to the free movement of people in the CEMAC zone. Articles 4 and 40 of the 1983 treaty of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the protocol added in its Appendix VII clearly state that community citizens can freely and at any time enter, travel to, establish in and exit any territory of another country member. Member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted in Dakar, Senegal on 29 May 1979 the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment. Articles 7 to 9 of the protocol, which came into effect on 1 July 2010, for the establishment of a common market for East Africa ensure that partner states guarantee the free movement of persons who are citizens of the common market, within their territories. Article 163 of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Treaty (adopted and signed by the Authority of Heads of State and Government on 22 December 1984 in Bujumbura, Burundi) provided for the gradual elimination of visa requirements within COMESA.

In 2005, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) reviewed its protocol on the facilitation of the movement of persons within its community, with aims to guarantee movement without a visa for a maximum of 90 days, residency (permanent and temporary), establishment and labour.

Thus, several sub-regions have taken the initiative to pursue states' integration through co-operation in terms of economic activities and the movement of people. So one can say that Africa does not lack policy initiatives for the free movement of people, residency and labour for Africans. The pressing challenges that have often been pointed out have to do with the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the policies and co-ordination⁸ (amongst others). Still, while this chapter acknowledges the administrative challenges that have been pointed out, it goes further to say that the policies make inadequate provision for the majority of poor African immigrants that eke out their survival from petty trading. The reality is that the majority of African immigrants in African countries end up being active in the informal sector. That is, the immigrants do not have access to formal employment (for reasons like restrictive policies, skills, education gap, being undocumented, etc.) or simply lose their formal jobs and resort to 'survival' options in the informal market.

There are numerous immigrants who fall outside the coverage of the protocols and policies that protect the formally employed migrant and provide for refugees. Furthermore, several of the popular destination African cities are attractive, not only because of the opportunities for formal employment, but also because of their teeming informal markets or sectors (for example Johannesburg, Lagos, Accra, Dar es Salam). Several migrants purposefully cross borders to actively 'try their luck' at making reasonable financial gains from such teeming informal markets. Thus, it is not sufficient to focus only on the free movement of people and labour, but governments should also concern themselves with the welfare of people who have been given access to move, notwithstanding the disapproval, or not, of their mobility. There is a strong need for policy and administrative action that acknowledge the fact that the majority of people who have access to free movement are not going to end up in employment within the formal labour market.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION THROUGH IMMIGRANTS' WELFARE – A WAY FORWARD

Given the rate of poverty and unemployment in Africa, it can be argued that risk, uncertainty and lack are featured in the everyday living experience of the majority of Africans – so, why should the migrants deserve any special consideration? It is an established research finding that migration to a new

place or country, in the context of this article, amplifies the risk of making a living and creates new and more complex challenges. As has been argued,⁹ 'Migration is both informed by risk and uncertainty, and generates risk and uncertainty ...'. While nationals can turn to their government, families and other related third-parties to ameliorate an emergency situation, immigrants are often unable to access immediate help in times of pressing need. So, even as national governments are hesitant to improve their immigration policies, there is a need for improved co-ordination and support across the board.

In the same line, the welfare of immigrants, who are 'surviving' in the informal sector, cannot be separated from the drive for regional integration.¹⁰ It should be of immense concern to agencies working for the integration of regions, as we can learn from the history of social welfare development in the European Union (EU).¹¹ For example, in the drive for an integrated economic community, the EU acknowledged that investment in people and the development of an active dynamic welfare state is crucial. Over the years, the role of the EU in ensuring the social welfare of its citizens across the board has grown considerably. Indeed, the EU recognises that it is critical that the pursuit of an integrated economic community should not compound existing social problems of unemployment, social exclusion and poverty within participating nations.¹² They have continuously enhanced their overarching support and co-ordination over the years.

During this time, social policy concerns increasingly took a substantial role in the deliberations of EU institutions. Starting with gender equality¹³ of salaries, the EU has increasingly added other areas of social concern.¹⁴ They consistently recognised social protection as a prerequisite in their drive to create a knowledge-based economy capable of sustainable economic growth. In this sense, social protection was increasingly treated as a productive factor, largely influencing moves for quality improvement based on the European Social Model. Their model showed a 'broadening of the social policy agenda, from an almost exclusively employment-focused social policy'.¹⁵ Issues of social protection and social exclusion have increasingly taken a central role in regional integration in Europe.

There are several reasons why the AU should take related steps to increase the focus on the social welfare of members of African communities. Deacon¹⁶ listed three broad headings that capture the relationship of social policy to migration. These are:

1. The access of different categories of migrants to social welfare.
2. The impact of immigration on the social policy and social services of host countries.
3. The impact of emigration on the social policy and social services of sending countries.

Generally, people are the facilitators of a vibrant economy and their socio-economic security will directly influence their ability to participate and identify with the community (immediate and extended).

More so, the movement of people and labour across borders tends to create tension that can easily escalate into violent conflict. Such tension can be felt mostly at two levels: the macro or policy level; and the micro or communal level. At the macro level, the challenge of mobility across border centers on the need to ensure that destination states are not socially and economically swamped by an influx of migrants taking advantage of easy access that is facilitated by a regional integration drive. Also there is a large and disparate level of poverty and social protection in each of the nation states in Africa. The disparity in the generosity of nations' social protection or welfare programmes will act as a strong attraction to would-be immigrants to favoured states. Such states, with a large influx of immigrants, will react by introducing internally restrictive policies with possible outcomes of institutionalised social exclusion and criminalisation of migration. When migration becomes a highly politicised issue, there is no opportunity to examine its benefits, opportunities and challenges practically.

In the same sense, nationals of states with a 'generous' welfare provision, will feel threatened that the large influx of migrants will greatly reduce and eventually swamp their benefits, creating feelings of xenophobia and motivating acts of violence against immigrants. In South Africa, for example, African immigrants are continually harassed, physically abused and denied access to social services (hospital, schools), which they are legally entitled to at the community level. Poor South Africans feel threatened, deprived and cheated of their scarce resources by immigrants. As long as South Africa cannot provide these essential services and support at an appropriate level of capacity to meet the needs of its citizens, these hostile feelings will remain and grow. African immigrants are (sometimes rightly) seen and perceived at the community level as being highly needy, poor and unable and unwilling to pay for their welfare. In this situation, facilitation of the free movement of African migrants across borders, even for regional integration purposes, will only exacerbate the tension and conflict in poor communities.

However, this author argues that, rather than discourage migration, the cause of the hostility and conflict can be strategically managed and eliminated, in order to harness its benefits. Continuing with the South Africa example, the crux of the tensions and conflict lies in the strength of the belief, at the communal level, that immigrants are dependent on the government. On the contrary, however, several studies¹⁷ have highlighted the economic contribution of immigrants to informal trade. However, the reality is that reports of such studies are not disseminated at the community level, for several reasons, including illiteracy and everyday relevance. Indeed, one

can say that the paper component of the journals in which such reports are published are more relevant to the practical needs of the local people (for example, as wrapping for products sold on the street). This clearly shows the need for innovation in the dissemination of relevant research reports at the local level.

Furthermore, there is another strategy that can target the crux of hostility and conflict for immigrants via the intervention of a supra agent, like the AU. In this strategy, the relevant needs of the immigrant can be covered by the AU and the immigrants, in an innovative social insurance scheme for African immigrants. This scheme would recognise African nationals, target specific needs, by-pass the politics of border-crossing and operate at the communal level on an individual basis. Exploring the challenges and strengths of such a scheme would take us beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, if such a scheme is successfully activated, immigrants would practically identify themselves as Africans, while their hosts would be assured that their government's scarce resources were not being utilised for the welfare of immigrants. In addition, basic-service providers will be more motivated to allow immigrants access to relevant services, rather than obstructing it through informal practices. The relevant point here is that the active participation of the AU in the social welfare concerns of poor African immigrants in African countries will contribute to regional integration, by ameliorating (in a practical and locally identifiable way) one of the main causes of host-migrant conflict and hostility at the local level.

In this vein, the AU could adopt three roles, in line with the goals of regional integration. The first and foremost of these (especially as the basis for the development of efficient and effective welfare-service delivery) is the recording of statistical information on immigrants (with a focus on undocumented immigrants). The AU could develop a unit that would provide a recording service for the registration of demographic information of undocumented Africans living in other African countries. These immigrants, though illegally thought to reside in their host countries, can still legally identify themselves as Africans. They could give their demographic information to the AU, if they were guaranteed non-interference from host national agents, especially interference that leads to deportation. This does not suggest the need for a new African passport, but rather an office (physical or virtual) where immigrants could register their presence – preferably in an electronic format.

Furthermore, in line with the goals of regional integration, the AU needs to centralise the issues of social exclusion and protection within agreements for the free movement of labour and people. While emphasis has been on free movement, there is the need for the emphasis to change to access to substantive social welfare across border.

The need for a focus on welfare across borders would definitely have repercussions for national governments of receiving and sending countries. So, in addition, the AU would need to improve its capacity to provide overarching co-ordination and administration for immigrants' welfare in African countries. The administrative cost would be high and require a creative partnership between the AU, national governments and individual migrants. Participating in such a partnership would protect receiving governments from being swamped by immigrant needs, ensure the social protection of poor African immigrants and promote regional integration – a win-win situation for all.

SOME PRESSING QUESTIONS ON IMMIGRANTS' WELFARE

Often enough, the teaser behind migrant hostility feeds on the rhetorical question: Why do these migrants remain in their host countries, despite the harsh conditions? The answer to this question is too complex to be explained away by economic rationality. Whatever the reason for staying in the host country, the fact remains that there is a social responsibility to provide the basic necessities of life or else to provide a guarantee of this in times of emergencies.¹⁸ For example, it is worrisome to think that after years of being active in the informal sector, a poor and aged immigrant is left vulnerable and without social care. He is unable to access care, either from his home country or host country; he is probably not registered as either an emigrant or an immigrant. Although he used his youthful years to work in the informal sector, he is unable to acquire enough savings, so after 30-50 years of petty trade, he becomes destitute. A lot of poor immigrants follow a similar life course, with more or fewer twists and turns, but similar endings. He is sentenced to a life of destitution, not just because of gaps in the social policies, but also because of gaps in the agents and institutions that could make a difference.

This article has argued that providing care for immigrants who are active in the informal sector would create a win-win situation for the host society, the immigrants and the region. The host society would benefit from the continuous business activities in the informal sector, which translates into several socio-economic benefits. The immigrants could actively change their economic situation through entrepreneurship and be assured of support during difficult and vulnerable periods of their life. The region would benefit from the promotion of a socio-cultural identity of Africans. It is an identity that cuts across ethnicity and nationality and which could create feelings of belonging, oneness and community. This would meet the basic requirements for co-operation, cohesion and togetherness within migrant hosting communities, and provide the missing boost for regional integration.

Furthermore, there is the moral question of whether or not adopting these roles indirectly encourages the undocumented movement of people across borders. Firstly, history has shown us that the Athenian polis allowed migrants to trade, study and work in Athens, and considered this beneficial for the growth of their society. Migrants were only excluded from the political rights of the citizenship, thus successfully harvesting the benefits of open borders in a win-win situation for migrants and state. Also, presently there is a growing scholarship on Migration Without Borders (MWB) that challenges conventional border control and explores innovative alteration to current migration policies and practice.¹⁹ In this vein, Pâecoud, and Guchteneire,²⁰ argued:

The MWB scenario is often dismissed as unrealistic. While it may indeed be an unlikely perspective for the near future, there are several arguments for going beyond a simplistic dismissal of free movement. The universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 'Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country'. (Article 13-2). Only emigration is recognized as a fundamental right, which raises the issue of the actual meaning of this right in the absence of immigration possibilities, and points to the necessity of envisaging a more comprehensive right to mobility.

Secondly, this article has argued that undocumented movement across African borders will occur because of the state and conditions of national borders across the continent. Ignoring this fact creates more social problems for the receiving country. Also, harsh restrictive tactics will lead to the institutionalisation of gross abuses against the human dignity of migrants, and the moral ethics of a progressive and developing society. Furthermore, as was pointed out earlier in the article, migration is as old as the human race; however, the illegality in migrating was only developed in line with the ambitions of states to systematically control the number and the type of immigrants.²¹ So, it could definitely be improved upon for the good of all.

Finally, one of the most re-occurring contestations to immigrants' welfare is the question of a lack of financial resources at the national level. The argument has always been that if citizens cannot access adequate social welfare provisions, immigrants (as strangers) cannot be expected to get such welfare provision. This is a valid point and this article has dealt with it by proffering that a supra agent (like the AU) take responsibility for the welfare of African immigrants. This lays to rest questions on the right to access based on nationality and creates an inclusive platform for all Africans. However, this does not deal with the question of financial resources,

knowing that the AU is currently donor funded. This article focused on arguing for the social welfare coverage of Africans who move from their country of origin and who are thus strangers in their place of residence.

The question of how the African Union could fund such a scheme, within its present context of financial constraint, is beyond the scope of this article and is discussed in detail in another article by this author, titled 'When the social net is tangled in governmental disorder: Prospects and Challenges for Innovative Social Welfare for African Immigrants'.²² This article argued that it is imperative for sustainability and ownership that such a scheme is funded from Africa and by Africans. It then proffers and discusses the strength and weaknesses of three possibilities: An innovative contributory (by the immigrants) social insurance scheme; funding opportunities from states; and funding possibilities from the African diaspora. However, the possibilities and opportunities for funding such a scheme are quite numerous and definitely not limited to the above mentioned three.

CONCLUSION

This article has argued that the neglected welfare of poor African immigrants negatively affects regional integration and that the AU should be practically involved in providing and ensuring the social welfare of African immigrants in Africa. Thus, the AU could create the context for states to guard and control accession, rights and responsibilities of citizenship, without curtailing the rich societal benefits of a multi-cultural society. There is indeed a strong motivation for an innovative exploration of free movement in Africa, particularly as it pertains to the gains for regional integration.

To this end, the article suggested that the AU should press for the centralisation of issues of social exclusion and protection for informal actors, within regional agreements for free movement of labour and people. The article argued that the AU should create the capacity to record the demographic information of African immigrants in African countries, with particular attention on immigrants who would otherwise be undocumented in their host country. Finally, this information should be used by the AU, in partnership with national governments and the immigrants, to develop an innovative social insurance scheme for poor African immigrants.

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Separatist Movements, Insurgencies and Integration in Africa

Manji Augustine Diyal

INTRODUCTION

We are supportive of African integration, but we are very sceptical too. Africa has been talking about integration for 30 or more years and they haven't done very much because they haven't gotten from rhetorics to the implementation phase.¹

The need for unity has been a recurring decimal in Africa's irredentist struggles against the forces of fragmentation and general under-development. In this struggle, African leaders have continually stressed the desirability of continental integration as a viable means to further the continent's development. This desire has continued to suffer setbacks, as a result of several disincentives, largely on account of rising insecurity and internal strife.

This state of affairs has always gravitated towards political instability, with the multiplier effect of undermining the existence of states and integration of the continent. The beginning of the twentieth century has been tumultuous for Africa and Africans. Nearly every sub-region on the continent is faced with an unstable, dangerous and frequently violent political environment. The violence is striking in that so much of it brews in the context of internal discontent and insurgencies.

In recent times, Africa has become home to some of the most costly conflicts in the world. Casualties have been estimated in millions. This represents a departure from the expectations and enthusiasm that greeted political independence in Africa in the 1960s² and the optimism regarding a somewhat integrated continent of Africa that characterised the immediate post-independence period.³ The transfer of power to post-independence African leaders was envisaged as an opportunity to push the fortunes of the new states to greater heights, especially in terms of economic development. But political independence, in actuality, came with its own challenges.

Part of the broader leadership debacle in post-colonial African states was the prevalence of sectional or ethnic imbalance within African states,

with its attendant inequality in economic development, access to political power and state resources. The net effect of this arrangement was the enthronement of exclusionary politics. Inevitably, states began to witness an increasing demand for justice, fairness and equity, among others.

Separatist movements developed with endless agitation for self-determination, often characterised by insurgent movements geared towards separation.⁴ These separatist demands are usually resisted by the existing political order because of a perceived threat to the state's political and territorial integrity. Ensuing conflicts of interest between agitation and resistance groups thus account for common causes of war.⁵

As Claude Ake avers:

All over Africa, the elites got embroiled in conflict aimed at capturing state power. The purpose for capturing state power is purely to advance their economic interests. State power in Africa has come to symbolize a license, a veritable means of creating and consolidating the material wellbeing of the elites. In fact, laying hold of political power came to be synonymous to guaranteeing ethnic privileges. Because of the importance attached to state power on account of its utilitarian value, the contest for its acquisition has been elevated to the status of war.⁶

The premium attached to state power and the pockets of conflict that dot the political landscape of Africa have made the achievement of integration a herculean task. The fact must be stressed, however, that integration is a product of conscious, premeditated and well-calculated resolve to cede certain aspects of a state's sovereignty to a common pool.

This chapter lends voice to the observation that the corporate existence of African nation-states, more than ever, is on the edge of a precipice. This is due, in part, to the heightened threat of political, ethnic and religious conflict, economic stagnation and near absolute erosion of African values by Western ideologies. Not only does this state of affairs circumscribe possibilities of economic development, it makes integration almost impossible. This chapter also underscores the importance of a sustained interrogation of insurgencies for better understanding. It argues that the attainment of an integrated continent of Africa is a function of the outlook and status of the corporate existence of the nation-states.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

It would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to find many volumes on political history where reference is not made to insurgencies, insurrection,

rebellion, revolution, uprising and the like.⁷ Insurgency is hardly a new phenomenon, as Roman armies could have reported from Gaul, Judea, or elsewhere. Insurgency has been the most prevalent type of armed conflict since the emergence of organised political communities.

Just like other concepts in strategic studies, multiple definitions exist for the concept of insurgency. However, most competing definitions contain common elements. The definitions used in this chapter draw upon these commonalities and some of the most useful, unique elements of individual definitions.

For example, O'Neil defines insurgency as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities, in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (for example, organisational expertise, propaganda and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate or sustain the basis for the legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.⁸ Metz and Millen⁹ see insurgency as a strategy adopted by non-ruling groups within a state to attain political objectives when they are unable to do so through conventional means.

Insurgency is therefore the strategy that is used mostly by those outside government and it is usually characterised by protracted, asymmetric and psychological warfare, which mobilises the population. The end result of this is to discredit the existing government and turn the tables in order to gain the upper hand and build legitimacy.

Insurgency, according to a 2012 publication on the analysis of the concept by the United States government, is viewed as a protracted political-military activity that is directed towards complete or partial control of the resources of a country, through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organisations.¹⁰

Madan, Praveen, *et al.* aver that insurgency is an armed insurrection or rebellion against an established system of government in a state. Insurgency aims to replace the existing regime with a regime that is more conducive to the inclination of the insurgents. Movements for independence in colonies are of this nature. Such centripetal insurgency also exists in authoritarian regimes that were formally independent. Centrifugal insurgency, on the other hand, is aimed at secession from the incumbent state and the formation of a new entity.¹¹ Thus, this kind of insurgency is often seen in expressions of ethnic nationalism. Individuals and groups are recruited into insurgency movements by two principal appeals: (1) to their sense of ethnic identity; and (2) to their political allegiance.¹²

While each of the definitions has a distinct interpretation, they nonetheless share some common elements. There is a convergence of opinion as regards the characterisation of insurgency as a 'struggle' with conflict colouration, rather than mere 'activity'. The definitions also establish a

common denominator of the phenomenon, not as one activity, but as a protracted campaign of activities aimed at subverting or displacing government legitimacy or control.

Insurgency uses unconventional warfare, including guerrilla war. Since insurgencies are protracted conflicts, external or third party intervention is the norm for mediation. A third party may be involved because it has been pulled into the conflict and it is sometimes forced to take sides. A third party may also get involved because it wants to take advantage of the situation, or use an insurgency movement to penetrate the concerned state militarily or economically for its own interests.¹³

Insurgency matters today because it is linked to the phenomenon of trans-national terrorism. Insurgents have used terrorism in the operational sense, deterring those who support the government and creating an environment of violence and insecurity in order to erode public trust in the regime. But now terrorism plays a strategic role as well. Insurgents can use terrorism as a form of long-range power projection against outsiders who support the government they hold in contempt.

Societal cleavages along racial, ethnic and religious lines are frequently among the root causes of insurgency and can be either helpful or detrimental to the progression of an insurrection. When one group enjoys disproportionate political and economic power and benefits relative to other groups, insurgents often find an opportunity to gain support from the disadvantaged groups. If the relatively deprived group constitutes the majority, the possibility of gaining support is naturally greater. The same is said of minority governments that deny the majority political participation and practise economic discrimination. Even if disadvantaged groups do not constitute the majority, they can still provide the foundation for serious insurrection.¹⁴

Worthy of mention is the fact that insurgency that seeks to overthrow the government and obtain power is known as revolutionary insurgency. Separatist insurgencies are implied when and where insurgents have more limited objectives, which may include separation.

The adjective *separatist* is used to refer to the objective of creating a new political sub-unit out of an existing political sub-unit within a 'sovereign' country. The new political sub-unit would have constitutional authority equivalent to that of the existing political sub-unit. Within this context, the term refers to seeking to create a new state out of an old state.

The *group* to which the adjective 'separatist' is attached refers to any collection of individuals who occupy a common territory. It may or may not be characterised by a common ethnicity, religion or language. Its *identity*, as a group, is distinguishable from other groups by the centrality of its support for the separatist objective. Its membership is in flux, depending on the

impact of events and the persuasiveness of separatist leaders. In addition to support for separatism, the separatist identity may entail a variety of other beliefs that support the objective.¹⁵

FACTORS INFLUENCING INSURGENCY

Having attempted a discussion on the concept of insurgency, it is also pertinent to understand the factors that generally influence insurgency in most parts of the world. These factors include, but are not limited to, socio-economic, socio-political and ideological factors. These factors, combined with others, generally account for the rise of insurgents.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS

According to Goldstone, in most cases, economic factors of one sort or another play a key part in the outbreak and endurance of political violence.¹⁶ Numerous past and current cases provide ample evidence that economic inequalities, which create a perception of relative deprivation, are a major cause of insurrectionary violence. In some situations, where a ruling elite and capitalist class deny the peasant and working classes a 'fair share' of the wealth, economic considerations become a primary motive for violence; in many other cases, they are intertwined with, and reinforce, other grievances.

In fact, O'Neil argues that many conflicts that seem, on the surface, to be based on communal rivalries, upon closer inspection, turn out to have a significant economic dimension.¹⁷ In calling for attention to the importance of economic factors in many insurgent situations, the present chapter does not suggest that there is primacy in all cases, as there are situations where economic factors are inconsequential in insurrections.

POLITICAL CULTURE

Political culture refers to the salient and enduring attitudes or orientation of people towards aspects of politics that are observable. More specifically, it encompasses their knowledge, feelings and judgements about aspects of politics. Although the study of political culture covers a vast range of orientations toward politics, we shall limit our attention to those with noteworthy implications for insurgency.

In their pioneering cross-national study of political culture, *The Civil Culture*, Almond and Verba developed three key concepts – parochial, subject and participant – to characterise the differences between people in terms of

their awareness of the political process, their disposition, their feelings and their judgments about their ability to influence it.¹⁸ These differences help us to further understand the circumstances insurgent leaders take advantage of, in order to mobilise support from society for or against a system of rule.

Those citizens, who have little or no awareness of the political system at the national level and a low perception of their ability to influence it, belong to the *parochial* group. They eschew involvement in political activity, including insurgencies. They do not offer much in terms of support for insurgent movements, unless government intrudes significantly into their sphere.¹⁹

Subjects have become part of the political system and are aware of its impact on their lives, but are not active in shaping policy. Normally, subjects are not inclined to join insurgent movements, as seen in the conservative orientation of slum dwellers in many countries. This does not mean that they will tolerate adverse treatment and discrimination by the government ad infinitum. Skilful propaganda by insurgent cadres can change citizens' orientation by creating a fresh awareness. But since such a process may take years, governments have the time and opportunity to respond. The nature of government's response will obviously affect the magnitude of change in popular attitudes. Where the response is poor, erstwhile loyal subjects may become alienated from the system.

This development may provide a breeding ground for insurgent movements to effect changes in policies they consider illegitimate. While this may also involve support for a change of regime or authority, subjects are not necessarily motivated to become active participants in day-to-day political processes. Rather, they desire better judicial, economic and social treatment. This accounts for fluidity in commitment, as they may defect from the insurgent position and revert to their more passive role once their desires are met. Not surprisingly, the rank and file of many insurgent organisations in the developing world fall within this category.²⁰

Participants are generally more informed and cognisant of national political institutions and wish to engage actively in the decision-making process. They usually include educated elites, who are confident of making an impact on national policies and on governance process generally. With such an orientation, they are vulnerable to recruitment by insurgents, if their desire to participate is blocked and if they become alienated from both the authorities as well as the system of rule.²¹ This is given fillip by Goldstone's view to the effect that alienation of elites is a fundamental condition for insurrection.²²

So, there is a variation in desired political participation. Hence, the essential questions are: Who wishes to participate?; and, What kind of participation do they have in mind? In general, the larger and more educated the group seeking participation, the greater the problem they could pose.

Besides, the kind of participation desired is also important. Not all will be akin to Western-style formulas of participation, like insurgents seeking to establish Islam as the state religion, as seen in the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria and Tuareg insurgents in Northern Mali. In spite of these three basic orientations, other attitudes that are rooted in more general societal values and norms may be politically relevant to insurgencies. Given the vast range of social values and norms in the world, it exceeds our purposes here to identify and classify all of them. Instead, we will suggest a few possibilities that analysts need to be aware of, with the caveat that an assessment of other values and norms may be necessary on a case-by-case basis.

INSURGENCIES AND INTEGRATION OF AFRICA

Numerous African states experienced armed struggle for independence and/or post-independence civil wars. During much of the twentieth century, these were often fuelled by the Cold War, as Africa was equally enmeshed in what could be described as zero-sum global geopolitical competition among the competing powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War era has since brought with it a remarkable decline in intra-state and inter-state insurgencies, as many have been resolved through diplomatic initiatives.²³

Yet in other cases, long-running conflicts on the continent are entering their second or even third decade. These tend to be struggles that were peripheral to the Cold War conflict, receiving relatively little attention from either the Soviet Union or the United States. Intra-state conflict in Africa has had a serious negative effect on inter-state co-operation and possible integration. From 1970 to date, not less than 30 conflicts or large-scale wars have been fought on the continent, with most of them being intra-state in nature. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries on the continent were afflicted with armed conflict.²⁴

Nnoli opines that most of these conflicts often hinge on a high level of social diversity, ethnic cleavage, sub-national identity, separatist tendencies and the struggle for political power by social forces in those countries. For example, northern Uganda has the unfortunate distinction of suffering almost twenty uninterrupted years of armed conflict between the forces of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the central government.²⁵

The post-Cold War era has also seen the creation of two relatively new but fully-developed regional conflict zones. The first being the intertwining of a series of localised conflicts in western Africa, primarily around the Mano River basin. Countries drawn into this conflict zone include Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea. Adejumobi observed that:

West Africa, like the Great Lakes region, has been an epicentre of armed conflict in Africa in which some of the most severe and sustained conflicts have taken place within the last two decades. The Mano River states of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea have all witnessed rebel insurgencies. Côte d'Ivoire, a country that was once an oasis of peace and stability in the region, also collapsed into a civil war. Senegal has been battling with an unending armed separatist revolt in the Casamance region, while Nigeria, the biggest country in the region, is embroiled in severe socio-political crises of an ethnic, communal, and religious nature, with no solution coming in sight. The crisis in the Niger Delta, which has transformed into kidnapping with heavy consequences on economic activities in the region, is one of the most disturbing.²⁶

In its quest to institute a Taliban-like Islamic system of rule in the northern part of Nigeria, Boko Haram has been responsible for a series of bombing and terror attacks. The recent and most challenging of these conflicts in Africa are those in Mali and Sudan. Even with the independence of Southern Sudan, the axis has continued to witness crises of varying degrees, which have become a herculean task for the African Union.

The second conflict zone pointed out by Nnoli was seen in Central Africa with the collapse of the Mobutist state in Zaïre, now the Democratic Republic of Congo. Central Africa and the Horn of Africa have been boiling pots of civil and military strife since the 1960s. Shortly after independence, the Congo went up in flames of internal conflict, leading to the death of many prominent Congolese. This necessitated foreign intervention that helped to assuage the warring factions and thus helped to restore peace in the country. But peace in the Congo, both the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), is demonstrably a scarce commodity, as tension still persists.²⁷ The M23 rebel group has posed a serious security challenge in the DRC. As in West Africa, various localised conflicts have assumed sub-regional dimensions – be it in Angola, Burundi, Chad, Rwanda, Namibia, Sudan, Uganda or Zimbabwe.²⁸

The rationalisation often put forward for the conflict ranges from the quest for self-determination, or dislodgement of corrupt and inept regimes, to redirecting the ship of statecraft for purposeful leadership, in terms of either socio-economic or political development.²⁹

The effects of the conflict on the citizenship and identity cannot be overemphasised. Although the concepts of citizenship and state have changed in time and space, the idea of modern citizenship is still connected with the notion of the state. The notion of citizenship is a political artefact through which the state constitutes and perpetually reproduces itself as a form of social organisation. Thus, Mudashiru points to the fact that citizenship is the means through which the modern nation-state, made up of various

nationalities, seeks to forge a common identity and collective experience for its people. Indeed, without the concept of citizenship, the idea of a modern nation-state cannot be translated into practice. Thus, it is the sense of citizenship that African states tend to be eroding through the prevalence of conflict and the crises on the continent.³⁰

It is extremely difficult to discuss the array of insurrections and armed conflicts that dot the landscape of Africa in detail in a discussion like this. However, we shall attempt an overview of some of the salient ones, particularly those that currently attract regional and international attention and response. We shall also attempt to look at the trans-national outlook that some of these insurgent groups have assumed in recent times. The section will then be concluded by attempting a discussion on the implications of integration in Africa.

TRANS-NATIONAL INSURGENCIES

We need not stress the fact that one of the major defining features of modern nation-states is possession of the legitimate authority to use force within a sovereign territory. This coercive force is used to maintain law and order, enforce contracts, protect lives and property, and to deter violent challengers. This power area is largely defined by a state's given territorial borders. The police and military forces of a state have no authority outside of their jurisdiction. For instance, countries often co-ordinate military and police efforts to arrest and extradite fugitives; however, co-ordinating such efforts requires trans-national co-operation and collaboration between states.³¹

Civil wars and insurgencies are unlikely to emerge if the state can successfully monitor and control subversive elements. Unfortunately, many African states are exceptionally weak; hence they cannot police their jurisdiction effectively. They often fall short of the requisite ability to project force across their territory. While poor state capacity can provide an alibi for insurgents to find a domestic safe haven, all states, even relatively strong ones, are constrained by their borders.

On account of these deficiencies, states have suffered from a spill-over effect from internal conflict in neighbouring states with a record of instability, rising poverty, bad governance and attendant discontent. 'Bad neighbourhoods' can facilitate insurgencies by providing militant trans-national sanctuaries where they can operate in relative safety.³²

While some countries have engaged in co-operative strategies to contain trans-national violence, quite a few have been drawn into prolonged conflict over the issue of foreign sanctuaries. The presence of cross-border militant groups undoubtedly internationalises domestic insurgencies and leads to

tacit or explicit bargains between neighbouring states over how to deal with the problem. At times, target states use coercive bargaining against their neighbours to press them to evict rebel units in their territory.

Troop movements along borders, cross-border strikes against rebel bases and direct negotiations with the armed forces of a neighbouring state (among other tactics) are used to increase pressure on a rebel organisation's host. At other times, states may devise co-operative strategies to police their borders and launch joint operations against militant groups. Doing so requires clear lines of communication and effective co-ordination of military action. Finally, states sometimes simply ignore the problem. In the latter instance, rather than direct confrontation or active co-operation, some states may be unwilling or unable to engage their neighbours, thus allowing the problem to fester – perhaps for years. To help understand these patterns, Tables 20.1 and 20.2 present a listing of cases where Trans-National Insurgency (TNI) groups spanned national boundaries. This list contains information on TNIs that were active during the 1990s and 2000s and where there was extensive use of neighbouring territory.

Table 20.1: Conflict Cases

Origin	Host	Rebel/insurgent group
Burundi	DR Congo	National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD), Forces for the Defence of Democracy – FDD (CNDD-FDD)
Burundi	Tanzania	CNDD, CNDD-FDD, Palipehutu, Palipehutu-FNL (National Forces of Liberation - FNL)
DR Congo/Zaire	Rwanda	Democratic Alliance for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL), Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)
DR Congo/Zaire	Uganda	RCD, RCD-ML, Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
Eritrea	Sudan	Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement
Ethiopia	Eritrea	Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, Oromo Liberation Front
Guinea	Liberia	Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea
Liberia	Guinea	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
Rwanda	DR Congo/Zaire	Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda
Senegal	Guinea-Bissau	Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance
Sudan	Eritrea	Sudan's People's Liberation Army
Sudan	Ethiopia	Sudan's People's Liberation Army
Sudan	Uganda	Sudan's People's Liberation Army
Uganda	DR Congo/Zaire	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF), West Nile Bank Front (WNBf)

Source: Salehyan, 2010.³³

The above Table 20.1 indicates where cases of trans-national insurgent activities resulted in conflict between states.

Table 20.2: Neutral Cases

Origin	Host	Rebel/insurgent group
Chad	Libya	Movement for Democracy and Development
Chad	Niger	Movement for Democracy and Development
Chad	Nigeria	Movement for Democracy and Development
Guinea	Sierra Leone	Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea
Liberia	Burkina Faso	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
Liberia	Cote d'Ivoire	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
Liberia	Sierra Leone	Ulimo-J
Rwanda	Uganda	Rwandan Patriotic Front
Senegal	Gambia	Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance
Sierra Leone	Liberia	Revolutionary United Front
Mali	Libya	Tuareg separatist National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA)

Source: Salehyan, 2010.³⁴

The above Table 20.2 indicates where affected states chose to remain neutral in the face of trans-national insurgent activity.

The identified internal conflicts with international dimensions have had grave repercussions for the economy of the affected states and the regions as a whole. In general terms, conflict of this nature retards development, as efforts are dissipated that relate to micro-sovereign issues of economic survival, the containment of internal pressures, the maintenance of sovereignty and the rebuilding of institutions destroyed during insurrectional campaigns. Thus, preoccupation with resolution of such conflict shifts the integration project to the background.

PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR INSURGENCY IN AFRICA

There is no gainsaying the fact that many states in Africa are endowed with abundant human and material resources. It is for this reason that, at independence from colonial rule, the existence of such resources led many to be optimistic about the future of their countries. However, rather than facilitate improvement in the well-being of the citizenry, proceeds from these mineral resources have often fuelled political violence, general insecurity

and human rights abuses – among other indices of economic disorder and socio-political instability.

Over the past decades, poverty has increased as key public institutions have crumbled. The explanation for this seems to find expression in the reasons advanced by Reno in analysing conflict in Africa. Reno constructs economic predation around the shadow state that exemplifies the ‘nexus between corruption and politics’, in which public office holders create a parallel state that is built on personal ties, patronage and illicit deals that profit their patrimonial works.³⁵

The Human Rights Watch report of 2012 lends credence to the above, particularly in the case of Nigeria. Nigeria is reputed to have Africa’s largest oil and gas reserves, with exports of US\$86.2 billion worth of petroleum products in 2011 alone. In spite of this enormous wealth, hundreds of billions of US dollars of public funds have been lost to corruption and mismanagement. Graft and corruption remain endemic at all levels of government.³⁶ The net effect of this includes, but is not limited to, violent contest for state powers in the midst of rising poverty and social discontent. The Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics revealed that the percentage of Nigerians living in ‘absolute poverty had increased nationwide from 55 to 61 per cent between 2004 and 2010’.³⁷

Indeed, poor governance and corruption have provided a ready justification for insurgent movements in Africa. Like in the case of the Boko Haram insurrection in Nigeria, a media report has it that:

Corruption became the catalyst for Boko Haram. [Mohammed] Yusuf [the group’s first leader] would have found it difficult to gain a lot of these people if he was operating in a functional state. But his teaching was easily accepted because the environment, the frustrations, the corruption [and] the injustice made it fertile for his ideology to grow fast, very fast, like wild fire.³⁸

As far back as 2004, early followers of Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of the insurgent group, cited increasing corruption and misery as motivation for their actions. This view was corroborated by one of his adherents, who also made an allusion to their objective of fighting corruption by institutionalising Islamic government.³⁹

In the same vein, the situation in Mali seems to be related to that of Nigeria. In a report prepared for the US congress by the Congressional Research Service, Arieff avers that:

Mali’s instability stems from both internal and external factors. These include poor governance, the corrosive impact of drug trafficking and other illicit commerce, military fragmentation and collapse, limited implementation of

previous peace accords with Tuareg rebel groups, and an uptick in regional arms and combatant flows from Libya since 2011. High-level corruption, reportedly tied, in part, to criminal networks, contributed to public distaste for the government and reported initial support for the coup against former President Amadou Toumani Toure.⁴⁰

Arieff adds that the Tuaregs:

have also complained of neglect and discrimination by the Malian government, which has been dominated by southern ethnic groups since independence. Most recently, negotiated settlements in the early 1990s and 2006-2009 – mediated by the government of Algeria – laid the groundwork for fragile peace by promising greater regional autonomy, the integration of Tuareg combatants into the military and more state aid for the impoverished north. The government never fully implemented these agreements, and non-implementation became a grievance unto itself.⁴¹

Thus, it can be rightly argued that contemporary insurgency in Africa is simply one of the many manifestations of the declining state and systemic weaknesses being experienced across the continent. Insurgency co-exists with many other negative indicators, most importantly the rise of militias, criminal gangs and syndicates, humanitarian crises, crises of identity, and trans-national terrorism.

CONCLUSION

Insurgency remains a recurring phenomenon in Africa, with its attendant consequences. The incidence of insurgency across the various sub-regions is mind boggling. Some of the factors that account for this development include, but are not limited to, a collapse of the value system, bad governance, poverty, and sectional politics, among other fallout or chaotic politics.

Pan-African integration is indispensable for Africa's presence to be felt in the globalised world. Hence, to advance the cause of pan-African integration, the noticeable tempo of democratisation of African states should be sustained. There is no gainsaying the fact that democracy will engender constructive engagement between and among stakeholders and de-emphasise the personalisation of power – a factor that accounts largely for separatist tension and erodes the possibilities of pan-African integration.

The pathway to overcoming these challenges also lies in reordering the domestic arena and the institution of the necessary framework that could foster trust and sustained confidence between the rulers and the ruled.

Trust and confidence building requires that local populations have a sense of belonging and that their well-being are inextricably linked to that of the country as a whole. This means their coming to terms with and understanding that being loyal to the government holds greater rewards than violent engagement.

Leveraging shared commercial interests through trade and investment can play a positive role in fostering co-operation on security matters. Thus, there should also be a conscious effort to intensify commercial exchange and trade relations among African states as a viable means of deepening inter-dependence among neighbours.

Effective diplomacy is therefore essential in any effort geared towards preventing the escalation of regional crises. States should co-operate on border security matters in order to prevent the escalation of conflict. This entails learning from identified instances, promoting clear lines of communication, sharing intelligence and establishing border co-operation regimes for countering violent groups as well as preserving friendly relations between and among states.

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The Use and Abuse of Militias

Making Sense of Militia-induced Conflict in Post-colonial Africa
and the Impotence of Regional Organisations

Chakwa Joshua

INTRODUCTION

The focus of this chapter is on post-colonial Africa's experience with militia-backed movements. It discusses the various theories behind the emergence and actual use of militias, as most such Western theories tend to blame governments for fuelling conflict. Using contemporary examples, the chapter then delves into what really promotes such militias on the continent. This is done in order to demystify and deconstruct some of the mentalities raised by state-centered theories. Since armed conflict has become a major preoccupation of the African Union (AU), there is a section on what the AU has done so far together with impediments to its effort. Findings tend to point to the weaknesses of the organisation allowing for the sprouting of militias. Further, unwillingness to effectively integrate militias at the end of a conflict allows for the resurgence of civil war.

THEORISING THE USE OF MILITIAS

State-centric perspectives see militias as state-centered projects or paramilitary units of state armed forces.¹ The central argument of this approach is that militias are people-driven. Locals can organise themselves for their defense with or without the assistance of government in times of national crisis, in which situations government fails to guarantee the security of its citizens. If the government becomes involved, conscription into the militia may take the form of compulsion in light of the normal government's monopoly over violence. Use of the Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs) during Zimbabwe's War of Liberation, for example, demonstrated this. The militia sometimes patrolled and fought side by side with the regular army, although in an unofficial capacity. Therefore politicians could argue that SFAs were indeed the Rhodesian army, but that was hardly the case.

The second approach, as indicated by Tar², is the society-centered perspective, which sees civil militias as non-state projects composed of actors and interests that are neither at war with the state nor in alliance with it. The state itself can use militias for public security purposes. This theory is mainly applicable in urban areas and it is associated with political parties and/or power brokers.

Last, is the hybrid perspective, which sees civil militias as complex phenomena that transcend simplistic formal/informal and state/non state dichotomies.³ Militias therefore arise because the government cannot guarantee the security of its citizens. The theory is hybrid because militias can develop either to assist government efforts or as predators bent on scavenging whatever may be left of a decomposing state. As will be demonstrated in the study, the state may embark on a deliberate ploy or effort to arm its citizens.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE GROWTH OF MILITIAS IN AFRICA

At times cultural factors in which leaders centralised power has continued in post-colonial Africa and is the source of militia-led conflicts.⁴ This conclusion, by Kubai, is arrived at without an examination of the role of the invisible hands that finance the rebels for their own reasons. The invisible is what the AU should deal with first, instead of concentrating on countering the rebel, who is merely an agent in the hands of political and economic giants. The centralisation of power does not appear to be a problem on its own, unless there are sponsors willing to start armed conflict for ulterior motives.

Religious factors also play into the growth of militias. To start with, traditional religion has been used to rally militias behind the goal of toppling incumbent governments. It was used in the nineteenth century as Africans resisted the intrusion of colonisers. Jihads or Holy Wars also proved a rallying called for resistance and rebellion against oppressive and corrupt local rulers. Attempts to spread Islam cannot be underrated in a discussion of militia-backed rebellion. In Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army emerged out of its leaders' knowledge of both Christianity and Acholi traditional beliefs.⁵ Thakur identifies three factors leading to the emergence of various militias in the case of Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). These are: personal enrichment; the power and security vacuum that generates the need to provide security for the people; and the current post-transition political climate that makes it impossible for militant groups to emerge and thrive in that part of the country.⁶

Militias emerge as a deliberate military strategy by a government under siege, as demonstrated by the creation of various militias during Zimbabwe's

war of liberation. The decision to use African militias against guerrillas was arrived at by the Rhodesian military, because it had many advantages. To start with, various forms of punishment meted out to rural civilians had failed to tilt the war in favour of the minority regime. Other factors, included: successful application of the concept in Malaya and Kenya; the need to create support for internal settlement; to command protected villages to meet troop shortages; to transfer the burden of the war to Africans; and to destroy the support base of guerrillas. Above all, the moderate leader Muzorewa, to whom most of the militias eventually reported, believed that he could work his way to the top without using guerrillas, whom he had failed to contain.

Militias may be used because they are more familiar with the territory in which they are to fight than are government soldiers. Governments resort to the use of militias because of a number of reasons, as propounded by Jones. They use militias because state security forces are weak and because policy makers believe that militias can help to pacify key areas of a country, especially rural areas where state control is minimal or non-existent. According to this line of thinking, a militia is an armed sub-state group that performs security and governance functions within a state. These functions include basic self-defense of a village, intelligence collection, reconnaissance and surveillance, and offensive military operations.⁷

A militia is so called because it does not officially fall under the command and control of the state's military police, intelligence agencies and other central government institutions. This is despite the force receiving money, weapons and other equipment from the government. That being the case, both the military and the state can disown the militia, if the need arises. To both organisations, therefore, this is the strategic logic for using militias. For example, during Zimbabwe's war of liberation, government officials, Chief Khaisa Ndiweni and Chief Chirau, had the audacity to condemn the role that private armies were playing, despite the fact that they also owned private armies.⁸ Two incidences involving clashes between Rhodesian Security Forces and Sithole's SFAs demonstrate this quite clearly. The first involved the massacre of about ninety of Sithole's auxiliaries by security forces at Spurwing Farm near Chivhu in 1979. Then in May 1979, 183 auxiliaries were killed by Rhodesian forces in Gokwe.⁹

While prepared to use them, government could also take stern measures against these militias. For example, the Barotse were opposed to Kaunda's coming to power and were assisted by the Portuguese security police (PIDE) and South Africa's Bureau for State Security (BOSS) to form a dissident group, which was supposed to oppose Kaunda militarily.¹⁰ The whole group was eventually sold out by the same South African military that had created them: they were all killed within minutes by the Fifth Zambian Rifles.

No-one claimed ownership of them. They were simply killed to compel Kaunda into a truce with Vorster. Since they were not formerly constituted, these guerrillas, like any other militia, lost their paternity when it suited their foster parents.

In Rhodesia, the government had become weakened, as a result of the prolonged war and economic sanctions. Government control was shrinking, particularly in the rural areas where the war was intense. SFA militias were attractive due to incompetent local policing and inept counter-insurgency practices. In the rural areas, militias could be useful in several ways. To start with, they were acquired by security forces in the belief that they could be effective in collecting intelligence on guerrilla insurgents, because of their permanent presence in a village, where they could collect information about the structure, organisation and support base of insurgents. Second, they were useful in eliciting information about guerrilla sympathisers in the village. Third, they were needed for the purpose of tracking down guerrillas. In Indonesia, the government relied on some 6 000 militia in Sumatra to track down guerrillas in the jungle in the 1950s. As one insurgent leader acknowledged, 'being local lads, they knew every creek and path, just as our people did, and could guide Javanese forces'.¹¹

Religion or cultural beliefs are also behind the escalation of militia-led conflict in Africa. Much as religion was used to resist the imposition of colonial rule in the nineteenth century, it is also behind the sprouting of militias today. Jihads, or holy wars, provided a rallying call for resistance and rebellion against tyrants, as well as European intruders. Militias in Somalia, for example, are also an Islamist-nationalist force. In the capital, Mogadishu, following the demise of Siad Barre in 1991, sharia courts became authoritative centres themselves. In the process, they recruited their own militias to carry out their frequently harsh punishments on transgressors. Ultimately, in mid-2004, 11 courts merged to form the Islamic Courts Union, led by Sheik Ahmed.¹² Therefore the move by the African Union (AU) in sending Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers to Somalia (AMISOM) in January 2009 (under the auspices of the African Union Mission) is only peripheral in as far as bringing lasting peace to the region is concerned. The conflict indicates religious polarity, which is an issue the AU should somehow find a way of addressing, without necessarily relying entirely on the use of force. The presence of AMISOM further expanded the conflict by bringing it to the Ugandan doorstep when, on 11 July 2010, Al Shabaab militias killed 74 people, who had gathered to watch a Soccer World Cup match at a local restaurant.¹³ The act automatically put the Ugandan government on a collision course with the militias.

International terrorism is on the increase in Africa, especially in the Horn of Africa, where militias and warlords are plentiful. According to

Cilliers, Africa recorded 6 177 casualties from 296 cases of international terrorism during the period 1990 to 2002, which figure is second to Asia's in terms of continental casualties.¹⁴ Al Shabaab militias, who are challenging the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu, are today openly cohabiting with Al Qaeda terrorists.¹⁵ The militarisation and radicalisation follows the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia, as well as the absence of a central government, which leaves the countryside open to predators. The absence of a government has provided Al Shabaab militias with a source of revenue from the port city of Kismayo. Today, Al Shabaab is linked with Al Qaeda, which it has incorporated into its military leadership. This has tended to increase suicide bombings in the Horn of Africa. The militia is also recruiting outsiders, who are ostensibly bent on fighting the West.

Instead of managing or containing conflict, the AU appears to be failing. The said unrest in the Horn of Africa is not subsiding and thus far it would appear that there is no way of halting it. Through examining early warning systems, it would have been possible to detect the simmering conflict following the removal of Siad Barre. Instead, the AU has been preoccupied with issues of sovereignty, which then delayed intervention and ultimately allowed warfare and terrorism to spread like a bush-fire which and eventually engulf the whole region. The problems in Somalia following the demise of Siad Barre showed that there was no sovereignty worth respecting. Giving respect to the courts has plunged the whole region in to turmoil. Worse, the presence of Al Qaeda places Africa in a conflict that it may not be able to contain, judging by its lack of resources.

Dangerous neighbours also breed militias. Sudan's neighbours are breeding grounds for both insurgencies and militias.¹⁶ In the case of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which is fighting the Ugandan government, its militants have spread throughout the DRC, the Central African Republic and Sudan's Dafur region.¹⁷ The LRA has also served regional leaders in the Horn of Africa. From 1994, Sudan began to use it against the SPLA, which was being supported by the Ugandan government. Put another way, both the Ugandan and Sudanese governments have been using militias for their own ends. The issue of militias demands honest co-operation among neighbours so as to eradicate the problem permanently. In the Great Lakes Region, ethnic differences have compromised that kind of unity. The difficulties of governing the DRC have partly enabled its neighbours to invade her, using the argument of 'pursuing terrorists'.

There is no historical evidence to suggest that African states are naturally violent. Most violence witnessed in Africa is closely associated with foreign intrusion dating back to the days of the slave trade, colonialism, the liberation wars, the Cold War and globalisation. The Angolan Civil War, which lasted for more than 25 years, was fuelled by a foreign hand,

although, of course, internal causes also played their part. Apartheid South Africa code-named its assistance to National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) Operation Silver until 1983 and then renamed it Operation Disa. Reagan's victory over Carter, in November 1981, brought the Republicans back to power and this set the stage for a modest military support programme for UNITA which was administered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).¹⁸ It continued until mid-1991 and was followed by an electoral support programme to help UNITA convert itself into a political party to participate in national elections.¹⁹ All attempts by the AU had no effect, until the foreign backers of both the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and UNITA (namely the USSR and the US) had begun to consider the need for peace seriously; because as long as they could benefit from diamonds and oil by promoting war, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was a powerless power broker.

Governments use militias because they are useful as a counter-insurgent force, as the use of the Janjaweed in Sudan showed. In the case of Sudan, the government denied it paternity to militias, but this was clearly an open secret. During the civil war in Sudan, government helicopter gunships dropped weapons, artillery and provisions in remote areas for Janjaweed militias.²⁰ That act clearly shows the state's failure to maintain its monopoly over violence and the outsourcing of manpower. Carey, *et al.* have gone on to give a lot more reasons why governments outsource to militias. For instance: it may reduce government liability for violent repressive actions; sometimes the government does not want to lose support from NGOs for transgressing human rights; pro-government militias are better able to gather the intelligence critical to counter-insurgent operations; and outsourcing provides flexibility and readily available additional forces at low cost. Quoting Green, Carey *et al.* conclude that: 'An army can defeat an army. An army can't defeat people'.²¹ Militias are recruited on the basis of their knowledge of the terrain and because they live among people; therefore, they should be able to defeat people. This gives them the extra advantage of being able to collect private information. They also have knowledge of people's culture, including the do's and don'ts. All this is likely to give them legitimacy, when compared to government forces, which are normally from places far away and which forces may not be trained to play a civilian role. The advantages to the government usually outweigh the disadvantages, such as a lack of discipline among militias, poor training, tarnishing of government's image and the possibility of betrayal.

The extensive use of militias across the continent brings into question the loopholes that go hand-in-hand with African independence. Many African governments, especially in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, are still unable to effectively control the territory under their

jurisdiction. As a result, the Lord's Resistance Army has been able to spread into eastern DRC, the Central African Republic, Southern Sudan and Sudan's Dafur region.²² In the Great Lakes region, the major challenge is that governments are weak and often absent in the periphery and forests, which are then effectively occupied and technically ruled by militias. Therefore Africa has a long way to go towards full independence, which must entail effective border control and the ability to keep out foreign militias.

Last, the growing presence of militias in Africa is also explained by the continent's historical legacy. For example, Sierra Leone and Liberia are products of slave emancipation. The dumping of former slaves into these lands was done without due respect to the indigenous populations. This new crop of freed and anglicised Africans became dominant over those already there, which culminated in inter-generational tension that has plagued West Africa. The solution lies in a government which is resourceful enough to bridge the economic and political gap, for example between Americo-Liberians and indigenous Africans. Similarly, the 25-year civil war in Angola is also partly explained by the differences between *assimilados* around Luanda and the rest of the population, with particular reference to the Ovimbundu. In the case of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), concerted effort to deal with militias and rebel groups is compromised by the bond between member states and their former colonial masters. The four economic groups (namely English, Portuguese, French and Spanish) have continued to maintain strong economic and political bonds with their former colonial masters.²³ As a result, there is usually an absence of joint effort when it comes to intervention against rebels and militias. These manifest, therefore, because there is just no restraint. Colonialism itself is the root cause of militia problems and warlordism plaguing the Horn of Africa presently. After European powers had carved up the continent, Somali people found themselves living in eastern Ethiopia, eastern Kenya and Somalia – the last amalgamation of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland.²⁴ These peoples formed a block, which has led to the emergence and continuation of regional conflict.

OAU/AU AND THE PROBLEM OF MILITIAS

The OAU (now the AU) has indeed been plagued with the problem of rebel militias since the founding of the OAU in 1963. The organisation has battled with these problems with very little success, as militia-driven conflict pits AU members against each other, making resolution of conflict a highly complicated job. Any investigation of the activities of the AU should be understood in terms of the founding principles of the OAU. It was founded

on the principle of respect for sovereignty of member states, prohibits interference in the internal affairs of sister states, and is generally opposed to secessionist movements.

Concerning the conflict in the Great Lakes Region, Zimbabwe's president Robert Mugabe, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Anan, as well as the presidents of South Africa, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, Namibia and Malawi, were witnesses to the 2004 declaration by the International Conference on Peace, Security and Democracy in the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which was signed in Dar es Salaam. The signatories were Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, the Republic of the Congo and Sudan.²⁵ Though in practice this did not end the conflict in the region, it was indicative of the quest to eradicate militia and rebel-driven conflict in Africa. There was an undertaking to neutralise, disarm, arrest and transfer to relevant tribunals, perpetrators of genocide. The AU facilitated transfer to The Hague, for trial, of Jean Pierre Bemba. It had earlier attempted a short-lived power-sharing deal in Rwanda, which collapsed, leading to the 1994 genocide.²⁶ Despite all such attempts, militia-driven conflict continues to plague Africa. The Horn of Africa has itself become a security issue to both the UN and the AU.

The role of the AU in dealing with conflict, such as indicated above, is complicated by persistent intervention by North America and Western Europe, which supply both the intellect and hardware for conflict. The AU is also incapacitated in its efforts to confront these rich regions, partly because of the neo-colonial relationship with them, which makes the periphery dependent. It was they who were responsible for the creation, sustenance and demise of Mobutu, and thus for warlordism and militia conflict, which has plagued the region to date. Through Cold War politics, the US, in particular, supported Savimbi to wage a destructive civil war in Angola. The French were responsible for the training and arming of interahamwe militias in Rwanda and they are, therefore, accomplices to the genocide of 1994.²⁷ Militias are likely to persist in Africa unless there is a collective declaration by African leaders to challenge the activities of developed countries that sponsor civil wars, while at the same time looting African resources, both on and under its soil.

The achievements of the AU in dealing with militias and rebels are generally negligible. Fourteen years after the creation of ECOWAS, and twelve years after it became operational, the African Development Bank concluded (in 1989) that ECOWAS' achievements were relatively insubstantial, as there had been neither economic advantage nor security benefits for the growing populations of the community.²⁸ Some members opposed intervening in the internal affairs of member states, on the basis that doing so would be contrary to the AU's Charter, which organisation all states belong

to. Further, the AU is not consistent in dealing with militias. A number of them have fought their way to be ultimately recognised as authentic governments. This applies to Uganda's National Resistance Movement, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. Their leaders are today recognised for toppling dictators and putting in place democratic governments. The West applauds them as democrats, who have, surprisingly, usurped power by shedding blood. These developments are a sham on democracy and obviously encourage disgruntled politicians who gather dissatisfied people into a rebel militia movement to wage violence against an incumbent government and then be blessed with recognition by both the AU and the West. The fact that these militias and their leadership realise that there is merit in the use of violence, as they will ultimately be recognised, means that independent Africa will continue to be plagued by conflict. The whole concept of peaceful resolution of continental security problems therefore becomes more complicated if it is so easy to use violence to win continental acceptance.

Of late, the continental block has remained mum on militia-backed movements that have taken power through the use of force in countries such as Libya and the Ivory Coast. Quattara's movement was made up of militias openly armed and financed by the French, yet they became a government. The South African president declared that he did not recognise Quattara because he had not won an election. When he went to Paris, he said the exact opposite.²⁹ Similarly, militias who dethroned Gaddafi were sponsored from without, but they were presented as beacons of democracy in the Western media. The AU had a great share in that state of affairs, because, through the principle of non-interference maintained by its predecessor (the OAU), it ignored internally and externally-sponsored terror.³⁰ Neighbours did not do anything about colleagues persecuting their own people. As a result of the complex, but interrelated, reasons identified above, Africa is largely unable to deal with militia-backed movements – a situation which has exacerbated armed conflict.

THE FATE OF MILITIAS AT THE END OF A CONFLICT

The end of liberation wars did bring complete reconciliation, especially among fighting forces that had opposed each other in Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. In Mozambique, however, the civil war that came after the liberation war, was long, costly and protracted. Renamo started as a surrogate force for Smith's minority regime and later transformed itself into an authentic movement with real grievances. Thus, its forces were demobilised

or joined the national army following the signing of the Rome Accords, which ended the 17-year civil war. Despite having fought against a liberation movement, Renamo's forces have been able to portray themselves as real fighters, who need the same treatment as those who operated as government soldiers. Still, there is a lack of satisfaction with the treatment they received from the government. In 2012, Renamo was reported to have gone back to the bush, a move which was a direct threat to Mozambique's neighbours. To date, the regional organisation, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), is yet to take action. Nothing much can be expected from the AU, as long as the regional organisation sees nothing unusual that requires regional co-operation.

UNITA guerrillas in Angola were not so fortunate and today the government uses every available weapon in its arsenal to condemn them. Selective treatment of former fighting forces is an area where lessons should be drawn in order to assist post-war conflict management in many African countries currently experiencing civil war or recovering from one, as dissatisfaction may constitute a rallying point for disgruntled members to resume armed conflict, which is detrimental to the health of a nation.

Integration and reconciliation of former antagonistic forces in Mozambique was assisted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), donors and the Mozambican government. A US\$35.4 million trust fund, administered by the UNDP, was set up to help troops and guerrillas reintegrate into civilian life. Each of them was to receive a weekly grant of \$2 for over 2 years. The programme benefitted both Frelimo and the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) veterans – a total of 93 000 men.³¹ The ID cards they were given became a source of pride and self-importance, as the cards did not specify the movement the man had belonged to during the war. Further, the money obtained was used to help their families, to pay school fees and above all, somewhere to start their life.

Although former UNITA combatants went through a demobilisation process and were paid, that was not the case for their child soldiers. Age was used to determine who would be eligible for demobilisation benefits. Former fighters above the age of 18 received demobilisation, photo identification cards, a travel authorisation certificate, five months' salary based on military rank, and food assistance. They also received a transport allowance and a reinstallation kit upon return to their home communities.³² The failure to address the concerns of boys and girls is clearly a call for an increase in criminal activities.

In Zimbabwe however, the demobilisation process was generally successful. Former militias aligned to the minority regime (including District Assistants, District Security Assistants, Guard Forces and SFAS) did not threaten the government at any time after they were disbanded, following

the attainment of independence in 1980. Since then, Zimbabwe has not had the problem of armed bands or militias terrorising civilians. This is unlike in West Africa and the Great Lakes region, where demobilisation has been fraught with challenges. In fact, the continent can take notes from Zimbabwe's success story, with particular emphasis being paid to how militias exchanged guns for peace and tranquility.

CONCLUSION

Armed conflict in Africa is generally driven by the presence of militias in the battlefield. These are sponsored by governments, rebel leaders, neighbouring countries, other continental powers and countries of the developed world. When dealing with problems in the Horn of Africa as well as the Great Lakes region, the influence of religion (Islam, Christianity and traditional religion) ought to be taken seriously, as they are quite pivotal. At the same time, governments such as that of Sudan have made deliberate moves to use armed militias in their fight against opposition. Of importance, however, is the failure of the OAU/AU in dealing with simmering conflict as a result of weaknesses in its Charter, disagreement among members, the influence of former colonial powers on each member and, above all, the failure by member states to publicly condemn the role of rich countries that are worsening relations and leading to militia-backed civil wars. The OAU/AU has held a number of conferences and, in some cases, made a decision to intervene in conflict-ridden areas. It has done this mainly through its regional organisations, such as ECOWAS and SADC. The AU has also condemned other militia leaders to the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity. Its weakness lies in accepting former militias as rulers.

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Towards Making Africa's Free Future with Unity and Renaissance

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African unity remains a cornerstone for Africa's development and further renewal. The ambitious progressive programmes and agendas that African states prepared individually and jointly will not achieve much if there is no continental integration and unity of purpose in Africa. It is important that there is consensus that African unity is paramount. The other details should be worked out as African unity is being pursued vigorously.

Emperor Haile Selassie, at the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963, underscored that

Africa's people did not emerge into liberty under uniform conditions: Africans maintain different political systems; our economies are diverse; our social orders are rooted in differing cultures and traditions. Further, no clear consensus exists on the 'how' and the 'what' of this union. Is it to be, in form, federal, con-federal or unitary? Is the sovereignty of individual states to be reduced, and if so, by how much, and in what areas? On these and other questions there is no agreement, and if we wait for agreed answers [for] generations hence, matters will be little advanced, while the debate still rages ... When a solid foundation is laid, if the mason is able and his materials good, a strong house can be built.¹

This book has sought to win the African intelligentsia to get on board in the intellectual effort to achieve epistemological clarity on the shared understanding and intellectual commitment to re-visiting the arduous historical journey Africa has gone through. The contributions in the book address various issues, albeit with a common goal to develop foresight, to generate innovative resources and to enhance constructive imagination by defining and shaping a free and united Africa. The series of conferences held since 2010 and the books that came out of them appeal to the African intelligentsia to come together in shaping a shared approach to learning how to deal

with all the problems Africa is facing today. If Africa has strong, decolonised and committed intelligentsia who share values, principles and policies, the opportunity to educate the African political class and prepare it for a positive change would be augmented. When the intelligentsia has an opportunity to engage politics, it could play a positive role. The current prevailing political landscape leaves much to be desired. If the intelligentsia proactively plays its practical role with tangible contributions to policy making and social change, it could be a force for good and a force to be reckoned with.

The African Unity for Renaissance conferences will continue to promote the knowledge results of research presented by researchers and African scholars and friends of Africa from intellectual communities across the world. African intellectuals have the opportunity to network to emerge as a community of committed intellectuals to help Africans overcome once and for all the negative inheritances from the relics of the institutions of slavery, the divide-and-rule principle, colonialism and neo-colonialism. It is long overdue for all Africans to enter into a post-colonial era that closes the negative chapter of the brutality Africans endured for several centuries.

The African political class have failed to correct the negative aspect of African history. More of the elite find it easy to relate to former colonial powers than to each other in Africa. This is evident from Africa's trade on the international market with 80 per cent of African goods destined for Western nations. In terms of initiatives, the elite are more receptive to the ideas and propositions from donor governments and their consultants, rather than their own intelligentsia.

A recent case is the agreement by the Economic Commission of Western African States (ECOWAS) to sign the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). Three states (Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana) agreed to sign. Nigeria, Gambia and Burkina Faso disagreed. The plan is still to sign in October 2014. The Economic Partnership Agreement is initiated and put forward by the European Union. African states are invited to sign, not to think and develop the plan together and to give leadership to Africans to get the opportunity to transform structurally the development deficit in Africa.

The problems with the EPA are manifold: Trade liberalisation opens the region to market goods and services from the EU to grow and impact negatively on African integration. There is no longer tariff protection for the infant industries in catching up with African economies. EU farm subsidies are intact and will not change in the foreseeable future. African markets are open, but EU markets remain more or less protected propped up by huge subsidies. The African economies are heavily dependent on primary goods, while the EU economies mainly rely on manufactured goods and services. Therefore the ground is far from level for Africa to be a competitive player

in the EU-Africa marketplace. Africa should indeed renegotiate an equitable trade agreement whereby the opening of the EU markets and the protection of its own markets are secured. The deal differentiates tariffs for Anglo-phone and Francophone ECOWAS members. At the moment some ECOWAS members have agreed to sign the EPA; it is advisable that such decisions are taken in block and the decision should come from all of Africa.

Africa should take its cue from Friedrich List who advised on these very issues a long time ago:

It is a very common device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him. . . . Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her manufacturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other nation can sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and to declare in penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth.²

Africa must heed this wise advice. The AU, ECOWAS, or any African state or regional grouping should pose to reconsider signing the EPA as it is.

The series of Scramble for Africa conferences, including the latest (re-named the African Unity for Renaissance Conference) has the ambition to bring all Africans towards a common understanding on how to push together for realising a shared African future based on unity to deal with challenges that Africa is facing, for example the challenges and dilemmas that the EPA poses.

We hope to see the African Unity for Renaissance Conference series to be the breeding ground for an enduring movement that will promote the realisation of African unity. The work has been started with reflection and the ambition to reach global African intellectuals to continue what Vusi Gumedede, in his recent inaugural professorial lecture, synthesised as ‘thought leadership, thought liberation and critical consciousness’. The shared approach by the intelligentsia is necessary to foster quality leadership endowed with public service, public ethics and public delivery. What is needed now is not to continue to talk about putting Africa first, but putting this into practice.

Five decades since the appearance of Nkrumah’s book, ‘Africa must Unite’ and his famous ‘Africa must Unite or Perish’ speech at the founding of the OAU in Addis Ababa, Africans are nowhere close to unity and the AU has even a fifty-year projection to unite Africa in 2063. What is wrong is not that we have not united yet, but that we have not learned to carry out

the cost-benefit analysis of unity and disunity. We have also not learned that being partially politically independent, without being economically independent is not sufficient – though it may be better than being controlled both economically and politically. Formal political independence on its own and without including all of Africa is not sufficient. What is needed is for all Africans to prioritise inter-African unity over any other form of unity or invitations to unite with others. This critical lesson still escapes many of the current states in Africa.

African values are incompatible with the values that were imposed by slavery, colonialism, apartheid and the unfettered greed of capitalism. African values require that Africans disinherit coloniality from the land and mind, by explicitly acknowledging and fully accepting that Africans are first and foremost 'Africans' with 'African-ness' as a projected identity of being African first, above all other identities. Just like 'Africa must unite or perish', we also have 'I am an African' liberation thought from Thabo Mbeki. The effort to unite requires the recognition of being African first. Both 'I am an African' and 'Africa must unite' must be promoted, as they reinforce each other.

There is a need to anchor Africa's united identity on our past. Civilisations have flourished in Africa long before civilisations in other regions. Political and economic freedom is not new to Africa. Africans had their own social and indigenous culture and tradition. Africans had been politically free and economically independent. These values live on today as Ubuntu, Ma'at, Ethiopianism philosophy, Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance.

These values contain living, deep philosophies that marry spirituality with materiality, by recognising that instrumental behaviour for consumerism comes from mimicking cultures alien to the rich ontological depth of original African values. Africans have defined themselves with the ontological depth of: 'I am, because you are' – not 'I think, therefore I am' or 'I consume, therefore I am'. The non-instrumental ontological value is built from associational values, such as: a child is one person's child only in the womb; one hand cannot tie a bundle; one needs a hand to wash another; and what the right hand gives, the left hand must not see. Deep association, communal and collective values that can promote the public welfare are central to the African experience.

Africans must join hands in creating a strong and independent Africa where a life of an African living in poverty and in indignity means is felt as their own poverty and indignity. To paraphrase Franz Fanon's prescient thought: the African cannot dissociate himself from the future that is proposed for his sisters and brother. This is a call to celebrate African unity and similarity to overcome disunity by appreciating any differences. Let all

Africans from ordinary people to the heads of states join the endeavour to create Africa's free future by making it.

There is a need to look back to our past in order to forge ahead: to build a fully liberated African future, we need to promote the rich African values that unify Africans and build African modernity from African philosophies, associational patterns and traditions and values. The emancipation of Africa means the resuscitation of African values and traditions. And when Africa is emancipated, it also means the whole of humanity is emancipated. There is a need to re-define and unify tradition with modernity, economics with politics and the state with the market. There is a need to change and replace donor aid with self-reliance. It is critical that Africans move from an economy based on the exploitation of natural resources to the knowledge-based economy in order to transform the current unsustainable fragmentation to sustainable integration. Promoting economic growth and evaluating success by mere growth of national income are not adequate. The African general welfare must be based on social and human-capital development. The key is to design unified approaches and socio-economic frameworks to eradicate ill-being and poverty and promote full employment; to provide and strengthen economic opportunities that would reduce all varieties of inequality to a zero level in Africa as a whole.

Deep values from ancient Africa promoted caring and sharing; economic gain should not entail social loss nor should social gain entail economic loss; a new kind of social entrepreneurship must be designed by Africa and for Africa, reflecting African values. What is critical is to find various ways and methods to bring all Africans on board and create a dynamic and innovative Africa where people continue to be self-incentivised and inspired in building a strong, free and independent Africa.

Leading African countries should be encouraged to emerge as pan-African nations with sharing and caring values that are anchored with the vision, perspective and foresight that their growth, development and independence are meaningless without the whole of Africa also achieving the same ideals, by applying African values to public policies.

There is a real need for at least a few strong African countries to emerge with pan-African national aspirations, by moving along a political and economic trajectory that enlists the support and love of all Africans and the fear of those that continue to undermine Africa. Finally, there is a real need to create a new African unity and renaissance manifesto, like the Afrocentric Manifesto or the Ethiopia Manifesto of 1829, to create a roadmap to realise fully and immediately the ideals poignantly articulated by African leaders: 'I am an African' and 'Africa Must Unite'. Postponing African unity for another 50 years to 2063 simply shows a conspicuous lack of drive to achieve the ideals that Africans have been longing for during the past half

century. Promoting the Africa Unity for Renaissance movement everywhere in Africa as a matter of urgency and necessity should be a corrective step towards instilling the drive for unity.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 Selassie, H., n.d. *Towards African Unity*. Available at <http://www.blackpast.org/1963-haile-selassie-towards-african-unity> [Accessed 27 June 2014].
- 2 List, F., 1841. *The National System of Political Economy*. Available at <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/315> [Accessed 25 June 2014].

The Third Tshwane Declaration

21st May 2013

PREAMBLE

OAU AU JUBILEE YEAR (2013–2014)

Hundreds of delegates from around the world participated in the 3rd Africa Conference: 50 Years After: Is Africa Uniting or Perishing? The learned researchers presented sixty papers and deep reflection on where Africa is today and where Africa ought to be going were clearly articulated. Building upon the First and Second Tshwane Declarations, the delegates unanimously declared Africa's future as bright and that Africa must stand up by making all Africans to remain committed to advancing the cause of African liberation, unity and renaissance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Jubilee Year must declare and work fastidiously towards ensuring that Africa's entering into a complete post-colonial condition becomes a reality.
2. The African Renaissance must be promoted across the globe heralding the important liberation imagination thus ending post-coloniality for good.
3. The Jubilee Year must be an opportunity to providing for Africans to coming together and learning to deal with major issues in the world by responding and acting collectively with a single voice reflected in and by agreed policy direction and clarity.
4. The AU must possess clear authority to represent the collective African voice and policy in dealing with and responding to global developments. Without prior AU consent, no outside authority should be permitted to intervene militarily in African affairs. Any African state that uses

- military action against any African country must first go through the AU and seek the approval of the AU.
5. All AU institutions should be upgraded from their current advisory roles to decision-making and transformative agencies to promote African agency, dignity, freedom and independence.
 6. One aspect that requires immediate attention is a practical and constructive response to defend Africans who face threats outside of Africa. The AU must possess this ability to defend the rights of all Africans in the Diasporas and across the world. An insurance scheme to protect African immigrants covering health and pensions primarily should be set up, and the AU actively must insist that Africans be covered.
 7. The AU should support the efforts by intellectuals and civil society organisations to systematize and sustain Pan-African Congresses. The Pan-African Congresses have gone through four phases: from 1900 to 1945 was the first Phase: from 1945 to 1963 was the second phase and the third phase is from 1963 to now. The 8th people centred African Congresses will take place in January 2014. The principle of African unity focuses first and foremost on all citizens, irrespective of their abilities or vocations.
 8. The AU must make every effort to create the conditions for sustainable education so that the people of Africa know and own the AU as their very own organisation. This is a process that must continue until the final aims are reached, whilst being fully funded by African citizens.
 9. The African Diaspora, both historic and current, must be attracted by creating a Returning Talent Fund and Resources (RTFR) so that all the knowledge that has been lost can be regained. Through such an action the brain drain can therefore be reversed by creating brain gain. The goodwill and sincere efforts by the global friends of Africa which numbers tens of millions should be further incorporated into contributing towards African Unity and Renaissance.
 10. There is a need to create a Pan-African Technology Institute (PATI) that will encourage the production of centres of excellence in key areas of African development, finally establishing universities with global brand distinctions. This should be part and parcel of the Pan-African University that the AU is supporting, which ought to be initiated in the Jubilee Year. In this regard the AU can promote research teams that work toward fostering inter-African research networks across all academic fields and universities to ensure active and productive closer collaboration. The AU must create a sustainable African Research and Training Area that combines research, science seminars and policy clusters.
 11. A Pan-African science, technology, engineering, mathematics prize with a global distinction similar to the Nobel Fund should be established

which must encourage inter-African collaborative networking where the prize is not given to an individual but a group of cross-country researchers or engineers that have collaborated with the utmost merit. The Diaspora learned communities are expected to be active collaborators and partners.

12. The AU must endeavour to ensure the visibility of the historical achievements of Africans in order to inspire generations of Africans to replicate the achievements of their ancestors. African indigenous knowledge systems must be the foundation for building African modernity and not copying that undermines Africa's achievements.
13. The 'Africa for Africans' Movement, that began after the 1776 American War of Independence and was inspired by Ethiopianism the guiding principle of which is the celebration of African similarities by appreciating whatever differences Africans have, can still contribute towards African Unity and Renaissance in the 21st century. Africa must build social and trust capital alongside stronger human capital in order to effectively manage physical, financial and natural capital. Negative branding which includes corruption and massive resource flight from Africa needs to be urgently addressed.
14. The Pan-African education curriculum on all key subjects must be re-designed and be consistent with the promotion of African Unity and Renaissance. Priority must be given to producing a series of textbooks, printed and electronic resources stemming from primary education to tertiary level. In this case African publishing houses like Real African Publishers that convey the richness of African contribution to world civilization must be produced in various formats and forms of expression. The AU should raise resources like UNESCO did to produce the series on African history on all areas of learning and training by promoting African unity and renaissance.
15. The African development agenda must be redesigned so that the African economy is transformed structurally from its current agricultural, mineral commodity based foundation, to an integrated inter-African innovative industrial manufacturing modern sustainable economy. The issue of land-grab is worrying and needs to be halted immediately. Inter-African agricultural development as a foundation for industrial development must be promoted.
16. Integration efforts consist of the four freedoms: labour, goods, services and capital. The AU must get its member states to promote the free movement of Africans and the Diaspora. In the mean time and immediately models of issuing visas to all Africans at the point of entry should be adopted by the AU. Furthermore, infrastructural development linking

- air, land and sea transports, and communication must be systematically organised and implemented. NEPAD must evolve as the planning agency to guide the process of systematic structural transformation with full authority.
17. Negotiations with multilateral agencies and major trading blocs should be conducted on an all-African collective, rather than on a national or regional basis.
 18. There should be global Pan-African networks for broadcasting Pan-African developments including culture, as has been established by other states and international organisations. This broadcasting network should endeavour to quickly achieve global brand recognition.
 19. The key challenge of youth unemployment needs to be addressed at the AU level where job creation can be integrated with learning, training, innovation and entrepreneurship. The AU should establish an entrepreneurship and innovation fund for young persons, as well as a research centre that identifies and highlights the contemporary sustainable solutions to employment and training challenges.
 20. Recalling the fact that fifty years ago the OAU achieved its self-declared aim of de-colonization, we take over the banner of liberation and continue in our path toward realising fully and tirelessly to see Africa rightfully emerge as its own leader in the 21st century. The AU must promote the African identity above all identities as the best way of expressing the rights and freedoms of the people of Africa with full dignity, confidence, self-reliance and liberation.

The Third Tshwane Declaration from South Africa should be communicated primarily to the AU, all Africans and the many friends of Africa in the world.

Drafted by a team led by Prof. Mammo Muchie and approved unanimously by all the academics and participants from across the world that attended the Third Scramble for Africa Conference held in Pretoria during 20-21 May 2013.

